

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HISTORY

OF

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

111819

BY

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Translated from the German

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

AMONG the many obligations which contemporary Christendom owes to the German Theology of the Nineteenth Century, not the least of them is due to its earnest revival and methodical cultivation of Christian Ethics as an essential department of theological science. Christianity, as primarily and predominantly a moral religion, has never lost sight of its cardinal bearing on human life, but certain special circumstances connected with the Christian movement itself have contributed to impress on the best theology of our time a more distinctively ethical character and tendency. The ecclesiastical Dogmatics of the Protestant Churches, which so well served their day in maintaining the essential truth of the primitive Christianity, have not kept pace with the general movement of thought, nor even advanced in harmony with the progress of the intellectual and moral revolution from which they sprang. Dogmatic Theology has thus largely fallen into disrepute as an arrested development or a decaying survival; and it has but rarely struck new roots into the vital soil of the latest scientific culture. The rise and progress of an independent Biblical Criticism, and the more scientific methods of reaching the primitive forces and vitality of the early Church, have in consequence determined a new return to the evangelical fountains of life, and have largely superseded and antiquated the elaborate Symbolics of the different Churches. At the same time, the differentiation of Biblical Theology from the proper dogmatic system, and its fruitful

cultivation on the basis of the new Exegesis, have forcibly shown the one-sidedness and comparative vacuity of the old dogmatic position. With the larger and fuller knowledge of the whole historical development of the Church and a comparative study of the non-Christian religions, there has also come more clearly into light the relativity and finite value of the mere intellectual forms which have been generated or occasioned by the logical process of reflection upon the products of the past. The exigencies of the practical Christian service, the humanizing of the government and orders of the Church, and the unionistic strivings, have also put the whole Christian system into closer relations with the living habits and modes of thought. And all this has brought the fact more clearly into view from various sides of Theology and practice, that the essential and paramount interest of Christianity is the Christian life itself, and that the scientific comprehension and elucidation of it is the chief function of modern theology.

Alongside of the theological movement in its own sphere, the whole current of philosophical and scientific thought has also been leading to a similar conclusion. The speculative ardour and originality which have arisen from a philosophical apprehension of the fundamental freedom and vitality of Protestant thought, have spent their force in daring and magnificent attempts to work out a monistic theory of the universe and a new ideal of life from the standpoint of the free rational self-consciousness. But their results have been unsatisfying and even disappointing in the extreme; and as one system superseded the other, it only paved the way for a more eager and resolute return to the concrete reality of the natural and moral worlds. In consequence, the speculative systems have been all but superseded by the practical work of empirical science and more direct investigation of the cosmic evolution and unfolding of existing things. Yet whatever changes have been thus superinduced upon the

intellectual standpoint, the moral life has thereby only become more clearly recognised as the consummation and crown of the whole natural and historical movement, and its value has risen rather than fallen in the eyes of earnest thinkers with the decadence of the speculative method. Whatever may be the estimation put by the different surviving schools of thought upon the dogmatic tradition and its forms, there is hardly any dispute as to the real value of the Christian life as the chief factor of modern civilisation, as the most potent embodiment of organised philanthropy, and as the highest practical consciousness of the time. Whatever else may be considered antiquated or superseded, the fact of the Christian life is always with us as our chief spiritual inheritance; and it demands as much as any other fact, and even more than any other fact, its scientific explanation and valuation.

Furthermore, in the great conflict that is being waged, at least on the surface of the social movement, between the practical Christianity of our time and the free spirit of modern reflection, it has now come to be clearly seen that the issue will be determined, in accordance with the methods and measures of the time, by direct regard to the practical realities and possibilities of the actual Christian life. It is towards this point that the Apologetic Science of our time is rapidly converging, and its triumph can only be won by scientific vindication of the supreme and indestructible virtue of the redemptive power in the life of the renewed personality. Here, too, the dogmatic effort, both in the individual theologian and in the Councils of the Church, must find its central interest; and all its postulates and presuppositions, rational or historical, will stand or fall by their verification in the realising conditions of the Christian life. If there be any validity in Mr. Herbert Spencer's designation of the "theological thaw," it is manifest whither the Queen of the Sciences must turn to renew her ancient warmth and vitality. There

is, in fact, no essential interruption as yet of the continuity of the Christian life, nor even any vital cessation at the heart of the theological movement. Nor, in consequence, is there any reason for despair of a genuine system of Christian doctrine that will be at once faithful to the supernaturalistic belief of the past and in harmony with the natural order and the moral freedom of the present. But it will only be by scientific elaboration of the living principle of the Christian faith on all its sides that Systematic Theology will be able to vindicate its claim to the supreme place in the hierarchy of the Sciences; and its progress in the future will mainly depend upon the success and certainty of its ethical conquest of the various elements and spheres of life. All this goes further to show the urgent need of profound and thorough investigation of the Christian life itself, or in a word, the cardinal importance of Christian Ethics, which is the theological science of that life.[1]

Moreover, the present conditions and tendencies of the material forces of human society, desiderate more than ever the highest ethical illumination and guidance. The turbulent and revolutionary elements of the social life are continually reproduced in their own natural forms, and are becoming increasingly intensified by their own spontaneous multiplication and aggregation. In consequence, the struggle for existence, with all its natural accompaniments of individual selfishness and social conflict, has taken a more acute form

[1] The formal relation of Ethics to Dogmatics need not be dealt with here. The view almost universally adopted now is that Dogmatics and Ethics are the two constituent and complementary departments embraced in Systematic Theology. Dr. Luthardt practically adopts this view (in his *Compendium der Dogmatik*, § 4); and, as will be seen, very definitely bases Ethics on Dogmatics. Summaries of the discussions of this question will be found in the Theological Encyclopædias of Hagenbach, Pelt, Rabiger, and others. Professor Flint, in his recent Article on Theology in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, says: "Christian Dogmatics and Christian Ethics are the two disciplines included in Christian Systematic Theology. They ought to be separated and cultivated apart, and yet must be recognised to be closely connected, and each the necessary complement of the other."

under the very shelter and fostering of modern liberty, so that the consciousness of clamant natural impulses and the unreflecting demands of a natural right to their satisfaction, have stirred the masses in their lowest depths, and are aggravating all the difficulties of the tasks of the modern State. The industrial necessities of the age, and the consequent agglomerations of the population, have likewise begotten new relationships, wants, and habits of life; and all the increase in wealth, and the means of comfort thereby produced, have only led to more glaring contrasts in social conditions and surroundings, and in individual enjoyment and suffering. The difficulties in the life of the multitude thus generated, have been greatly multiplied at the great centres by the facility and increase of international intercommunication. With all the progress of science and all the cultivation of art which has marked the time, the spirit of the age has become more material, more realistic, more exacting in its practical arrangements, and more indifferent to the natural sympathies. The ideal of Humanity which the present century has been vaguely striving to formulate and vainly struggling to realize, has alternately elevated the few and depressed the many by its transient enthusiasms and its practical failures. Nor have the disturbance and unrest of the spirit of the time, arising from its perpetual tension and oscillation between a concentrated individualism and a fantastic socialism, been overcome by the attempts to popularise intellectual culture or by the political concessions of indefinite liberal legislation. Still less has the advocacy of a mere secular moralism, severed from all religion and formulated as a calculating utilitarianism on an agnostic basis, been able to meet the urgent need of a higher elevating guidance of human life, or to give society even in its centres of greatest outward refinement any guarantee against the threatenings of a relapse into chaos and barbarism. Such secular and utilitarian morality at its highest and best gives no means of reaching the deepest springs of the inner life, furnishes no remedy for individual

despair, stirs to no heroism of sacrifice, secures no social stability, and yields no solace against the horror of universal death. And thus the necessity of an ethical ideal of life, at once spiritual, vitalising, and regulative, has again become more clearly apparent than ever before from the very shadows flung over the life of man by the secularism, agnosticism, and pessimism of our time. Here it is that Christian Ethics must now take its proper place and exercise its practical function in showing how to spiritualize the material conditions of human life, to mediate between their natural conflictions, and to lift them out of their inherent discordance into the higher moral unity of the kingdom of God.

For it is the very function of Christian Ethics to deal with these problems in all their variety and breadth and depth. As a science it approaches human life from the highest standpoint, and yet every human fact and relation in detail is to it of infinite significance. It may well say, even more than any other science: Nihil humani a me alienum puto. „From the lowest deep into which sin can carry humanity up to the loftiest height man can attain, it ranges over all the reality and possibility of human life. It has to exhibit the highest ideal of Humanity involved in the Divine purpose of revelation, with its theanthropic presentation in the Son of Man and its gradual realization in the universal embodiment of the Kingdom of God. In opposition to the pessimism of our time, it has to show forth the concrete and attainable *good* of the highest spiritualisation of man in the eternal union with God; in opposition to the lawless naturalism of the time, it has to lay down the supreme law of *duty* in the light of the Christian conscience and in the infinite actualization of liberty through absolute dependence on God; and in opposition to a mere corporeal secularism, it has to portray the spiritual *virtue* of the Christian life in its individual representation of the restored image of God, and in its various forms and spheres of work and communion. While starting from the Divine-human

process of regeneration and sanctification in the individual personality, Christian Ethics has very specially to deal with the social and universal life of humanity as the sphere of the terrestrial realization and embodiment of the Kingdom of God, the highest good of mankind. It is on this side that the cultivation of Christian Ethics is at present most urgently required in view of the existing social conditions and tendencies. The conception of the Church as an ethical organism working out the pure ideal of humanity in the communion of its members, rather than the mediæval notion of a theocratico-political Institution or State working in rivalry or collision with other States, or claiming jurisdiction and supremacy over them, is gradually becoming the standpoint of the Christian Moralist. And from it he may now hope to deal more justly and effectively with all the great social and political questions of the time: the relation of the Church to the State; the Christian duties of political citizenship and international relationships; government; legislation; justice; crime; punishment; communism; socialism; the domestic life and the household; the rights of property; individuality; labour; science; art; pauperism; progress; reform; in short, with all the vexed social conceptions, questions, and problems of the hour. For these constitute the essential objects and interests of a thoroughly methodized and comprehensive system of Christian Ethics, and they must now be dealt with in accordance with all the resources of theological science.[1]

[1] The formal division of the Science will no doubt be dealt with by the Author in the systematic part of his work. Some of the most important divisions will be found in the Theological Encyclopædias of Hagenbach (translated by Crooks and Hurst), Pelt (1843), and Rabiger (translated by Rev. J. Macpherson, 1885, T. & T. Clark). Professor Flint, in his article "Theology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, gives the following as a scheme of Christian Ethics:—"I. Determination of the nature, limits, and method of the science, and of its relations to other disciplines, and especially to those which are ethical and theological. II. Presuppositions of the science: these are—(1) The ethical idea of God as revealed in nature and in Christ; (2) man as a moral being in his relation to the law and revelation of God; (3) creation and providence as ethical systems; and (4) the kingdom of God in itself, in relation to creation and providence, and as the goal

Such a science is manifestly one of the utmost difficulty as well as of the greatest importance. It presupposes all the capability of natural or philosophical Ethics, and does not contradict or supersede its legitimate products, but supplements and completes them.[1] It implies the highest speculative apprehension and insight in dealing with the ultimate objects of the Christian faith, and it requires the freest movement of thought in exploring their relations to the concrete conditions of the finite consciousness. It is beset at the same time with all the difficulties that are involved in the attempt to reach a scientific interpretation of the darkest and deepest sides of human experience. Its range of interest is as extensive as the whole manifestation and development of the race. All the currents of speculation, history, and science thus meet in the department of Christian Ethics. No wonder that it has been late in taking scientific shape, and that its systematic expositions are still but tentative, one-sided, and incomplete.[2] But the reawakened sense of its value is the guarantee of its increasing progress. All the other departments of theology will continue to be fertilized by its earnest and practical spirit, and contribute to enrich it in return. The critic and exegete will have light thrown from it upon the multifarious details of Scripture, and find their unity in its end. The historian will be better enabled by it to understand the purpose and

of moral life. III. The fundamental conceptions of the science: these are (1) the Christian ethical law; (2) the Christian conscience; (3) the Christian ethical ideal; and (4) Christian virtue. IV. The reign of sin in the individual and society viewed in the light of Christianity. V. The origin and progress of the kingdom of God in the individual soul, and its manifestation in the virtues and graces of the individual character. VI. The realization of the kingdom of God in the various spheres of society—the family, the Church, the nation."

[1] See Dorner's thoughtful and comprehensive view of the relation of Christian Ethics to Philosophical Ethics, in his *System of Christian Ethics*, § 3 (1887), and contrast it with the superficial and narrow position advocated by Dr. Wardlaw in his *Christian Ethics* (5th ed. 1852).

[2] Christian Ethics was first treated as an independent theological discipline by L. Danaeus (Daneau), a theologian of the Reformed Church, in his *Ethices Christianæ*, lib. iii., published at Geneva in 1577.

causality of the movement of the past. The dogmatic theologian will have his most abstract conceptions vitalized by contact with its realities. The practical theologian will find in it the surest guidance to the right government, administration, and extension of the Church. The preacher and the pastor will have their individual insight and tact deepened, confirmed, and enlarged by its methodical unfolding of the whole contents and relations of the Christian life. A complete Christian Ethic would at once be a practical solution of all the religious problems, and an index of the real value of the Christianity of its time.

It is their recognition of these relations of modern Christianity that has mainly given the more constructive German theologians of this century their right to leadership and guidance. In particular, as regards Christian Ethics, it is to Schleiermacher that we owe the living insight and the renovating touch which have made his exhibition of the subject, fragmentary and incomplete though it be, so fruitful and significant. He has been followed by many earnest thinkers in this sphere, who have dealt more clearly and simply with the Christian ideal, and who have brought it into closer relation to the new movements and wants of our time. What we have now to do amid our own perplexities and difficulties, is to appropriate their learning and to follow out boldly the lines of their best thought. Throughout the whole range of English Christendom, the same fundamental problems of the individual life and of society which have stimulated the German scholars and thinkers, are making themselves felt, and have even become glaringly apparent; and the question of the capability of Christianity to take up and solve these problems is also now our chief task. Whatever may be the interest of the critical study of the origins of Christianity, and whatever may be the charm or constraint of its historic products, the chief value of all Christian investigation and thought just lies in their relative capability in furnishing material and resources

for this task. In other words, the interest of Christian theology is rapidly gravitating from all sides towards the problems of Christian Ethics; and our comparative neglect or superficial treatment of this side of theological science can only be undone in its effects by a more earnest and methodical cultivation of it in view of the moral exigencies and even necessities of the hour.[1]

But of no department of theology is it more true than of Christian Ethics, that it can only be surely approached and adequately understood through historical study of its development. The most superficial glimpse of Church history shows that every Christian age has had its own moral tasks, and that no one age has ever completely grasped or realized the full significance of the whole Christian idea of life. If the Christian ideal is indeed the highest and most comprehensive, it could not but require a development through variation and progress to exhibit in the successive formations of history its inner riches and possibilities. It would be vain to expect

[1] A good deal might be said regarding the comparative neglect or superficial treatment of this department of theology in English-speaking countries, and the effect thereof upon the character and movement of English Theology generally, but this will fall to be more properly dealt with in the sequel of the History. Wardlaw's *Christian Ethics* (1st ed. 1833, 5th ed. 1852) is still the best known book on the subject; but apart from the narrowness of its standpoint and the externality of its method (which make it rather a dogmatic than an ethical treatise), it is now almost entirely antiquated and superseded. The translations of the Christian Ethics of Wuttke (*Christian Ethics*, 2 vols. 1873), Harless (*System of Christian Ethics*, 1880), and especially of Martensen (*Christian Ethics*, 3 vols. 1878–1888) and Dorner (*System of Christian Ethics*, 1887), have done much to revive and stimulate interest in the subject in England. Among recent works showing a gratifying evidence of this interest, the following may be mentioned:—F. D. Maurice, *The Conscience: Lectures on Casuistry*, 1868; T. R. Birks, *Supernatural Revelation, or First Principles of Moral Theology*, 1879; Stanley Leathes, *The Foundations of Morality: Discourses on the Ten Commandments*, 1882; C. A. Row, *The Moral Teaching of the New Testament*, 1872; J. A. Hessey, *Moral Difficulties connected with the Bible*, 1872; Newman Smyth, *The Morality of the Old Testament*, 1887; Dr. H. Wace, *Christianity and Morality* (Boyle Lect. 1876), 7th ed. 1886; Dr. G. Matheson, *Landmarks of New Testament Morality*, 1888. Dr. Luthardt refers to *Ecce Homo* (*infra*, pp. 26–7) with evident appreciation of its discussion of the ethical principle of Christianity.

to find such an ideal in the self-consciousness of any one individual who is the mere recipient of its power, or even in any one branch of the Church, or in the conflicting apprehensions of its various branches at any one time. Least of all could this be found in the antagonistic p tialities of a divided and distracted age like ours. The stud of Christian Ethics is thus thrown back upon the whole historical movement as the natural enlargement of his own individuality and experience; and he must traverse it anew in the light of present strivings and tendencies in order to realize the various elements and phases, the different limitations and aberrations, and the manifold tentatives and aspirations, exhibited by the Christian life in the past and embodied in its history. It is only thus that he can hope to understand the genesis and conditions of the present order of things within the sphere of the Christian life, and something of the essential reality and possibility embraced in the contemporary Christianity.

It has been mainly with a view to further this necessary and fundamental process of historically studying this much neglected but most important subject, that the present work has been translated. Dr. Luthardt requires no introduction to the English student of theology in view of those valuable and popular works of his which have already become naturalized in our English theological literature. In particular, his popular apologetic Lectures on the Moral Truths of Christianity have already shown to English readers in a genial and attractive form his insight into the moral essence and relations of the Christian religion, and something of the thoroughness of his preparation for dealing with the historical development of Christian Ethics. His *History of Christian Ethics* is designed as an historical preparation and basis for a more complete and methodical exposition of his system, and it is in consequence severely, even drily, scientific in its method. This volume brings the History down to the Reformation, when the subject of Christian Ethics began to differentiate itself from

the other departments of theology and to attain a properly scientific interest and form. The historical movement is sketched with a firm hand and with wonderful conciseness, while the abundant details are grouped in their most suggestive bearings and set forth with due regard to their objective importance. So far as it has gone, Dr. Luthardt's History is not only the latest, but it is the best, most proportionate, and most useful that we yet possess.[1] From the natural involution of the thought in the concrete life of the time, the historical representation gives at every stage glimpses of the state of Christian morals in the Church as well as an account of the ethical reflection of its leaders and guides; and if these are seldom ideal, and often even disappointing and forbidding, they are nevertheless necessary and valuable in the special relation. In a preliminary survey of pre-Christian Pagan Ethics, Dr. Luthardt gives a clear summary of his recently-published sketch of *Ancient Ethics*, dealing especially with the Greek and

[1] The only other good History of the subject yet available in English, is that of Wuttke (*Christian Ethics*, vol. i.); but not to speak of the hard and mechanical style of the translation, it is not so complete nor so rich in its references to sources as the present work. The older German Histories of Stäudlin (1799–1823), Marheineke (1806), and De Wette (1819) are now superseded. Feuerlein (1857–1885), Neander (ed. by Erdmann, 1864), and Wendt (1864) are still recognised as authorities. The more recent works of Bestmann (1880, 1885), Gass (1881, 1886), and Ziegler (1886), have their respective merits. Bestmann deals with the subject in greatest detail, and his work is a nobly conceived and, so far as it has gone, a thoughtfully and ably executed History of the whole relations and development of Christian Morality; Gass is luminous, concise, and catholic, and has some sections of special value (such as his account of the Ethics of the Byzantine Theology, of which he is an acknowledged master); Ziegler writes from a philosophical standpoint, and with force and elegance, but with no great depth, nor even with much insight into the essence of the Christian Morality. Dr. Luthardt has written his history in full view of the results of all these historians, and the characterisation of his work here given is not an exaggerated one. The translator may, however, be allowed to say that with all his appreciation of the fidelity and accuracy of the author's particular expositions, he would desiderate a broader standpoint of criticism than the strict Lutheranism that here determines most of the historical estimates, his own theological convictions being founded on the theology of the Reformed Church. This has only made him the more anxious to give a faithful rendering of the original, and to sacrifice nothing in the text to style or expression.

Roman Schools, and with the Ethics of Buddhism; and he then proceeds through an exposition of the ethical development of ancient Israel in its three stages of the moral doctrine of the Old Testament, the particularistic nomism that followed the canonical period, and the Hellenistic Universalism, to the History of Christian Ethics proper. The distinctive character and contents of the Ethics of the New Testament are then set forth as enunciated and proclaimed in the Gospels and Epistles. In dealing with Biblical Ethics, Dr. Luthardt follows the principles and spirit of the vital and profound school of exegesis to which he belongs; and the only objection that could be taken to his treatment of the subject from his own point of view, is his extreme brevity and condensation. The historical development of Christian Ethics in the ancient and mediæval Church, is then delineated with the utmost care and conscientiousness. Not a name or fact of real importance in the historical movement has been left out of account, or passed over unnoticed. The summaries and criticisms are always clear and intelligible, and the selections and quotations from the sources are very valuable. We have here indeed "a book of good faith" which is pre-eminently fitted as an historical sketch for Students of Theology, and faithful study of it cannot but further the best interests of theological science.

The study of the historical development of Christian Ethics as a whole, is specially relevant and incumbent at the present time in view of the negative and unsettling tendencies of the critical movement and the growing need of regaining a practical standpoint that will be at once secure in itself from the destructive assaults of the new scientific conceptions, while freed from the intellectual perplexities of the old dogmatic position. And such study ought to lead not only to clearer intellectual apprehension of the ethical movement, but to a more living realization of the supreme excellence and worth of the Christian life itself. As the Law of the Old Testament was a *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*, so the Law of Liberty in its

historic realization should lead the followers of it ultimately to the essential righteousness. But here, too, there is much blindness and prejudice and misunderstanding to be overcome, and nothing has so surely overcome them as the large and severe discipline of history. The student will therefore best approach the subject through the scientific reflection of this discipline; and in doing so he may well recall the maxim which Augustine so earnestly lays down in reference to the whole system of Christian truth: "Purgandus est animus, ut perspicere illam lucem valeat et inhærere perspectæ."

W. H.

EDINBURGH, *November* 5, 1889.

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SKETCH OF PRE-CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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I.

THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT PAGANISM.[1]

CHRISTIAN ETHICS has its proper preliminary history in the Israel of the Old Testament. But manifold relations are also found existing between the ethical reflection and exposition of the ancient Church and the ancient Pagan Ethics, especially in the philosophical Schools; and the influence of these relations continued to show itself in later times, especially in the moral system of the Roman Church. A preliminary survey of the Ethics of pagan antiquity, as well as of the Ethics of ancient Israel, ought therefore to precede a special History of Christian Ethics. Having treated of the ancient Pagan Ethics from this point of view in another work as an introduction to the History of Christian Ethics,[2] under reference to it, this introductory sketch will be limited to a concise survey of pre-Christian Ethics, and to an indication of the characteristic distinction between the ancient pagan views of Ethics and the moral doctrine of Christianity.

[1] LITERATURE.—On the popular ideas of Morality: NÄGELSBACH, Homerische Theologie, 3 Aufl. v. Autenrieth, Nürnb. 1884. Nachhomerische Theologie, 1857. L. SCHMIDT, Die Ethik der alten Griechen, i. ii. 1882. On the Philosophical Systems of Ethics: The relevant parts of the Histories of Ancient Philosophy by BRANDIS, ZELLER (SCHWEGLER, ERDMANN), and others. More particularly: T. ZIEGLER, Die Ethik der Griechen, 1881. LUTHARDT, Die antike Ethik in ihrer geschichtl. Entwicklung als Einleitung in die Geschichte der christlichen Moral dargestellt, Leipz. 1887 (187 S.).

[2] LUTHARDT, Die antike Ethik, etc., *u.s.* 1887.

I. The Popular Ethical Ideas of the Greeks.

§ 1. *Historical development of the popular ideas of morality.*

The Homeric poems exhibit the basis of the prevailing moral way of thinking. They reminded mortal man, in his dependence on the higher Powers, of his limitations. This continued to be the foundation of the moral thinking of the people, even when, in the period of the gnomic literature, reflection was applied to the consideration of the requirements of the civil and political life of the people, and to the necessity of mutual restraint and the observance of regulated relations. The culmination of the Greek life which began with the Persian wars, carried the reflecting spirit of the time through the great historical experiences to a higher stage in the moral contemplation of human things, and the moral ideal was comprehended in the notion of the *καλοκἀγαθία*. At length the subjective criticism which took form from the time of the Peloponnesian war, dissolved the traditional basis of the moral habit of thinking, and it imposed on philosophy the task of substituting for the old traditional views new foundations for the moral life of the community evolved out of the proper rational thinking of the individual.

1. *The Homeric basis.*—The ancient pagan ethics is essentially naturalistic, and in this it corresponds to the naturalistic character of the pagan religions. In Homer and from his time, it is not the moral personality which constitutes the subject of morality, but the mortal finite man as dependent on the higher Powers. Accordingly, morality here consists essentially in the recognition of this dependence, as well as of the limitations which are imposed by practice and law on the individual in relation to others, through the life of man in society. The Homeric man knows no duty of love either towards the gods or to man as such. Accordingly, sin is not the violation of any such duty, but is a disregard of the limitations and orders of the common life presented in customary

observance and legal right; and it is regarded as occasioned by an obscuration of the understanding, or by some delusion having an external source, and not as caused by a personal perversion of the will to evil. In correspondence with this fundamental view of man, death appears as the final power of life. Death does not permit the attainment of a full enjoyment of existence; it throws a gloomy shadow over life, and finally relegates man to resignation.

2. The stage of reflection in the *moral gnomic literature* begins with Hesiod (*c.* 800), in his ἔργα καὶ ἡμέραι. Hesiod reflects on civil society as organized into classes, and his standpoint is that of the common citizen. He finds morality in reciprocal justice in so far as it repays like with like, while immorality is represented as consisting of the arrogance which violates legal right. Such thoughts as these recur, although to some extent in a higher mode of apprehension, in the subsequent elegiac writers, in the Aphorisms which are collected under the name of Theognis, and in the (Delphic) Sayings of the so-called seven Wise Men.

3. The popular moral reflection reached its highest point in consequence of the experiences of the Persian wars. These wars familiarized the popular mind with the thought of a divine providence (πρόνοια), which was essentially viewed as punitive justice (δράσαντι παθεῖν), and which at the same time was opposed to arrogance, or even to excess of happiness, which was regarded as the envy of the deity. Hence morality here also pre-eminently consists in recognition of man's natural and civil limitations. The σωφροσύνη of the ἀνὴρ μέτριος is not internal sanctification, but only the limitation of nature to the measure prescribed by the life of the community and by reason; and in this the δικαιοσύνη of the *suum cuique tribuere* also exhibits itself in relation to an enemy. Under the point of view of this δικαιοσύνη, are also placed gratitude and mercifulness towards the helpless; and thus we have always a morality of the deed and not of the doer, while along with these bright sides deep shadows likewise appear. The standard of action is given in the political community by which the value of the individual in the social relations of life, as well as his conduct, is measured. The expression of the corresponding morality is the καλοκἀγαθία;

it is the practice of the δικαιοσύνη as determined by the recognition of the measure and limit of the σωφροσύνη in the manifold relations of the common political life. This is not a morality which presents an Ideal standing above the individual as the higher truth so that it may be fashioned into reality; but it is the legality of life as given with the natural living itself and more precisely determined by the political order. And hence it does not demand an internal conquest of the proper self of the individual, and a renovation of the ultimate ground of the inward man, but only a limitation of his natural externalizations on the given basis of natural existence, in order that the collective life may thus shape itself harmoniously and beautifully. The opposite of this is formed by ὕβρις. Its opposition to the regulating powers of the life of the community is folly and want of understanding, from which indeed all men suffer,—a condition which is recognised as a fact of experience. The basis of this condition is partly determined by nature, and is found partly in infatuation. The evil deed, however, is imputed to the doer in the conscience and in his consciousness of guilt. This finds a comprehensive recognition in the poets and historians, and it is actually realized in punishment.

4. The dissolution of this moral reflection begins with the period of subjective criticism. Prior to this period, the agreement of the traditional practice of the people with reason was assumed as self-evident; but from the time of the Peloponnesian war and the age of the Sophists, subjective criticism became prevalent, and it applied the standard of individual thinking to ethical questions. The traditional views were thus decomposed, as may be seen in Euripides, the favourite poet of the Athenian youth. It thus became necessary to attempt to oppose the right reason to this false reason, in order thus to obtain a new basis for morality. This was the task which philosophy set to itself from the time of Socrates.

II. The Philosophical Systems of Ethics.

§ 2. *Socrates and Plato.*

Socrates sought to establish rationally the supremacy of morality by means of induction and definition. Thereby he initiated that Intellectualism which continued to rule the subsequent Moral Philosophy. Virtue is right insight, and therefore knowledge; sin is ignorance; the norm of the moral is the law of the State. What is moral is therefore affected with the limitation of relativity, and is kept within the bounds of the usual national way of thinking. Plato continued to make the intellect the starting-point of Ethics, while at the same time he expanded the thoughts of Socrates into a systematic whole. He raised the intellectual conception into the objective essence of the Idea; and in the Idea he beheld the true reality, which comes only more or less to manifestation in the empirical material reality. The highest Idea of the Good is actualized in the four psychologically grounded principal Virtues, and it has to realize itself in the State. Although the State is construed from the standpoint of the Idea, yet it cannot be carried out correspondingly in reality. In this domination of the thought of the State, and in various limitations of the national ethical views, we have a revelation of the Hellenic mind, while in the irreconcilable dualism of Idea and reality, spirituality and sense, we have also evidence of the impotence of the ancient Pagan spirit generally. The element of truth presented by the ancient spirit in Plato only consists in his being the prophecy of a morally apprehended antithesis, and of the higher overcoming of it by Divine revelation and influence.

1. Socrates consciously abandoned the preceding philosophy of nature, and made the actual life presented in human society the object of philosophy. In doing so he sought to justify and purify the traditional contents of the moral reflection by

conceptional thinking in opposition to the dissolving theory of the Sophists, and to found it upon reason itself. In the conceptions which he obtained by induction and definition, he believed that he became possessed of things themselves, so that he defined virtue to be a teachable mode of knowing, with which was also given the ability to perform it. But as the good is that which corresponds to an end, it is likewise in his view the useful; and this prevents him from coming to the pure conception of the good. Although it was his desire to make his philosophy serviceable to the common political life, yet his emphasizing of the intellectual factor made any influence of it upon the collective life of the people impossible.

2. This supremacy of the intellect is likewise found in Plato. Virtue is insight, and sin accordingly is want of knowledge; only it has to be observed that in Plato's view knowing is not mere conception, but has a real content in the ideas or spiritual essences, of which the highest is that of the good.—Hence the highest good is flight out of this world of sense and corporeity into that other world of spirituality or deity. In this sense it is the greatest possible resemblance to God (*ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*) by means of virtue and philosophical insight. Spirituality and morality, desensualization and moralization, are therefore apprehended as identical; and hence the specific conception of the moral in its natural freedom is not attained.—Morality as thus apprehended separates into four virtues which are psychologically established in accordance with the tripartite division of the life of the human soul (*λογιστικόν, θυμός, ἐπιθυμητικόν*). These four virtues are *σοφία, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη*, the last of which is the harmony of the whole, arising from the limitation of the several parts of the soul to the task pertaining to each. With this Ethic are connected many of the limitations of the Hellenic way of thinking in the questions relating to pæderasty, unchastity and marriage, and slavery, as well as the ancient heartlessness and the ancient prejudice against labour. The moral idea has to find its realization in the State, which, however, being construed by Plato according to the philosophical idea, was sketched as an ideal which was not able to find its realization in the natural order of things, and which only obtained the significance of a

prophecy of an order of things which could not be actualized in a natural way. Plato's ideal of the State thus became a presentiment of the Kingdom of God.—The transcendent Idea, according to Plato, was to be the power of healing and renovating the reality, and it was to serve as a *θεραπεία ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὦμεν.* It accordingly remains an abstraction in contrast to reality, and the individual can only rise by thinking to this abstraction by withdrawing himself in the spirit out of the reality of sense. In place of the moral antithesis there here comes in the natural opposition of the spiritual and the sensual, and the moral process appears as spiritualization and desensualization. But this under the appearance of moral truth is a perversion of it. Under that appearance, and with the pretence of being identical with the Christian antagonism of spirit and flesh, it also afterwards pressed into the sphere of the thought of the Church, and perverted it.

§ 3. *Aristotle.*

In distinction from the idealism of Plato, Aristotle puts himself in his exposition of the ethical virtues upon the basis of the concrete life. In his *Nicomachian Ethics* he distinguishes the dianoëtic virtues of the philosopher from the common ethical virtues, and keeps himself within the limits of what is possible to man. In doing so he substitutes for the Socratico-Platonic principle of knowledge in the sphere of the ethical virtues as distinguished from the dianoëtic virtues, the principle of practice and habituation. He starts from the question as to whether happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) is the highest good. He finds this to be so on the ground that what is distinctive of man consists in the rational soul, and pre-eminently in the activity which is determined by reason as the immanent teleology of man; and this rational acting is at the same time what is virtuous. Such acting corresponds to reason, and it consists in every individual case in the observing of the mean between extremes. The relation to the political life which has to be the regulating point of view

for all action, furnishes the duties of the various spheres of life. This lends a political character to ethics and makes it a constituent part of politics.

1. *The psychological basis.*—In the sphere of action, the End is regulative, and the highest End is the highest good. Now, according to common agreement, this is happiness. Happiness, however, is not to be defined as Plato does by a transcendent idea of the good, but by the nature of man. As the distinguishing characteristic of man, however, is his rational soul, and as his proper function is therefore rational activity, it is in this accordingly that his happiness consists. Further, man is a rational and sensible being, and in him there is thus an irrational part (ἄλογον) opposed to the rational part (λόγον ἔχον). This irrational element being partly vegetative, is so far entirely without relation to reason; but as active desire it stands partly in relation to reason, in so far as it can obey or resist it. Thus the pure rational dianoëtic virtues, as the higher virtues of the divine philosophic life, are separated from the ethical virtues of the common human practical life; and for these it is not knowledge which is the principle, but willing (βούλησις) which belongs to desire (ὄρεξις). Here too, then, knowing is set over willing or desire. And as desire belongs to the sensible side of man, but is the principle of "ethical" acting, the naturalistic character of morality also remains in this system. For, morality only consists in the sensible desire letting itself be determined by reason as that which posits the end, in order thus to realize the idea of the good.

2. *Ethical virtue and the virtues.*—The ethical *virtue,* in distinction from the dianoëtic virtue of the pure reason, is acquired by exercise and habit (ἦθος from ἔθος). The supremacy of reason which is acquired in this way authenticates itself in the observance of the mean (τὸ μέσον), so that the essence of virtue consists in this. The mean, however, does not determine itself according to a real principle, but empirically, according to the moral tact and judgment of the intelligent, and according to the law of the State which trains the individual to such moral tact, so that ethics is thus politically determined. Morality and custom, morality and

right, are here still undistinguished.—From the consideration of the various relations and circles there arise the individual ethical *virtues*, the highest of which is "virtue towards another" as such; and therefore the chief virtue of the civil life is *Justice*. Justice is partly *distributive justice* which deals with the distribution of honour and possession, and therefore more especially with the sphere of the public life and its rightful relationships; and partly it is *retributive justice* which has to regulate the civil relations of buying and selling and such like, as well as those of theft, adultery, bodily injury, manslaughter, robbery, etc. The political point of view is therefore exclusively the standard for the guidance of the moral judgment; and so the special world of moral being is not yet discovered. The Aristotelian series of virtues is therefore wanting in the specifically Christian virtues of humility, resignation, patience, hope, as well as of gratitude, selflessness, sacrifice, and above all, love. This civil point of view covers the relationship of man to man, and therefore it does not allow the development of a common universal morality. Only a few presentiments of this occasionally break forth like a prophecy of the future.

3. *Friendship.*—It is only in connection with friendship, which plays a great part in Aristotle, as in the ancient world generally, that something more inward and higher is here added to justice viewed as mere legality (Nicom. Ethics, viii. and ix.). The true friendship which is higher than that which rests upon advantage or pleasure, is the friendship of the good and of those who are like each other in virtue. In this friendship there is "one soul;" there rules in it equality and a community of all things; and the one friend is the ego of the other. But even from this, Aristotle draws the consequence that the greater the distinction between individuals, so much the less friendship is possible. The conception of friendship is thus lost in that of the social relationships; and the ethical way of regarding it, is replaced by the political point of view.

4. For, the *State* furnishes the standard even for friendship, as well as for the whole sphere of the moral life. As the highest realization of reason, the State is also the highest end of human existence, and everything else is only a means to it. For, man is a πολιτικὸν ζῶον. From this point of view

the *duties* are determined; and the *social* relationships, the family union, the relation of parents and children, the position of slaves, etc., are to be judged and appreciated by it. This means that the moral relationships are estimated according to a standard that is alien to them. For it is not man and his moral personality as the same in all, which decides; but it is the natural side of man and his position in the civil life, as different in different individuals, which furnishes the standard of moral judgment. Here too, then, ethics is not determined according to a really moral principle, but in a naturalistic way.

§ 4. *Stoicism.*

The Cynics had taken as their position the absoluteness of the subjectivity. The Epicureans start in their ethical doctrine from the individual and set up with their principle of pleasure, in the sense of painlessness and tranquillity (*ataraxia*), an ethic of reflection, which is not an end, but a means for the egoistic end of individual wellbeing. Stoicism starting from Cynicism and its absolute subjectivity, and in opposition to Epicureanism, unfolded a system of ethics which aimed at including both a universal morality and a self-glorification of the subject. By its principle of the universality of nature and reason, it determined virtue as a living in conformity with nature, and consequently with reason (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν). Such virtue was represented as alone good in the proper sense, whereas all other so-called goods are only *adiaphora*, which do not affect the subject itself. Corresponding to this view, virtue is not merely moderation of the passions, but passionlessness. This gives virtue its unity, which is comprehended in the ideal image of the wise man. This ideal, however, is an unreal abstraction, so that the concession is made to reality and its requirements of their being middle duties and a corresponding fulfilment of duty. In this way a double morality was taught, while the consistent outcarrying of the perfection represented in the system, led to a return to Cynicism. While the self-glorification of the subject in

contrast to the conflict of life, could only assert itself in the freedom of suicide, the principle of natural and rational universality led to the cosmopolitanism of a universal citizenship and its ethical consequences, and in the religious sphere to a pantheistic monotheism. In both relations Stoicism passed beyond the ancient limitations. But on neither side does the system advance beyond abstractions to a personal relationship; and it has therefore only attained the significance of a prophecy of the future.

1. *Epicurus* started from the doctrine of pleasure proclaimed by Aristippus, and ennobled it. He declared pleasure to be the essential good, in the sense of painlessness for the body and tranquillity for the soul. This *ataraxia* characterizes the wise man. Virtue is the means for this end of pleasure; and thus this ethical doctrine arises out of reflection. Hence grew the ideal of a cultivated life of enjoyment which withdraws as much as possible from public activity (λάθε βιώσας), in order not to be disturbed in its tranquillity. Epicureanism is thus a refined egoism which could only enervate to a greater degree the energy that was dying out; and hence it could not but give way before Christianity which had to steel itself in suffering and labour.

2. *Stoicism* forms the antithesis to this position. It starts from the Cynicism of Antisthenes, who declared virtue to be the only good, and to be sufficient for happiness, so that the wise man sufficing for himself (αὐτάρκης) has not to trouble himself about the other interests of life and its practices and forms. But in this principle of absolute subjectivity lay enclosed the cosmopolitanism which Zeno and his followers, Chrysippus, Cleanthes, and others developed. This development was supported by the cosmopolitan turn which the ancient life had taken through Alexander the Great and the diminution of the political interest. The cosmopolitanism of this system, however, was unquestionably of an entirely abstract character.

3. The principle of the Stoa is the universality of nature, which is identical with the universal reason (φύσις, εἱμαρμένη, λόγος). As applied to ethics this principle is accordingly a

demand of conformity to nature, and therefore to reason (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν). In this conformity virtue consists; and in virtue, happiness consists; while, on the contrary, everything else is only an adiaphoron. Such rational acting demands not merely moderation, but conquest of the passions as the irrational; and this is *apathy*, a negative virtue which coincided in issue with the Epicurean ataraxy. In this wisdom consists the unity of virtue, which, however, is explicated into the well-known four cardinal virtues, which mainly through the Stoics became the scheme of ethics down to a much later time.

4. This idea of morality finds its representation in the *Ideal* of the wise man. The wise man is alone happy, free, and perfect; he is a king and a priest; and in happiness, does not fall short of Zeus. These descriptions and paradoxes ultimately spent themselves in hollow pathos and mere rhetoric. But as this ideal could not be shown in reality, recourse was had to the notion of progressers (προκόπτοντες), who were to form the transition from the fools to the wise men. In like manner, the attempt was made to supply the defects of the system in the doctrine of external goods, which, according to the strict meaning of the doctrine, are properly all adiaphora; yet certain of these, in so far as they stand in relation to moral acting, are to be distinguished as preferable (προηγμένα) from those that are non-preferable (ἀποπροηγμένα). In like manner, in the doctrine of duties, the *perfect* duties (κατόρθωμα) constitute what is properly good in distinction from the middle duties (καθῆκον· μέσον), *officium medium*, or common legality. This is the doctrine of a double morality which afterwards passed into the Church.

5. The consequence of this natural universality and universal rationality was the cosmopolitanism or universal citizenship accepted especially by the later Stoics. This is indeed only an empty abstraction; yet it is so far a formal preparation for the positive realization of the idea by Christianity.

6. The mood of mind related to this universality and its necessity was resignation, a negative virtue; while the accentuation of the subjectivity and of its self-glorification in opposition to the compulsion of necessity, led to the issue of *suicide* (ἐξαγωγή, *patet exitus*); which is a renunciation of

all solution of the moral problem, and is therefore the self-refutation of the ethical system.

7. The identification of that natural universality and universal reason with the Deity, gives to the Stoa the *religious impress* which distinguishes it, and leads to its striving after an ethic of humanity, as well as to the attempt to attain a universal religion. But this religion is as abstract as its moral humanity, and did not advance beyond a certain universal religious mood distinctive of pantheism; and thus it had only the significance of presenting a prophecy of a concrete universal religion founded on a personal relationship to the absolute personality.

III. The Popular Moral Philosophy.

§ 5. *Cicero and Seneca.*

As Rome received the product of the ancient world generally into itself in order to transmit it to following times, so in like manner did it receive and transmit the results of the ancient philosophy. But in conformity with the sober and practical spirit of Rome, it gave a popular and practical turn and application to what it thus received. The moral system of the Stoics corresponded most to the tradition of the old Roman spirit, and Cicero sought to reproduce it in a popularized form, along with other philosophical systems of thought, and to communicate it to his age. Seneca again endeavoured to expound it as a remedy for the diseases of the time; but he did not overcome the opposition of the ideal and reality, nor did he possess, even in the religious basis which he attempted to give to ethics, a power of realizing it; so that this discord led only to greater rhetorical embellishment. Nor did he know of any other wisdom than resignation, and he ultimately recognised suicide as the only way of freedom.

1. *Rome's vocation* was to unite the ancient world of its time, and also to receive the spiritual life of the peoples into itself in order to be the means of transmitting it to subse-

quent ages. But in doing this it communicated the impress of its own spirit. On account of its sober character it essentially accentuated what was practical, and in philosophy this was shown by a preference for ethics. Along with other philosophical influences that appeared in its better spiritual attitude, Rome showed most sympathy for the earnestness and severity of the morality of the Stoics. There was thus developed a popular philosophy, and especially a popular moral philosophy, which became the common property of the better minds; and in connection with this system the elements of cosmopolitanism and the pantheistic religious tendency received further development.

2. *Cicero* regarded it as his vocation to reproduce and popularize the Greek philosophy, and he especially applied himself to ethics. Besides his Five Books on the highest Good and Evil (*De finibus bonorum et malorum*), in which the doctrines of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics regarding the highest good and virtue are reciprocally expounded, the Five Books of the Tusculan Disputations, treating of particular practical questions, and the monographs entitled, Laelius and Cato Major, he also wrote his important *De Officiis* in three books, in which he treats of the *duties* on the basis of a work under the same title by Panaetius. In this treatise the Stoical system of ethics is presented under a modified form from the point of view of duty, and for a long time it exercised an important influence in consequence. Cicero here distinguishes a double series of duties or a twofold morality, namely, the ideal morality of the wise man (*rectum perfectum*, *κατόρθωμα*) and the morality of the common man (*medium commune*, *καθῆκον*). After the manner of the Stoics, the basis of morality is nature; and the ethical principle is *convenienter naturæ vivere*. As nature is the universal, there grows from it the cosmopolitanism of the *societas generis humani, humanitas*, and the corresponding sentiment of benevolence (*beneficentia, benignitas*), which, indeed, has its limits in the worthiness of the object, and in regard for ourselves. This is generally a very reflective morality; and its purity is, besides, essentially impaired by the practical point of view of utility and public opinion, so that in reality it still amounts to a selfish virtue.

3. *Seneca* composed numerous writings on moral subjects. Such are his 124 Letters addressed to Lucilius, forming a kind of moral handbook; the consolatory writings addressed to his mother Helvia, Polybius, and Marcia; and his treatises on Benefits in seven books, on Anger in three books, on Tranquillity, on the imperturbability of the wise man, on the leisure of the wise man, on the brevity of life, on the blessed life, on Providence, etc. Seneca has substantially contributed by these writings to make the Stoical reflection in the modified form in which he represented it, the religious and moral conviction of men of earnest minds. In the Christian Church he was afterwards often regarded as a Christian, and even lately he has been again represented as such on fanciful grounds. Seneca repeats the Stoical positions of the universal reason of nature, the ideal of the wise man, his perfection and independence of all external goods and experiences,—an ideal to which reality certainly nowhere corresponded, and least of all his own reality. Finally, he reproduces the Stoical cosmopolitanism, representing the common reason as combining all men into the *corpus magnum* of the universal human *societas*, from which even the slave is not excepted. A universal humanism thus seeks to work itself out of the ancient particularism, but it does not advance beyond theoretical propositions, nor does it become a real power. For even the religious sentiment, so strongly represented by Seneca, could bestow no moral energy; for, the god of this pantheistic monotheism is only the abstraction of the world, and not the living God of the historical revelation, and accordingly is not a power of moral realization.

§ 6. *Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.*

Epictetus continues the tendency of Seneca, with a still stronger representation of the religious element. But neither does Epictetus advance beyond resignation in presence of the necessity of nature; nor, with all the stress laid by him on universal human community, does he advance beyond a merely passive morality to a positive moral influence. The same tendency of thought is found in the Meditations of

Marcus Aurelius; but here it is more than ever combined with the mood and tone of effeminacy and powerlessness, yet accompanied with the old self-feeling of identity with the Deity.

1. *Epictetus* (in his *Ἐγχειρίδιον*) made the significance of philosophy lie entirely in its moral purpose. The philosopher is a physician for the sick; and the knowledge of the sickness is therefore the presupposed condition of its healing. If he accentuates the religious element even more strongly than Seneca, yet it does not lead him beyond resignation. The Deity is the universal Reason of the world in which man participates. By returning to this his affinity with God, man makes himself independent of all that is external and indifferent towards it. His State is the world; his community is mankind. For all men are the offspring of the Deity (*Διὸς ἀπόγονοι*). Yet a real love of man is not reached. His last word is *ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου*, endure and abstain, "bear and forbear," — the expression of a purely passive morality, which renounces all positive moral activity.

2. *Marcus Aurelius* has embodied his Stoical confession in beautiful words in his philosophical diary, *Εἰς ἑαυτόν*, which he composed in the last years of his life (A.D. 172–175). But with all his fine expressions he does not pass beyond the limitations of the Stoical system, nor of the ancient philosophy generally. In so far as man belongs to the transitory world, his mood of mind should be resignation; and in so far as he belongs to the world of reason, and therefore participates in the Deity, it is a proud self-feeling. The former mood occupies the mind of Marcus Aurelius in the strongest degree. The ancient world is preparing for its dissolution. But not the less does he also feel the mood of pride; and so from the perishing external world he withdraws himself into the inward world of the spirit, of reason, of inner freedom. "It suffices to live alone with the *δαίμων* in one's own inner self, and to serve it uprightly." This religion is therefore a worship of one's own divinity. We are all citizens of the one great kingdom, the world,—a sort of kingdom of God. We are thus created for one another; we have to care for one another; we are to be well affected to one another.

But however beautiful and almost Christian this sounds, it is still only meant as worship of one's own divinity; the dominant idea is therefore not love, but pride. If we are not allowed to live according to our own divinity, then Marcus Aurelius likewise knows no other escape than that of suicide (τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι). He despairs of any such view as that the moral task in this life must be able to be solved under other circumstances. What is this, however, but a mistaking of the proper nature of morality? This whole Stoical exposition of ethics is strong in words but weak in power. From it help could not come; but only from a kingdom of God which "consists not in words but in power" (1 Cor. iv. 20).

3. The *Cynicism* which issued from Stoicism, and which wished to translate the independence of everything external taught by Stoicism into the reality of life, exchanged this independence for indifference towards all the practice of human life in society. It thus undid the effect which the earnest moral preaching of individual representatives of the system might exercise, by resolving it through many crude manifestations and a perversion of its alleged nature, into a caricature of what was not nature. Yet Cynicism was always a protest against a certain tendency to hyper-culture; and, as such, it has been repeated in similar phenomena in later times on Christian soil.

IV. The Issue of the Ancient Morality in the Ascetic Ethics of Mysticism.

§ 7. *Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.*

The religious restoration in the age of the Antonines in contrast to the earlier intellectualism, sought in all sorts of new cults and in attachment to forms of the past for satisfaction of the religious want and the power of moral renovation. Thus there was formed a religious and moral fellowship around the fantastic form of Pythagoras. The members of this association believed that salvation was to be found and brought to the world by getting rid of the sensuous nature; and they found in individual members

like Apollonius of Tyana representatives of this religious asceticism. Plotinus brought such attempts to work out a religious system of ethics on the basis of the previous presuppositions to a conclusion in his comprehensive system of Neo-Platonism. According to Plotinus, the goal of all moral striving is the union of the soul with the Deity and the supersensible world of pure abstract being. For, spirituality is the good; corporeality is the bad; and the way to that union which is consequently purification and release from the corporeal, is mystical elevation, and at the highest an enthusiastic transportation out of the sensuous consciousness into that divine world of pure being. — In this mystical asceticism and enthusiasm, the intellectualism of the Greek philosophy issues, and with this it ends. The long and deep influences of this philosophy on the later theology of the Church, rest upon its apparent affinity with the Christian antithesis of spirit and flesh. Here, however, the fact was overlooked that the philosophical antithesis was a natural opposition, whereas the Christian antithesis was properly a moral opposition, because it is grounded on the personal relationship to the moral personality of God.

1. In the *Age of the Antonines* a religious restoration was effected as a recoil from the intellectual enlightenment which prevailed at the close of the republic and in the beginning of the period of the emperors. Doubt and despair of attaining to knowledge and certainty of truth by a theoretical way, begot a hunger for revelation which exhibited itself in a morbid tendency towards all sorts of cults, consecrations, and doctrines, and down even to mere magic arts. With this mystical inclination there was connected in this period of satiety, the ascetic tendency which saw the way to salvation in getting rid of sense or desensualization.

2. This mode of thought attached itself to the mythical form of *Pythagoras* around which a Neo-Pythagorean circle gathered, the members of which honoured him as their saint, as the organ of divine revelation, and as the realization of their own moral ideal. With this formation of the religious

life in the shape of an allied religious order and of an ascetic morality, the Neo-Pythagoreans believed that they had the means of healing the evils from which the times suffered. In this sense Philostratus, *c.* 220 A.D., wrote a mythical account of the life of the Cappadocian Pythagorean, Apollonius of Tyana, who belonged to the first century, and who had acquired a name by his alleged gift of prophecy and magical art. The moral life is here represented as liberation from the imprisonment and defilement of the body by abstinence from flesh, wine, and marriage. Such a process of overcoming sense is regarded as the way of becoming divine. Desensualization is deification; and the ethical task is therefore conceived as physical.

3. This longing after supernatural revelation, with release from sense as its condition, is also shared in by *Plutarch* of Chæronea († *c.* 120 A.D.). Plutarch as a man of public life is indeed more sober than the Neo-Pythagoreans generally, and in his doctrine of virtue he occupies an intermediate position between Aristotle and the Stoics. But the moving thought of his life was the founding of morality upon piety in the sense referred to.

4. *Plotinus* († 270), the scholar of Ammonius Sakkas († 242), and greater than his master, was the chief founder of the Neo-Platonic School. Plotinus completes this tendency towards the supersensible world of the Deity to which the soul has to soar in mystical elevation, and he exhibits it in a comprehensive system. The goal of all moral striving is union with the Deity. The Deity again is pure supersensuousness, the highest Being in the sense of the abstraction of being; and this pure spirituality is identical with the good. Morality is thus made identical with spirituality. The moral task is the process of becoming disembodied; and happiness is union with the higher world of the spirit by the way of purification from defilement by the body, of spiritual abstraction from all that is sensuous, and of mystical elevation to the divine world. On the highest stage this is effected through enthusiastic ecstasy, in which all human consciousness vanishes and is merged in the divine consciousness, in that "frenzy of love" by which man himself becomes God. This is a height which manifestly was possible only for the

aristocracy of the intellect, not for the crowd; and Plotinus himself, according to the testimony of his scholar Porphyry, participated in it four times.

This was the last consequence of the ancient Intellectualism, and of its elevation of the intellect at the cost of the will. The development which began with the sober dialectic of Socrates, ends with the enthusiastic intoxication of nature, and with magic as the means of attaining to it. However morally high the character of Plotinus as delineated may have been, and however great his spiritual significance may appear to us, it is still the fact that with his philosophy he opened the door to all superstition; and with all his spirituality he only brought to light the naturalistic foundation of all heathen morality and religion. He lacked the knowledge of sin.

5. *The issue.*—The scholars of Plotinus have only spun out these thoughts somewhat further. This was done either more in the ascetic direction, as by Porphyry, or in the sense of a fantastic mysticism as by Iamblichus, who made a religion out of this philosophy, a religion which the Emperor *Julian* sought in vain to establish as the truth of the ancient religion. But neither could the appearance of the celebrated Hypatia, at Alexandria, in the beginning of the fifth century, nor the scholastic erudition of *Proclus*, at Athens (†485), keep this philosophy in life. The edict of the Emperor Justinian in 529 put an end to the philosophic school at Athens. But the influences of this Neo-Platonic philosophy, with its mystical enthusiasm and its desensualizing morality, stretch far down into Christian times, and it even affected the thoughts of the theology of the Church. For of all the ancient systems, this philosophy appeared to have the closest affinity to Christianity. And yet the similarly sounding antitheses of the spirit and the flesh are fundamentally and essentially different on both sides. For in Christianity they are moral and personal, while in the philosophical system they are naturalistic and physical. And as this is the distinction between heathenism and Christianity generally, the same holds true of the morality of the two systems.

V. The Difference between the Ancient Ethics and the Christian Ethics.

§ 8. *The limitations of the Ancient Ethics in contrast to Christian Ethics.*

In Christianity the chief interest turns upon man's personal relationship to God as the absolute moral Personality. In the ancient world, as in heathenism generally at all its stages both in religion and in morals, the interest turns upon man's relationship to nature, which appears even in the form of the highest abstraction of universal Being (as in Stoicism) and of pure Being (as in Neo-Platonism). Hence arise the limitations of the old pagan systems in the relativity, individualism, naturalism, and inequality of their morality. Their way of morality is either the lower one of civil legality, or the higher one of philosophical knowledge. The latter, however, is only accessible for an aristocracy of mind, and is as little capable from the nature of things of renewing the inner nature of man as the former is, so that the old nature of man remains unbroken and the same. Accordingly the principle of morality is still always the natural selfhood and selfishness, whether in an individual or general form. In contrast to this, Christianity marks an essential progress, and it possesses a real healing power in its proclamation of the divine revelation of grace.

1. *The stages of the Ancient Ethics.*—The civil Morality observed in moderation and justice the limitations relating to the Deity and men which are drawn by the will of the Deity. From this stage philosophical ethics rises in Aristotle to the norm of reason, and from Plato to the Deity. From the resemblance to God which Plato sets up as the ideal, it advances in the Stoa to identity with God, and in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus to unity with God. But it is never the personal God and the personal and therefore truly moral relationship to Him that is realized as such, but it is the

cosmos which, only as non-sensible, is invested with the name of the Deity, so that even with all the religious grounding and colouring which ethics receives, no advance is made beyond the relation to nature. Hence as a necessary consequence arise the limitations of the ancient apprehension of the moral world.

2. As the cosmos is not what is highest and absolute, but is always only a relative thing, the Ancient Ethic lacks the highest goal and the highest norm, and accordingly is affected with the limit of *relativity*. It is not the moral in the highest sense which it knows, but only a relative morality like that of the State. Even the universalism of the last period does not rise above the limit of the cosmos; for its religious and moral universality, to which it expanded the ancient mode of reflection, is only the image of the cosmos; and besides, it is an abstraction. Moreover, as the cosmos is the world of the manifold and individual, the morality that is determined by it, bears also the limit of *individualization* in itself. This is so, in the first place, because only individual relative relationships are the regulative relations, and not the one fundamental relationship to God. Such an ethic knows only individual virtues and not the unity of a single morality.[1] In whatever measure the Stoics strive after such a unity, it remains only a postulate, with the characteristic of abstract universality, which does not involve any guarantee of reality.—Further, as the world is the sphere of nature, the Ancient Ethics bears in itself the character of *naturality*, so that the moral does not obtain recognition as a particular sphere distinguished from the actual spheres of common practice and legal right. And as this is the world of *inequalities*, morality is also different for the different individuals; and this is contrary to the conception of the moral as the same for all, because for the personality in all.

3. The way to the realization of this morality as apprehended by the ancient way of thinking, is either that of *legality*

[1] So it is said in *Ecce Homo*: "The patriot, incapable of public treason, may be capable of private treachery. The chaste man may be a traitor. The honest man may be cruel." ECCE HOMO, A Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ, 13th ed., London 1876.

in so far as it is concerned with regulated formation in action, and therefore with a control of nature by the insight of reason and the formal power of the will (which consequently is only a *justitia civilis* or a morality of external action); or, when philosophy is taken as ministering to morality, it is the way of *knowledge*, which by the nature of the case is open only to a select number of individuals, so that the Ancient Ethics in their alleged higher form bears an aristocratic character in itself, which is contrary to the idea of the moral. Knowledge, however, has its limit in that limited standard, so that a true knowledge of the moral reality is not attained, but the moral judgment is always a superficial one. And, moreover, it also involves the limitation that knowledge cannot be a power for the moral renovation of the will. Taking the νοῦς as its principle, the Ancient Ethics does not reach the demand of μετάνοια; and even if it came to it, it would not possess the real power of effecting it.

4. Thus the moral basis of nature as it is, *i.e.* the natural selfhood, remains as the *principle* of the Ancient Ethics. In the Church from the beginning this principle has been designated as *pride*, and rightly so.[1] The magnanimous man of Aristotle, as well as the wise man of the Stoics, bears the unmistakable impress of this pride in himself. The ancient world is the world of selfishness. *Caritas*, according to Böckh, is not an ancient virtue;[2] and if the ancient world is not just the world of individually limited selfishness, yet it is that of an enlarged general selfishness, as in patriotism, etc. "Plato congratulates the Athenians on having shown in their relations to Persia, beyond all the other Greeks, 'a pure and heartfelt hatred of the foreign nature.'"[3] And although this antagonism of the peoples became less, it gave place only to

[1] So Kant in his *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*, 6 Auf. 5, 186.

[2] Uhlhorn, Die christl. Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche, Stuttg. p. 3 ff. Böckh, Staatshaushalt der Athener, ii. 260. Lactantius, Institt. vi. 101; "Mercy and humanity are virtues which are peculiar to the righteous and to the worshippers of God. Philosophy teaches nothing of them." Staël, De la literature, i. p. 149: "The happiness of others is not the object of the morality of the ancients; it is not to serve them, but to render oneself independent of them, that is the principal end of all the counsels of the philosophers."

[3] Ecce Homo, p. 150. Plato, Menexenus, p. 245: τὸ τῆς πόλεως γενναῖον καὶ ἐλεύθερον. . . φύσει μισοβάρβαρον διὰ τὸ εἰλικρινῶς εἶναι Ἕλληνας καὶ ἀμιγεῖς βαρβάρων.

indifference and to the proud haughtiness of the men of knowledge.[1] "The selfishness of modern times exists in defiance of morality; in ancient times it was approved, sheltered, and even in part enjoined by morality."[2] And although liberality was known and practised, yet that is not mercy. Christianity, on the other hand, indicates an essential progress and a difference of position.[3] It is therefore against history to deny this progress.[4]

Neither did Buddhism, which has been so often brought close to Christianity or made equal to it, advance beyond the limitations of the Ancient Ethics.

APPENDIX.

§ 9. *Buddhism.*

The Buddhism of Asia is connected with the ascetic mood which led men to flee from the world. It became prevalent at the closing of the period of the ancient world, and passed even into the Christian Church. On this account it appeared to carry in it motives and manifestations related to Christianity, whereas it is in reality fundamentally different from it and does not depart from the basis of heathenism. For the

[1] Sen. Ep. 73: sapiens tam æquo animo omnia apud alios videt contemnitque quam Jupiter.

[2] Ecce Homo, p. 151.

[3] On the difference between the Christian and the ancient pagan Ethics, see Ecce Homo; also Schaubach, Das Verhältniss der Moral des klassischen Alterthums zur christl., *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851. H. Thiersch, Die Stoa des Zeno u. die Halle Salamonis. Vergleichung der stoischen u. der christl. Ethik. Allg. Conserv. Monatsschr. 1880, Oct., pp. 261-280. Uhlhorn, a. a. O.

[4] Buckle (History of Civilisation in England, i. 180) specially advocates this view: "There is unquestionably nothing to be found in the world which has undergone so little change as those great dogmas of which moral systems are composed. To do good to others; to sacrifice for their benefit your own wishes; to love your neighbour as yourself; to forgive your enemies; to restrain your passions; to honour your parents; to respect those who are set over you: these and a few others are the sole essentials of morals; but they have been known for thousands of years, and not one jot or tittle has been added to them by all the sermons, homilies, and text-books which moralists and theologians have been able to produce."—There is therefore no progress in moral truths, neither in moral power, nor in moral knowledge, but all the greater is the progress in science.

redemption which it would bring, is meant not as redemption from sin, but from suffering, which life itself is; and, moreover, it is a self-redemption which is to be accomplished by knowledge. The morality of compassion which grows out of this knowledge is an ethical product of the pessimistic sentiment which mistakes the moral significance of life and its work, and which accordingly possesses no power of exerting an influence upon life. For, this passive reflection and attitude with reference to the moral task of life lacks positive relationship to the personal God who is the Lord of the world, and who is consequently also alone the salvation of life, and the energy of the moral activity of life. This ethic therefore remains within the limits of the ancient moral views and of heathen ethics generally, in that it knows only of a relationship to the world whether this is positively or negatively apprehended. Hence Buddhism was on this account also unable to find the right moral relation of man to the world.[1]

1. *Buddha*, who sprang from the noble race of the Sakhyas, was born *c.* 560 B.C. It is related that his feelings were deeply moved by the sorrows of life, and at the age of twenty-nine he left his home and family in order to find the way to a deliverance from those sufferings. For long years he practised a rigid asceticism, but this did not lead him to the goal he aimed at. Thereafter, when sitting under a tree, the knowledge dawned upon his mind of the cause of suffering and the way to deliverance from it. Having thus become the enlightened (Buddha), he preached this new knowledge for more than forty years, wandering about as a mendicant. He thus gathered a company of monks around him, and to these a wider circle of laymen became attached. After his death, *c.* 480 B.C., the councils of his followers drew up the necessary regulations of the community; and the canonical writings were fixed.

2. His *doctrine* is fundamentally not religion or cultus (as

[1] Dhamma padam (*i.e.* footsteps of the law) palice ed. Latine vertit, etc. v., Fausböll. 1855. Max Müller, Chips, vol. i. Oldenberg, Buddha, s. Leben, s. Lehre, s. Gemeinde, Berl. 1881. G. Voigt, Buddhismus u. Christenthum, Zeitfragen des christl. Volkslebens, H. 89, Heilbronn 1887.

it afterwards became), but philosophy. Moreover, it is not speculative or religious philosophy regarding the origin of the world or the gods, but it aims only at being a wisdom of life, and more particularly redemption by the way of thinking or knowing, a redemption not from sin but from suffering. Life itself is suffering, because a constant cycle of becoming and perishing. The chief thing is to know this, and through this knowledge to obtain redemption from suffering; and therefore to save oneself by thinking: a God, or belief in God, not being necessary to us. Not-knowing is the ground of evil; knowing is the salvation from it. For "out of not-knowing the formations arise, and out of these formations consciousness arises;" and so on through a long series of intermediate members. "Out of desire comes the clinging to existence; from the clinging to existence comes the becoming; from the becoming arises birth; from birth arises age and death, pain and lamentation, sorrow, anxiety, and despair. If the first cause on which this chain of effects hangs is removed, if the not-knowing is annihilated, then all that springs from it falls at once, and all suffering is overcome."[1] „There are therefore four truths of cardinal importance: *dolor, doloris ortus, doloris interitus, doloris sedatio,* on the *octopartita via.*[2] The first truth of suffering is this: Birth is suffering; age is suffering; sickness is suffering; death is suffering; the being united with what is unloved is suffering; the being separated from what is loved is suffering; not to attain what is desired is suffering,—in short, existence itself is suffering. The second truth of the origin of suffering is this: That it is the thirst for being which leads from new birth to new birth, along with pleasure and desire, and the thirst for change and for power. The third truth of the destruction of suffering is the total annihilation of desire. The fourth truth of the way to the removal of suffering is the holy octopartite path, of which the eight parts are: right insight, right thoughts, right words, right deeds, right behaviour, right striving, right remembering, right self-suppression. The centre of the Buddhistic doctrine is thus redemption from suffering by knowledge.[3]

[1] Oldenberg, p. 117. [2] Dhamma padam, 191.

[3] Oldenberg, a. a. O. Kirchliche Handlexicon, herausg. von Meusel, Leipz. 1887. "Buddhismus," p. 593. Voigt, Buddhismus u. Christenthum, p. 32.

3. The *Ethic* of Buddhism rests upon the fourth truth. It is twofold: behaviour towards one's neighbour, and behaviour towards oneself. In the intercourse with one's neighbour there are above all five prohibitions which come into consideration: not to kill any living being; not to seize upon the property of another; not to touch the wife of another (and for the monks not to touch a woman at all); not to speak untruth; to drink nothing that is intoxicating. To these prohibitions there correspond the commandments of goodwill towards all creatures, of mercifulness, of beneficence, etc.[1] The ideal is the wise man; for all are fools; and he who knows this is wise, whereas he who regards himself as wise is a fool.[2] The wise man is unmoved by praise and blame; he is without desire, without wish, free from anxiety, loosed from possession, calm in heart through his knowledge, and envied even by the gods.[3] This ideal sounds quite Stoical, and these propositions seem Christian, and hence it is that the ethics of Buddhism have been so often and so highly celebrated.

4. *Criticism.*—These precepts have been lauded as being such that nothing in the works of other heathen writers can be compared with them for moral purity.[4] "It appears almost inconceivable that man can have raised himself so high without any divine revelation, and come so near the truth."[5] Besides the five chief commandments against murder, theft, adultery, drunkenness, and lying, there are also special precepts against every vice, such as hypocrisy, anger, pride, distrust, rapacity, gossiping, and torturing of animals. Among the prescribed virtues we find not only reverence for parents, care for children, subjection to authority, gratitude, moderation in happiness, resignation in misfortune, and equanimity at all times, but there are also virtues prescribed which are foreign to the other heathen systems, such as the duty of forgiving injuries and of not requiting evil with evil. All virtues

[1] Clementia iram vincat, malum bono, avarum liberalitate, veritate falsiloquum. Verum loquatur, ne irascatur, det parvulum rogatus: per has tres conditiones ibit in deorum propinquitatem. Dhamma padam, 223, 224.

[2] Qui stultus se stultum putat, sapiens ille quidem ideo; stultus vero se sapientem putans, is certe stultus dicitur, *l.c.* 63.

[3] *L.c.* 81-96.

[4] Max Müller, *u.s.*

[5] Laboulaye in the *Débats*, 4th Sept. 1853.

spring from *Maitrâ*, and *Maitrâ* can only be translated as mercy or love. Burnouf says: "I do not hesitate a moment in translating the word Maitrâ as Mercy (Love ?). It does not indicate friendship nor the feeling which the individual man has for some of his fellow-men in particular, but the universal feeling which fills us with benevolence towards the whole of humanity, and which animates us with the constant wish to help them." Others take the same view.

But apart from the fact that Buddhism does not profess to be a redemption from sin, but from suffering, and therefore is superficial in its principle, and does not touch what is specific in suffering, namely, sin and guilt, the following remarks may be made regarding it. 1. All that Buddhism sets forth is only requirement, and therefore of the nature of law, while it does not possess in it the power of fulfilling what it demands. 2. Knowing is not power. 3. The morality which is here taught is itself only a passive morality, and consequently enervating, without having the power of exerting an influence upon life for the fulfilment of its tasks. 4. Experience also furnishes testimony to the fact that Buddhism, although professing to be a universal religion, has not become any power in the movement of history. Even Kuenen has acknowledged that Buddhism is blind to the significance and the value of life.[1] In its principle of knowledge this doctrine, like the ancient philosophy generally, involves the aristocratic principle; and, in fact, Buddhism originally made its way more among the higher classes. "For the poor among the people, for those who had grown up serving with the labour of their hands, and who were steeled in the necessities of life, the proclamation of the pain of all existence was not made; nor was the dialectic of the doctrine of the fulness of suffering in the concatenation of causes and effects fitted to satisfy the desire of those who are spiritually poor. This doctrine belongs to the intellectual man, and not to the foolish. It is very unlike the word of Him who let the little children come to Him, for of such is the kingdom of God. For children and for those who are like children, Buddha's arms were not opened." "Redemption is above everything else science; and the preaching of this redemption can be neither more nor

[1] National and Universal Religions, Lond. 1882, p. 293.

less than the exposition of this science, *i.e.* a development of certain series of abstract conceptions and abstract principles."[1] Here there is no personal interest for the individual, no personal conscience of sin, no individual participation, no entering into the inner life of the individual, no relation of person to person as with Christ. All is only a uniform rest of contemplation; the personal disappears behind the formal, or the scheme of thought. No one seeks and comforts the suffering and the sad; it is only the suffering of the whole world of which we hear ever and again. With Christ all is personal; here all is impersonal. Accordingly, the morality of Buddhism is not positive personal love, as in the case of Christianity, but rather negative and universal friendliness. The personal life is here extinguished in insensibility, and only a certain calm feeling of benevolence is left, while, moreover, there is a constant outlook towards a reward. In place of labour in itself, and of the struggle with sin, there comes abstraction from what is earthly; an internal and even a corporeal withdrawal or retraction, carried even to the stopping of the breath. And thus Buddha knows neither a personal relationship to the Deity in prayer, nor the personal moral task of labour. His ideal is the monk, and his special community is an association of monks, while in place of labour there comes contemplative solitude. In reality, however, there has grown out of this abstract philosophy a religion of unspiritual and mechanical ceremonialism, and of the most external works, and it has not been able to exercise the moral energy of an animating influence, but has only worked in a morally enervating way upon the will and upon action. Prschewalski[2] found only the utmost dulness of thinking and willing among the Mongols as the effect of this belauded religion. Nor has any energetic reformation of this always more and more degenerating religion been ever attempted. It is just the main citadels of Buddhism, and above all, Thibet, where it is found most unmixed with alien elements, and in unquestioned possession of dominion, that stand religiously, morally, and culturally on an extremely low stage.

[1] Oldenberg, 159, 183, 191.

[2] Reisen in die Mongolei in 1870–73. Aus dem Russischen, 1877. Cf. Allg. Zeitung, 1877, Nr. 38, Beilage.

It is only the personal relationship to the personal God that carries in it the power of true morality. Such is the result of the whole of our survey of the ancient pagan Ethics. This personal relationship, however, must be the doing of God Himself, and man must enter into it religiously in order to realize the relationship correspondingly in his moral conduct. It was this that Israel had as its distinguishing prerogative before the other peoples.

II.

THE ETHICS OF ANCIENT ISRAEL.

I. The Ethics of the Old Testament.

§ 10. *The distinguishing character of the Ethics of Israel.*[1]

The distinguishing character of the Ethics of the Old Testament is determined by the distinguishing character of the history and religion of Israel. The relation of salvation between God and mankind is what has been realized in the history and religion of Israel, so that in distinction from all other peoples what is national and natural appears here only as the vehicle and form of a revelation which bears a universal purpose in itself. Hence this impresses upon the ethical development of the Old Testament, in distinction from every other historical development, the distinguishing character that it is absolutely determined by the corresponding consciousness of God, and consequently, although in the form of what is natural and national, it is yet really in its essence ethically and universally determined.

1. *The naturalism and national limitation of the heathen ethics* are involved in the naturalism and national limitation of the heathen religions. Even in their last and highest stages their ethics do not pass beyond this limitation. For even the cosmopolitanism of the ancient world at its close, is still always conceived from the side of human nature, and it

[1] Cf. the Theologies of the Old Testament, especially that of Oehler, Tüb. 1873, 74, 2 Aufl. 1882. [Theology of the Old Testament. Translated. 2 vols. T. & T. Clark, 1874.] Dillmann, Ueber den Ursprung der alttest. Religion, Giessen 1865. Ed. König, Die Hauptprobleme der altisr. Religionsgesch. gegenüber den Entwicklungstheoretikern, Leipz. 1884.

is therefore thought of naturalistically, and not from the standpoint of the one personal God and the same identical relation to Him, which is the truly universal and ethical relation. Even the "Reason" of the Stoa and the "Being" of Neo-Platonism are only abstractions of the world; and the same holds true of the world-negating morality of both these modes of thought, because as such it is always determined by the idea of the world, and therefore naturalistically and by reference to external things. So that a personal morality in the proper sense is not reached by it; and consequently the true conception of the ethical relation is not attained, because the consciousness of the absolute personality and of the relationship to it is never regulative in these systems. And in like manner there is never found a joyous certainty of the power of the moral life, because a merely national consciousness or a rational universality lacks certainty of the future.

2. *The prerogative of Israel* consists in this, that its natural history as a people is the bearer and form of the relationship of salvation between God and mankind, and of the historical realization of that relationship. This is the standard of the consciousness of God in Israel. The God of Israel is the God of the world and of its future, for He is to be the God of all the peoples. Here too religion, and consequently also morality, presents in fact a national form corresponding to the historical stage of the development of the pre-Christian time generally. Hence ethics has here likewise a naturalistic basis. In this lie the limit of the Old Testament period and the constant temptation of Israel in its real connections. But the special content enclosed in this limitation is not of a naturalistic, but of a personal and moral kind, because it is determined by the personal relationship to the God of the history of salvation, and therefore to the ethically personal and universal God, who is accordingly conceived of monotheistically.

3. *The character of the Revelation.*—It is the error of the modern theory of development that it represents the ethical monotheism of Israel as developing itself out of a merely national basis. This theory maintains that monotheism developed itself out of polytheism, and that the ethically conceived

God of the world was developed out of the naturalistically conceived national God. "The Israelitish religion has not historical facts of salvation, but *nature* as its basis. The relation of Jehovah to Israel was originally a *natural* relation; what is so specifically represented as the theocratic element in the history of Israel is brought into it by elaboration,"[1]—so that the specific distinction of Israel from the heathen peoples is thus denied, and they are both put on the same foundation. But this is evidently a contradiction in itself; for out of the root of nature there can be developed, according to the nature of things, only the stage of abstraction from nature, or the negation of nature, but not the entirely different positive conceptions of the moral personality and of the revelation of salvation in history.[2] Moreover, this view stands opposed to notorious facts presented to us in history, and with the constant consciousness of the legitimate representatives of the Israelitish consciousness.[3] The traces of naturalistic religion and of a corresponding mode of life in Israel coming far down and repeatedly renewed, are only evidence that the natural element was also present here. But at the same time they likewise prove that the opposition to it of the ethical monotheism was not a natural product of the national spirit, but that it was introduced from without and from above, and was therefore a matter of revelation,—a fact which is constantly asserted and authenticated by the consciousness of Israel. The same holds true of the immovable certainty of salvation in the future in face of all the contradictions of the actual conditions.

4. *The ethical significance of Israel.*—In Israel, then, an ethical conception of God is attained for the first time, and more particularly this is not realized merely as a philosophical

[1] So Kuenen, The Religion of Israel, 3 vols., Lond. 1874-5. Prophets and Prophecy in Israel, 1877. National Religions and Universal Religion, Lond. 1882. Duhm, Die Theologie der Propheten, Bonn 1875. Wellhausen, Stade, etc. Also Ed. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums, 1 Bd. 1884, § 309, 358 ff.

[2] Ranke, Weltgeschichte, i. 1881, p. 32: "The idea of Jehovah has not sprung out of nature-worship; it is opposed to it." P. 38: "In the simple advance of national nature-worship, there would have been no history of the human race. This history first gets foundation and soil in the monotheism which separates itself from nature-worship."

[3] Cf. Ed. König's work, *u.s.*, and his Beiträge zum positiven Aufbau der Religionsgesch. Israels, 1886, p. 4 ff.

rational cognition, but as a historically certain fact. Accordingly, there is attained here for the first time an ethical view of the moral life in the proper sense, which does not merely justify itself before reason, but is certain of its historical justification.[1] And this holds true, although in opposition to this the only legitimate way of thinking, the powers of the natural life, both in the spheres of thinking and acting, always again assert themselves in the reality of experience.

§ 11. *The ethical conception of God in Israel.*

On the basis of His historical revelation God has become certain to Israel as the only true God, and therefore as the one only God, as the God of power as well as of grace, as the holy and just God, and as the purposive guiding wisdom.

1. *The monotheism of the Old Testament* is not a doctrine of the speculative philosophy of religion, nor an intellectual abstraction, but a truth of practical significancy. Its formula is thus expressed: "Jehovah is God," "I am," *i.e.* God (Deut. xxxii. 39; Isa. xliii. 10), He alone (Isa. xxxvii. 16[2]). This means that He is the *only true God*, as that expression does not merely indicate the oneness of God. "Who is like Thee?" (Ex. xv. 11; Micah vii. 18). "Thus the so-called ethical monotheism attributed to the prophets is an unfounded invention of the advocates of the theory of development."[3] It is only the full consequences of the conception in contrast to the gods of the powers of the world that have been drawn forth in the fundamental knowledge expounded by the prophets.

2. *The power of the World.*—The heathen way of thinking

[1] The Israelites were conscious of being raised above the Egyptian and Canaanite mode of life and observances in their morality, as is shown by many express testimonies (Gen. xix. 8; Lev. xviii. 3; Judg. xix. 30, xx. 6, 12; 2 Sam. xiii. 12).

[2] Cf. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, i. 63.

[3] Ed. König, Die Hauptprobleme, 39, 44; Beiträge, 8 ff. It is specially noteworthy that even Vatke in his Lectures on Introduction to the O. T. 1860, pp. 43, 601, not only celebrates "the Israelites as the only real monotheists of the ancient world," but has also recognised the prophets and even the very earliest of them as "the oldest vehicles of the revelation of monotheism."

always believes its gods to be involved in the world, just because they are of a cosmical root; whereas, in the consciousness of the Old Testament, God is from the outset distinguished from the world, and is separated from it. This is already expressed in the first statement about God as the creator, by which the consciousness of God, characteristic of ancient Israel, is distinguished from all that is heathen. For if the world is the product of a free act of God, then God is essentially distinct from the world as the power and the Lord of the world. As distinguished from the corporeal world, God is self-evidently spirit;[1] and as such a spiritual power standing behind the world, He is the object of awful reverence (*Elohim*). As the supramundane being (El shaddai), and not merely a power in the world like the heathen gods, but a power above the world, and, indeed, above the whole world, He forms the consciousness of God especially in the patriarchal time.[2]

3. *The personality of God* is given of itself with His supramundane being. As Jehovah, He belongs to Himself, He has His own self-existence; and accordingly He determines Himself, and is therefore free and personal; and consequently He is also identical with Himself, in the history of His faithfulness, in relation to men. Ps. xix. calls God *Elohim*, as the God of the revelation of nature; and *Jehovah*, as the God of the revelation of the law. But the certainty of the personality of God is independent of the question as to the age of this name (Jahve), for that personality is already given with the certainty of the creation and with the historic revelation. Accordingly, it also expresses itself in the great word, "I am" (Deut. xxxii. 39; Isa. xliii. 10), which contains the strongest self-affirmation of God. But if God, as supramundane and personal, is separated from the world of mere nature, there is thereby rendered possible

[1] Isa. xxxi. 3, אֵל=רוּחַ, in opposition to בָּשָׂר, man. In like manner אֱלֹהִים, Ps. xcvii. 7, 9; 1 Sam. xxviii. 13.

[2] The government of the world by the God worshipped by Israel is, however, also often stated in later times, as with special distinctness in Amos ix. 6. Compare also Isa. lxiv. 1: "Oh that Thou wouldest rend the heavens, that Thou wouldest come down, that the mountains might flow down at Thy presence."

a personal relationship and attitude towards Him; and this from the outset is separated from the world, and therefore is not naturalistic, but is specifically moral because it is personal.

4. *The gracious God.* — Inasmuch as God puts Himself into a historical relation to men, He shows Himself in such condescension as the gracious God. For it is of free self-determining grace that God puts Himself into a relationship to Abraham, and then to Israel, in spite of their sinfulness, chooses them out of the rest of the sinful world, and enters into a covenant of fellowship with them; and in so doing He prepares the salvation of the future, and, notwithstanding all the sin of Israel, continues faithful to Israel. For it is a manifestation of grace which Abraham receives, and which has as its aim the salvation of the world (Gen. xii. 3, xxii. 18); and the song of Moses (Deut. xxxii.), that Magna Charta of all following prophecy, which only develops further the themes that are here touched, is a glorification of the faithful grace of God towards His people. And the same holds good likewise of the confession of God in that great theophany of the Old Testament presented in Ex. xxxiv. 6 f.

5. *The Holiness of God* is impressed on the Law. For while the commandments of the Decalogue sound external, but have an internal meaning, in opposing sin in all the relations of human life, pursuing it even to the secret coveting of what belongs to one's neighbour, they reveal a holy will of God, and exhibit it as a rule for man. Further, the revelation of the law enables the people to recognise the infinite distance between themselves and their God, and demands a mediation through a mediator and a covenant-sacrifice which rests upon the consciousness that that distance pre-eminently conditions the forgiveness of sin, and thereby the holiness of God is brought into consciousness. And although the specific determinations of the law relate to the externalities of the religious and civil order and practice, yet these are in a naturalistic form symbolical expressions of a moral will of holiness which only gives itself an external manifestation in the natural form of a national religious and civil commonwealth; but thereby it would bring always more into the consciousness of the people their own unholiness in contrast to the holiness of God.

Hence the conception of holiness is not, as Kuenen and others consider, a later conception due to the subsequent progress of prophecy when it first attained an ethical conception of God, and thereby the idea of His uniqueness; but the quality of holiness was from the outset given in the conception of God as the supramundane personality. And, moreover, it was not given as a sensuous conception such as that of a consuming glory,[1] but as a moral conception.[2] For the exaltedness above the world (קדשׁ from קד in the sense of separatedness) includes "moral perfection as an important factor in it.[3] With this is given a norm for men as the fundamental law of their moral being and acting. "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy."[4] Upon this the law also founds its precepts regarding ceremonial purity as symbolical expressions of that fundamental moral thought. Thereby this whole ceremonial and legal symbolism becomes at the same time a prophecy of the perfect moral holiness of the future. If prophecy gives more decided prominence to the holiness of God in the ethical sense, and קְדוֹשׁ יִשְׂרָאֵל has become the favourite name of God in Isaiah, it is nothing new, but only an unfolding of the consciousness that is expressed in the law, — an unfolding which was at once prepared in the vision of the calling of the prophet (Isa. vi.), and called forth by the punishment of Samaria. The New Testament revelation has freed the conception of holiness from all the naturalistic investment found in the Old Testament; and has taught us to know it as God's essential and normative perfection.

6. *Justice.*—If the holiness of God is made manifest in the law, the justice of God has been made known in the history. The conception and the certainty of it accordingly lie at the basis of the religious and moral views and utterances of the Psalms. As an expression of the relation on the divine side, to which the human side has to correspond, it is determinative for the latter. Nowhere is justice so much spoken of as in the Psalms; for they have to do with the contrasts in the reality

[1] As Herm. Schultz in his Theol. des A.T. 1878, p. 517, and others hold.

[2] Cf. Ed. König, Die Hauptprobleme, etc., p. 44 f.

[3] Ed. König, Hauptprobleme, 84. Cf. Baudissin, Studien zur semit. Religionsgesch. ii. 1878, pp. 1–142. Delitzsch in P. R.-E. 2 Aufl. v. 718.

[4] Lev. xi. 45, xix. 2, xx. 7, 26; 1 Pet. i. 16.

of the moral life between the pious and the godless. The root צדק indicates "straightness," as determined by the starting-point and termination of the way, and therefore partly the state that is conformable to a regulating relationship,[1] and partly the conduct that is conformable to that relationship. When applied to God it therefore expresses that He remains faithful on His side to the relationship into which He has entered with Israel, and in Israel with mankind. As this relationship is one of salvation, it is therefore in correspondence to it that He is the producer of the salvation of Israel and therewith of mankind: both negatively, by checking the unholiness of the enemies of Israel and delivering them over to judgment, and positively by realizing the salvation of Israel through the power of His grace. Thus does His justice reveal itself in the history of salvation which is an active outcarrying of His love: only this not without hatred to sin, first in Israel, and then in relation to the peoples who are led through judgment to a share in the salvation of Israel. In this conception of justice on its different sides there is embraced in unity the variety in which the use of this word meets us, it being used as synonymous with faithfulness and with punitive justice and judgment, as well as with salvation and gracious favour. Human justice has to correspond to this divine justice. From this point of view the opposition between the just and the godless takes shape, and it rules the book of Psalms from Ps. i. Hence the pious man may appeal to his justice (*e.g.* Ps. iv. 2, Ps. vii., and often elsewhere), while he is also still continually conscious of his sin (Ps. xix. 13); since no living man is just before God (Ps. cxliii. 2).

7. *Wisdom.*—But as the contemplation of the history of salvation widens of itself to contemplation of the ways of God in the world generally and of the mysteries of life, and as at the first glance no authentication of justice is here found in the sense of a corresponding retribution, this contemplation gets to a knowledge of the wisdom of God, the theology of which coincides with the goal of the history of salvation. The knowledge of God is deposited in the *Chokmah*

[1] Kautzsch, in his Programm "On the derivatives of the root צדק in the linguistic usage of the Old Testament," 1881, p. 59, represents the idea expressed in צדק as "congruentness."

literature. We have it first presented in the Book of Job, which seeks an answer to the questions of the heart and the understanding in view of the experiences of life. While God is called Eloah (41 times), or Elohim (3 times), by Job and his friends, and is only twice called Jehovah (Jahve) by Job, the author of the book in the historical parts designates Him by this name. The significance of this is therefore that Jehovah is the solution of the enigma of Elohim. For we can have no relationship to power, but we may certainly have such to God as the revealed God. This God, however, is one who works teleologically in the world; this is the practical philosophy of the Chokmah, the result of the knowledge of salvation to the contemplation of the world. For as in nature it is not merely the power of God that is active, but there is also purposive intelligence and will, so is it likewise in the moral order of human life. Accordingly human wisdom also determines itself as purposive (end-positing) intelligence and will; for as Jehovah is both the ground and the goal of all things, the way of wisdom is to know and to fear Him. All that is earthly, including happiness and unhappiness, obtains its significance only by reference to Jehovah. The relationship to Elohim finds its truth in the relationship to Jehovah. From this there arises a moral judgment and guidance of life. This is found expressed in Proverbs—the reflective wisdom of Israel which rises far above all the other practical moral teaching of the ancient world.[1] And even the knowledge of the nothingness of all things as it is exhibited in *Koheleth* (Ecclesiastes) is essentially distinguished from the pessimism of the heathen way of thinking by the certainty of God to which the thinking turns as to a rock in order to save itself out of the flood of perishing things.[2]

In these constituent elements the consciousness of God which is proper to Israel, realizes itself, unfolding itself in advancing stages. But what unfolds itself is already fundamentally given in principle at the beginning. This consciousness, however, is ethically determined through and through. As such it was fitted to be the basis of a corre-

[1] Fey, Die sittl. Anschauungen des salomon. Spruchbuchs, Halle 1886.

[2] Cf. Aug. Köhler, Ueber die Grundanschauungen des Buches Koheleth, Erlangen 1885, p. 13 ff.

sponding moral consciousness. In the reality of the relationship, however, into which God has put Himself to Israel, there lay the presupposition for the possibility of moral realization. The historical *covenant relationship* of God and Israel formed this presupposition. Then the Law rested upon it as prescribing the rule of conduct in relation to it.

§ 12. *The Covenant-relationship.*

The Covenant-relationship formed the basis of the Law. God put Himself into this relation to Israel through the election of Abraham, and then of the people, and through the final establishment of the Covenant. Hence the moral conduct that is conformable to the will of God appears as conditioned by the relationship of grace in God's fellowship with man, and not as conditioning this relationship.

1. The Covenant is the point of view under which the relationship of God to His people is put from Gen. ix. 9 to Jer. xxxi.-xxxiv. It is not like a bilateral contract among men, but it proceeds exclusively from God and His initiative as a unilateral institution of God into which man, and therefore Israel, only enters. At the same time the spontaneity and activity of God, presupposed in the formation of the Covenant, are given expression to in the accentuation of God as the subject of the Covenant.[1] God as the author of all salvation is the offering active party in the concluding of the Covenant, who institutes the relationship between Himself and men. It is only as men have to enter upon this institution and offer of God, as the receptive party, that this activity of God is represented as the foundation of a compact, and in consequence the mode of expression used in other contracts has thus been applied to it.[2] Such expressions, however, were not meant to prejudice the initiative on the part of God, and so in the LXX. the Covenant is represented, not by *συνθήκη*, but by *διαθήκη*.

[1] Compare the personal pronoun in Gen. ix. 9, וַאֲנִי הִנְנִי מֵקִים אֶת־בְּרִיתִי אִתְּכֶם ; and similarly in Gen. xvii. 7, connected with בֵּין.

[2] Cf. Bredenkamp, Gesetz u. Propheten, 1881, p. 21 ff. Ed. König, Der Offenbarungsbegriff des A.T. 1882, Bd. 2, pp. 338–340.

2. *Election* is the act of choosing on the side of God, by which He enters into relation to man: בָּחַר. Thus God chose Abraham, and then Israel, when He called the former out of Chaldea and the latter out of Egypt (Hos. xi. 1). This gracious election also forms the foundation of the law. The decalogue puts this act of grace on the part of Jehovah at the head of the commandments by way of remembrance (Ex. xx. 2). So that the relationship of grace on the side of Jehovah in the patriarchal period and in the redemption out of Egypt, forms the presupposition of the conduct of Israel corresponding to the requirement of the law, and it has to determine the consciousness of Israel; but it is not conversely the case that the conduct of Israel according to the law, is the presupposition of the Covenant-relationship. Deuteronomy especially recalls this gracious election (cf. vii. 7 f., viii. 17, ix. 4–6). In so far as God appropriated Israel to Himself in such election, the fact is indicated by the term יָדַע.[1]

3. *The Fatherhood of Jehovah and the Sonship of Israel* is the relationship established by this election. For it is not to the creation, but to that election and to the deliverance of Israel out of Egypt that reference is made when Jehovah is called Israel's Father (Deut. xxxii. 6), or Creator and Former (Isa. xliii. 1, 15, xlv. 11), and Israel God's Son (Hos. xi. 1), or His first-born (Ex. iv. 22). This sonship is then likewise referred to those who belong to Israel (Deut. xiv. 1).

4. In consequence of this, Israel is God's *own holy and priestly people.* Israel was delivered out of Egypt in order to be His own people, His "people of inheritance" (עַם נַחֲלָה), Deut. iv. 20; and in Deut. xiv. the words, "ye are the sons of Jehovah your God," are succeeded in the next verse by the words: "for thou art an holy people to Jehovah thy God, and Jehovah hath chosen thee to be a *peculiar* people unto Himself above all peoples that are upon the face of the earth."[2] Israel is a holy people just because Jehovah has made Israel His own. "I brought you unto myself; and ye

[1] Gen. xviii. 19, יְדַעְתִּיו; and then also Amos iii. 2, רַק אֶתְכֶם יָדַעְתִּי מִכֹּל מִשְׁפְּחוֹת הָאֲדָמָה; and Hos. xiii. 5, אֲנִי יְדַעְתִּיךָ בַּמִּדְבָּר.

[2] עַם סְגֻלָּה. Cf. Deut. vii. 6; and on סְגֻלָּה, Ex. xix. 5; Ps. cxxxv. 4.

shall be unto me a kingdom of priests" (Ex. xix. 4, 6).[1] This objective fact forms the basis and presupposition of all the laws of holiness and purification, so that it is only to be regarded as exhibited and figuratively realized in these laws, and not conversely.

5. The *Particularism* which expresses itself in this separation of Israel bore, however, universalism in its bosom, inasmuch as from the outset Abraham's election was to serve as a blessing to all nations; and prophecy proclaimed this universalism of the salvation of Israel.

6. The answer of Israel to the election and ratification of the Covenant of Jehovah, was the *obedience of faith.* So it was in the case of Abraham when he followed the call of Jehovah and trusted the promise of Jehovah (Gen. xii.). And thus it was that the promise of grace and obedience of faith, forms the beginning of the history of Israel and the origin of this people. This was a God-wrought origin of an ethical kind, different from all other beginnings of all other peoples, which are only of a natural kind. So it continued in the history of the patriarchs, a history of believing hope (Heb. xi.), and on into later times. God reckoned this faith as righteousness (Gen. xv. 6), an *imputata justitia;* and it is this which forms the presupposition of the practical relation. Circumcision follows justification, according to Gen. xvii. 10 ff., as *σφραγὶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ* (Rom. iv. 11). Therewith is established the relationship of faith and law, of the righteousness of faith and the righteousness of the law.

§ 13. *The Law.*

The Law is on the one side a manifestation of the special relationship of grace in which Jehovah stands to Israel, and on the other side it is a commandment addressed to Israel. This commandment has to regulate the whole external life of the Israelitish community, and of its individual members corresponding to the relationship of Israel to Jehovah as

1 מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, certainly not a "priestly kingdom," *βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα,* LXX.

belonging to Him. But at the same time it represents the corresponding inner subjective relationship. Consequently, as the order of the external commonwealth of Israel was particular and transitory, and yet in its essential content it was universal and abiding, it thus pointed on to a time when its essential content, freed from its natural form, should come as such to manifestation and realization.

1. *The Law as a revelation of grace.* — The Law is a revelation of grace, inasmuch as it forms a constituent element in the history of Jehovah's relationship of grace to Israel. For where has it ever happened that God has so acted to a people and spoken to it face to face as to Israel? (Deut. iv. 7, 32 ff.). "Happy art thou, O Israel: who is like unto thee, a people saved by Jehovah?" (Deut. xxxiii. 29). Hence the law is the delight of the pious man (Ps. xix. 11, cxix. 72, 97). And thus, too, the relationship of grace is reflected in it, a relationship which was to obtain realization in the righteousness of faith that is in Christ (Rom. x. 6 ff.; cf. Deut. xxx. 11–14)—a demonstration of, and not a means of that grace-relationship.

2. *The Law as commandment.*—The Law is undoubtedly in reality a *νόμος τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν* (Eph. ii. 15), demanding and commanding, not giving. It thus reminded men of sin, to which it was opposed with its negative form, "thou shalt not," without, however, being able to take away sin; for it is only *γράμμα*, not *πνεῦμα*. The falling away of the people at Sinai shows their inward state and attitude towards the law. Hence it is also engraven in stone as a thing standing externally over against the people; it is not internally one with the people. It was also felt as a burden, at least from the standpoint of the New Testament (Acts xv. 10), and it is so designated (Gal. v. 1). This opposition of the demand of the law to the inward moral reality, which it was nevertheless unable to change, made it the means of convicting of sin (Rom. iii. 20), of the heightening of sin (Rom. iv. 15; Gal. iii. 19, *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*), and thus the strength of sin (Rom. vii. 9 ff.). It worketh wrath (Rom. iv. 15), and thus becomes the great indictment against Israel, and in Israel against mankind (Rom. iii. 19; Col. ii. 14).

3. *The Law as prophecy.*—Thus it points beyond itself to a time when there shall be no more an externally opposing commandment, but the internal reality of righteous disposition; and thus the prophet designates the new covenant (Jer. xxxi. 33). The law was to prepare for this time by its very requirements: παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 24), and to foreshadow that time in the variety of its precepts and ordinances: σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων (Col. ii. 17, and Heb., especially chap. ix.).

4. *The Decalogue*[1] is a summary of the fundamental conditions of the common life of Israel as God's community. These conditions are represented as applying to every individual: "Thou shalt." The mode of numbering the commandments of the decalogue is, as is well known, a matter of dispute.[2] It is best to regard the words, "I, Jehovah, am thy God," as an introductory and fundamental word,—an expression recalling to remembrance the fact that Israel was to see and reverence Jehovah as its God. The commandment of the duty to parents would then be the fifth of the first series, the words of which are all accompanied by motives, and have *pietas* as their content, while the last five commandments contain deduced duties relating to the external conduct of life towards one's neighbour. These latter are shortly connected on to each other without reference to motives, and are such that they justify themselves before the moral consciousness of right. These five commandments are therefore briefly enjoined, whereas man has to be inwardly moved to the former five.

5. *The internal movement of the Decalogue* is as follows. 1. The first commandment is to recognise Jehovah as God, as He has revealed Himself in the history of salvation, and as Israel has experienced Him as Redeemer in His grace and power. This is an act of *faith*. In this all else is grounded and comprehended, so that what follows is only an unfolding

[1] That the form of the Decalogue in Ex. xx. 2-17 (Deut. v. 6-18) is the correct form, while Ex. xxxiv. 11-26 is not the fundamental law, and that it belongs to a body of laws which goes back to Moses, has been shown by Delitzsch (Urmosaisches im Pentateuch, Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft, etc., 1882, p. 281 ff.) and by König, Beiträge, etc., p. 24.

[2] Cf. Geffcken, Ueber die verschiedene Eintheilung des Dekalogs, 1839. Delitzsch, P. R.-E.[2] iii. 535 f., and von Zezschwitz, Katechetik, ii. 1, 1872, 250 ff.

of it. Thus all morality is rooted in religion, all moral action in faith, and all moral conduct of man in God's relationship of grace. This is a new ethical principle which thus enters into the history of the moral consciousness and life of mankind. And it corresponds to this that in Lev. xix. the various individual precepts are carried back to this fundamental recognition of Jehovah: "for I am Jehovah, your God." So Luther introduces the exposition of each of the commandments with that of the first commandment. The first word of the Law, then, and the basis of all the following, is faith in the God of salvation. 2. With this all idolatry and image-worship is excluded. Jehovah alone is to be worshipped; it is His will to have wholly the love of the heart. 3. He wills, however, to be recognised as He has revealed Himself. His *name* is His revelation; abuse of His name would therefore be disesteem of God. Accordingly Jehovah will be recognised, Jahve alone, as God. And particularly, 4. in such order as He Himself has arranged and founded in the creation. Moreover, 5. in His *representatives* through whom He produces the earthly life. To love towards God as it rests upon faith and is realized in the manifold recognition of Jehovah, there is annexed love *towards our neighbour* as it exhibits itself in the manifold recognition of our neighbour in his possessions. And in particular, 6. the foremost possession of our neighbour is the good of *life* itself, as the presupposition of all other goods. Among these goods, however, the foremost again is, 7. his *wife* out of whom his house is reared. Next, 8. there is his *earthly possession* as belonging to his house; 9. his *public name* and honour in the community to which he belongs. 10. The last ground, however, of such manifold modes of injury is the wrong desiring or *coveting* of what belongs to our neighbour. In Deuteronomy this is included under the wife as the basis of possession, but in Exodus it is designated as house, etc., the individual things which all belong to the possession of another. In this second half of the commandments the line movement is from without inwards, from the deed to the word and heart. The whole, however, advances from faith to the love of God and then to the love of our neighbour.[1]

[1] Others otherwise. Compare von Zezschwitz, System der Katechetik, ii. 1, p. 365 f. I. Table: Heart, Mouth, Work; II. Table: Work, Word, Heart.

The commandments have thus an externality in their expression, especially in the second half of the series; but they are nevertheless inwardly meant, as is shown above all by the beginning and conclusion. Hence they are correctly summarized in Deut. vi. 5, and even in the Decalogue itself in the so-called Book of the Covenant in Ex. xxvi. as love to God (אֹהֲבַי), and in Lev. xix. 18 as love likewise to one's neighbour, and they are correspondingly summed up in Matt. xxii. 36. What Christ does in the Sermon on the Mount is only to reduce them to their proper meaning, while at the same time their Old Testament limitation is taken from them. For, it is the saving God and the Redeemer, not yet of the world, but of Israel, and it is their neighbour in the sense of a fellow-countryman (Lev. xix. 18), and not yet of man as such, to whom this love applies. The universalism is still enclosed in the husk of particularism; but the husk encloses a germ with a rich future in it.

Similar individual precepts are to be found elsewhere; but nowhere such a connected whole at once so simple, complete, and inward, and embracing all the essential fundamental moral requirements and fundamental conditions of a right moral state of the community. This could not but train and elevate the moral consciousness to that height and purity in which Israel was far superior to all the other peoples of antiquity, even to those among them who stood morally highest.

6. *The humane character of the Old Testament legislation.*— The Old Testament proceeds upon a monotheistic and personal apprehension of God. In relation to Him stand the individual members of the people as belonging equally to Him, and there is a reciprocal recognition and goodwill conditioned in the actual relationship, by which the Old Testament law of morality becomes far superior to that of the highest peoples outside of Israel, and it also goes far beyond any kindred expressions of the Stoa. If in that system the moral conduct is summarized in δικαιοσύνη as the ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον in the sense of the *suum cuique*, yet the most icy selfishness is compatible with it, and only at the close of the ancient world does there stir a softer mood of goodwill which accentuates the man in the man, without, however, passing at bottom

beyond words. But in the Old Testament legislation there is expressed in a series of individual determinations, and in the whole ideal which lies at its basis, a spirit of humanity which, in its national limitation, is the prophecy of a future that was yet to embrace mankind. Such are the regulations about the jubilee year, in which all that had been sold and pledged was to be given back (Lev. xxv.), whether these regulations were capable of being carried out or not. Further, we may refer to the regulations about the harvest: that the olive tree was not to be shaken, the vineyard not to be gleaned, and the sheaf forgotten upon the field not to be afterwards fetched, but that all this was to belong to the poor, the widows, and the orphans (Deut. xxiv. 19–22); that it was allowable to pluck ears going through the cornfield (Deut. xxiii. 25), and that what grew in the Sabbatic year should be for the benefit of the poor (Ex. xxiii. 11). These regulations, and much more of the same kind, show a conception of property which was essentially distinguished from the rigid and absolute conception of the Roman law, and they were specially based upon the fundamental religious thought that the land as well as the people properly belonged to God as its Lord and Owner, and that the Israelites held their land from God only in fee, so that all ownership is only relative, and the possessor has to make its enjoyment accessible also to others.[1] A series of other regulations come to the support of these. Thus we may refer to the prohibition of usury in the case of fellow-countrymen (Ex. xxii. 25; Lev. xxv. 35–37), or pledging the upper garment over night (Ex. xxii. 26–28; Deut. xxiv. 10–13); the commandment to pay the needy their hire before the evening (Deut. xxiv. 15); the institution of the so-called poor-tithe, *i.e.* the second tithe, which was to be applied at the end of every three years for a feast to be given to the strangers, widows, and orphans (Deut. xiv. 28, 29, xxvi. 12, 3); the recommendation of liberality to the poor (Lev. xix. 9; Deut. xv. 11, xxiv. 19 ff.); of gentleness and attention to the infirm (Lev. xix. 14; Deut. xxvii. 18); and of reverence for age (Lev. xix. 32). Such, too, are the regulations about honesty in trade and conduct (Deut. xxv. 13 ff.); about

[1] Cf. Uhlhorn, Die christl. Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche, Stuttg. 1882, p. 42. [Christian Charity in the Ancient Church. T. & T. Clark.]

bondmen and slaves (Ex. xxi. 2–11; Lev. xxv. 41, 42, 49, 55);[1] about the measure of corporal chastisement (Deut. xxv. 3); about the friendly treatment of strangers (Ex. xxii. 21, xxiii. 9; Lev. xix. 34); and about widows and orphans (Ex. xxii. 22). The garment of the widow was not to be taken in pledge, and widows and orphans were to be invited to feasts (Deut. xvi. 11, 14); for God is the father of the orphans and the judge of the widows (Ps. lxviii. 6). There were regulations even in favour of the lower animals (Deut. xxv. 4, v. 14, xxii. 6; Lev. xxii. 28; Ex. xiii. 4, 5), applying also to the cattle of an enemy. Mercy belongs to the character of a just Israelite. He is "merciful and mild" (Ps. xxxvii. 26); he "considereth the poor" (Ps. xli. 1); he dealeth graciously and lendeth (Ps. cxii. 5); whereas "the tender mercies of the wicked are cruel" (Prov. xii. 10); for, God is gracious and merciful, etc. Therefore "he that hath mercy on the poor honoureth God" (Prov. xiv. 31). Hence the entirely different estimation of the poor in Israel from what it was in the heathen world. For God looketh upon the lowly, and considereth the poor and needy. Hence the right fasting which God has chosen is thus described: "Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the bands of the yoke, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?" (Isa. lviii. 6, 7). It is expressly forbidden to hate or calumniate our neighbour; and it is commanded to love him as ourself (Lev. xix. 16–18). And this is not restricted merely to fellow-countrymen, but it is also commanded to show love even to an enemy: "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink: for thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head" (Prov. xxv. 21, 22); and the sojourners in Israel are often commended to goodwill. All this shows a stage of morality far surpassing that of the heathen world, and even the highest philosophical ethics of antiquity; and if such morality was not always realized, yet it shows

[1] Mielziner, Die Verhältnisse der Sklaven bei den alten Hebräern, Kopenh. 1859. Riehm, Handwörterbuch des bibl. Alterth. 1884, ii. 1498 ff., "Sklaven."

what was the moral requirement, resting as it did upon the religious basis which Israel had as an advantage over all other peoples through the covenant relationship of God to His people. The Old Testament promise of reward has, indeed, been often dwelt upon as a sign of a morality of a low order; as when it is said: Do this that you may live long, etc. (Ex. xx. 12; Deut. viii. 1, xi. 8, 9, and elsewhere); but the reward of which the New Testament also speaks, is meant as a heightening or completion of the relationship to God which in the Old Testament had still a natural form, and therefore found a positive realistic expression. Accordingly it is not external goods as such which thus come into consideration, but these are regarded as a manifestation of that essential relationship, always in accordance with the existing stage of the history of salvation.

7. *The basis of the individual determinations of the Old Testament law* is the *holiness of God* in contrast with the *sin of the people*, with whom He is yet willing to have fellowship in *gracious love*, so that the order of the commonwealth and common life of the people thus grows out of those two factors of holiness and sin and the goal of fellowship or communion. The thought lying here at the foundation is therefore of a moral kind. But as the object dealt with is a national and therefore natural commonwealth and common life, it is not a moral and personal, but a natural and therefore an external order of life on which those moral thoughts are externally impressed, so that this external order of life has only symbolical and pedagogic significance. This constitutes the limitation of the order of the Old Testament law, which must fall away at its time.

8. *The dwelling of God in Israel.*—From that point of view the law above all regulates the mode in which God wills to dwell among His people, so that along with it the distance of the sinful people from their God, as well as the limit of their fellowship with God, is clearly shown. This is not yet the inward personal fellowship with God as mediated by the Spirit, but the external fellowship of a people realized on the basis of their natural life, and therefore a fellowship that exhibits itself by means of a natural life which is separated and set apart for this purpose. But even this communion with God proceeds from God; for it is not Israel that has made itself the community of God, but Jehovah by making His dwelling among His people. And

yet He does this in such a way that He as the Holy One is still separated from the people, and therefore it is done only through the medium of priestly servants and in a house which separates Him from them as well as brings Him nigh. It is only under certain conditions (of purity) that one can approach Him, and that the Israelite participates in God's community and its sanctuary,—conditions which, corresponding to the stage of the history of salvation, are likewise of an external and natural kind.

9. To this category the *sacrifices* pre-eminently belong. Resembling the heathen sacrifices in their external appearance, and like them of an outward character, they have the prerogative over these in that they are legally instituted by God Himself, and thereby are made effective, that is, by reference to the fact that the nation belonged to Jehovah. The sacrifices are to be so regarded whether it be that they realize the present covenant fellowship with Jehovah in external symbolization of the personal relation: as expression of complete surrender in the burnt-offering, or of a grateful return in the thank-offering (but in this case not without the memory of the sin that was worthy of death, which recollection has to precede all presentation of the fruit of works in the drink-offering); or that they were to restore the disturbed covenant fellowship with Jehovah in the sin-offering and the guilt-offering. The worship generally, and the regulations regarding fasting and such like, are to be put under the same point of view as the sacrifices.

10. *The regulations for maintaining purity*[1] had a special purpose; they had to serve to exhibit externally the holiness of God's Israelitish community in its individuals, and continually to bring to remembrance the defiling influence of sin before God. For the purity of the individual must correspond to the holiness of the community if the individual was to have a share in it and in its sanctuary, corresponding, however, to the national and therefore natural character of God's community in its external form. The conditions of this purity consisted, partly in the observance of the distinction of clean and unclean in the sphere of the laws relating to food (Lev. xi.), and partly in washings and offerings for purification with reference to defilement by leprosy, death, and sexual emission (Lev. xii.–xv.); while the whole community was ordered to purify

[1] Cf. Riehm's Handwörterbuch u. s. w. ii. 1274 ff.

itself every year from all impurity, and to expiate its sin by the great sacrifice of atonement (Lev. xvi.).

11. The relation of the community as belonging to God *in its whole existence,* was exhibited by consecration of possession in the firstlings and tenths (Lev. xxvii.), by consecration of the *daily life* through a religious worship in the daily morning and evening sacrifices, by consecration of the *course of time* in the sacred division according to sevens and its festivals (Lev. xxv.), and by consecration of the history of Israel in the memorial celebrations of Jehovah's saving acts in history (Lev. xxiii.). Thus the law and its regulation of the commonwealth and life of Israel was, even in its external form and naturality, a symbol of moral thoughts and relationships, and even thereby it called these to remembrance and was an education for them; so that in the law itself there was already involved the tendency to internalization.

§ 14. *The Internalization of the Law.*

The legal regulation of the religious life of Israel had *as such* already the significance of mediating the theocratic relationship of Jehovah and His people. Nevertheless, if the personal relationship of the Israelite to his God was to be a right relationship, the will of God which lay at the foundation of it must become a thing of the inward personal life and disposition. The recognition of this was set forth by Deuteronomy and the Psalms, and more particularly by the Prophets, in opposition to a carnal trust in the external order of the law, and thus far in opposition to that order itself. According to the testimony of the reflective literature, this was not without an influence on the moral judgment and guidance of life, yet the opposition between law and reality still pointed to a future in which it was to be overcome.

1. The *decalogue,* both in its beginning and conclusion, already shows that although it sounds external, it yet has an internal meaning. Under this point of view Deuteronomy repeats the law. This consideration explains its subjective and hortatory character. Its object is to lay the law to the heart, and to

introduce it into the heart. Hence it also accentuates the fundamental presupposition of the law: love to Jehovah with the whole heart as the sum and centre of the whole law (Deut. vi. 5; cf. Ex. xx. 6). Hence such words as those in Deut. v. 9: "Oh that there were such an heart in them that they would fear me, and keep all my commandments always," are indeed connected with the knowledge that the carnal nature is contrary to keeping the commandments, and that God Himself must therefore enable this to be done, and that He also will do so; as is stated in Deut. xxx. 6: "And Jehovah thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love Jehovah thy God with all thine heart and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." Whatever date may be assigned to Deuteronomy, these statements are only an elucidation of the original view. Only this point of view undoubtedly comes always into more decided prominence in the later times, as is seen in the Psalms and, above all, in the Prophets.

2. *The Psalms.*—Hence it is erroneous to say that the progress in the time of the Psalms, and especially of the Prophets, consists in this, that the external legal order was held in little account, whereas the moral law was emphasized exclusively and in contrast to it. The celebrated word of Samuel to Saul in 1 Sam. xv. 22: "To obey is better than sacrifice," refers to the personal relationship to God. At the same time Samuel himself offered sacrifices. The *Psalms* undoubtedly give the external law a place behind the λογικὴ λατρεία. They put external sacrifice behind the heartfelt sacrifice of the obedience of the will (Ps. xl. 7 ff.) and the broken spirit (Ps. li. 18 f.). But along with this, it is also said in Ps. li. 19: "Then shalt thou delight in the sacrifices of righteousness, in burnt-offering and whole burnt-offering: then shall they offer bullocks upon thine altar." The truth of the external worship is therefore conditioned by the moral attitude; in this itself the right worship consists (Ps. xv. 24–30). God does not lay importance on the external as such; all the beasts of the forest are already His. "Offer unto God the sacrifice of thanksgiving; and pay thy vows unto the Most High; and call upon me in the day of trouble; I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me" (Ps. l. 14). The

sacrifice of the prayer of the heart is therefore the right sacrifice. Along with this, however, the external sacrifice, and therefore the ritual law, is again recognised (Ps. lxvi. 15). The two are not in contradiction, but are wholly compatible with each other. When the matter in hand deals with the theocratic relationship of the commonwealth and of its members to God, and therefore with what is naturally determined, then external sacrifices and the external order of this commonwealth as established by God assert their right. But the personal relationship of the individual to his God is not mediated by that order, but is only personal and moral. The Psalms, however, treat of this personal relationship. In them, accordingly, sacrifice and offerings become symbols of what is internal. Sacrifices are temporal, belonging to a particular time and conditioned by the contemporary stadium of the history of salvation, and they are therefore particular and transitory; whereas the personal and inner relationship is what is essential, abiding, rich in futurity, and universal. This always works itself out more decidedly from the husk of what is naturalistic and particular. Hence it is specially represented by the Prophets, for they were the bearers of the future of the Kingdom of God with its personal and universal character.

3. *The Prophets.*—On the one side, we find such facts as that not only the Levites (2 Chron. xxx. 30), but also the prophets, support King Josiah, after the finding of the Book of the Law, in renovating the legal order of the religious life (2 Kings xxii. 11 ff.; ver. 14 mentions the prophetess Huldah, and in xxiii. 2 we have "the prophets"). In particular, Jeremiah (xi. 1–8) undertook to peregrinate in the cities of Judah, and to exhort the people to the observation of the law. On the other side, this wholly external legalism appears again to be blamed and rejected by the same prophets. For it was not a conversion of the heart, but a deception (Jer. iii. 10). Hence the prophetic preaching turned itself against all this external, dead, ceremonial worship. We find this already in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. (Joel ii. 13; Amos v. 21 ff.; Hos. vi. 6; and then in Hezekiah's times, Isa. i. 12, xxix. 13; Micah vi. 6–8). In the time of Jeremiah, the testimony against the *opus operatum* at length became an essential part of the prophetic preaching (cf. *e.g.* Jer. vi. 20, xiv. 12). But

this was not done as if it was a rejection of the legal sacrificial worship itself. Otherwise this would not have been adopted as an essential feature in the picture of the Messianic future (as in Isa. lx. 7, etc.), and so too in Jeremiah (not merely in the contested passage xxxiii. 18, but also in xvii. 26, xxxi. 14, xxxiii. 11). The thought always is that man is not to think that he can find God for himself with mere external gifts, without a corresponding internal disposition. Hence, on the one hand, a new temple and sacrificial worship is prophesied for the new Jerusalem (*e.g.* Isa. lvi. 7, lxvi. 20); and, on the other hand, it is again said (lxvi. 3) that Jehovah will have no new temple built, and that sacrifices and oblations are abominations to Him. The external cultus has therefore moral value and significance only if it is an expression of the corresponding internal disposition, which therefore has only essential worth. What is here worked out is the sharp distinction between the natural and the moral. It is a distinction which the ancient pagan world not only does not know, but identifies them with each other; whereas it is prepared in Israel in that the two are distinguished from one another while connected with one another, and this distinction is finally realized in a clear and sharp way in Christianity. That corresponding disposition could indeed only be the effect of a new spirit of life which the law could not give, but only prophecy could promise (Isa. vii. 9; Hab. ii. 4). The School of the Law had in consequence a fear of moral knowledge and of the moral guidance of life. And the evidence of this lies before us in the proverbial literature of Israel, with which no moral literature of the heathen ancient world can be compared. In it the moral reality of Israel towers far over that of the heathen world. But notwithstanding this, the carnal nature of the people remained uninterruptedly and fundamentally opposed to the will of God as it announced itself in the law.

4. *The opposition between the Law and reality.*—The Law had not grown out of the national and natural soil of Israel as the national orders of the life of other peoples had done; but it had been given from without by God.[1] The moral reality of Israel was therefore not one with the Law. This

[1] On the question why Israel's religious and moral ideal cannot be called the blossom of the genius of its people, see Ed. König's Der Offenbarungsbegriff, etc.,

contradiction runs through the whole history of Israel as nowhere else. Hence the lapse already at Sinai, and such reproaches as those in Amos v. 25 f. For, naturalistic worship was just as near and as natural to the natural being of Israel as was the case with other peoples. Israel was not different from these other peoples of itself; what it had distinctive was not φύσει but θέσει. Hence the constant conflict of this θέσις with the φύσις, of the prophetic spirit with the natural inclination, down through all the history of Israel. The inner unity of the Law and inclination, is an element in the prophetic hope of the Messianic time with its new spirit and new heart (cf. Jer. xxxi. 31–34; Ezek. xxxvi. 26 f.). And when later, in the severe school of exile, the people were fundamentally cured of their inclination to polytheistic nature-worship, and the Law had become one with its national thinking and life, the union then attained was only with the Law as the order of the national Commonwealth, and therefore on its natural side. Accordingly, we have here the same principle as among the heathen peoples, only in a monotheistic form, and therefore it is so much the more difficult to recognise its untruth. This is the essence of Pharisaism, and hence Christ reduces its religious and moral character to the level of heathenism. Pharisaism was prepared in the period following the prophets, when the spirit of the national particularism attained the supremacy under the semblance of a genuine Israelitism, and thus determined the moral way of thinking.

II. The Particularistic Nomism.

§ 15. *Its beginning in the post-canonical interval.*[1]

As the restoration of Israel was essentially founded upon the legal order of Israel, and was concluded in it, this became

Bd. i. pp. 87–95. See also the interpretation given by Kahnis (Lutherische Dogmatik, Bd. i. (1861) p. 291) of Isa. i. 2; Jer. ii. 10–13, viii. 7.

[1] Keerl, Die Apokryphen des A. T. Ein Zeugniss wider dieselben, Lpz. 1852. Das Wort Gottes u. die Apokr. 1853. Die Apokryphenfrage 1855. Schürer, Apokryphen des A.T., P.R.-E. 2 Aufl. i. 485–511. Geschichte des jüd. Volkes im Zeitalter J. Chr. 2 Aufl. 2 Th. 1886, p. 575 ff. Merguet, Die Glaubens- u. Sittenlehre des Buches Jes. Sirach, 1874.

the occasion of the spirit of particularism and of nomism developing itself, and this spirit found an expression in the post-canonical literature of Israel.

1. *The particularistic and nomistic danger at the close of the canonical period.*—The experiences of Israel during the Babylonian exile, and the subjection following it, endangered its national existence in the present, and with it also the future of salvation, and they also brought a danger of being dissolved among the heathen. The consequence was an effort to avert this danger by close national combination, and to establish the commonwealth on the most rigid maintenance of its national order of life. And this was to be only a means to an end, namely, to secure the future of salvation. It was only too easy, however, for the means itself to become the end. This then constitutes the false particularism and nomism. In the canonical period and literature this particularistic nomism does not yet appear, but the possibilities and connections of it are found showing themselves. This side of things could not but unfold itself in the time of the exile. The Book of Daniel is not, however, a proof of this. For the painful care exhibited in it in avoiding defilement by food (i. 8 ff.) and the maintenance of the external order of prayer (vi. 10) are sufficiently explained by the whole position and by the necessity of a rigid hedging in from heathen ways. The words of Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar (iv. 27) are not to be translated as in the Vulgate: peccata tua eleemosynis redime et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum,[1] but: "break off from (פָּרַק) thy sins by righteousness,[2] and from thine iniquities by showing mercy to the poor, if there may be a lengthening of thy tranquillity;" *i.e.* Nebuchadnezzar is from now to practise the royal virtues of justice and compassion, having hitherto made himself guilty by wilfulness and cruelty; and thereby, if it be possible, he shall keep threatening judgment far from himself. Hence eternal salvation is not what is dealt with here.[3] So in Prov. xvi. 6 we have the words: "By mercy and truth iniquity is purged;" but only in this

[1] Theodot: τὰς ἁμαρτίας σου ἐλεημοσύναις λύτρωσαι καὶ τὰς ἀδικίας σου ἐν οἰκτιρμοῖς πενήτων.

[2] צְדָקָה, not "Alms."

[3] Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, i. 593 f.

sense, as it goes on to say: "and by the fear of Jehovah men depart from evil." It is only where the former is that the latter is also; not where there is merely external work, but where there is the right internal sense. And similarly, the passage in Isa. lviii. 7 means only to press for an exhibition of the right disposition in contrast to mere external doing, if Israel is to realize the comfort of salvation. But the New Testament knowledge is not yet anywhere fully expressed here; and a position like that of the exile, and still more of the restoration, on the basis of the legal orders of the life of Israel, included more strongly the danger of false particularistic demarcation and nomistic accentuation of the law. The point of connection for this was furnished by the activity of Ezra the scribe; for his effort was directed towards the supremacy of the law. This he made the basis of the new existence of Israel (cf. Neh. viii.–x.). As the law was exclusively apprehended as the divinely prescribed order of the commonwealth, it was taken from its connection with the history of salvation and its reference to the future of salvation. Thus it became an external ordinance in its letter; and the relation between Jehovah and the people was founded upon this law and its observance. Thus the human attitude towards it received fundamental significance, and it conditioned the higher relationship, instead of that relationship as it had proceeded from Jehovah being the presupposition of this human attitude and conduct as it ought to be. This was the fundamental error of Pharisaism.

2. *The false nationalism of the Apocryphal literature.*—The particularism of the period during which salvation was unfolded in the history of Israel was only a means to an end, and the temporary bearer of the universalistic future as its contents; but the means became more and more the end, and the present took the place of the future. The election of Israel thus appeared as a purely national prerogative, which was regarded as founded on a natural basis, like the prerogatives of other peoples. Thus the national spirit which pervades 1 Maccabees rests, in spite of the zeal shown for the law, essentially upon a mistake regarding the distinction between what is merely national and consequently natural, and what belongs to the history of salvation. With this also disappears

the capacity of estimating what is individual in its significance for the whole, and everything is equally glorified in a rhetorical manner. Deeds and manifestations of a purely worldly disposition are lauded as much as the products of the proper religious spirit and life in Jehovah; and therefore the secular and the sacred are here mixed up with one another without distinction. In like manner the spirit of the Book of Judith is that of a purely worldly and carnal national patriotism; the deed it celebrates may no doubt be outwardly compared with deeds of the time of the Judges, but it has another soul.

3. *External Nomism* becomes combined with this false nationalism. In the Book of *Judith*, there is conjoined with self-willed carnal ways a rigid maintenance of the rules for food, the regulations for purification, and the times of prayer; but this is done in the sense of a merely external legality of works unconnected with the sanctification of the disposition (viii. 4–6, ix. 1). The Book of *Tobias*, which is the product of an exacting sense of piety, praises alms combined with fasting as a means for the forgiveness of sins on the part of God (iv. 11, 12, xii. 9). This inclination to a righteousness by works is also shown in the Book of *Jesus Sirach*, however deserving this product of the religious spirit in Israel otherwise is of manifold recognition. Here, too, a sin-cancelling and generally a saving power is ascribed to alms (iii. 33, xxix. 15). The morality of this book generally is utilitarian and eudæmonistic. Evil is to be avoided on account of the evil consequences, and good is to be done on account of the good consequences, entirely as in the ancient heathen ethics and the common popular morality.—On the other hand, the prophetic element with its Messianic hope retreats into the background in these writings. The future could only be conceived in accordance with the scheme of the present; that is to say, that the present took the place of the future, and the law the place of salvation. It is easy to see how this false self-sufficiency and this absolutizing of the law internally hang together. This, however, is the root of fanaticism. All these phenomena are embraced in Pharisaism, and became a system in Pharisaism.

§ 16. *The Pharisaic Nomism.*[1]

The Pharisaic reflection makes the Old Testament law and its fulfilment the basis and presupposition of the right relationship between man and God, and consequently the exclusive means of salvation. This false absolutizing of the law is, at the same time, a mistaking of its position in the history of salvation, and an externalization of it, as the historically conditioned letter is raised to the position of being the expression of the essential will of God, and that will is thereby perverted by being represented as requiring an external mode of acting through works. But as it is the law of the Israelitish commonwealth, there is also posited therewith a false estimation of the Israelite nationality, and of the fact of outwardly belonging to it as constituting a medium of salvation. Thereby this way of thinking leaves the line of the history of salvation, which has as its goal a moral universalism founded in religion and not in nationality, and determined by purely personal relations and not by external facts. The Pharisaic nomism thus thereby loses itself by passing into the naturalism of the heathen way of thinking.

1. *The Nomocracy.*—The character of the Judaism after the exile, from the time of Ezra and Nehemiah, is nomocratic. Prophecy recedes and ceases. All salvation is expected from the law and from the observance of the law (Ezra ix. 13, 14). This observance advances from its earlier position in which it had to put into practice and manifest faith; and it rather takes the place of faith as the *basis* of the relationship between God and His people. Thus the being occupied with the

[1] Cf. WINER, Realwörterb. ii. 244 ff. EWALD, Gesch. des Volkes Israel, 3 Aufl. 1864 ff., iv. 357 ff., 476 ff. KEIM, Gesch. Jesu v. Naz. 1867, i. 250 ff. SCHÜRER in Riehm's Handwörterb. der bibl. Alterth. ii. 1187 ff. Gesch. d. jüd. Volks u. s. w., 2 Aufl. ii. 325 ff. WELLHAUSEN, Die Pharis. u. Sadd., Greifsw. 1874. WEBER, System der altsynag. paläst. Theol., Lpz. 1880. LAZARUS, Zur Charakteristik der talmudischen Ethik, Bresl. 1879. SIEFFERT, P.R.-E.[2] xiii. 210–244, where the other literature is also given.

Thora and its fulfilment appears as the most important thing in religion. The pious become scribes, the synagogues become schools, and the behaviour of the individual is legally circumscribed down to the least detail. The Thora itself again appears as the highest good, and becomes the centre of the people even when an external centre and external community no longer exist.

2. *The Pharisees.*—In the Pharisees, during the Hasmonean age, this mode of thinking becomes fixed, and constitutes a distinctive party among the people, which as such bears in itself the character of "separation," and is in possession of the religious influence upon the people, while the genteel priestly party of Sadducees are in possession of the political position and power. The principle of the Pharisees is the absolute position and significance which they assign to the Thora. The Thora is the exclusive salvation, life, and light. The religious disposition is therefore love to the Thora as the highest good, and the religious process is the learning and observing of the Thora. Accordingly, legality is the exclusive form of religion. In particular it regulates the offering of prayer, and makes it, as religiosity generally, a performance exactly defined to the most minute details; and it is to be presented to God with the hope of a corresponding performance on the part of God in return, *i.e.* reward. But as such an exact study and such punctual observance of the law in common life and for all, is not possible, it becomes confined to a religious aristocracy who, in their occupation with it, walk on the way of perfection, and whose merit then comes to be available for the good of others. This is the type of a later distinction in the Church, which was also prepared on another side by the ancient philosophy.

3. *Righteousness by works.*—The fundamental error consists in a dislocation of the normal relationship between God and man. The history of salvation had made known the relationship of grace from the side of God, to which faith had to correspond, as the basis of the covenant-fellowship. This fellowship then exhibited itself in the observance of the divine will, and in such a way that the individual and external requirements appeared only as limitations which concealed the germ of universalism. The place of this basis

is now taken by the requirement on the side of God and the corresponding behaviour on the side of man; and then the behaviour of God towards man is also determined accordingly. The place of faith is therefore now taken by the doing of the law; faith itself becomes legal performance; and this partly intellectual and partly practical performance of righteousness then claims recognition from God, so that there is activity on the side of man and passivity on the side of God.[1] Fellowship with God is thereupon always measured according to the amount of this righteousness. This fellowship is therefore continually only in the state of becoming, and is never certain. All this is a prototype of future aberrations, which likewise put the subjective attitude in a false order before the objective relationship.

4. *The national Particularism.*—Now the law regarded as the medium of salvation is the law of Israel; and this is the privilege of Israel before all other peoples. Accordingly Israel itself thus obtains importance as the medium of salvation; and in consequence of this the fact of belonging to Israel has a saving value. The merely historical significance of Israel in reference to salvation is thereby made eternal; and with the law, its nationalism is also made absolute, whereas the other nationalities are declared as such to be unholy and excluded from salvation. This is a negation of the universalism which the particularism of the Old Testament nevertheless carried in its bosom. This sole saving nationality likewise became a prototype of future aberration.

5. *The naturalizing of morality.*—Further, all nationality, including that of Israel as such, belongs to the natural basis of life; and the orders of the external commonwealth accordingly bore the same character in themselves. With the Israelitish nationality the external order of life is therefore also stamped by Pharisaism as conditioning salvation, and consequently as of moral value. Accordingly the moral is placed in the externality of things and practices, *i.e.* in the natural side of the subjective behaviour, instead of in the inward relation of the personal disposition towards the essential will of God, which formed the substance of the

[1] Cf. Schlatter, Der Glaube im N. T., Leiden, 1885, p. 45 ff.

precepts of the law.[1] This is a naturalizing of morality, such as was the case with the ancient paganism. Pharisaism thus diverges from the line of the history of salvation to the path of heathenism, to which it, however, sought to put itself into direct opposition. But it was not an inward opposition of substance, but only an outward opposition of form. Hence its manner is placed in the New Testament on a line with that of heathenism (Matt. vi. 7). Thus the renewal of Pharisaism in the Church could not but be at the same time a renewal of heathenism in a Christian form. Against this Pharisaic principle the proclamation of Christ is directed; and the same holds of the renewed antagonism of Paul, as well as of Luther in a later day.

§ 17. *The Essene Asceticism.*[2]

If Pharisaism represents righteousness by works in the positive and active sense, and its influence upon the national life from the point of view of the Scribe, Essenism represents righteousness by works in the negative and ascetic sense in the form of monastic retirement from the world, and under the point of view of priestly purity.

1. *The Essenes.* — The Essene communities, according to the accounts of Philo and Josephus, numbered about 4,000 members in Palestine. They lived, partly separated from the other Jews in colonies on the Dead Sea, and partly scattered about among the rest of the people. They formed a closed order (*τάγμα*), with strictly regulated conditions of admission and of the order of life. They observed community of goods, abstinence from all luxury and pleasure, and mostly

[1] SCHLATTER, Der Glaube, etc., p. 52: "The Law is resolved into a system of juridical rules which abstracts from the inward life and leaves it relatively free, and only regulates the external side of action, and in it holds itself and God to be satisfied."

[2] ZELLER, Philos. der Griechen, iii. 2, pp. 277–338. RITSCHL, Altkath. Kirche, pp. 179–203. SCHÜRER, Gesch. der jüd. Volkes, 2 Aufl. ii. 1886, pp. 467–493. UHLHORN, P. R.-E., 2 Aufl. iv. pp. 341–344. KEIM, Gesch. Jesu v. Nazara, i. 1867, pp. 282–306. LUCIUS, Der Essenismus in s. Verhss. zum Judenth., Strassb. 1881. DEMMLER, Der Essenismus, Theol. Stud. aus Württbg. 1880, i. 90 ff.

also from marriage. They busied themselves with agriculture and peaceful arts, but they kept away from extensive commerce and similar occupations directed to the acquisition of money, and rejected war, as well as slavery. Their morality consisted in reverence towards God, the practice of justice and mercy, and above all of truthfulness and strict obedience towards superiors. The course of their day was filled up with prayer, labour and ablutions, and religious meals. They prayed at the dawn of the day with their faces turned towards the sun. They kept the Sabbath, but they rejected bloody offerings, and therefore took no part in the temple worship, although they sent votive offerings to the temple.

2. *The negative and ascetic character of their righteousness by works.*—The pre-Christian limitation of a positive objective estimation of the moral is not surmounted here any more than in Pharisaism. Only morality bears here a more negative and ascetic character in itself than in the Pharisaic nomism. Wherever morality is positively, *i.e.* naturally, apprehended along with positive practice of it, there also appears the negative form of ascetic abstinence which is regarded as a higher stage of morality. Such asceticism developed itself on Jewish as well as on heathen soil. This negative morality, with its lauded but fundamentally negative virtues of modesty, meekness, and such like,[1] is at the same time a withdrawal from the public national life, and the renunciation of any influence upon it. The individual seeks only to preserve himself, and gives up the people as such; or, in other words, he renounces the exercise of a moral calling in the world because he despairs of its possibility. The place of the moral calling is taken by the religious shaping of life, but in the form of external practices. This requires, not merely withdrawal from the other life in the world, but also orderly association in a particular community, or the monastic form of life. Monasticism thus took form in Israel among the Essenes as in analogous phenomena on heathen soil.

3. *The point of view of priestly purity.*—The thought which lies at the basis of this striving for self-preservation in retirement from the world, is that the life in the world and the sphere of the natural are as such defiling. This point of view

[1] Joseph. Bell. Jud. ii. 8. 6.

of defilement and purification—by means only of what is natural or physical—was developed by inner necessity in the heathen reflection; and it was likewise developed here on Israelite soil. The Old Testament view of Levitical defilement and purification formed its starting-point; for it seemed that the Law would not require such purifications unless the world of natural things were an impure world. Now, as this purity was required above all of the priests, and as Israel was called a priestly people, that purity has also to exhibit itself in this people. But as this did not apply to the whole people, it should at least hold good of this selection out of the people, and it should exhibit itself in their community. The priestly purity was in this case what the knowledge of the written law and its practice was in the case of Pharisaism. But both lie in the periphery, not in the centre of the personal life and of its immediate relationship to God; and they are therefore not grounded upon true morality and right religion.[1]

4. *Foreign influences.*—It has been maintained that foreign influences operated in the formation of Essenism,—whether originating in Parseeism, as Hilgenfeld and Schürer believe, or in Pythagoreanism, as Zeller holds, or as is most improbable in Buddhism, as others suppose. But it follows from what has been said that it will hardly be necessary to accept any such view. Points of contact are found, but they took form involuntarily. It is only the ascetic view taken of the body as a chain for the soul into which it has been brought by a fall, that appears to lead us beyond the bounds of the Israelitish way of contemplating things. But it was a necessary consequence of the ascetic way of thinking generally; and foreign influences may have worked upon its development without, however, producing it. Essenism is thus to be considered as an Israelitish formation, and it may be regarded as the other, negative side of Pharisaism, but without its influence upon the life of the people. It was not till a later time that its influences were able to make themselves seen in the ascetic tendencies that arose in the

[1] On and against the view of Lucius, who erroneously refers the beginning of the striving of the Essenes after purity to Deut. xxiii. 6–14, see König in Herzog's *Encycl.* (2) xiii. 635.

Church, and that they came into contact with those that sprang out of the soil of the ancient paganism.

III. The Hellenistic Universalism.

§ 18. *Transition to the false Universalism.*

While prophecy taught a future universalism of salvation, and the Chokmah literature represented the God of the history of salvation as the God of the world, the Jewish thinking in the post-canonical time came into contact on the Alexandrian soil with the ancient Philosophy, and particularly with the Stoic system and its cosmical universalism, and the Jewish thinkers turned round towards this Hellenistic universalism. While they sought to find and prove this universalism in the Old Testament, and particularly in the Thora, they believed that thereby they had overcome the Old Testament particularism, and that in it they possessed the true glorification of Israel.

1. *The true Universalism of Israel* is the centre of the Old Testament particularism in two of its forms: prophecy and the Chokmah literature. Prophecy proclaimed the salvation which is attached to Israel and to the House of David, as a salvation destined for all the world. Thus the universalism of salvation grows out of the particularism of the history of salvation. It has found its fulfilment in Christianity. But the voice of prophecy was silent from Malachi, — and the prophetic understanding and interest then sank into the background. The Chokmah literature, however, applied its reflection to the contemplation of the world, and to the divine teleology in the world and in human life; and it advanced from the knowledge of God as given in the history of salvation, and came to regard the God of the historical salvation as also the God of the world.

2. *The cosmical turn of thought.* — With this movement the Hellenistic, and especially the Alexandrian mode of thought comes to connect itself. Through the mixing of the peoples brought about by Alexander the Great, the cosmo-political state of mind and mode of thinking were introduced,

and they had found a place above all in Alexandria. The Alexandrian Judaism now entered within this influence; but it took this turn, that instead of conceiving and exhibiting the God of the revelation of salvation as also the God of the world, as the Chokmah had done, it rather sought to apprehend and exhibit the God of the world as the God of revelation; or, in other words, it resolved the God of salvation into the God of the cosmos, and the revelation of salvation into the cosmos and its laws and orders. This looked like the Old Testament universalism, yet it was nevertheless the opposite of it.

3. *Influences and Motives.*—This turn of Jewish thought was brought about, partly by contact with the Greek world generally, behind whose self-consciousness the Jewish thinkers did not wish to remain. It was also partly brought about by contact with the Greek philosophy, and especially with the Stoic philosophy and its cosmical universalism.[1] As Pharisaism was a shutting up of Judaism against the Greek world and a fixing of itself in the national particularism of Israel, Alexandrinism was the opening up of it towards the Greek world and the reception of the cosmical universalism from the waning philosophy. But if Pharisaism is pride in the prerogative of the particular nationality of Israel over other peoples, this Hellenistic universalism is not less a product of national vanity, which seeks to prove that the knowledge of truth in the Hellenic philosophy was a primeval possession of Israel. But in fact this demonstration is only given by first importing this foreign element into the Old Testament Scriptures, and then showing it to be there by the untruthfulness of the allegorical method. For while it supposes it enriches its own possession by this process, it really only destroys its most essential speciality.

4. *The Old Testament Apocrypha.*—While the other Old Testament Apocrypha indicate the turn to Pharisaism with its righteousness by works and its national particularism, the *Book of Wisdom*, with all its connection with the mode of thinking which is in accordance with the revelation of salvation, shows the beginnings of this cosmical universalism.[2] For, what is here said of wisdom passes over the lines of the Chokmah in Job and Proverbs to the path of emanation and

[1] Heinze, Lehre vom Logos, 1872, p. 184 ff. [2] Heinze, p. 193 ff.

the cosmical principle. This Jewish universalism is distinguished, however, from the Stoic universalism by its monotheistic presupposition which prevents it identifying the reason that rules in the cosmos with the Deity; but it approaches it in this, that it makes the universal principle of wisdom in the world an emanation from the divine Being Himself (vii. 25), and thus obliterates the boundary line between God and the cosmos. As the universal principle it is also the knowledge of the cosmical life, without any reference to the thought of salvation in this knowledge (xvii. 7 ff.). The same principle is beheld as ruling instead of Jehovah in the history of Israel (*e.g.* x. 17). It is also the source of the morality of this book, which is described in the manner of the Stoics according to the four cardinal virtues as they proceed from "wisdom" (viii. 7). The quadruplicity of the division certainly recommended itself here on account of its reference to the cosmos; and in like manner the significance of the Old Testament order is found in its reference, not to the future salvation, but to the cosmos. A likeness to the world is seen in the robe of the high priest, and its four rows of ornaments are emphasized (xviii. 24). In this there already lies the whole principle of the cosmical interpretation of the Law in Philo. It involves a quite different interest from that of the Old Testament. The explanation of the world takes the place of the redemption of the world, and the interest of philosophical knowledge takes the place of the interest of salvation. It is a spurious universalism which is then given out as the prerogative of Israel.

§ 19. *The Philonic Universalism.*[1]

The cosmical universalizing of the Old Testament law is also accompanied in Philo with its resolution into the universal natural law of the Stoics. In the contemplation and observation of this universal law of nature, morality, according

[1] DÄHNE, Gesch. Darst. der jüd. alex. Religionsphilosophie, i. 1839. EWALD, Gesch. des Volks Isr. vi. 268 ff. ZELLER, Philosophie der Griechen, iii. 2, pp. 338–418. HEINZE, Lehre v. Logos, 1872, p. 204 ff. ZÖCKLER, P. R.-E.[2] xi. 636 ff. SCHÜRER, Gesch. des jüd. Volkes, ii. 831 ff., 866 f. Schürer and Zöckler give the rest of the literature.

to Philo's view, consists: only that the religious grounding of morality is monotheistic in Philo, and not pantheistic as in Stoicism. But as his monotheism is not that of the historical salvation but a cosmical monotheism, his ethics were confined within the bounds of naturalism. Philo thus placed morality in spirituality, and consequently resolved the moral ideal into the religious practice of an ascetic negation of nature. And thus his position came to coincide with the religious strivings on the ancient soil, in the sense of an ascetic mysticism and wisdom of life.

1. *The fusion of the Jewish and Hellenic modes of thought* had been prepared in Alexandria, and it was there brought to a conclusion by Philo. He did this by maintaining and pretending that all the higher wisdom of the Hellenes could be shown to be contained in the Thora as an ancient possession of Israel from the time of Moses. In carrying out this view he had to make use of the most arbitrary allegorizing; and in reality what he did was to import those thoughts which arose outside of Israel into the Old Testament literature and reflection, and thereby he divested them of their special and peculiar character. He put the Stoic universalism of the cosmical speculation into the place of the universalism of the prophets which was founded upon the history of salvation, only with the modification which his monotheism required that the Logos of the Stoics, the divine universal Reason of the world, could not be identical with God Himself, as was held by the Stoics, but occupied in his view a middle position between God and the world. But this monotheism also underwent a deflection in the sense of the philosophical speculation. Its God is no longer the concrete God of the positive historical revelation of salvation, but the unqualified (ἄποιος) Monad, in the sense of an abstraction from the world. It is therefore a perfection in the sense of absolute Being, which is on the one hand the negation of the world, and on the other its all-efficient causality. Through this universalism and its antithesis of God and world, to which the antithesis of spirit and matter corresponds, the morality of the system is likewise determined.

2. *The universalism of Philo's moral doctrine.* — The consequence of this universalistic way of thinking was that Philo resolved the positive moral Law of the Old Testament into a universal law of nature, which was the same in the sphere of nature and in morals. With this position the specific character of the moral sphere was annulled. The written Law of Moses was only an outline of the original universal law of nature, according to which the patriarchs already lived and from which the heathen fell away. This law found a symbolical representation in the Law of the Old Testament cultus, but it likewise rose again into consciousness in the Greek reflection, and especially in the moral philosophy of the Stoics. Thus, in accordance with that philosophy, Philo indicates as τὸ τέλος, τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν; and he adopted the four Platonic cardinal virtues of the Stoa, only that Israel already had this knowledge as an ancient possession in the four streams of Paradise as the place of the virtues. The practice of virtue, however, is determined, according to Philo, by the opposition or antithesis of body and soul.

3. *The ascetic character of Philo's ethics.*—The antithesis of soul and body, reason and sense, corresponds to the antithesis of God and the world. The body and its sensuous nature is to Philo the source of all evils; it is the prison, the grave of the soul. In this consists the essence of sin, which is therefore as universal as bodily existence. This, however, is a naturalizing of sin and of morality which, sprung from a heathen root, must have here too the same consequence of an ascetic morality. Philo likewise agrees expressly with the Stoa in other respects, as in the distinction of the wise man and the progressive man, in the description of the wise man, and in the definition of the highest good.[1] In the writing commonly entitled *Quod omnis probus liber* he carries out the proposition that every virtuous man is free, and cites as proofs of it the Greek and Indian gymnosophists and the Essenes, so that he completely represents the later stoical ascetic tendency. Thus in his view the moral task does not consist merely in limitation, but in complete negation of the desires and passions; not in metriopathy but in apathy; and so far as the inevitable natural wants are concerned, the

[1] On the Stoic elements in Philo, see Heinze, u.s. pp. 208 ff., 277.

utmost moderation is to be observed. In this depreciation of all that is external the royal liberty of the wise man is exhibited. Only this moral task is not to be reached and realized by one's own reason and power. The Logos by which this task is to be solved is not in Philo's view, as it was to the Stoics, the proper reason of the universe indwelling in the individual man, but it is the reason and power proper to God, and mediating between God and what is out of the divine. The Old Testament standpoint of Philo therefore modified the moral doctrine of the Stoics in this sense. It involved the position that piety, according to his view, is the mother of the virtues, that reference to God is the right motive of all acting, and that communion with God is the goal of man. Morality is thus more religiously grounded and regulated in Philo than in the Stoics. But this regulation is determined according to the abstract apprehension of the Deity; and thus morality is also negation of the sensuous and cosmical reality in order to belong already in this present life to the spiritual world (the *κόσμος νοητός*). It is always with internal repugnance that the wise man devotes himself even to worldly and political affairs; he sees in them only a necessary evil. His ideal is life in the contemplation of the Divine. The highest stage is ecstasy, in which the individual divests himself of his finite consciousness while relating himself in a purely passive way towards God, abandons sensuous being and thinking, and is filled and moved by the divine Spirit as a will-less organ. It is thus that the finite has part in the infinite. This view of ethics thus issues entirely in that ascetic mysticism which is characteristic of Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neo-Platonism.[1] These symptoms confound the moral task with a purely spiritual elevation, and put the process of moralization in desensualization; and thus with all their opposition to nature they do nevertheless only establish the natural principle of the heathen religion and morality. The truth of morality could only form the opposite of this.

[1] Hence Philo is designated at times in the ancient Church as a Platonist, as in the saying: *ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει* (Hieron. Vir. illustr. c. 11), and at other times as a Pythagorean, as in Clem. Alex. Strom. i. 15. 72: *ὁ Πυθαγόρειος Φίλων*; ii. 19. 100. Euseb. H. E. ii. 4. 3: *μάλιστα τὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἐζηλωκὼς ἀγωγήν.*

4. *The Therapeutic Ideal.*—It is a controverted question as to whether the writing entitled *De vita contemplativa* which has been handed down under Philo's name, and which gives a description of the Therapeutæ, is actually by Philo. It has been rejected, particularly by Lucius,[1] who holds it to be an apology of Christian asceticism written under Philo's name, and dating from the end of the third century. Almost all critical writers, such as Harnack and Schürer,[2] agree with this view. Zeller accepts it, with the modification that the composition is a product of Ebionitic asceticism resting upon dualistic speculation. In any case, the Therapeutæ are to be regarded as essentially different from the Essenes. They do not form an order like the Essenes, but an association of anchorites. Their time was much more exclusively devoted to contemplation and religious exercises. Women also took part in their association, their religious services, and their associated meals. Asceticism is more thoroughly carried out by the Therapeutæ than by the Essenes; their fasts sometimes lasted for a week, and they entirely rejected marriage. It is said that there were "such everywhere in the world; for not only the Greeks, but also the barbarians wished to participate in such a perfect good." Most of them, however, were in Egypt, especially in the region around Alexandria beyond the lake Mareotis, where they formed a colony, living in separate huts. It is said of their sacred dances that they began at first with the men and women separated, and then they were united into one choir (*καθάπερ ἐν βακχείαις ἀκράτου σπάσαντες*). But this seems too much after the fashion of heathens for us to think of Jews or Christians; and the statement about the spread of the Therapeutæ among the Greeks and barbarians points to this view. If what is said in chaps. iii. vii. and viii. concerning the Holy Scriptures does not form an obstacle to this view, we have here the description of an ascetic enthusiastic life which grew up on a natural heathen basis as the ideal of the moral perfection of the true citizen of heaven and the world. Were the writing to be ascribed to Philo, it would be a witness rather to his mingling and confusing of the Old Testament view with the natural heathen way of

[1] Die Therapeuten, 1879.

[2] A. Harnack in *Herzog Encycl.* 2 Aufl. xv. 584 ff. Schürer, u.s. p. 863 f.

thinking. But even if it is not his, and if it is a sort of romantic invention, yet its standpoint is within the consequences of his ethical views. This perversion of moral truth was all the more dangerous on account of its anti-sensual spirituality, because it was more difficult to understand than the original natural growth, and it was time that the truth itself should appear face to face with it.

The particularistic nomism and the Hellenistic universalism were two one-sided positions into which the Old Testament preparation had fallen asunder. Either the particularism had extracted the universalism which formed its kernel, or the universalism had stripped off the particularism, and thus left the path of the historical salvation. In the former case the letter of the Law was declared to be what was universally valid; in the latter case the cosmical universalism was represented as the secret truth of the letter. In the former case, as well as in the latter, the truth of the moral factor was therefore misapprehended and confounded with *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*; and accordingly it was conceived in a wholly positive external way. In both cases, however, it was overlooked that the basis of the position of the individual must be the relationship of grace from the side of God, to which faith from the side of men has to correspond. In the former case, the principle of man's conduct was placed in the righteousness of working, in the latter in the perfection of abstinence. The truth could not but consist in the relationship of grace becoming a reality, and, on that basis, of conduct becoming really moral, as being thus founded on a personal reference to God, and through it also to the world.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

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THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

I.

THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.[1]

I. THE PROCLAMATION OF THE TRUTH IN THE GOSPELS.[2]

§ 20. *The realization of communion and fellowship with God in Christ's person and work.*

THE speciality of the New Testament revelation consists in the actual realization of the previously typified and prepared communion with God in the person and in the work of Jesus Christ by which the objective relationship of the grace of God to men is established; and it forms the necessary presupposition of the corresponding relationship and conduct of man.

1. *Christ as the goal of the preceding history of the Old Testament.*—The Old Testament history is, in the form of the national history of Israel, the history of the process of salvation, *i.e.* of communion or fellowship with God as it becomes realized; and this history is presented in a prior symbolical and typical representation, and in prior prophetic proclamation. This pre-represented and pre-proclaimed future is realized in the person of Jesus Christ in whom the Word became flesh. In this sense He is announced and greeted as He in whom the history of Israel is to find its goal (Matt. i. 1–17; Luke i. 32 f., 55); as He in whom the new day of salvation is to break when Jehovah will visit His people (Luke i. 68 f., 78). The

[1] WEIZSÄCKER, Die Anfänge christlicher Sitte, Jahrbb. f. d. Theol. 1876, pp. 1-36. ALBR. THOMA, Geschichte der christl. Sittenlehre in der Zeit des N.Ts., Haarlem (Sittenlehre Jesu, Pauli, der Gemeinde).

[2] O. FLÜGEL, Die Sittenlehre Jesu, Langensalza (1887), 1888. (Edited from Allihn's MSS. Follows the ideas of Herbart's Moral Philosophy.)

presence of Jehovah in His people is then to be a present fact (*Immanuel:* Matt. i. 23). With this forgiveness of sins is realized (Luke i. 77; Matt. i. 21); and the presupposition of the new covenant prophesied by Jer. xxxi. 34 becomes fact. With this goal of Israel, however, the salvation of the heathen is likewise attained (Luke ii. 31 f.); and therefore the universalism of the new time is also realized (Luke ii. 1: *Cæsar Augustus*). It is therefore this fact, and not new doctrines, laws, notions, and such like, which forms what is new in the new time of fulfilment.

2. *The person of Jesus Christ.*—The significance of this fact rests on the person of Jesus Christ and its significance. The witness of the Synoptic Gospels and that of John complete each other. In the synoptic proclamation, testimony is given to Jesus in His relationship to the Old Testament as the goal of the Old Testament: ὁ Χριστός, the goal of the Old Testament longing (Matt. xiii. 17; Luke x. 24), as the Lord of the House of David (Matt. xxii. 43 f.), the fulfilment of the law (Matt. v. 17), and more than the temple (Matt. xii. 6). He is also represented in His relationship to the community of God as its bridegroom (Matt. ix. 15, xxii. 2); in His relationship to individuals as the goal of every human soul (Matt. xi. 28 f.); and in His relationship to humanity as its goal as the "Son of Man;"[1] and His relation to the world as its Lord (Matt. xiii. 24 ff., 36 ff.), to whom therefore is committed the fate of things for eternity (Matt. xvi. 25; xxv. 34 ff.). In short, He is not merely a part of the world, He has an absolute relationship to the world (Matt. xi. 27); but this rests upon His essential relationship to God, on His Sonship in the absolute sense (Matt. xi. 27). Now this relationship forms the theme of the Johannine proclamation. Christ is represented in the Gospel of John as having independent possession of the divine life (v. 26); as in fellowship with the divine working (v. 17 ff.), and of divine capability, resting upon the community of essence of Father and Son and their complete union in each other (x. 33, 38). He is therefore the absolute revelation, and the presence of the Father Himself (xiv. 9 ff.; chap. xvii.); wherefore He also claims a corresponding recognition (v. 27). This goes far

[1] Cf. the works on N. T. Theology, and Grau's Selbstbewusstsein Jesu, 1887.

beyond mere harmony of will, and includes an essential relation of being in itself, which on that account is eternal. There is therefore a new relationship between God and man actually realized in the Person of Jesus Christ; and through this there is given for men in Him the real principle of sonship with God, and fellowship with God, which is then also the norm and power of their conformity with God.

3. *The Word of Jesus Christ.*—The salvation of fellowship with God concluded in Jesus Christ, is expressed by Him in the word of His testimony. This testimony is therefore a bringing home of the conviction both of the necessity and of the helplessness of men as regards salvation in behoof of repentance; as well as of the reality of salvation in Him, and therefore of the saving grace of God in behoof of faith. This testimony accordingly opens up a new knowledge of the moral reality of man in distinction from the moral knowledge of the ancient world. Sin is no longer known as error or obscuration of insight, but as a central perversion of the person, as a matter of the heart in its relationship to God. "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." This leads to an entirely different moral estimate of life from that which was current in the ancient world. Corresponding to it, the way of salvation is no longer placed in knowledge, and rising by it to the world of the divine, but it is recognised in the gift of God as given in the person of Christ, and its appropriation in repentant faith. With this there is opened up the possibility of a real new moral power and actuality.

4. *The work of Christ.*—The will of God actualized in Him and witnessed in His word, had to be fulfilled by Christ in the work of His life, and He had thus to make it a constituent part of the history of mankind. This is the "counsel of God" (*βουλή*, Luke vii. 30), the divine *θέλημα* (Matt. xxvi. 42; John iv. 34, and elsewhere) and *ἐντολή* (John x. 18 and frequently); and it makes His doing and suffering a unique *ἔργον* (John iv. 34, xvii. 4). The point of this His life-work is His death. His course of life tended to this from the beginning. He refers to His death as the condition of His significance for the future (John x. 17), and foretells it —always the more clearly—as the necessary issue of His life; and in founding the memorial of the last evening, He calls it the

new covenant, which rests upon the forgiveness of sin: εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν (Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.). He passes through His death on to the new activity which He has to exercise from God over the whole world (John xvii.), and which is actively carried out through His Spirit in the activity of those who are His on earth (John xiv. 16 ff., xv. 1 ff., xvi. 7 ff.; Matt. xxviii. 18 ff.).

5. *The new relationship of God to men* which is thus realized in Christ is the *Father-relationship:* not in the sense of creation, but in the sense of redemption. For in and with Christ, the Son of God in the absolute sense, the fatherly relation of God to those who are Christ's is also given as a new relationship. Since then, we call God "our Father" (Matt. vi. 9), not merely as Homer called Zeus the father of gods and men, nor as the Romans spoke of Diespiter (Diei pater).[1] For what was given in Adam who "was God's" (Luke iii. 38), and what had then become in Israel a father-relationship of Jehovah to this people, is now realized in Christ for all men, but only in Him; for in Him they are God's (John xvii.). This objective fact is the presupposition of all that is subjective.

§ 21. *The human Answer of Faith.*[2]

The God-produced principle of conduct, corresponding to the self-witness of Jesus, is Faith, which appropriates the new relationship of grace, and thus makes man participative of the salvation of communion and fellowship with God as it is realized in Christ.

1. *The requirement of faith.* — In the person and life-work of Jesus Christ, the salvation of fellowship with God for salvationless humanity is realized and concluded; and it is authenticated in the Word in behoof of its appropriation in faith, which appropriation is effected through the knowledge of man's want of salvation. The Word thus becomes the principle and object of faith (John iv. 41 f.), which has Christ Himself as the salvation for its subject, and therefore in His

[1] Cf. Zinzow, Der Vaterbegriff bei den röm. Gottheiten 1887.

[2] Schlatter, Der Glaube im N. T. Eine Untersuchung zur neutest. Theologie, Leiden 1885.

inner essence and significance. Thereby faith obtains here quite another significance from what it had in the Jewish nomism. In the latter, it is a thing accomplished by man, in itself only an intellectual operation, along with which comes the practical side of works; and for this double performance reward is expected from God. Man is thus put into activity, God into passivity. In the New Testament representation God's deed is the primary and fundamental thing, and man is relegated to acceptance and reception of the divine performance in faith. In this sense faith is demanded by Jesus from the beginning to the end. And this is not merely in the Gospel of John where faith determines the whole progress of the Gospel record, but also in the Synoptists. For, the Sermon on the Mount, because primarily spoken to the disciples (cf. Luke vi. 20), also implies faith in Him, because it presupposes discipleship. And in like manner the same holds of the miracles of healing; they are done in accordance with faith (Matt. ix. 27 ff.), and always according as faith seeks mere external healing or essential healing, which is the forgiveness of sin or the relationship of grace in Jesus (Matt. ix. 1 ff.). Nor was it her love which availed the woman who was a sinner (Luke vii. 36 ff.),[1]—it only proved the reception of forgiveness,—but it was that faith (vii. 50) which consoled itself with the grace of forgiveness.

2. *The essential nature of faith* is formally a thing of inwardness and freedom; it does not consist of a doing, but of an inner personal relationship, perhaps occasioned by external signs and wonders, yet not resting ultimately upon these, but loosened from them and resting upon the Word (cf. John iv. 47 ff., and the interpretation in my commentary). That is to say, faith is called forth by the impression of the person of Jesus Himself made through the medium of the word; and it is therefore a personal relationship to the person of Jesus, and, moreover, an all-sided, because central relationship. And hence it is designated as contemplative and appropriating cognition (*θεωρεῖν*, John [iii. 15] vi. 40; *γινώσκειν*, John vi. 69, x. 38, xvii. 6 – 8), as entering into and agreeing with the will (*λαμβάνειν*, John iii. 11 f.;

[1] Against the common Roman Catholic interpretation as well as that of De Wette, Olshausen, Baum.-Crus., and Bleek, which is contrary to the connection.

ἔρχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, John iii. 20 f., v. 40, vi. 35, 37, 44, 45, 65; ἀκούειν τῆς φωνῆς, John x.; ἀκολουθεῖν, John viii. 12); as inmost appropriation (eating and drinking of His flesh and blood, chap. vi.); and so community and fellowship (chap. xvii.).

3. *The operation of faith* is reception of salvation (Luke xix. 9) imaged forth in the miracles of healing, and especially of the forgiveness of sin (Luke vii. 48), or of renewed sonship or adoption (Luke xv.); and therefore of the grace-relationship of God to men realized in Christ. Along with this, it is negatively deliverance from the previous oppressive burden which prevented the attainment of joyfulness (Matt. xi. 28, 30); or, objectively expressed, it is liberation from the wrath of God (John iii. 36), rescue from a world hostile to God, and with this it is preservation from judgment and destruction (κρίσις, v. 24, xii. 31; ἀπώλεια, iii. 16 ff.), or from death (John v. 24, etc.). Positively, it is saving, salvation (σωτηρία, John iii. 17), God-childship (John i. 12 f.), through regeneration (John iii.), in communication of life (iii. 15 f., v. 24, 39, etc.) and of light (iii. 19, ix. 4, 5, xii. 35 f.). In short, it is a new real saving relationship.

§ 22. *The new disposition of Faith.*

This new relationship to God in faith is likewise the power of a new principle of conduct in the renewed disposition, which begins with the subjective change of repentance, manifests itself in love to God and to our neighbour, and puts forth its activity in prayer and trust in God.

1. *The new relationship between God and man which is historically realized in Christ, and which becomes appropriated by man through faith,* is the presupposition of the new mode of conduct; the new being is the presupposition of what-is-to-be, etc., and not conversely. In this consists the difference between the moral doctrine of Jesus and the nomistic ethics of Israel and of the heathen world. That appropriation in faith of the new relation between God and man actually presented in Christ, is realized in an inward state of disposition wrought by God which has its beginning in *repentance* as the presupposition of faith. Μετανοεῖτε is the first exhortation

of Jesus as well as of the Baptist (Matt. iv. 17); and there is joy in heaven over a sinner that repenteth (Luke xv. 7, 10). In repentance, conversion is accomplished as the turning away from our own old nature and turning unto God (ἐπιστροφή, Luke xxii. 32). Its constituent elements, as shown by the history of the Prodigal Son or the publican in the temple, are self-knowledge, self-humiliation, self-judgment (Luke xv. 17, 21, xviii. 13, 14). Out of this feeling of spiritual poverty (Matt. v. 3 f.) and oppression (Matt. xi. 28) grows the hunger and thirst after God and His grace (Matt. v. 6; John vii. 37). And thus is realized the return to God in faith which makes the objective salvation given in Christ a personal fact of the individual in his relationship to God.

2. *Love* is the manifestation and verification of faith. The Sermon on the Mount describes love (Luke vi.) as the true righteousness (Matt. v.–vii.), not as a new law or as a perfecting of the Mosaic law[1] in the subjective disposition; but because the words are spoken primarily to the disciples under presupposition of attachment to Jesus in faith, as an exhibition of the disposition which must be proper to faith, if it is to be of a right kind. Love is thus described as love to God above everything, with denial of all else (Matt. x. 37 f.) and to our neighbour without any distinguishing and questioning (Luke x. 25 ff.). In contrast to the atomistic exposition of the law by the Scribes and fulfilment of the law by the Pharisees, Jesus designates this love as properly the one and essential will of God, as it lies at the basis of all that is individual in the law.

Jesus elsewhere gives as the sum "of the law and the prophets," a resumé which sounds purely formal, and such as might also be laid down by prudence, as in Matt. vii. 12: "All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them." Yet in this there is implied an appreciation of others which puts them on equality with our own person, and from that point of view it takes the positive rule of behaviour. This distinguishes this expression from those other apparently parallel maxims in the Apocrypha (Tob. iv. 16), in the Rabbis, and in Greco-Roman writers, which all issue in the negative thought: what

[1] Against Ritschl, Altkath. Kirche, 36 ff. Cf. Hofmann, Schriftb. i. 598 f.

you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to others. This is an expression of selfishness, whereas the other is an expression of love which loves a neighbour as oneself.

Jesus teaches His disciples to actualize *the relationship to God* above all in prayer as that inward intercourse with God, which has only God and not men in view, and to which the subject itself is of chief importance, and not the using of many words (Matt. vi. 5 ff.). Moreover, prayer has to subserve the activity called forth for the kingdom of God (John xiv. 13 f., xv. 16); it has to be made auxiliary to one's own inner life (Luke xi. 5–13), and self-preservation in dangers bearing on the state of one's salvation (Matt. vi. 41). He further teaches that this relationship is to be actively carried out in firm trust in God (Matt. vi. 25 ff., x. 29 f.) and in undaunted confession (Matt. x. 32 f.), as well as in the denial for God's sake of all that is earthly, even of what is dearest, such as father and mother, if it must so be (Matt. x. 34 ff.); and not less is it likewise to be carried out in active labour in the service of the kingdom of God (Luke v. 10; John xv. 16).

Jesus teaches His disciples to actualize *the relationship to others* in reconcilableness (Matt. v. 23 ff.; Luke xii. 58; Matt. xviii. 21 ff.; Luke xvii. 3), in the patience which beareth and does not seek to get its rights,—for so are the much misinterpreted words in Matt. v. 38 ff. to be understood. It is also to be actualized in the active manifestation of love towards the poor and needy (Matt. xxv. 34 ff.), as also towards the stranger (Luke x. 30 ff.), and even towards enemies (Matt. v. 34 ff.); in humility, in mutual subordination (Matt. xviii. 1 ff.), in consideration for the weak (Matt. xviii. 6 ff.), in keeping marriage sacred (Matt. xix. 3 ff.); and in recognition of human order (Matt. xxii. 17 ff.). When Jesus demands under certain circumstances, renunciation of earthly possession (Matt. xix. 16 ff.), or declares riches to be an obstacle to the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xix. 24), it is not the possession of riches as such and in themselves which He means, but it is the hanging of the heart upon them to which He points. Likewise in the case of the rich man (Luke xvi. 19–31), it is not the riches themselves but the non-application of them to relieving want and filling up extreme differences of condition for which He announces condemnation in the other world. It is therefore

always the disposition that is dealt with, corresponding to the whole character of the moral doctrine of Jesus. In like manner the words in Luke xi. 41: "Howbeit, give for alms those things which ye can; and behold all things are clean unto you," are not meant to convey the meaning that possession in itself would be unclean, but Jesus means the selfishness that clings to possession. Giving alms is a manifestation of freedom from earthly possession as well as a way to become inwardly free therefrom; and hence the Lord praises mercy not merely in words, but also was an example of it and a guide to it. Again, that Jesus, according to Luke's account of the Sermon on the Mount, in calling the poor, the hungry, and the mourners blessed, did not mean those who are externally so as such, and that He did not speak thus in the common Ebionitic sense, follows at once from the fact that the words were primarily addressed to His disciples who never lacked anything (Luke xxii. 35). Hence, in like manner, the woe pronounced over the rich (Luke vi. 24) is not to be understood of the rich in the sense of external possession as such, as if riches in themselves were damnable.[1] Jesus is speaking of what His disciples have to expect on account of Him in the present time, but this suffering will be converted in the future into joy; whereas the men of the world have now already all they desire, so that the time of the revelation of the kingdom of God has for them no further consolation, but then the hungering and thirsting, etc., will in their case begin. It is far from being the case, then, that in such utterances of Jesus, or at least in these accounts of them, expression was given to the ideal of perfection, which is characteristic of "the ascetic view of the world."[2]

3. *The position of Jesus towards the law* is expounded in the Sermon on the Mount. It is not merely the extension of

[1] Cf. Hofmann, Die h. Schrift N. T. viii., 1 Ev. Luk. 1878, p. 159 ff.

[2] So Keim, Gesch. Jesu, ii. 232: "The coarse, naked Ebionitism with the war-cry of outward poverty in contrast to riches." Holtzmann, Neutest. Einl. (1 Aufl.) 380, refers to "the ascetic view of the world to which the want of possession appears as perfection." Even B. Weiss in his Leben Jesu, ii. 61 (cf. i. 83, and his Com. on Matt. 1876, p. 135, and Bib. Theol. des N. T. 4 Aufl. 1884, § 137*b*), speaks of "the ascetic view (of the Gospel of Luke), which sees in riches *in se* something sinful, and therefore holds the giving them up and distributing them as alms to be the only way of purifying oneself from them," although he adds that Jesus Himself was far from holding this view.

the law to the disposition, so that the ceremonial law (cultus Sabbath, sacrifices, etc.) was conceived by Him as continuing to exist till His return, and explained as relative only in contrast to the commandment of love; but He wishes to bring the Old Testament law and the whole law to actualization. This He does by showing forth the proper will of God, and how it lies at the basis of all that is individual in the law and will be fulfilled in all. Hence the fulfilment of the law is in the disposition corresponding to it, and the power of this fulfilment is constituted by faith in Him.

4. In this separation of the moral from all that is ritual and legal lies *the independence of the moral* from all that is positive, and the possibility of practising the moral in the most varied forms and orders of the external life. This, again, at the same time involves the recognition of these external orders of life, *i.e.* of the earthly calling, and of its being equally fitted in all its variety of forms for the practising of that moral fulfilment of the essential will of God.—For, this world of the disposition belongs to the *inwardness of the personal life* in its relationship to God; and thereby morality is separated not merely from the external phenomenon which comes into view (cf. Matt. vi. 1 ff.) as a process between the soul and God, but it is also separated from the spheres of customary observance and legal right. It is separated from the former, as, for instance, when it is said in Matt. xv. 11: "Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which proceedeth out of the mouth;" and from the latter, as in His refusing to decide the dispute about inheritance (Luke xii. 14). This separation of these spheres is in opposition to all the Jewish as well as heathen morality prior to Christianity which was characterized by the confounding and mixing up of these different spheres. In other words, Christianity has discovered the world of personality in its independence of all external law and all that is positive and natural; and in this reference of personality to God it has established the absoluteness, unity, inwardness, and universality of the moral in distinction from the ancient world. The philosophy of the Stoics and the Cynics had a presentiment of this and sought after it, but could not attain it.

§ 23. *The new order of things in the Kingdom of God.*[1]

Jesus, attaching His teaching to the Old Testament, proclaimed the Kingdom of God as the new order of things; and He represented this order as having to realize itself through God's revelation of grace and men's faith as a divine fellowship of forgiveness through grace, and as a human fellowship in the disposition of love. This order is further represented as already belonging in its inner subsistence to the present, as destined for all peoples, and as tending to a historical completion and to a corresponding external embodiment in the future æon.

1. The Kingdom of God, according to the Synoptic accounts, formed the chief theme of the preaching of Jesus (Matt. iv. 17, x. 7, and frequently). His proclamation was attached to the Davidic Solomonic prototype presented in the Old Testament (cf. the Psalms, especially ii., xlv., lxxii., cx.), and to the prophetic annunciation of the Messianic kingdom (*e.g.* Micah iv. 1–4; Isa. xlv. 29; and particularly Dan. ii. 44, vii. 14 ff.). This Kingdom is called *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Luke), because a government of God; *β. τῶν οὐρανῶν* (Matt.), because it is realized from heaven upon earth; and to this it bears in itself a corresponding characteristic. It is designated, partly as present (*ἤγγικεν*), Matt. iv. 7, x. 7; *βιάζεται*, xi. 12, and elsewhere; *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν* (Luke xvii. 21); and partly as a future kingdom (Matt. vii. 21, viii. 11, xiii. 43, and frequently). According to the parables in Matt. xiii., it is founded by God's word; it is a secret power and of infinite value, but it has a mixed existence on earth, and thus a process of sifting is before it.

2. *The essence of the Kingdom of God* is primarily the good

[1] Hess, Vom Reiche Gottes, 11 Aufl., Zürich 1781. Kern der L. vom Reiche Gottes, 1819. Keil, Historia dogmatis de regno Messiæ Christi et app. ætate, 1781 (Opuscula acad. ed. Goldhorn 1821, p. 22 sqq.). Flatt, De notione vocis *βασ. τ. οὐρ.* 1794, 4. Theremin, Die Lehre von göttlichen Reiche, 1823. Fleck, De regno divino, Lips. 1829. See also the Theologies of the N. T.; Ritschl's Rechtf. u. Vers. iii. 13 ff., and his Unterricht, etc. § 56; and Herm. Schmidt, Die Kirche, etc., Lpz. 1884, p. 12 ff.

which consists of fellowship in the grace and life of God; for it comes with the tidings of the forgiveness of sins (cf. the baptism of John) and with regeneration (John iii. 3 ff.); and it is (in the Gospel of John) identical with the fellowship of the divine life in Christ (John iii. 15, and frequently). On the ground of this, it is further the task and fellowship of the corresponding disposition of love (Matt. v. ff.; Luke vi. 20 ff., etc.; John xiii. 34 f., etc.) in the community of the believers (ἐκκλησία), which accordingly is the earthly place of the Kingdom of Heaven (cf. Matt. xvi. 18, 19: the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven). That is to say, it is the fellowship of the forgiving grace of God and of the disposition of love.

3. The *Universalism* of its destination is grounded in this divineness of its origin and the inwardness of its essence. For, everything is delivered to Christ by the Father (Matt. xi. 27); and all nations are to be gathered into His community, and thereby to share in His kingdom (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19). Its field is the world (Matt. xiii. 38). This universalism of the proclamation of Jesus is opposed in principle both to the particularism of the nomistic Pharisaism and to the cosmical universalism of the Hellenistic Alexandrian Judaism, as well as to the unbroken ancient national particularism and to the pantheistic cosmopolitanism of the expiring ancient world. Thus does Christianity show itself as a specifically new principle.

4. The *objections* to the moral doctrine of Jesus have been summarized in recent times with the greatest acuteness by D. F. Strauss. In the concluding remarks of his later popular *Life of Jesus* (1864), he finds essential lacunæ in the sketch of Jesus: "The life of man in the family retreats into the background with this teacher, who Himself was without a family. His relationship towards the State appears a purely passive one. He is averse to acquisition of property, not merely for Himself because of His calling, but He is also visibly disinclined to it; and all that concerns art and the beautiful enjoyment of life remains completely outside of His circle of vision." "These lacunæ are not of such a kind that they only lack completeness in detail while the regulating principle was given; but there is lacking from the outset the right conceptions with reference to the state in particular, and

to acquisition and art." Again in his last book on the *Old Faith and the New* (2nd ed. 1872), Strauss speaks still more sharply. He compares Christianity with Buddhism, and says: "Sakiamuni was a nihilist; Jesus, a dualist." "In fact, the Christian dualism has essentially the same consequences as the Buddhistic nihilism as regards the contemplation and guidance of human life and its relationships. Nothing that may here present itself as aim and object to human activity has a real value; all striving and aspiring after such is not vain merely, but even hinders man from attaining his true destination, whether this is called 'nothing' or 'Kingdom of Heaven.' The utmost possible passivity of attitude, with the exception of that activity which is requisite for the relieving of the suffering of others, or for the glorification of the redeeming insight (whether it be the doctrine of Buddha or of Christ), leads most surely to the goal. Accordingly the striving after earthly goods, and even the possession of such in so far as one does not voluntarily divest himself of them, is pre-eminently of evil," etc.[1] These views have been appropriated and repeated, particularly by Ziegler in his History of Christian Ethics.[2] But all this rests upon a complete misunderstanding of the work and significance of Jesus. He had not to set forth a programme for the fulfilment of the tasks of culture on their various sides, but He came to redeem from sin and its guilt, and in the faith of this salvation to waken love to God and to our neighbours. This love is the soul of all activity, not merely of the so-called negative virtues, but also of all possible fulfilment of duty, so that it was enough to prepare for it a place on earth, in order thereby to put the right soul also into the fulfilment of the tasks of culture.[3]

Strauss and Ziegler likewise speak of the *dualism* of Jesus, as distinguished from the Buddhistic nihilism. Now Jesus undoubtedly recognises transcendent motives as well as a

[1] See further what he says (p. 65) on the want of the domestic and family life; and (p. 80) that Jesus must become more alien to mankind as a religious teacher from day to day.

[2] Against Ziegler, see my review of his book in the Theol. Lit. Bl. 1886, Nr. 37.

[3] See also as against Strauss: Pezold, Theol. Stud. aus Württemberg, 1881, pp. 227–250, 314–338; and J. Köstlin, Ueber die Weltflüchtigkeit d. Christenth., Deutsch-evang. Blätter, 1877, p. 641 ff.

transcendent goal, just because He knows a transcendent God; but every theistic mode of thinking is dualistic, and every system of ethics is likewise such as long as it is religious. But this is quite a different kind of dualism from that which afterwards lay at the basis of the ethics of the Roman Church, which represented the heavenly life and the natural life in this world as two opposites that excluded each other. When the advocates of these views (and Ziegler in part agrees with them) find *asceticism* in Jesus, the one passage referring to Him as "a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber," which was certainly not invented, is sufficient to overthrow completely all representations regarding the ascetic impression which Jesus is said to have made. We may add that His first miracle—at least according to the Gospel of John—was the miracle of making wine at Cana; that He accepted invitations even to the houses of opponents in genteel surroundings; that a banquet was given in honour of Him at Bethany before His death; that He was not displeased at the "waste" of the precious spikenard, etc.; and in view of these facts there remains nothing of the ascetic and monastic exemplar to found upon. The same holds true with regard to the alleged contempt of nature and *hostility to nature*, attributed to Jesus and the primitive Christianity. The well-known words of Jesus about the lilies of the field, and the birds of the air, and the sparrows on the roofs of the houses, not one of which perishes without God's will, show such a pure joy in Nature and her life that one cannot truly speak here of hostility to nature. "To Christianity," says Ziegler (p. 419), "man as natural is at the same time the sinful man, and hence—let the expression be taken in my regard as gently as you can—it is hostile to man and hostile to nature. It is only when man is regarded as the object and receptacle of grace that he becomes worthy and interesting; and—as the Middle Ages carried out this line of thought—he is worthless and of no account without the Church, which introduces and mediates this process of grace." But against this whole train of thoughts Jesus, the friend of children,—to pass over all else,—enters His protest. The objection rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding. Undoubtedly in the view of Jesus too, and not merely in that of Paul, the natural man is the sinful man; but man is not

such by creation, but as a fallen being. Yet even as fallen he is "interesting" to God. Does not God make His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and send His rain on the just and the unjust?

With very special emphasis it has also been alleged by the advocates of these views, that Jesus could not have attributed any value to *labour* which takes care for the morrow; and accordingly that no words of His are found which recommend labour. Hence it is said further by Ziegler (p. 200), that "the more Christian monasticism is not the monasticism of the West, which is laborious, which cultivates the ground, which tends the sick, copies codices, and teaches children; but the contemplative and idle monasticism in the monasteries of the East, which shuns the world." But it may be asked if Paul, who said, whoever will not work, let him also not eat, could have actually sketched such a different view as fundamentally that of his Master? Or, again, it may be asked, is such a view compatible with the other passage, that he who provides not for his household is worse than a heathen? But it is conceivable that Paul had occasion to call to mind the duty of labour; for he wrote to Greeks, among whom the appreciation of labour and the taking pleasure in it were very deficient, as is well known. The position, however, was quite otherwise in Israel, where even every Rabbi must have learned a trade. To have exhorted men there to the duty of labour would have been strange, because it was entirely superfluous. The appreciation of labour which the Greco-Roman world owes to Christianity, springs in fact from Judaism. Jesus assumes it to be self-evident that men labour and have to labour. The householder in the parable (Matt. xx. 1 ff.) goes out in the morning to hire labourers for his vineyard; and the labourers who stand idle in the market wait for work, and at evening they receive their hire. The Lord expresses as a self-evident principle the proposition that the labourer is worthy of his hire. (Matt. x. 10; Luke x. 7); and the fact that this expression is repeated in 1 Tim. v. 18, and even appears as a proverb, shows that this principle was regarded as unquestionable even in the Christian circles of the earliest time. And the justification and duty of labour were evidently combined with the reminiscences of the Lord, as is manifest from the

way in which He is remembered when it is stated that the Nazarenes designated Him not only as the "carpenter's son" (Matt. xiii. 35), but as the "carpenter" (Mark vi. 3); and they therefore knew Him from His work in this calling until the higher calling of His life took its place. Besides, there is also a non-canonical passage which is preserved in the interesting manuscript D at Luke vi. 4, and which by its paradoxical form as well as by the freedom of its attitude towards the law seems to preserve a genuine expression of Jesus. According to this passage, when Jesus saw a man working on the Sabbath, He said to him: "O man, if thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed; but if thou dost not know it, thou art cursed, and a transgressor of the law,"—an expression which indeed refers primarily to the right attitude towards the Sabbath commandment, but which also includes as a presupposition the right and duty of labour. Hence there is no reason for holding that Jesus did not appreciate labour.

Undoubtedly Jesus "has attributed no worth to the *acquisition of riches.*"[1] It was not a part of His office to recommend this, nor did He need to recommend it; for men are wont, and certainly the Jews of that time were wont, to be careful about acquiring riches without any recommendation. But this practice has in itself no moral worth. The calling of Jesus was not to attend to the instructing of men with reference to values in political economy, but to what was of moral value. It needs no demonstration to show that moral dangers lie in riches. That Jesus regarded poverty as likewise not without danger, is shown by His warnings against anxious care as to what we shall eat, what we shall drink, and wherewithal we shall be clothed. For these are usually the cares of the poor, and not of the rich. Riches were not in His view an absolute hindrance to the kingdom of heaven, but he warns His hearers against the folly of *πλεονεξία*. For He reminds them in Luke xii. 15 that it is not greatness of possession that helps one to continue in life. This is the meaning of the parable of the man who believed that by the rich product of his land he had richly secured his life for a long time. But riches bring the loss of eternal life when

[1] Ziegler, p. 66.

the soul of a man so hangs upon them that he neglects to strive after what is essentially good because of them. This, however, is an estimate of earthly goods which has always been fully justified, even where the life of labour is carried to the highest.

It likewise rests upon a misunderstanding when it is further maintained that Jesus saw in *marriage* and the family generally a "fetter" and impediment in the way of participating in the kingdom of heaven, and that He therefore gave a higher place to the unmarried state.[1] Undoubtedly Jesus speaks of those who had "made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake," *i.e.* had got rid of sexual desire. But it also holds good of the married that they must be able to make this renunciation. Jesus Himself belonged exclusively to His redemptive calling. He had not to give the example of the father of a household; He was the householder (*οἰκοδεσπότης*) in the circle of His disciples; and thus He also demanded from those who entered into the fellowship of His calling that they must be able to resolve to abandon house and home, etc., for the sake of this calling. He has, however, expressly referred to marriage itself as founded and ordered by God (Matt. xix. 4); and thus He has fully recognised it and morally appreciated it. Moreover, He was also "subject to His parents" till His calling claimed Him entirely. For the sake of this calling He undoubtedly knew neither father nor mother, nor brother and sister. Yet He did not depart from life without caring for His mother even on the cross; and He thus assigned the duty of a son to His favourite disciple, the fulfilment of which He therefore undoubtedly regarded as compatible with his calling as a disciple.

Further, Ziegler thinks that Jesus showed "a certain indifference towards *political life*." He deduces this from the well-known words: "Give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." Now, undoubtedly Jesus did "renounce all earthly Messiahship," but this He did just on account of His true Messiahship. A Barcochba might put himself into the service of the "national hope;" but such a one just showed himself thereby to be a false messiah. The "national hopes" were living enough in

[1] Ziegler, p. 66.

Israel without this, and were taking a questionable form. A true Messiah had to turn away the thoughts of men from these hopes, and to direct them upon the one thing needful, but not to be a sort of political demagogue. This celebrated passage, with its separation of the two spheres, has been lauded by Guizot among others as the fundamental expression of the new Christian political order. It thus undoubtedly involves a political principle of the richest and most fruitful nature; and all the political wisdom of antiquity did not attain to its "political" wisdom. Nor is it easy to see how the words used regarding the temple tax (Matt. xvii. 27) display an almost "anxious passivity." They are rather words bearing on the care of the soul, and addressed to those who cannot understand the higher liberty of Jesus and of His followers. The consideration in question is a command of love which contains the kernel of the moral doctrine of Jesus. As Jesus not merely taught this doctrine, but practised it and made it active in the world, He thereby made a power of life active which manifested itself as an efficient impelling principle on all sides of real life, including the life of civilisation and culture.

II. The Apostolical Proclamation.

§ 24. *The Jewish-Christian Proclamation.*[1]

The Jewish-Christian proclamation, as specially represented by James, brings into prominence that side of Christian morality according to which it is the higher fulfilment of the Old Testament law.

1. *The common evangelical basis* presented in the Gospels of all the Apostolical proclamation of morality, consists in the knowledge that the presupposition of all Christian morality is the new relationship between God and man as it is established in Christ, and as it becomes a reality also for the individual through faith. Thereby it is lifted far above all mere moralism, which aims at working out the relationship by one's own conduct, even upon that stage which

[1] C. F. Schmid, Neutest. Theol. p. 387 ff. Wold. Schmidt, Der Lehrgehalt des Jak.-Briefs, Lpz. 1869; and the other N. T. Theologies.

accentuates the agreement and harmony of the Old Testament and the New.

2. *The Jewish-Christian proclamation*, which forms the first stage of the apostolical proclamation, naturally makes prominent the agreement of the New Testament with the Old Testament, and it thus designates Christian morality as the higher fulfilment of the Old Testament law.—*The Epistle of James* represents this stage. Of a predominantly practical and moral character, it accentuates the moral activity in which faith has to exhibit itself, and therefore puts the Christian life under the point of view of the *Law*: not of a natural law, but of the Old Testament moral Law (ii. 10), which is at the same time the New Testament Law, just because it is the holy will of God. But this law is not an external ordinance, but *νόμος ἐλευθερίας* (ii. 12), and therefore also *νόμος τέλειος* (i. 25). The presupposition of its fulfilment, however, by which it is a law of liberty, is the new birth out of the seed of the (New Testament) word of truth (i. 18). Through this real principle of morality the Christian life, as well as the moral doctrine here presented, is raised above all moralism. For all conduct rests upon the new (objective) principle of the divine *πνεῦμα* (iv. 5), and the (subjective) principle of faith. For although James knows a "dead," "idle" (*ἀργή*, ii. 20) faith which exists only in words (ii. 14, 18), yet the true faith is perfected (*ἐτελειώθη*) in works, to which it is co-operative (*συνήργει*, ii. 22). Accordingly, all fulfilment of the Law (*δικαιοσύνη*) is grounded through the new creative activity of the word of God and the inward reception of it in faith. But this is the new principle of the Christian morality. James turns this principle against the temptations and dangers which the external position of his readers brought with it (i. 2–ii. 13, indicating the difficulties arising from the limited form of the Christian community and from the striving after human favour). He also turns it against the vices of the old Jewish nature which were carried over into the Jewish-Christian circles. Thus there was found, first, in the sphere of the spiritual life a one-sided doctrinalism which was proud of the prerogative of better knowledge, but which denied the moral power of faith (ii. 14 ff.), combined with positiveness and the other evils

which followed from that obscuration of knowledge (iii. 1 ff.); secondly, in the sphere of the worldly life there was the false desire of acquisition and hardheartedness springing from the lust of having (iv. 13 ff.). In contrast to all this, James sets forth (v. 7 ff.) the right attitude and conduct, namely, patient waiting for the future coming of the Lord which does not allow itself to be dispirited through suffering, the reliance of prayer, and mutual correction.

§ 25. *The Gentile-Christian proclamation.*[1]

The Gentile-Christian proclamation is primarily represented by Paul. In its exposition of the Christian life it especially accentuates the element of freedom or liberty, posited with the new relation of Sonship to God, and given in the spirit of Jesus Christ as the principle of the new life of the Christian, in opposition both to the slavery of sin and to the limitedness of the law. And, on the other hand, this liberty is exhibited in contrast to the world of creation, and in the service of love, in free subordination under the orders of the natural and Christian life of communion and fellowship, as well as in the observance of the common Christian practice of morality.

1. *Paul's calling* was pre-eminently the proclamation of the Gospel in the Gentile world. The character of his preaching was thereby more exactly determined. On the one side, it had to put itself into relation to previous heathen history; and, on the other side, as it came from Israel and raised itself from the Israelite limitation to the wide plane of the world of nations, it had also to exhibit its relation to the previous history of Israel. In relation to both it had to accentuate the specifically new element of the Gospel. From this there necessarily resulted the contrast of the past and the present, the *then* and the *now* (*ποτέ—νῦν*), as the determining point of view. This was also the result of the special development of the life of the Apostle.

[1] ERNEST, Die Ethik des Ap. Paulus, in ihren Grundzügen dargest., 3 Aufl. Gött. 1880. Cf. the Theologies of the N. T.

2. *The slavery of the heathen world under sin.* — The Adamitic humanity is the world of sin and of death (Rom. v. 12 ff.), so that the natural φρονεῖν cannot be otherwise than determined by sin, and therefore ruled and bound by it (Rom. vii. 7 ff., 14, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν), and thus it issues in death (Rom. viii. 6, τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος). This whole state of things stands in antagonism to God (Rom. viii. 7, ἔχθρα εἰς Θεόν), and therefore under the wrath of God (Eph. ii. 3, τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς). For although moral consciousness and moral impulses were not wanting (Rom. ii. 14), yet they did not change the universal state nor overcome the dominating hostility to God of the power of sin (cf. Rom. i. 18 ff., iii. 19).

3. *The slavery of Israel under the law.* — Israel shared with the heathen world the condition of being morally hostile to God (Rom. iii. 1 ff.; Eph. ii. 3). For although Israel had the revealed Law as a divine prerogative (Rom. iii. 1 f., ix. 1 ff.), yet the Law, notwithstanding its holiness (Rom. vii. 12), did not serve to overcome sin on account of the sinful condition of human nature even in Israel, but only served to give occasion and intensification to sin (Rom. vii. 9 ff.). For even such external fulfilment as it brings about by its commands and threatening in the ἔργα τοῦ νόμου, is not real, because it is not free fulfilment of the essential will of God; it therefore does not take away the dominion of sin, and therefore makes no distinction between the Jews and the heathen (Rom. iii. 9, προεχόμεθα; are we better than they?), but only contributes to the knowledge of sin (Rom. iii. 20, vii. 7), and thereby to the preparation for the new time of the sonship of God and its liberty (Gal. iii. 24, iv. 1 ff.). For although the law formed an opposition to sin and to its dominion, yet on its side it imposed certain external ordinances on the sensible life which were therefore of a positive kind (δικαιώματα σαρκός, Heb. ix. 10), and which therefore belonged likewise to the Gentile morality and religion, and to the world of material elements (στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, Gal. iv. 3, 9; Col. ii. 8, 20). Accordingly, it was not the revelation of the essential will of God; and hence it was not an immediate, but a mediated revelation (Gal. iii. 19, δι' ἀγγέλων, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου); and it had come in

between' (Rom. v. 20, *παρεισῆλθεν*). And although it included the moral will of God in itself (Rom. vii. 12, *ἡ ἐντολὴ ἁγία καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθή*), as it is summarized in the commandment of love (Rom. xiii. 9, 10), yet it had no power of putting it into practice because it only came to man as a demand or claim, and therefore externally (*γράμμα*, Rom. ii. 29, vii. 6; 2 Cor. iii. 6).

4. *The new relationship of liberty in Christ.* — In Christ, the Son of God in the flesh, the end of the law has come, because the adoption of men as sons of God has become real as a fact; and this has thereby also become possible for all (Gal. iv. 4). Again the end of the law has come, since it is the end of subjection (*ὑπόδικον εἶναι*) under the wrath of God through sin and its guilt (Rom. iii. 21 ff. and often); consequently there is a new relationship to God, namely, the relationship of adoption as sons of God (*υἱοθεσία*, Gal. iii. 26, iv. 5). All that is needed is only to belong to Christ in faith (*ἐν Χριστῷ*), in order that the new relationship to God, realized in Christ, may be a reality for the believer. This new relationship, however, has its inner reality and witness in the Spirit of God (Gal. iv. 6, *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, κρᾶζον· Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ*). Now this spirit is the power of the new life (Rom. viii. 4 ff.), which is released both from its boundness by sin (Rom. viii. 2, 12), as well as from the slavery of the law (Gal. iv. 31, v. 1, 13, etc.). The new relationship to God in faith is for the Christian the law of his life which binds him, and thereby he is freed from all other bondage (1 Tim. i. 9, *δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται*). On this account, again, he is also free in relation to the whole world of the creation; for nothing binds him whose relationship to God is personal and not qualified by things. Accordingly, he does not need to make a matter of conscience of anything (*e.g.* Col. ii. 16 f.), but can make free use of everything; for *πᾶν κτίσμα Θεοῦ καλόν* (1 Tim. iv. 4). With this all false asceticism and negation of nature, as well as all naturalizing of Christian morality in general, is averted: *πάντα ἔξεστιν* (1 Cor. vi. 12, x. 23).

5. *Sanctification.*—But this involves the inward boundness to the inner law of the spirit which is the principle of a new

life (Gal. v. 25). For liberty is not a licence for the old sinful nature (Gal. v. 13, *μὴ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς ἀφορμὴν τῇ σαρκί*); for, the new state in Christ and the old state of the flesh are not compatible with each other (Rom. vi.). But the new principle of life of the spirit is the inner law of the corresponding mode of conduct. To the so-called dogmatic part of his Epistles, the apostle, as a rule, attaches an ethical or practical part, the doctrine of faith being thus followed by exhortations to the corresponding life. Not as if these exhortations or requirements of the moral life which Paul sets forth were meant to go along with faith as another special principle (thus giving faith *and* love), but they are included in faith. Faith is the active principle which works through love (Gal. v. 6). For if we are united to Christ through faith, and if Christ is He who died and rose again, our relationship to Christ is also a fellowship of His death and of His new life; so that both of these have made themselves efficient in us in corresponding conduct, as a becoming dead to the old nature of the flesh, and as a walking in the new life of the Spirit, *i.e.* in sanctification, in opposition to the former heathen nature as this is specially exhibited in the sins of impurity and in the dominion of selfishness. The Apostle very frequently speaks of these sins, for in the degree in which they are the characteristic manifestations of the heathen nature (Rom. i.), it is also pre-eminently characteristic of the Christians to keep themselves far from them. The greater the temptation there was to this in the heathen surroundings, and the laxer the judgment about them, so much the more frequent and emphatic are the reminders of the Apostle, not only against the heathen vices in general, but specially against this sin (1 Thess. iv. 3 ff.; Gal. v. 19; Col. iii. 5; 1 Cor. vi. 13 ff.; 2 Cor. xii. 21, etc.). In opposition to the heathen selfishness, he sets forth the commandment of love as the active exercise of Christian liberty.

6. *The service of love.*—For, as the spirit of Jesus Christ is a spirit of liberty in contrast to the world, so it is a spirit that binds inwardly to a corresponding activity, and specially towards God in Christ, as well as towards our neighbours in the various relationships of the earthly life. As the essential will of God has realized itself in Christ, the life of the

Christian is also the active carrying out of this essential will of God. This, however, is the will of love. The life of the Christian is thus a life of love towards God (2 Thess. iii. 5, *ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Genet. obj.) in Christ (Eph. vi. 24, *ἀγαπᾶν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ.*; 1 Cor. xvi. 22, *φιλεῖν τὸν κύριον*), and in the manifold manifestations of this love: as living to God in Christ (Rom. vi. 11), in humble and thankful recognition of the salvation in Christ (1 Cor. xv. 10; 2 Cor. iii. 5), and of all graces and gifts (Eph. v. 20; Col. ii. 6 f.; iii. 15, 17, etc.), in joyful and patient trust (Rom. viii. 25, 28, 31 ff., etc.), as well as in a comforted confession to God (Rom. x. 10, xvi. 27, etc.). As in such love our whole life becomes a service of God (Rom. vi. 16, 21, xii. 1), so it also becomes a service of our neighbour in love, as all others are also included and willed in the love of God in Christ; for Christ died for all (Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11). This love shows itself above all in active communicativeness; and the apostle frequently exhorts to beneficence, and praises certain for it (2 Cor. viii. and ix.); but mercy is to be exercised in liberty and willingness (2 Cor. ix. 7), and with pleasure (Rom. xii. 8). This serving love ought also to manifest itself in the "love-feast" (1 Cor. xi.), in hospitality (Rom. xii. 13; 1 Pet. iv. 9), which is specially required of the bishop (1 Tim. iii. 2), etc. In all this, however, it is Christ Himself (Col. iii. 11) who is properly the object of our love, or in whom our not loving is atoned for (1 Cor. viii. 12). It carries itself actively out in the fellowship of the Christian life as brotherly love (Rom. xii. 10), and in the fellowship of the natural life as neighbourly love (Rom. xiii. 7, 10), and thus it unfolds itself into a multiplicity of virtues, and exhibits itself in the natural circles of life in which the Christian moves. Especially in the later anti-Gnostic Epistles, Paul emphasizes the connection of the Christian's life with the natural life, and consequently of faith with the common virtues under the universal point of view of *εὐσέβεια* (1 Tim. ii. 2, iii. 16, iv. 7, 8, vi. 3, 5, 8, 11; 2 Tim. iii. 5; Tit. i. 1). This Christian mode of conduct is specially distinguished by having the double character of the heavenly sense (consciousness) and earthly subordination.

7. *The heavenly sense.*—As the sense of the Christian in

faith is love to Christ who has been raised to the right hand of God, the Christian knows that his home is above with Christ. Our πολίτευμα, *i.e.* our proper political commonwealth in which we have our right of home, is in heaven with Christ (Phil. iii. 20); for from thence we also expect our salvation in the Lord Jesus Christ, who is to bring our life to its goal; for, the sense of the Christian in general is set on things above, where his life is hid with Christ in God, and is, consequently, certain to him in faith (Col. iii. 1–3). This thought likewise receives special expression in 1 *Peter*, and the mood of this Epistle is consequently that of the pilgrimage on earth (1 Pet. ii. 11). Christians ought to regard themselves as redeemed in Christ from this vanishing world to the eternal world that passeth not away (1 Pet. iii. 4); and therefore as called to holiness (i. 15, ii. 11 f.), and as the people of God who have their conversation on earth (ii. 9, 10).

8. For this very reason, however, their life on earth is led in the recognition of and *in obedience to the earthly orders*, as God has ordained them for this earthly life. These orders or institutions include the magisterial and political (Rom. xiii. 1 ff.; 1 Tim. ii. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 13 ff.), and the conjugal and domestic (Eph. v. 22 ff., vi. 1 ff.; Col. iii. 18 ff.; 1 Pet. iii. 1 ff.). The Apostle Paul in this sense explains and decides the question of marriage (1 Cor. vii.); he further recognises property and acquisition (1 Cor. vi. 1 ff., vii. 29; cf. Acts v. 4), and he only blames the Christians for disputing about these before the heathen (1 Cor. vi. 1 ff.). He desiderates labour with quietness to eat one's own bread (1 Thess. iv. 11; 2 Thess. iii. 10, 12), and in order to be able to give to the needy (Eph. iv. 28). He declares the enjoyment of the earthly not to be wrong in itself (1 Cor. vii. 31); for every creature of God is good, if it is only used with thankfulness to God (1 Tim. iv. 4, 5); and he thus establishes the liberty of enjoyment (1 Cor. viii. 4). He also affirms the earthly calling (1 Cor. vii. 20, 24); and James likewise does the same of trading (Jas. iv. 13). For as Christians are free in God (1 Pet. ii. 16), they are able much more readily to adapt themselves to the various subjections of the political and social order, and even to the relationship of slavery (Eph. vi. 5 f.; Col. iii. 22; 1 Tim. vi. 1 f.; Tit. ii. 9;

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1 Pet. ii. 18 f.); and they are able therein even to bear experiences of injustice (1 Pet. ii. 18 ff.). In like manner they will adapt themselves correspondingly to the necessary orders of the life of the Christian community, whether in supervision or subordination (1 Pet. v. 1 ff.). Paul refers to such orders in his communities, and he maintains them.

9. For, the Christian life of the community requires *a common moral practice.* While the Jewish Christians found their external order of life in the Old Testament law, it was incumbent on those Jewish Christians who were superior in moral feeling to the heathen, to be in this the instructors of the Christians who were converts from heathenism. This is the significance of the decisions of the so-called Apostolic Council (Acts xv. 29). For these were not dogmatic or religious propositions,[1] but regulations for practice with a view to the education of the moral feeling;[2] and Paul, although he retained the Old Testament law as an observance for his own person,[3] yet he emphatically repudiated the compulsoriness of the law for his Gentile Christians, but held to the observance of those practical rules (παραδόσεις, 1 Cor. xi. 2, vii. 17; Phil. iv. 8; cf. his polemic against participation in idolatrous feasts, 1 Cor. x.); and in general he insisted on the observance of good Christian morals in his communities (*e.g.* 1 Cor. xi.); yet so that he always still maintained the principle of evangelical liberty.

§ 26. *The Johannine Proclamation.*[4]

In opposition to the Antinomianism of the libertines, the Johannine proclamation gave expression at the close of the Apostolic age to the commandment of the obligatoriness of love as grounded in the new fellowship with God.

1. *Libertine Antinomianism* was a reaction from a false Judaistic legality by an abuse of the Pauline preaching of the liberty of the Christian man, and it threatened to endanger

[1] Against Baur, Overbeck, and others.
[2] Cf. Lechler, Ap. u. Nachapost. Zeitalter, 3 Aufl. 1885, pp. 164–191.
[3] Acts xxi. 20 ff.; cf. Lechler, p. 189.
[4] Cf. the works on the Theology of the N. T. and on the Apostolic Age.

and devastate the moral state of the communities towards the close of the Apostolic Age. The principle of this Antinomianism was the abused πάντα ἔξεστιν, *i.e.* to the *pneumaticus*. Paul had already fought against it (1 Cor. x.); but now this Antinomianism was threatening to lay waste the whole Christian life of the community. It arose from a false severance of the inner state of the spirit and the outer life in the flesh; and it was the practical consequence of the Christological error which separated in the person of Christ between Jesus and Christ, and between the flesh of Jesus and His higher pneumatic nature. The latter heresy was opposed by the Gospel of John, and the former by the First Epistle of John. The Second Epistle was opposed to the heretical teachers, and the Apocalyptic Epistles as well as Second Peter and Jude were written in opposition to the actual devastation thus caused (cf. 2 Pet. ii.; Jude 4 ff.; Rev. ii. 6, 14, 15, 20, iii. 4). While the legal mode of thought against which Paul had to combat was of Jewish origin, this antinomian tendency had mainly heathen roots. In the former connection the question dealt with was the relationship of man with God; in the latter it was his relationship to the world. In the former case, the error lay in supposing that the relationship to God can be restored by our own conduct; in the latter, it lay in thinking that conduct is not inwardly bound by the relationship to God in faith.

2. In opposition to this Antinomianism, Christianity therefore appears here as ἐντολή. Hence the frequent use of this word in the Johannine writings, not only in the Christological sense, but in reference to the law of Christ's life,[1] as consisting in unity with the divine will as His will, and also in the ethical sense for the Christian's law of life.[2] Now as God's will in Christ has revealed itself as love to men,[3] so God's will in us, or His commandment, is also the will of love. This is the new commandment for Christians (John xiii. 34 f. and often); it is the determination of the subjective principle of conduct posited through the new relationship to God in

[1] John x. 18, xii. 49, 50, xiv. 31, xv. 10.

[2] John xiii. 34, xiv. 15, 21, xv. 10, 12; 1 John ii. 3, 4, 7, 8, iii. 22–24, iv. 21, v. 2, 3; 2 John iv. 5, 6; Rev. xii. 17, xiv. 12, xxii. 14.

[3] *E.g.* John iii. 16; 1 John iii. 1, 16, iv. 8, 16, etc.

Christ. For although it is the old will of God, it has nevertheless only found its truth now in Christ and in the Christian ὅ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν (1 John ii. 8). The commandments of the Christian conduct of life do not appear as imposed externally or as superadded to the Christian state, but as contained in the relationship to God Himself (*e.g.* 1 John i. 6, ii. 6, and in other passages).

3. The *contents* or substance of this commandment refers both to the relationship to the world and to the relationship to the new community. In relation to the *world* the Christian life is *liberty* from the world, and victory over the world, not as something that has to be won by our labour, but as given with Christ and the Christian state.[1] This liberty from the world has, however, to be preserved and not to be confounded with that spurious liberty which is slavery of the flesh, and which is preached by the false Antinomian gnosis of the Nicolaitans, etc. (see the Epistles in the Apocalypse). In this it authenticates itself as holy purity, for the Christian is delivered from this world through the fellowship of God which is in Christ, and is made to belong to the world of God which has begun in Christ and is waiting for its full revelation; and he makes this hope be subservient to the power of sanctification (1 John iii. 2 f.), the denial of which therefore involves the loss of that future (cf. the Epistles and Revelation). In relation to the new Christian community this commandment is the *active practice of love* in the manifoldness of its manifestations. It is also a *life of prayer* in the adoration of God and Christ,[2] and in the service of the work of Christ (John xiv. 13, xvi. 23; 1 John v. 14 f.) and of the brethren (1 John v. 15 f.); and *fidelity* in confessing Jesus (John xv. 27; Rev. ii. 10).

Thus it is essentially the same content which is presented on all the stages of the New Testament proclamation of truth. The new moral life of the Christian is rooted in the new relationship to God which is mediated in Christ, and through that relationship the new mode of conduct is determined as both free and bound.

[1] John ii. 12 ff., ἐγνώκατε, νενικήκατε, etc.; v. 4, νικήσασα; v. 18 ff., ἴσμεν, οἴδαμεν, etc.

[2] Cf. the heavenly liturgy in the Apocalypse.

I.

THE ETHICS OF THE ANCIENT CHURCH.

LITERATURE.

WILLIAM CAVE, *Primitive Christianity*, 1672. The first Part of this work treats of the Worship of the ancient Church, and the second and third Parts give a sketch of the moral condition of the primitive Christianity (its humility, contempt of the world, temperance, chastity, fidelity to the faith, patience, justice, love and benevolence, unanimity and peaceableness, obedience to authority, penitence and discipline). Undoubtedly prominence is given to the bright side. BARBEYRAC, *Le droit de la nature et de gens*, traduit du Latin de M. Pufendorf par Barb., Amsterd. 1712, 4to. The preface to this work criticizes the Ethics of the Church Fathers.—In opposition to the last work, and with superior knowledge of the relevant literature, the Fathers are vindicated by the Benedictine CEILLIER in his *Apologie de la morale des pères de l'église*, etc., 1718, 4to. Again Barbeyrac defended his views against Ceillier in his *Traité de la morale des pères de l'église*, etc., Amsterd. 1728. BUDDEUS in his *Isagoge historico-theologica ad theologiam universam*, etc., Lips. 1727, p. 620 sqq., takes an intermediate position between them.—STÄUDLIN, *Gesch. der Sittenl. Jesu*, 1 Bd., Gött. 1799, gives, p. 814 ff., the further literature of the subject. Stäudlin praises BALTUS, *Jugement des ss. pères sur la morale de la philosophie payenne*, Strassb. 1719. J. G. WALCH, Biblioth. theol. t. ii. p. 1072, and Bibl. patrist. pp. 364 sqq., 504 sqq. SCHRÖCKH, Kirchengesch. Bd. 3, pp. 254, 417 ff., etc. [Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Translations of the works of the Fathers of the Christian Church prior to the Council of Nicæa. Ed. by Drs. Roberts and Donaldson. 24 vols. T. & T. Clark.]

I. The Ethics of the Post-Apostolic Church.[1]

§ 27. *The blunted Paulinism of the post-Apostolic Church.*

In the post-Apostolic Church not only did the vitality of the new Christian spirit exhibit itself in verifying fact, but the essential elements of the knowledge of the moral truth of Christianity were maintained. But notwithstanding this, the sharpness of the Pauline moral cognition became blunted in the age immediately following the Apostles, and a new legalism was thus prepared. The occasion for this was partly the change in the opposition which had to be dealt with, as the Pauline opposition to the Judaic nomism was succeeded by the post-Pauline opposition to the gnostic antinomianism. It was also occasioned in part by the historical influence of that natural mode of thinking, both in its heathen and Jewish form, which loves to think of the relation between God and man according to the law of demand and performance, which is thus founded upon the conduct of man, and has its correspondence in reward on the side of God.

1. *Moral reality and truth.*—The Apologists, in dealing with the heathen, appeal to the proof presented by the evidence of the Spirit and its power,[2] and they must have had a right

[1] Rietter, Die Moral der christ. Schriftsteller der ersten zwei Jahrhh. Progr. Regsbg. 1845. A. Ritschl, Die Entstehung der altkath. Kirche, 2 Aufl. 1857. Weizsäcker, Die Anfänge christlicher Sitte, Deutsche Jahrbb. 1876, 1. Moritz v. Engelhardt, Das Christenthum Justin's d. Märt., Erlangen 1875. Keim, Rom u. das Christenth. 1881. Lechler, Das apost. u. nachap. Zeitalter, 3 Aufl. 1885, pp. 568 ff., 586 ff. Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, 2 Aufl. i. Erlangen 1886, p. 100 ff. Behm, Das christl. Gesetzthum der Apost. Väter. Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissenschaft, 1886, pp. 295-309, 408-416, 453-465.

[2] Cf. Justin, Apol. i. 14-17, 27-29; Ep. ad Diogn. 5. Tertullian, Apol. 44. Origen c. Cels. in i. 26, 31, 46, 64, etc.

to adopt this line of argument. And this is proved by what we know of the post-Apostolic Fathers (Ignatius and Polycarp), as well as by the statements of those who succeeded them (Justin and others), and their martyrdoms. Moreover, the power of the new moral spirit is exhibited not only in the form of enthusiasm, but also in the relationships of common life. Pliny's account to Trajan (Epp. x. 97) gives prominence in his description of the Christians along with their worshipping of Christ (carmen Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem) to the morality of the life led in that closed community: seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent. Among the virtues appearing conspicuously, the chief were chastity and love in their manifold exercise.[1] And the conflicts about the question of a second repentance, notwithstanding all the errors which took form in connection with them, show how earnest was their attitude towards sin. If, nevertheless, divergence and aberration from the loftiness and purity of the New Testament both in life and knowledge, early showed itself, the reason of this is to be found in an obscuration of the Pauline view which had soon begun to appear.

2. *The early obscuration of the Pauline notion with aberration towards moralism and nomism* is a fact which lies patent before us, and which at an early stage had made itself manifest in various ways.[2] The Tübingen school of Baur has sought to explain this phenomenon as arising out of the struggle between the Judaic and Gentile Christianity of the post-Apostolic Church and its gradual adjustment. But this whole construction of the earliest Church History breaks down on the fact that the post-Apostolic Church was essentially a Gentile Christian Church. Ritschl in his "Origin of the ancient Catholic Church" derives this blunting of Paulinism, or this "new legalism," from "the incapacity of the heathen Gentiles to master the right Old Testament presuppositions of the fundamental ideas of the Apostle,"[3] in place of which heathen ideas, and especially the heathen moral philosophy and its moralism,

[1] Cf. Keim, Rom u. das Christenthum, 1881, p. 332 ff.

[2] H. Thiersch, Vorlesungen über Katholicism. ü. Protestantism. 1846, i. 172 f.

[3] Entstehung der altkath. Kirche, pp. 272, 280, 298, 274 ff., 282.

were introduced and were foisted on the Christian thoughts.[1] Certainly it is not a sufficient explanation (because it is too general, and not sufficiently historical in its motive) to refer this fact with Graul to the principle of legality in human nature generally.[2] Thiersch has more correctly explained the fact from the attitude of opposition taken up to the gnostic antinomianism: "The ground of this phenomenon is to be found in this historical opposition, and not merely in the general human psychological root of all such aberrations; nor only in the principles of the ethics of the Stoics, which passed into the Alexandrian School; nor in the moral pride of the *Romana virtus*, which took form in the Western Church in the shape of Christianity; nor, finally, is it to be found (or if so, only in the very slightest degree) in echoes of the old Judaism. The whole heathen gnosis was a most repulsive caricature of Pauline doctrines, particularly in its practical principles, in its denial of human freedom, in its view of a difference founded upon natural necessity between men destined to salvation and men not capable of it, in its opposition to the Old Testament and the works of the law, in its assertion of the freedom of the knower (Gnostic) from the moral law as well as from judgment. The Church did not succeed, as the Apostle John had formerly done, in resisting the degeneracy in such a way that the whole truth of the Pauline doctrine should be at the same time preserved." Rather was the right relation between justification and living conduct distorted in the course of that opposition, and the latter was thereby necessarily led to assume the character of legality. "Attention to the moral attitude and conduct of man in relation to God predominates over attention to the religious relationship of man as established by God, and the right equipoise between these two sides of the religious idea is wanting." And the religious relationship to Christ Himself came to be "apprehended as the recognition of the rule of faith and as the fulfilment of its law" (Ritschl, 331, 581).

3. This aberration from the Pauline doctrine is not without

[1] So Moritz v. Engelhardt in his "Christenthum Justin's;" Ad. Harnack, Dogmengeschichte, i.; Kurtz (in his Church History), and others.

[2] Die christl. Kirche an der Schwelle des Irenäischen Zeitalters, Lpz. 1860, p. 162, along with Th. Harnack's Der christl. Gemeinde-Gottesdienst, p. 49.

a certain *connection with Paul himself.* For in the writings of his later time, when he had himself already to deal with the opposition which appears in the Pastoral Epistles, Paul leaves the sharp points of his doctrine out of view in order to accentuate εὐσέβεια generally, and the moral health of the Christian life. Even at an earlier stage, when he was not (as in the polemical Epistles) dealing with the Pharisaic opposition, he had already evidently moved on more general lines, and left the opposition between Faith and Law in the background.[1] And hence it might easily come to be imagined that the individual was moving on the basis of Pauline thoughts, even when their proper meaning had come to be misunderstood. Again, as the other apostles stated in a greater measure their agreement with Paul, while at the same time they did not require to expound their views with the same objective sharpness of statement, the post-apostolic Church would be the more inclined to believe that it stood upon the common apostolic basis even although it had broken its relation to the Pauline thoughts.

4. *Heathen influences.*—Along with a blunting of the apprehension of Christianity from universalizing it, there co-operated certain corresponding heathen as well as Jewish influences tending to moralism. Certainly the Christianity of the post-apostolic teachers did not consist merely in the triad of God, Virtue, and Immortality, to which, since Ritschl led the way, it has become customary to reduce it in its essentials.[2] On the contrary, Christ's atoning death and the forgiveness of sin, as well as the new power of life of the Holy Spirit, are in all these teachers of fundamental significance for their manner of thinking, while the Christian life was attached to the two mysteries of baptism and the eucharist. Yet in their mode of conception, and especially in connection with the forgiveness of sin in baptism, the influence of the heathen way of thinking asserts itself. Christ's death was viewed after the manner of heathen expiations, and thus instead of being conceived in connection with His person, and as the establishment

[1] Cf. Hofmann, Schriftb. i. 608.

[2] So M. v. Engelhardt, Das Christenthum Justin's, p. 402: "Umdeutung des Christenth. in eine göttl. Tugend- u. Lohnlehre;" A. Harnack, Dogmengesch. i.; and even Gass, Gesch. d. christl. Ethik, i. p. 59: "Die drei Wahrheiten."

of an abiding actuality of fellowship with God into which we enter, it was regarded as a single fact with expiatory effect upon sins lying in the past; and then for the life lying before the individual there emerged the task of his own moral conduct—of love—and of his own compensations for individual sins.[1] This opened the way to the moralizing mode of reflection, which, moreover, could not but present itself to those who had passed through the ancient moral philosophy. But this did not give even the slightest justification for assimilating Christianity and Hellenism, and thus denying the revelational speciality of Christianity and the morality of the Church.[2]

5. *Jewish influences.* — Not less strongly have we to estimate the Jewish influences, instead of excluding them, as has become the prevalent habit in a one-sided opposition to Baur by those who follow Ritschl's views. For, the originally Jewish basis of the Pauline communities could not remain without temptation to a reaction. The Jewish Christianity had, even after the event recorded in Acts xv., a pædagogic significance and a corresponding influence on the Gentile Christian communities in regard to the moral judgment and guidance of life. The fact of a Jewish Christianity still existing in connection with the Church in the time of Justin, cannot be ignored.[3] These influences operated specially through the Old Testament Apocrypha, which, as is shown by the Christian literature of Alexandria, were much used, and they exercised an important influence in favour of the doctrine of works. The accentuation in particular of alms, fasting, and prayer, and the expiatory power which was attributed to alms[4] (already in Barnabas and even in Polycarp, x. 2), may certainly be traced back to the Jewish influence. The issuing of Judaism in a high estimate of intellect and works so far coincided with the development of the ancient moral philosophy, so that the

[1] Behm has referred to this in the work quoted above.

[2] So, *e.g.*, Aubé, St. Justin philosophe. Étude critique sur l'apologétique chrétienne au IIe siècle, Paris 1875, p. 212: "Christianity and Hellenism fundamentally one." 305: "Thus Christianity [in the doctrine of the λόγος σπερματικός] has its roots in natural reason." Cf. Th. Jahn's notice in Schürer's Theol. Lit.-Zeitung, 1876, p. 441 ff.

[3] Shown by Hilgenfeld in his review of A. Harnack's Dogmengesch. i.

[4] Tob. iv. 10, xii. 9.

two came into contact with each other. Only—corresponding to the distinction between heathenism and Judaism, and their respective interests—while the former occupied itself with the relationship to the world and liberation from nature, the latter dealt with the relationship to God. The Jewish influence thus brought about the turn of things favourable for the heathen element, so that the proof for the fact of this Jewish influence lies in it.[1] And they also announced themselves in the oldest formulation of Christian moral principles which we have from the time immediately following the Apostolic Age.

§ 28. *The oldest post-Apostolic formulation of moral doctrine in the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles."*[2]

The educational need of definite formulation of doctrine led also in the sphere of Ethics to a summary of what was essential. This summary proceeded from the Jewish Christian side, in accordance with its vocation, and it was furnished to the young Gentile Christians. It lies before us now in its oldest form as it is contained in the lately-discovered "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," in the section designated as the "Two Ways." This production in its other moral contents shows us the average character of the post-Apostolic morals, but they are already accompanied with traces of Judaistic legality.

[1] See Diestel, Gesch. des A. T. in der christl. Kirche, Jena 1869. "The authority of the Old Testament essentially contributed to this, that Christianity was apprehended as a new *law*." "The theocratic conception of the Church (especially since Cyprian) *arose* out of the relationships, but it imbibed its strength from the O. T. and took its idea of right from it, notwithstanding that the *theological* tradition continued to assert the abrogation of the Law on its Levitical side. This turn in the position is shown most strongly in the Apostolical Constitutions," p. 141.

[2] The Literature of this subject is given in Dr. SCHAFF'S work: The oldest Church Manual, called the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles: The Didache and Kindred Documents, 2nd ed., T. & T. Clark, 1886. Editions of the Didache by Bryennios, Constant. 1883, Harnack, 1884, and others. Cf. also HARNACK, Theol. Lit.-Zeitung, 1886, xii. 15. Th. ZAHN, Forschungen zur Gesch. des neutest. Kanons, iii. 278–319. FUNK, Theol. Quartalschr. 1884, iii. 381–402. The Literature of this subject includes a large number of other publications.

1. *The need of formulation.* — One would form a quite erroneous idea of the actual state of the post-Apostolic Church were the impression to be gathered from the Pauline Epistles that we have here only a flood of individual tendencies and individual thoughts which assert themselves in unchecked freedom, and are in conflict with each other. Much rather is it the case that from an early stage there existed definite orders of life and formulations of faith and confession. The first Christian Church had sprung from Israel. But an Israelite was accustomed to definite regulation of thought and life. This custom was not left behind in accepting the faith in Jesus the Christ and joining the community of His confessors. Moreover, the need of fellowship, as well as the pædagogic task which fell to the Church, could not but further this tendency. Still more was this the case as the bounds of the Church were enlarged, and as heathens entered into the community for whom the Christian Israel was the called teacher. Accordingly we find the Christian faith formulated in the baptismal confession, and in the rules of faith which grew out of it. We also find prayer formulated in the Lord's Prayer and in its early statutory usage, as well as in definite eucharistic prayers in the "Teaching of the Apostles," which appear to go back to the earliest apostolic time, and which, like the doxologies in the Apocalypse, let their Jewish foundation be recognised. Why then should not the subject of morality have found likewise a similar formulation? We are thus led to regard the "Two Ways," which are found in the "Teaching of the Apostles" as well as in the Epistle of Barnabas and in the Shepherd of Hermas, and in various other forms or traces, as such a primitive formulation of the ancient Church.

2. The "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles:" *Διδαχὴ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων*, or as it is more exactly entitled in the superscription of the text itself: *Διδαχὴ Κυρίου διὰ τῶν δώδεκα ἀποστόλων τοῖς ἔθνεσιν* (*i.e.* to the Gentile Christians), as lately discovered and edited by Bryennios, represents the influence of the Jewish Christianity upon the Christians from among the Gentiles. For in its whole bearing it shows, not a heathen-Christian, but a Jewish-Christian

origin,[1] while by the addition τοῖς ἔθνεσιν it indicates a Gentile-Christian destination. At least the eucharistic prayers in it (which undoubtedly are not due to the author, but are elements handed down from the early Christian worship) are not of Egyptian origin;[2] and it discloses very original conditions in the character of the ecclesiastical relations presupposed. This work must be assigned to an earlier date than the Epistle of Barnabas, which contains the "Two Ways" at its close, but much out of order. It must also have preceded the Shepherd of Hermas,[3] so that it may be regarded as belonging to the end of the first century. The whole production is an ancient Church Order, and it is indeed the oldest of its kind. The Two Ways of Life and Death[4] are contained in chaps. i.–vi.; but although their matter is ethical, they contain only, according to Matt. xxviii. 20 (διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν), an exhortation addressed to catechumens as introductory to the following act of baptism. Chaps. vii.–x. contain regulations with reference to the order of baptism and the Lord's Supper, together with eucharistic prayers which are certainly of early date and perhaps of apostolic origin, and which claim the highest interest. Chaps. xi.–xvi. contain regulations of the community regarding apostles (itinerating preachers), prophets, and teachers, bishops and deacons. Chap. xvi. closes with an eschatological outlook which especially attaches itself to Matt. xxiv. 25 as well as to 2 Thess. ii. This shows in particular that the Gospel of Matthew then existed in the form in which we now have it. Besides this, the Gospel of Luke is also recognised in this writing.[5] This also shows that the Didaché is of Jewish-Christian origin; yet it does

[1] As Ad. Harnack at least formerly thought. He considers it originated in Egypt, *c.* A.D. 150 (140–165).

[2] For chap. ix. speaks of corn on the mountains.

[3] For I cannot convince myself that the Didaché is dependent on the "Shepherd," as is maintained by Th. Zahn in his *Forschungen*, etc., and by Wohlenberg in his recent work, Die L. der zwolf App. in ihrem Verhältniss zum neutest. Schriftthum, Erlangen 1888.

[4] On the basis of Jer. xxi. 8, and at the same time in allusion to Matt. vii. 13, 14. This representation goes far down. Thus it is found even in Lactantius, Inst. div. vi. 3. 1. Cf. § 39. 2.

[5] Wohlenberg counts thirty passages (or after deducting doubtful ones, twenty-

not repudiate the Pauline proclamation, but represents the apostolic average (the twelve apostles).

3. *The Two Ways.*—It is a sort of moral catechism which the "Teaching of the Apostles" gives in the first six chapters under this title. This sketch of Christian ethics was certainly much circulated in an independent form, and thus used; and it has thereby easily acquired different forms and expressions in detail. We have no guarantee for believing that we have now the correct text. Here and there it appears to present unmistakeable traces of a corrupt expression. At all events we have in it a monument of the ethics of the post-Apostolic Church of the common ecclesiastical type. For it is unquestionable that we have in the Didaché a production designed for proselytes (as Harnack at least once thought), and that it was of Christian and not of Jewish origin. There are no specifically Jewish marks in it. The whole is built upon the two fundamental commandments of love to God and love to our neighbour. This especially applies to the exposition of the Way of Life, and also to the details relating to the second commandment, beginning from the love of our enemies and expounded both in a positive and negative form. The exposition of the Way of Death follows the exposition of the Way of Life.

On account of its importance, the ethical teaching of the Didaché is reproduced in the following extracts and summaries:—

"Chap. i. There are Two Ways—one of Life and one of Death; but there is great difference between the Two Ways. Now the Way of Life is this: First, thou shalt love God who made thee;[1] secondly, thy neighbour as thyself;[2] and all things whatsoever thou wouldst not have done to thee, neither do thou to another.[3] Now the teaching contained in these words is this: Bless those who curse you, and pray for your enemies, and fast for those who persecute you; for what thank

six) in which the Didaché presupposes and refers to the Gospel of Matthew, and five similarly referring to Luke.

[1] So Justin, Apol. i. 16. [2] Matt. xxii. 37–39.

[3] Matt. vii. 12, but here in a negative and thereby a distorting form. In this form the expression is also found elsewhere as the sum of ethical doctrine, as in the Clementine Recognitions, viii. 56: omnis enim propemodum actuum nostrorum in eo colligitur observantia, ut quod ipsi pati nolumus, ne hoc aliis

is there if ye love those who love you?[1] Do not even the Gentiles the same? But love ye those who hate you, and ye shall not have an enemy. Abstain from fleshly and bodily lusts.[2] If any one give thee a blow on the right cheek, turn to him the other also,[3] and thou shalt be perfect. If any one press thee to go with him one mile, go with him two. If any one take from thee what is thine, ask it not back, as indeed thou canst not.[4] Give to every one that asketh thee, and ask not back,[5] for the Father wills that we should give to all [6] from His own blessings.[7] Blessed is he that gives according to the commandment, for he is guiltless.[8] Woe to him that receives: for if any one receives having need, he shall be guiltless; but he that has not need, shall give account," etc.

Chap. ii. then brings in the negative side, attaching the detail primarily to the Decalogue. "Thou shalt not kill. Thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not corrupt boys; thou shalt not commit fornication. Thou shalt not steal. Thou shalt not use witchcraft; thou shalt not practise sorcery (*φαρμακεύειν*). Thou shalt not procure abortion,[9] nor shalt thou kill the new-born child.[10] Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods. Thou shalt not forswear thyself. Thou shalt not bear false witness. Thou shalt not speak evil; thou shalt not bear malice. Thou shalt not be double-minded nor double-tongued," etc.

Chap. iii. gives warning against anger, murder, idolatry, lying, etc., and exhorts to meekness and humility.

Chap. iv. exhorts to observing the words of the preacher of the Word of God, and to avoid division, and rather to care for peace. "Be not one that stretches out his hands for receiving, but draws them in from giving.[11] If thou hast, thou shalt give with thy hands a ransom (*λύτρωσιν*) for thy sins."[12] Exhortation is thereafter given to bring up the children to the fear of God,

inferamus . . . et intra hanc regulam humanorum gestorum singula quæque concurrunt.

[1] Matt. v. 44–46; Luke vi. 27 ff. "Fast" in the text is a peculiar alteration which already shows an alteration of the right way of thinking, even if the "fasting" were meant as a means of making beneficence possible.

[2] 1 Pet. ii. 11. [3] Matt. v. 39 ff.

[4] A peculiar addition to the words of Scripture, due to the state of the time.

[5] Luke vi. 30.

[6] *δίδοσθαι* is here used in the Middle Voice, according to the later Greek usage.

[7] Pastor Hermæ, Mand. ii. 4, only with *δωρημάτων* instead of *χαρισμάτων*.

[8] Similarly Pastor Hermæ, Mand. ii. 6; cf. Acts xx. 35: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

[9] A reproach often addressed by the Apologists to the heathen.

[10] Directed against a widespread heathen habit.

[11] Sirach iii. 31 (36). [12] Matt. xi. 29 f.

and to treat the believing slaves in a kindly way, while the slaves have to be subject to their masters as a type (τύπος) of God. "In the congregation thou shalt confess thy transgressions, and thou shalt not come to thy prayer with an evil conscience." "This is the Way of Life."

Chap. v. then gives in contrast the Way of Death in the sins of cursing, murder, adultery, etc.

Chap. vi. proceeds thus: "Take heed that no one lead thee astray from the way of this teaching, since he teacheth thee apart from God. For if indeed thou art able to bear the whole yoke of the Lord, thou wilt be perfect; but if thou art not able, do what thou canst. And as regards food, bear what thou canst; but against idol-offerings be exceedingly on thy guard, for it is a service of dead gods." With this ends the address to the candidates for baptism.

One clearly recognises the Jewish soil upon which this Christian exhortation grew. But the view presented is not Judaistic; for the conduct here required is not expounded as the condition of the covenant of baptism, but as the standard for the future conduct of the baptized, and the relationship of grace is therefore regarded as the presupposition of that conduct. Only it appeared to be doubly necessary in the case of candidates for baptism from among the heathen (and not without reason) to remind them of the moral earnestness of the Christian life in contrast to the heathen inclination to moral laxity. So in Pliny's account to Trajan (of which we are here involuntarily reminded) the addresses to the community are represented as of a similarly moral nature. The "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles" aims at reminding the Gentile converts of the moral earnestness of the Christian life, and it has done this. The short moral catechism, as it is here given, continued to do its work. We see its continued influence in Barnabas and Hermas, and then in Alexandria and Rome. The fundamental outlines of the order for worship and for the guidance of the community, were developed into the later Church Orders found in the Apostolical Constitutions, etc., which exercised considerable influence upon both the Eastern and the Western Church till far down. But the *Didaché* contains (and undoubtedly was thus at the same time the means of diffusing) the beginnings of a false view of works. For although it is in other respects neither specifically

Judaistic nor even Pauline, but presents the general Christian type, it still speaks in Chap. iv. of alms as a λύτρωσις ἁμαρτιῶν;[1] then in Chap. viii. it accentuates the purely external distinction between the two Christian fast days (Wednesday and Friday) and the two Jewish fast days (Monday and Thursday), and it ordains the repetition thrice every day of the Lord's Prayer. Although the state of the Christian is described as a state of faith, yet its representation lacks the full and clear Pauline tone. Christianity appears predominantly as a moral mode of conduct in holy earnestness, common prayer, humble concord, and hope of the future. This was the form in which the young Church appeared to the heathen world, and made its victorious impression upon it. That was in correspondence with its character, and it was demanded by the relations of the time; but at the same time it furnished an opening for the alien element of Judaistic legalism, and it came into contact with the element of the heathen moralism.

§ 29. *The Apostolic Fathers.*[2]

The immediate literature of the post-Apostolic Age contains moral material of a varied kind, although it is not elaborated scientifically but appears predominantly in the form of exhortation. The so-called Apostolic Fathers all belong by their origin and tendency to the Gentile-Christian soil; and they believe that they are in harmony with the Pauline as well as with the other apostolical literature, without being conscious of their considerable deviation in parts from it. Christianity had to gain a place in human society and an external form in life, and, corresponding to this activity, it appears here in contrast both to the heathen antinomianism and to the order of the Law of the Old Testament, as the

[1] Cf. Dan. iv. 24; Tob. iv. 10, xii. 9; but also Polyc. ad Phil. 10. 2.

[2] Cf. the edition of the Apostolic Fathers, by O. v. Gebhardt, Ad. Harnack, and Th. Zahn, Lpz. 1876–77. HILGENFELD, Die app. Vv. Untersuchungen, etc., Halle 1853. Further, the relevant sections in RITSCHL'S Altkath. Kirche, and M. v. ENGELHARDT, Das Christenth. Justin's, etc. E. FRANKE, Die Lehre d. ap. V. Ztschr. für luth. Theol. u. Kirche, 1841 ff. [J. Donaldson: The Apostolical Fathers, 1874.]

new law of inwardness and freedom, and consequently of universality, and as the new life of faith and love springing out of the spirit of Christ, as well as of hope and fear. Christianity also brought along with it the virtues of purity, humility, obedience, and peaceableness, but the post-Apostolic Age already begins to show a dimming of the significance of the principle of faith and the righteousness of faith.

1. *The (First) Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians* was written in the commission of the Roman Church, *c.* A.D. 95, on the occasion of disturbances which had arisen in Corinth through the wrongous deposition of the presbyters. Chaps. i.–xxii. exhort to humility, obedience, and peaceableness in contrast to envy and pride. Chaps. xxiii.–xxxvi. carry on the exhortation on the ground of the Christian motives of hope, faith, and love. Chaps. xxxvii.–lix. refer to the Corinthian divisions which give occasion for presenting a view of order (*τάξις*, c. 40) and harmony (c. 30, 33, 34), which are established by mutual humble subordination (*ἐπιείκεια καὶ ταπεινοφροσύνη καὶ πραΰτης*). It is shown how this order forms the universal divine law in the whole of nature (c. 19, 20) by separation from the ceremonial matters in the Old Testament (according to Christian gnosis, c. 36, 41, 45); and how it is also to be realized in the Church by mutual humble subordination (*ταπεινοφροσύνη*, according to the type of the death of Christ, c. 37). Faith is indeed indicated in the Pauline way as the only condition of salvation (32. 4), and the *ἀγαθοποιΐα καὶ ἀγάπη* (*πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθόν*) required by the will of God is derived from faith (*πανάρετος πίστις*, c. 1), but not from justification. Christ's death is indeed applied as a call to *μετάνοια* (c. 7), and therefore to moral conduct; but justification and new moral conduct stand side by side, and are not put into an inner relationship to each other. Hence an independent significance for the relationship of man to God is attributed to the moral doing of man, to love, prayer, etc. The common conception of *obedience* comprises the obedience of *faith* and obedience in good *works* (c. 9, 10). Faith manifests righteousness (c. 31, 33, 48); and the forgiveness of sins is derived from it (c. 50, *μακάριοι*.

ἐσμεν, εἰ τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐποιοῦμεν ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ ἀγάπης, εἰς τὸ ἀφεθῆναι ἡμῖν δι' ἀγάπης τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν). The Pauline basis is still distinctly recognisable, but the consciousness of its significance has almost disappeared, and the practical tendency conduces still more to make the individual satisfied with a general Christian bearing, and to make him indifferent towards determinate dogmas. Thus a mode of thinking that is specifically contrary to that of Paul, comes to take its place. But the lately discovered conclusion of the Epistle, with the great ecclesiastical prayer of the Roman Church, not only sounds forth the full biblical note of prayer, but also involuntarily awakens admiration for the moral greatness and Christian fervour which are here expressed, and which enables us to see that a power lay hidden here against which even the power of the Roman Empire could do nothing. On the other hand, this prayer is also full of significance in its expression of the patriotic recognition of the sovereign power as ordained by God (c. 61); and it shows that the primitive Christianity, with all its withdrawal from the world, was still conscious of preserving a positive relationship to the orders of the earthly life.

2. The so-called *Second Epistle of Clement*, a homily addressed to a congregation,[1] belongs to the second century (*c.* 130–145). It is the oldest congregational sermon which we have. It originated at Rome, and it has some affinity with the Shepherd of Hermas. It is a still less Pauline and more strongly moralizing exhortation to repentance (*μετανοεῖν*) and to confession (*ἐξομολογεῖσθαι*) of the Redeemer as a counter-performance in return (*ἀντιμισθία*) for what we owe to Christ (i. 2 ff.). We confess Jesus, however, by the fulfilment of His commandments (*ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει καὶ μὴ παρακούειν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐντολῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, c. 3), by the confession of Him in our actions (*ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτὸν ὁμολογῶμεν*, c. 4), and in love to our neighbour (iv. 1, 2). The incarnation of Christ specially reminds us that we are also to keep our flesh holy (c. 9), looking to the future reward; and this is especially applied in opposition to the libertine gnosticism (of Carpocrates)[2] and the Epicurean antinomianism (c. 10),

[1] This view is mentioned by Möhler, Patrologie; herausg. v. Reithmayr.

[2] Nitzsch, Dogmengesch. p. 99.

connected with the denial of the resurrection. In this way (*ποιοῦντες τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Χριστοῦ*) we attain salvation (*σωζόμεθα*), the *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* (c. 12), and the *ἀνάπαυσις*. All this may be right if it rests upon the right presupposition of justification, which makes all doing a grateful response to the divine gift. But if this is lacking, it is the way of legalism which estimates the conduct externally; and it comes to such estimation (cf. 16. 4). Alms are good as repentance of sin (*καλὸν οὖν ἐλεημοσύνη ὡς μετάνοια ἁμαρτίας*); fasting is better than prayer; but alms is better than both. Love covers a multitude of sins; prayer from a pure heart saves from death. Blessed is every one who has been found full of alms (*μακάριος πᾶς ὁ εὑρεθεὶς ἐν τούτοις πλήρης*); for alms effect a diminution of the burden of sin (*ἐλεημοσύνη γὰρ κούφισμα ἁμαρτίας γίνεται*). This is the way of salvation and the morality of the Old Testament Apocrypha (cf. Tob. xii. 8, 9); it is the accomplished or acquired righteousness of one's own conduct instead of the imputed righteousness of faith.

3. *The Epistle of Barnabas*, dating from the beginning of the second century, and written by a Gentile Christian and for Gentile Christians, originated on Alexandrian soil. It aims at showing that the *new Law* of Jesus Christ has entered into the place of the abolished Old Testament law. This new law is a law of inwardness; it is the indwelling of faith and love through the hope of eternal life (1. 4). This is represented as the three *δόγματα* of the Lord: the hope of life, which is the beginning and goal of our faith; righteousness, which is the beginning and goal of judgment; and joyous love, which is the evidence of the works of righteousness (1. 6). In other words, it is the fulfilment of the new law of freedom [1] in virtue of the indwelling of the spirit and word of God and of Christ within, after we receive forgiveness of sins, and have been created anew (16. 8–10). Here then the Pauline basis is still so far maintained; for the forgiveness lies backwards and the hope forwards, and between these the Christian life realizes itself as the "way of light" (c. 19) [2] in love and fear towards God and love

[1] 2. 6: Nova lex domini nostri Jesu Christi, quæ sine jugo necessitatis. c. 4: Ut dilectio Jesu consignetur in præcordiis vestris in spem fidei illius.

[2] In opposition to the way of darkness, which leads to destruction.

towards our neighbour, in communicativeness of earthly goods which reckons nothing as the exclusive property of its possessor (c. 19), but gives alms which work as a ransom for sin (*διὰ τῶν χειρῶν σου ἐργάσῃ εἰς λύτρον ἁμαρτιῶν*, 19. 10) in truth, uprightness, and justice; which avoids heathen idolatry and vices among which, along with idol-worship, and hypocrisy, and lying, special emphasis is laid upon the widespread habit of taking away the life of children before or after birth (c. 19, 20). This is specially expounded in the "Two Ways" with which the Epistle concludes, as the "Teaching of the Apostles" similarly begins with an exposition of them. It is necessary, continues Barnabas, to call to mind this higher truth of the Old Testament law in order that one may not be putting oneself at ease in a false way with the justification which has already taken place (*ὡς ἤδη δεδικαιωμένοι*, 4. 10; *ὡς κλητοί*, 4. 13).[1] This reminder was the more necessary, the more that faith began to be apprehended as an intellectual thing. It had the effect, however, of setting the moral conduct as something distinct beside justification, and thus making it independent in a false way.

4. *The Ignatian Epistles.*[2]—The regulating point of view for the Ignatian Epistles is that of churchly unity. It is only by being introduced into the ordered fellowship of the Christian community that the Christian life of the individual in faith and hope realizes its truth. The new life of the Christian proceeds from Christ and the Holy Spirit, and it realizes itself in faith and love. The cross of Christ is the *μηχανή* which carries us; the Holy Spirit is the rope; faith is the *ἀναγωγεύς*; and love is the way which brings us to God (ad Eph. 9). Faith and love to Christ are the beginning (*ἀρχή*, principle) and goal (*τέλος*) of life; but like Christ's *σάρξ* and *αἷμα*, they form also a consistent unity to which everything else is attached;[3] but love is the principal thing.

[1] Nitzsch, a.a.O. p. 101.

[2] Th. Zahn in his and O. v. Gebhardt's ed., and Nirschl, Die Theologie des heil. Ignatius, Mainz 1880.

[3] Ad Eph. 9. 14: *οὐδὲν λανθάνει ὑμᾶς ἐὰν τελείως εἰς Ἰ. Χρ. ἔχητε τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ ζωῆς καὶ τέλος. ἀρχὴ μὲν πίστις, τέλος δὲ ἀγάπη· τὰ δὲ δύο ἐν ἑνότητι γινόμενα Θεός ἐστιν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα εἰς καλοκἀγαθίαν ἀκόλουθά ἐστιν.*

For as the σάρξ indicates the historical manifestation of Christ, so likewise the faith which relates to it is more of a historical nature. Love, however, corresponds to the blood which circulates in the body, and is therefore, as it were, the living blood of the Church. Christ's death is the power of love, which draws us into the fellowship of His death in order that we may arise again animated as with new love. We are specially participative of this principle of love in the Lord's Supper. The blood of Christ in the Supper is the power that produces love. The Church, then, is the covenant of love in which everything is directed towards union; and the vicarious love of Christ continues itself, as it were, in the mutual relations of conduct. It is not merely in the exercise of fellowship in worship that this unity exhibits itself in the most beautiful way (ad Magnes. 7), but all Christian action ought to have a churchly character (thus, *e.g.*, marriage is not to be concluded without the γνώμη of the bishop, ad Polyc. 5). The whole Christian life has to grow out of faith and love as the realization of the moral ideal of the καλοκἀγαθία. It is a divinely consecrated life (ad Polyc. 7), a warfare. Of baptism it is said, μενέτω ὡς ὅπλα; faith is to be the helm, love is to be the spear, ἡ ὑπομονὴ ὡς πανοπλία (ad Polyc. 6). But the highest exercise of love to Christ is martyrdom, which was the longing of the Bishop of Antioch (ad Eph. 1, 11; ad Rom. 2, 4, 6). All this is expressed more from overflow of feeling in dogmatic indefiniteness than in actual error, and it is without false asceticism. This is shown in the well-known words about celibacy and marriage. "If one can continue in continence (ἐν ἁγνείᾳ), let him remain so to the honour of the flesh of the Lord without boasting (ἐν ἀκαυχησίᾳ). But it becomes those who marry and are married that their alliance should take place with the consent (μετὰ γνώμης, *cum sententia*) of the bishop, in order that the marriage may be to the Lord, and not according to lust. Let everything be done to the glory of God" (ad Polyc. 5).

5. A more measured and sober spirit prevails in the *Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians*. Full of quotations and reminiscences from the New Testament, and especially from

Paul and Peter, he here calls grace in opposition to works our saving (c. 1; cf. Eph. 2. 8, 9); and he designates faith as "the mother of us all," inasmuch as the new life grows out of it. Hope follows faith; but love to God and Christ and to our neighbour precedes faith (that is, in rank).[1] "He who stands in these has fulfilled the commandment of righteousness; for he who has love is far removed from all sin" (c. 3). In stating such doctrine, the author's endeavour and consciousness are directed only to maintaining the apostolical tradition and the Christian fellowship, and warding off heretical innovations. In opposition to the surrounding world, he exhorts to careful and meek conduct (c. 10), to abstinence from all heathen ways (c. 11), but also to intercession for kings, priests, and powers, as well as for the persecutors and enemies of the cross (c. 12). With all the Paulinism apparent in this whole mode of thinking, we have alms still recommended here too, on the ground contained in the Apocrypha (Tob. iv. 10), that they redeem from death.

6. *The Epistle to Diognetus*, on the other hand, exhibits the new moral spirit of Christianity without regard to churchly fellowship, and in diametrical opposition both to the foolish idolatry of heathenism and to the foolish and ridiculous religionism that attached itself to the Old Testament. The new spirit is represented in its absolute newness and inward freedom as above all that is earthly (with which, however, the Christians still stand connected), and as the hidden power of the whole cosmical existence. This new life is described in proud words. The Christians live like other men, and yet quite otherwise. "They dwell in their own native lands, but are strangers. They take part in all things as citizens, and they suffer all things as foreigners. Every foreign country is a fatherland to them, and every native land is yet a foreign land. They have the table in common, but yet not common. They are in the flesh, but do not live after the flesh. They live upon the earth, but are citizens of heaven. They obey the existing laws, and excel the laws by their lives. They love all, and are hated by all" (c. 5).

[1] Against Zahn's view, PP. App. Opp. ii. p. 116. Cf. Clem. Alex. Quis dives, c. 3, 29.

What the soul is in the body, that the Christians are in the world (c. 6). This, however, they owe not to men but to God, who planted in their hearts "the truth and the holy and unfathomable word" through Christ Himself, by whom the world was created, and who nevertheless appeared in meekness and gentleness for redemption, not with violence, but with mild persuasion (*βία γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι τῷ Θεῷ*), to love and not to judge. But assuredly He is about to appear at His second coming as judge (c. 7). Christianity is therefore a moral power that inwardly renovates and elevates above the world in the spirit of love, which is, at the same time, the truth of the world.

7. *The Shepherd of Hermas.*[1]—While in the Epistle to Diognetus the spirit of individual mysticism breathes in accordance with the tendency of the Greek mind, the *Shepherd of Hermas* expresses the genuine Roman spirit of churchly communion bound up with the severe earnestness of the Christian order of life. This work stands in high, almost canonical, authority. In it the ascetic tendency of the ethics of the ancient Church has found its first expression, and the tendency has received further impulse from it. The fundamental moral conception of this book is that of the life for God. This life is the gift of God, salvation being received through baptism; and the preservation of it, and its always renewed attainment, form the moral task of the Christians. Thus the objective side of the working of salvation by Christ falls into the background before the subjective side of the moral conduct of the individual himself. In this sense the Christ preached to the world, appears as the law given to the world. The two aspects of Christ, in so far as He has brought on the one hand the cancelling of sins, and on the other the law of God which shows the paths of life, fall asunder.[2] That is the moral element of this book and the nature of its view. Now the author wishes by his work to establish this law, for

[1] Th. Zahn, Der Hirte des Hermas, Gotha 1868. Winter, Sittliche Grundanschauungen im Hirten des Hermas, Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissenschaft, 1884, pp. 33–46. M. v. Engelhardt, Das Christenthum Justin's, p. 410 ff. Uhlhorn in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] vi. 9 ff. Schenk, Ztschr. f. kirchl. Wissenschaft, 1885, 8. Zum ethischen Lehrbegr. des Hirten des Herm. Gymn.-Prog. Aschersleben, 1886 (especially on "Sin," as in Hermas).

[2] Cf. Winter, p. 44.

Christendom needs it. Accordingly he receives his revelations from the "angel of repentance," who appears in the form of a shepherd (Vis. v.). These revelations are divided (although not by the author himself) into five Visions (ὁράσεις, visiones), twelve commandments (ἐντολαί, mandata), and ten similitudes (παραβολαί, similitudines). The moral exhortations are set forth under the point of view of repentance. The author impresses the necessity of repentance from regard to the impending completion of the Church and the judgment of the world, and in opposition to the increasing laxness, more especially in reference to the desire of enjoyment and attachment to earthly goods and the earthly sense. He also urges it in opposition to the ambition, discord, and unbridled conduct of the clergy, both higher and lower, and against the secularization of the Church. By this exclusive accentuation of the moral element, the exhortations in consequence obtain a legal and, even already, an ascetic character. The author diverges from the current triad of faith, hope, and love, occasioned by the particular character and aim of his work, and perhaps with an objective reference to the four cardinal virtues of the ancients; and he designates the four principal virtues as fides, abstinentia, potestas (= fortitudo ?), and patientia. These are followed — with an already increasing inclination towards schematic constructions—by the eight wider virtues: simplicitas, innocentia, castitas, hilaritas, veritas, intelligentia, concordia, caritas (Sim. ix. 15). Over against the former virtues stand: perfidia, intemperantia, incredulitas, voluptas; and over against the latter: tristitia, malitia, libido, iracundia, mendacium, stultitia, inflatio, odium (cf. Vis. iii. 8, Mand. viii.). Every successive virtue is the *filia* of the one preceding. Here also *fides* is the mother of them all (Vis. iii. 8); and the whole circle is enclosed by *fides* and *caritas*. The tendency is a "*mystical* nomism" which rests upon a real fellowship, and not merely on a moral harmony with Christ.[1] But it is at the same time a nomism which accentuates doing in a manner not compatible with the truth of the righteousness which is of faith. It sets forth Christianity predominantly under the point of view of a divine furtherance and a human performance; and so it paves the way to the distinction of

[1] Th. Zahn, Der Hirt des H. 1868, p. 467.

the double morality of the ordinary and extraordinary modes of action, the precepta evangelica and the consilia evangelica. The beginnings of this distinction [1] are already found here in the references to fasting, to sexual continence in marriage,[2] and to martyrdom (Simil. ix. 28).[3] This production certainly represents the current Christianity of those days in so far as it moves on the path of legal moralism. On the common soil of the morality of the Old Testament Apocrypha it brings this moralism into relationship with the Judaistic mode of thinking, as it is found in the fundamentally Jewish production called "the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" [4] with their exhortations to mildness, chastity, moderation, and peaceableness. At the same time, it strikes into the path of the ascetic righteousness; and here it is in accord with the ascetic tendency of such works as the *Acta Pauli et Theclæ* [5] and their ascetic judgment of the married life (Acta, etc., c. 5 : *μακάριοι οἱ ἔχοντες γυναῖκας ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες*). The error of this way of thinking consists in its transforming what is meant in reference to the disposition, and especially continence, into an external practical mode of conduct, and so making it a work.[6] Thus did the first unconscious divergence from the strict line of the Pauline doctrine of justification lead step by step into intellectualism and moralism, — a movement which was furthered by Judaistic influences based on the Apocrypha, and heathen influences springing from the moral philosophy of the time.

[1] Sim. v. 3 : *ἐὰν δέ τι ἀγαθὸν ποιήσῃς ἐκτὸς τῆς ἐντολῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ, σεαυτῷ περιποιήσῃ δόξαν περισσοτέραν καὶ ἔσῃ ἐνδοξότερος παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ οὗ ἔμελλες εἶναι* ; cf. Mand. iv. 3.

[2] Vis. ii. 2 : Conjux tua futura est soror tua — ; continebit se et consequetur misericordiam. c. 3 : Simplicitas et singularis continentia salvum facient te. Sim. ix. 11 : Nobiscum dormiet ut frater non ut maritus.

[3] M. v. Engelhardt, Justin, p. 419. Th. Zahn (p. 177 ff.) also recognises at least a certain precedence in honour.

[4] Cf. Schürer, Gesch. des jüd. Volks, 2 Aufl. 1886, ii. 662 ff.

[5] Ritschl, Die Entstehung der altkath. Kirche (1857), pp. 292-4 ; and Schlau, Die Akten, etc., ein Beitrag zur christl. Liter.-Gesch., Lpz. 1877, hold this work to be of Gentile-Christian Catholic origin and of anti-Gnostic tendency. Lipsius, Die apokryph. Ap. geschichten u. Ap. legenden, ii. 1, Braunschw. 1887; Appendix on Gnostic writings and their catholic revision in the third century.

[6] Cf. Acta, etc., c. 5, 6 : *μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν Θεὸν ὄψονται. μακάριοι οἱ ἁγνὴν τὴν σάρκα τηρήσαντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ναοὶ Θεοῦ γενήσονται. μακάριοι οἱ ἐγκρατεῖς*, etc. *μακάρια τὰ σώματα τῶν παρθένων*, etc.

II. The Ethics of the Greek Church.

§ 30. *The Ethics of the Apologists of the Second Century.*

The Apologists of the second century likewise accentuate the novelty and sublimity of Christianity; and consequently they also speak in a similar way of the Christian morality. They thus represent it in contrast to the extra-Christian and pre-Christian morality, both Jewish and heathen; while, on the other hand, they lay stress upon its originality, and its connection with the truth of heathenism and Judaism. They express this in the notions of the Logos (Reason) and of the new Law; and they make prominent in Christianity the two sides of knowledge and morality, which have both their source in the grace of regeneration in baptism, but which at the same time require the free-will of man, whose conduct, springing from the motives of fear and hope, has to expect a corresponding recompense from God. Through such media did the Greek Christian seek to connect his new consciousness, both for himself and others, with his other world of Greek thought.

1. *Justin Martyr* († *c.* 165)[1] in prosecuting his apologetic work is led to speak of the sublimity of the Christian morality in contrast to the heathen morality. In this behoof he refers to the moral alteration which had taken place through faith

[1] Otto, Corpus apologetarum christianorum seculi secundi, Jen. 1876 sqq. Semisch, Justin d. M., 2 Bde. Bresl. 1840. M. v. Engelhardt, Das Christenthum Justin's, Erlangen 1878. Hilgenfeld, Ztschr. für wissensch. Theologie, 1879. Stählin, Justin d. M. u. sein neuester Beurtheiler, Lpz. 1876. (The two last against Engelhardt.) Behm, Bemerkungen zum Christenth. Justin's d. M., Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissensch. 1882, pp. 478-627. Dieckhoff, Justin, Augustin, Bernhard u. Luther. Entwicklungsgang christl. Wahrheitserfassung, Lpz. 1882.

in the Christians.[1] "Since we have come to believe on the Logos we have been delivered from these demons (idols), and follow only the unbegotten God through the Son. We who formerly found pleasure in lust now find delight only in moral temperance (*σωφροσύνην*). We who once followed sorcery have now consecrated ourselves to the good and unbegotten God; we who once loved gain above all things now give up what we have to be common property (*εἰς κοινὸν φέροντες*) and share it with every one who is in need; we who once hated and killed each other, and who would have no common hearth or domestic fellowship with those who are not of our own tribe because of their different customs, have now, since the appearance of Christ, a common table. And we pray for our enemies; and we seek to win those who hate us without cause, so that they, living after the glorious teaching of Christ, may have good hope and may become participative with ourselves of the same blessings from the God who rules over all" (c. 12, 13, 67; Dial. 47; Apol. i. 14). Justin knows, indeed, of many who are not Christians although they confess Christ's doctrine with the mouth (i. 1, 16, 63 E); and these he willingly gives up to the punishment of the heathen (c. 16, 64 C). Notwithstanding this he can point with pride to innumerable Christians in the case of whom Christ's word has become truth, who have been converted from incontinence to continence, and who through a long life have kept themselves uncorrupted, and have proved themselves to be such (c. 15, 62 B). In contrast to the heathen ethics, he triumphantly sets forth the morality of Christ in a summary of the ethical precepts of the Sermon on the Mount (Apol. i. 15–17). What Justin here brings into prominence is more especially purity (already from the desires of the heart) and love even to enemies, in the manifoldness of its active manifestations, as well as obedience to the sovereign power occasioned by the social conditions of the time. It is only when denial of the Christian confession comes into question that this obedience has a limit; for conscientiousness stands above everything else to the Christian: "We will not live with lies" (Apol. i. 8; cf. Tatian, c. 4). This morality, again, is at the same time the universal reason in which the heathen likewise participate;

[1] See similar descriptions in Ep. ad Diogn. 5; Lactan. Instit. iii. 26, etc.

only that what has been participated in by them but in part is here completely present (λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον) and a possession for all, even for the least, so that through God's power they live according to it (Apol. ii. 10). What in relation to the heathen is called *Reason*, and is shown to be in germ in every man, is called in reference to the Jews *Law*, ὁ καινὸς νόμος (Dial. c. Tr. 12; cf. Micah iv. 2); and at the same time it is the old pre-Mosaic and universal law by which the Mosaic law with its ceremonial determinations and concessions to the sin and weakness of the people is abrogated as regards the Christians, and is only still valid in its typical sense. It was generally common for the Apologists of that time to justify Christianity in this way, by showing that it was the same as the original truth which preceded heathenism and lay at its foundation; that it was older than Homer, and even as old as the world, as is argued by Tatian (c. 41) and Theophilus (16 ff.); and consequently that it was to be regarded as the truth of the universal law of nature postulated by the Stoics. Christianity is thus represented on the one side as a revelation of the divine Reason in and through Christ, and faith is the recognition of this truth; it is acceptance of the doctrine of Christ, γνῶσις, and therefore it is essentially intellectual. Again, Christianity is represented on the other side as νόμος, the new law, and at the same time as the resuscitation and completion of the law of creation, which also lay at the basis of the Old Testament law (Dial. c. 4); and it is therefore fundamentally a morality of universal reason. The former side appears in the Apologies of Justin; the latter in his Dialogue. The former truth has been corrupted in heathenism by the demons, the powers of darkness (Apol. ii. 8, 10). On account of the sin of Israel the Law has become an external ceremonial legality, and as such limited to Israel (Dial. c. 18, 27). Now Christ has brought us the knowledge of this primeval and new will of God as destined for all peoples (Dial. c. 11); and He bestows renovation in baptism in order now to fulfil the true will of God with free-will, and in order to attain by the way of εὐσέβεια καὶ δικαιοσύνη to the ἀφθαρσία and συνουσία of God (Apol. i. 10). The relationship to God is thus based by Justin Martyr on the ground of performance and counter-performance. Consequently it is dependent on

the conduct of man; and faith is thereby itself made a performance or act of obedience. But such a new mode of conduct which exhibits righteousness in love to God and to our neighbour (Dial. 93), is not attained without a preceding forgiveness of former sins. The condition of this lies in the *μετάνοια* to which Christ's death leads us (and which is of deciding significance for Justin, Apol. i. 61; Dial. 12, 13, 141), and in faith which is trust in the assurance of the forgiveness of sin in Christ's death, and which has it in consequence: so that in this sense faith does not appear as a doing of anything, but as the religious basis of the new moral conduct of the person in righteousness. Further, the renewal through the regeneration by the Holy Spirit which is connected with baptism,[1] together with the new saving knowledge (*φωτισμός*) and the deliverance from the state of bondage, which is the consequence of the natural birth,[2] forms the fundamental presupposition and the living beginning of that new mode of conduct. Hence it appears that Justin teaches an illuminating and renewing grace. Christ, as the first-born of all creatures, has become the beginning of the new race of men (the Christians) who are born again of Him through water, faith, and the cross (Dial. 138). In the view of Justin, knowledge and renewal are regarded only as presuppositions of our own doing; and the present relationship to God and the future are based upon them, and thus the grace of God does not come to its full significance. On this position moralism is not excluded from the outset. The goal of the Hellenic philosophy was to find the higher morality on the way of knowledge, and it is this which seemed to find its truth in Justin's view. The revelation of God in Christ and divine grace are regarded as a means for that end, instead of being viewed as the essence and goal of Christianity. But it should not be forgotten that Justin's exposition is always determined by the apologetic tendency; and in consequence it passes over to the antagonistic sphere, and especially to the heathen mode of thinking and conception, and attaches to them what is new, so that a pure

[1] Dial. 29, 135: *δύο γίνη—τὸν μὲν ἐξ αἵματος καὶ σαρκὸς, τὸν δὲ ἐκ πίστεως καὶ πνεύματος γεγεννημένον.*

[2] Apol. i. 61: *ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀφέσεώς τε ἁμαρτιῶν ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν.*

and full expression of the Christian element itself is not reached.[1] Moreover, the inner Christian state of life shows itself here with such certainty and decidedness regarding the specifically new element which had arisen and been bestowed with it, and with such warmth of personal relationship to the person of Christ and the new life in God attained therein (on account of which the individual was conscious of constantly living in the presence of death),[2] that this real Christianity went far beyond the limited lines of any such theory.[3] But if the Greek philosopher rejoiced at having found here the higher truth of Plato and of the Stoics (Apol. ii. 13), and then believed the new knowledge to be liker those philosophies than it was, and so regarded it, we need not wonder at this. In point of fact, the theology of Justin united two heterogeneous elements, the specifically Christian element and the ancient element, and they proceeded side by side without being internally mediated with each other. And this continued to be the case at bottom even with the succeeding Greek theologians.

2. *Tatian.*[4]—While Justin gives more prominence to the affinity of Christianity and of Christian morality with the Hellenic moral philosophy, the opposite position is represented by Tatian in his λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας. In this work Tatian took up the sharpest opposition to the Hellenic paganism and to Greek culture generally, and in contrast to it he extols the "barbarian philosophy" (*i.e.* Christianity) in proud words. Here again regeneration is represented as the basis of morality, and it is by means of it that the disorder of the sensuous nature is corrected (c. 5). For as we have incurred it by our freedom, we ought also to make ourselves free from it again; and thus attain to the right freedom from the world, and by participation in God's being to immortality (c. 7). "Die to the world, renouncing the madness of its pursuits; live to God, renouncing thy old nature through the knowledge of His being! We are not

[1] Cf. Stählin, l.c. p. 5 f. Against M. v. Engelhardt's one-sided application of the apologies.

[2] Apol. i. 3. 11 sqq.

[3] Against the view of M. v. Engelhardt and the Ritschl School, see *e.g.* Harnack in the Theol. Lit.-Zeitung, 1878, Nr. 26.

[4] Otto, Corp. Apol. etc. T. vi. Ad. Harnack, Tatian's Rede an die Griechen, übersetzt u. eingeleitet, Giessen 1884.

born for death; we die from our own fault; freedom has completely undone us. We have become slaves, we who were free; on account of sin have we been sold. Nothing evil has been created by God, it is we who have produced what is bad; and what has been thus produced we can again renounce" (c. 12). It is only thus that we attain to immortality. For the soul is immortal only when it participates in God, whose spirit it has forsaken in consequence of sin (c. 13). "Consequently we must now again strive after what we have possessed and lost, namely, to unite the soul with the Holy Spirit and to effectuate the God-willed union with it" (c. 15); and thus we become free from the seduction and dominion of the demons. The philosophers do not help us to attain this; they really know nothing and can do nothing; for they do not know the true God; but this "barbaric" philosophy with its simple truth does know Him. "My soul was instructed by God, and I knew that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition, whereas these other doctrines take away the slavery under which we lie in the world, deliver us from our many lords and thousand tyrants: and yet they do not give us goods which we might not have already received, but rather those which we had indeed received but could not retain in consequence of error" (c. 29). For Christianity is the renewal of what originally existed, and is as old as the world (c. 20).[1] The antagonism which is here delineated was afterwards carried out further by Tatian; and in this way he reached a dualistic encratistic asceticism which rejected marriage and the enjoyment of wine and flesh. And thus mixing and confusing the ethical with the physical, he lost himself in Gnostic paths.

3. We find thoughts akin to those of Justin in the other apologists. *Athenagoras*, who perhaps belonged to Athens, wrote his πρεσβεία περὶ Χριστιανῶν (*supplicatio pro christianis*) in 177 A.D.[2] He also describes the sublimity of the Christian morality as a morality of love even towards enemies (c. 11), of renunciation in prospect of the future (c. 12), and of purity even in thought. It sees relatives in others (c. 32), and it recognises marriage only as subservient to its end, the production of children, or entirely

[1] So Theophilus, 16 ff. [2] Otto, Corp. Apol., Jen. 1857, vol. vii.

abstains from it from the higher estimation put on celibacy, and with a view to more inward fellowship with God (c. 33). He regards second marriage as εὐπρεπὴς μοιχεία, and abhors the getting rid of or exposure of children. *Theophilus* wrote his treatise addressed to Autolycus in 180 A.D. in three books (Ad Autol. L. iii.).[1] It is only at the close that he comes to speak of the morality of Christianity, and he describes it in agreement with the divine moral law in the Old Testament as a morality of justice, chastity, and love even towards strangers (iii. 10–14).—The Christian earnestness of sanctification in contrast to heathen ways here shows an ascetic tendency, especially in reference to the sexual life. This is still more distinctly seen in other writings, such as in the treatise entitled *De Resurrectione* (*e.g.* c. 3), which has been ascribed to Justin, and which certainly belongs to the second century. Nor need we be astonished if we thus early see this mode of thinking, which was foreign to the original Christianity, developing itself in the Church.

§ 31. *The Ethics of the Alexandrian Theology.*

1. *Clement of Alexandria.*

The alliance which Christian theology as then developing itself entered into with the Hellenic philosophy, especially in Alexandria, realized its full consequences in the treatment of ethics as well as in other departments of theology. The endeavour to exhibit Christian Ethics as the truth of previous Ethics was justified; and it led to a combination of the two which not merely occasioned a treatment of Christian Ethics according to the formal standard of philosophical Ethics, but also materially influenced Christian Ethics, so that there resulted a still unmediated double current of ancient philosophical conceptions and those conceptions that were genuinely Christian. Thus it happened that in spite of the decidedly Christian basis of the movement, its attachment to the ancient intellectualism and its

[1] Otto, Corp. Apol. vol. viii.

development of the beginnings made by Justin, led to the highest good being regarded as γνῶσις (θεωρία, ἐπόπτεια). This Gnosis has its beginning in this world, and it finds its completion in the ἀνάπαυσις and ἀφθαρσία of the other world, so that in the one-sided apprehension of God as an object of knowledge neither the personal moral relationship to God nor the corresponding active relationship to the world came to full recognition; but the enthusiasm of knowledge went the way of contemplation and of asceticism, which put the striving after sinlessness in the place of justification, and then in the further development sought to attain this on the way of desensualization. In Clemens Alexandrinus, the Stoic morality resting upon the metaphysics of Plato gave something more than a vesture to his Christian thoughts, while in Origen the specifically Christian element comes out more decidedly, yet not without the influence of the Neo-Platonic way of thinking.

Clement of Alexandria[1] († c. 220 A.D.) has embodied a large amount of ethical material in his three works: the λόγος προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας, the παιδαγωγός (three books), and the στρωματεῖς (seven books), as well as in his beautiful monograph τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος. These three works represent three succeeding stages which are to lead up from the world to God Himself. From the unreal and impure heathen myths, the *Exhortation* (λόγος προτρεπτικός) calls the reader to the sacred tones of the heavenly truth and its eternal melody, which the Logos of God sounds forth in the harmony of the universe as well as plays upon the human

[1] Opp. ed. Potter, Oxon. 1715. Münscher, in Henke's Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Bd. 6, Helmst. 1796, p. 106 ff. Darstellung der moral. Ideen des Cl. Alex. u. des Tertull. Ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der christl. Sittenlehre. Berg, Diss. de Cl. Al. eiusque morali doctrina, Viteb. 1798. H. Reuter, Clem. Al. theol. mor. capita selecta, Vratisl. 1853. Merk, Cl. Al. in s. Abhängigkeit v. d. griech. Philos., Lpz. 1879. Against his overstrained view: Winter, Zur Ethik des Cl. u. Alex., in Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissensch. 1880, p. 130 ff. Die Lehre des Al. Cl. von den Quellen der sittl. Erkenntniss, in Luthardt's Jubil. schr., Lpz. 1881, pp. 99–137. Die Ethik des Cl. v. Alex., Lpz. 1882. Jacobi in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ii. 26 ff. Waldstein, Der Einfluss des Stoicism. auf die älteste christl. Lehrbildung, Stud. u. Krit. 1880, 4, p. 645 f.

soul itself; for the heavenly Logos, that instrument of God Himself, is friendly to man. "The Lord has compassion, He trains, incites, warns, saves, preserves; and as the transcendent reward of those who follow Him as disciples, He promises us the kingdom of heaven" (c. 1). Starting thus from the idea of the Logos, Clement connects the thought of salvation with the thought of the world. For the former is contained in the latter. As the Word was in the beginning we were willed in it,[1] so that Christianity is thus only what was originally. For the Logos, who is the Creator, has now appeared as a teacher to lead us to eternal life, and so to save us. Christianity is therefore the goal of the previous development, because the original and the Christian morality are properly from the outset "inscribed on the heart itself" (c. 10). In the *Exhortation* this position is negatively unfolded and exhibited in detail. We have here a universalizing in a cosmical sense of the truth of salvation, and this is an Alexandrian thought belonging to Philo and others. The universalism of the revelation of salvation and of Christianity, is here connected with the past of the constitution of creation instead of being connected as in Scripture with its destination, and referred to the future. This thought is proper to the whole Greek theology of that time. It has indeed its points of connection in the Pauline expressions contained in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians, which connect the salvation of Christ with His position in the world; but here it has become falsely cosmical through the influence of the natural universalism of the Stoics.

Those who are thus led to the Christian truth are then received and taken in hand by the *Pædagogus* or "Teacher" in order to lead them through the training of the Church to the highest stage. For as history generally is an education or training administered by the Logos leading to the complete revelation of the Logos, here the Hellenic philosophy finds its place as well as the Old Testament law which leads u[illegible]gh fear to the highest legislation[2] and grace in Christ,

[illegible] καταβολῆς ἡμεῖς· οὕτω δεῖν ἴσισθαι, ἐν αὐτῷ πρότιμον

[illegible]cept the Logos as law, we would learn to know His shortest and nearest way to heaven. They are

in order that from being slaves we may become by regeneration free sons of God in Christ.[1] Now the Church is the educational institution which has to bring individuals to the goal of perfection. The moral training as the *Pædagogus* expounds it, is the way to the higher stage of the gnostic which is represented in the *Stromata*. The *Pædagogus* thus becomes an exposition of the Christian morality, and, according to the "Two Ways," it is a first exhibition of it. It is not a scientific, but a practical representation of Christian Ethics,[2] in the form of lectures to the catechumens relating to the regulation of the external life, down to the externalities of diet, social intercourse, sleep, conjugal fellowship, ornaments, etc. All this is expounded as under the training of the Logos according to the ancient moral standards of proportion and reason (ii. 8, iii. 9), the *σώφρων* (ii. 7), the rational mean (ii. 1), and beautiful harmony (i. 13, ii. 3); and it concludes with the description of a typical Christian as he should exhibit himself in his conduct.[3] For, virtue is the harmony that is effectuated by reason: sin is the disorder of reason (i. 13). This exhibition of Christian morality as the *εὐταξία* of life (iii. 12, p. 303) in outward practice, is a dealing with morals according to the analogy of the ancient popular philosophical expositions, in which morality is frequently merged in practice, and ethics often becomes a doctrine of mere propriety in conduct. But here there is the difference that all this rests upon baptism and faith (i. 6), in which the perfection of the future is already anticipated, and that the regulation of the external life is here regarded as destined to be only the way to the higher and inward life.

In order to give an outline of these Exhortations we may here quote some of them from the Second and Third Books. And first, we take some of those that relate to *eating* and to *banquets*. If other men live in order to eat, then, says the

laws of love and not of fear." i. 7: "Fear is transformed into love." The Teacher says on one occasion: Fear God the Lord (Deut. vi. 2); and He again exhorts us to "love the Lord thy God" (Matt. xxii. 37).

[1] Pæd. i. 6. Quis dives, c. 9.

[2] I. 1: *πρακτικός, οὐ μισθοδικὸς ὁ παιδαγωγός.*

[3] A sort of contrast to the Aristotelian ideal of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, Nicom. Eth. iv. 3.

Pædagogus to us, eat in order to live. We ought to be satisfied with what is necessary, and not to seek sensual delectation; but to enjoy simple and few dishes as more compatible with spiritual activity, while immoderate and dainty enjoyment is hurtful to the body and hinders the soul from aspiring after what is heavenly. Clement describes that life of enjoyment in forcible terms. He contrasts with it the love-feast as a ἑστίασις λαγική. "The enjoyments of the common feast possess a certain stimulus for Christian love; they are a reminder of the eternal joys." The Christians in particular are not to take part in the so-called death-feasts, for that is a fellowship of demons. The other invitations cannot be always declined; and then what is served has to be eaten, but with inward indifference towards luxury in dishes. "It is necessary for one to help himself to what is served with propriety; the hand, chin, and napkin must be kept clean; the face is not to be distorted with grimaces; and in the course of the meal, one must not behave unseemly." One ought not to speak while masticating, nor eat and drink at the same time. We need not refrain from certain dishes. "For it is not that which enters into the mouth that defileth a man." Only it is necessary to avoid extremes; the middle way is the best. In like manner, Clement, in chap. ii., gives precepts with regard to *drinking*. The young should avoid wine, for they are hot enough without it; "the measure of youth foams otherwise over the brim of shamefulness." But others have also to observe moderation. "At evening, wine may be drunk at meal-time, if we have to take no further part in the readings, which require greater sobriety." "In the old; as a rule, there are no longer violently raging desires which would lead us to fear shipwreck from drunkenness; and standing firm upon the anchors of reason and time, they more easily weather the storms which rise up from the wine-cup." They may also make cheerful jests at table, yet there is for them too a limit in drinking, etc. "It is therefore proper to use wine partly as a medicine only for the sake of health, and also partly for promoting cheerfulness and recreation." Clement then goes somewhat specially into the consequences of excessive enjoyment of undiluted wine; although, on the other hand, he blames "the so-called Encratites."—In chap. iii. he treats in detail of *luxury in household furnishings*. "In things whose proper measure is the need of them, there should be no luxury." "Generally food, clothing, furniture, in short, everything in the house, ought to be in harmony with the law of the Christian life according to the particular person, age, calling, and time. For the servant of the one God, it is becoming that even his property and furniture bear the stamp of the unique moral life." "The

best riches is poverty of desires; and the genuine pride is that which does not magnify itself by riches, but despises them." Chap. iv. treats of *entertainments* at meals. When Clement comes here to speak of music and song, he shows the fine feeling regarding them which the ancient world possessed; and which we find, for example, in Aristotle. "The broken strains and wailing measures of the Carian muse corrupt the morals like so many poisonous drinks, since they incite by their luxurious and unwholesome music to a passion for such play." "Man is in truth an instrument of peace." "If thou wilt love the Lord thy God, and also thy neighbour, thou must first enter into communication with God by thanksgiving and psalm-singing, and then with thy neighbour by becoming conversation."—Chap. v. treats of *laughing*. "Men who follow the inclination to laughing, or rather to the ridiculous, must be banished out of our republic. For as all words flow from the disposition and character, it is not possible to make ridiculous speeches which do not spring from a ridiculous character." "One may make witty remarks but not jests. Besides, one should moderate himself even in laughing."—In chap. vi. he continues thus: "We must not only keep ourselves from unbecoming words, but we ought also to stop the mouth of those who utter such by a severe look."—Chap. vii. treats of *propriety at meals and in society*. "If the purpose of drinking together is the testifying of friendship, and if food and drink are to be accompanied with love, why then should we not rationally associate with each other and speak lovingly with each?" One should recline or sit becomingly; and at meals we should help ourselves slowly and not greedily. "It shows the man of culture to rise before others, and to retire gracefully from the meal." "Untimeous laughter is to be avoided, in the same way as untimeous tears." The aged ought to lead the conversation at a meal, and the young should only timidly take part in it. "Speak, if it must be, only when you have been twice asked; and comprise your speech in few words." "Loud shouting borders on folly." "Our goal is tranquillity (ἀταραξία); and this is expressed in the words: 'Peace be unto thee!' Do not answer before you hear. There is something womanish in the agitated voice. The wise man observes moderation even in his voice." "Let the look be earnest; let the turning of the neck and every motion be composed, and so even with gestures with the hands in speaking. Generally composure, rest, meekness, and peace are characteristic of the Christian."—Chap. viii. deals with the *use of ointments and garlands;* and it shows how well versed Clement was in these matters with their excessive luxury. "Our men ought to smell rather of virtue than of ointments;

but let the woman exhale the fragrance of Christ." Moreover, the women should seek for some of those perfumes which do not give headache to men. Perfumes may be used so far as they strengthen the nerves, and therefore as a medicine. Clement will also allow no use of garlands at noisy carouses.—"Garlands are therefore forbidden to the pupils of the Logos;" "Not so much merely because the garland is the sign of noisy revellings, but because it is consecrated to the gods."—Chap. ix. treats of *sleep*. Trouble is not to be taken about expensive couches, etc.: "he who possesses them is not forbidden to use them, but eagerness for them is to be restrained." "A sleeping man, like a dead man, is useful for nothing; and therefore we ought frequently to rise from our couch at night and to praise God. Blessed are they who watch for God; they make themselves like the angels whom we call 'watchers.'"—In chap. x. Clement speaks of the *begetting of children*. "Our life is full of honourable actions; let a man either marry or entirely abstain from marriage." "To have intercourse for any other end than the begetting of children is a wrong against nature." "One should not be shameless even at night, because it is dark; modesty should burn like a lamp in the heart." This leads Clement to speak of modest behaviour, especially in the case of women, in their appearance and clothing. "Bodily beauty is not to be a prey for men to hunt after." He then continues such admonitions in reference to the shoes (chap. xi.), and to ornaments of gold and precious stones (chap. xii.). In the Third Book he reviews the arts of the toilet (chap. ii.) and dandies (chap. iii.); and then speaks about society (chap. iv.), baths (chaps. v.–ix.), and the visiting of gymnasiums (chap. x.), and then concludes with a sketch of the right mode of conducting life (chaps. xi., xii.). "We must not appear to be free, but be free; as the pupils of God we are also His adoptive children. Hence we ought to assume in our bearing, movements, walking and dress, in short, in the whole of our life, a manner which becomes the perfectly free man. Further, men should not wear the ring on other fingers, but put it on the little finger, and on its lowest section; for the hand is thus fitted for the labour for which we use it." "As a seal we should use a dove, or a fish, or a ship with swollen sails, or even a line or an anchor. If one is a fisherman, the seal should suggest the apostles, or the children drawn out of the water of baptism. But we should not have idols engraved." "In regard to the hair, it is to be worn in the following way: Let the head of men be cut short, unless one has woolly hair. The chin is to be covered with hair. Curled hair should not hang down too long from the head after the manner of the locks of women; for men the beard is enough." "For women it suffices to comb

the hair softly, and to fasten it with a simple pin on the back of the neck." "Locks of hair after the manner of public women, and plaited tresses hanging down, make the person ugly." "The wearing of false hair is entirely to be rejected; to adorn the head with the hair of others and to put on dead wigs is truly godless; for on whom does the priest lay his hand? Whom does he bless? Not the ornamented women, but the false hair." "There is something very beautiful about a diligent housewife who clothes herself and her husband in garments made by herself." "Let the whole appearance, look, walk, and voice, be altogether well ordered, not as with some, who have something theatrical about them, and take on tripping movements as in dancing." "Away, moreover, with all that is showy in walking! Let the step be earnest and slow, yet not hesitating. Men should not strut about on the road and stare with craning neck at the passers-by." "Let plays and recitations, with their buffoonery and chatter, be forbidden." "Let husband and wife go into the church respectably dressed, and not with an affected walk, and in silence, with genuine love of their neighbours in their heart, and with a modest body and modest sense." The kiss of peace is not to be abused (chap. xii.). "The best mode of life is orderliness" (*εὐταξία*). "The divine Logos as a teacher leads human weakness from the sensuous to the spiritual." This is the key of what frequently recurs in the matter of this work. It is the ancient ideal of culture in a Christian realization.

The *Stromata*[1] treat the ethical questions more in principle and on the stage of the gnostic. The intellectual factor had won the predominance in the Greek philosophy, as we see by Plato's *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ Θεοῦ* and his *ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ*, by the higher dignity assigned to the dianoëtic virtues over the ethical in Aristotle, and by the ideal of the wise man of the Stoics. Following this view, Clement indicates the ideal of the Christian to be the *γνωστικός* who stands higher than the *πιστικός*; and his ideal *γνῶσις* is the intuition of God and His absolute Reason as it has revealed itself in the

[1] The complete title of this work is given by Eusebius (H. E. vi. 13. 1) as follows: *τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς.* Cf. Strom. i. 29. 182, iii. 18. 110, v. 14. 142, vi. 1. 1. The term *στρωματεῖς* (*Stromata* or *Miscellanies*) originally signifies pieces of tapestry woven in divers colours, and is here applied, according to the manner of the time, to indicate a miscellaneous production. Plutarch had given the same title to one of his popular mixed works. Cf. Overbeck, Anfänge der patrist. Liter., Histor. Ztschr. v. Sybel, 1882, p. 460.

Logos. The ideal of the *ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ*[1] is made possible by the revelation of the Logos, and is attained by the aid of grace; and it consists essentially in the intuition of God, an intuition which is inseparable from love.[2] Now the future blessedness consists in the blessed beholding of God and of divine things in heaven: in *γνῶσις, ἐπόπτεια, θεωρία,* which is the highest goal and therefore the highest good.[3] But by the *πίστις γνωστική* we already behold the future. And in this knowledge of God the gnostic is a God upon earth;[4] for the ultimate goal is deification, the *Θεὸς γίνεσθαι, θεοποιεῖσθαι.*[5] This glorification of gnosis goes the length of the paradox, that if there were to be a choice between knowledge of God and eternal blessedness (*σωτηρία αἰώνιος*), the Gnostic would decide for the former.[6] This stands entirely upon the line of the ancient notion and attitude of mind, the consequence of which is the elevation of the contemplative life above the active.[7] With this Platonic element, however, is combined the Stoical element in the idealization of the *ἀπάθεια.* For that elevation into the intuition of the divine withdraws the individual from the sphere of the sensible and the changes of its *πάθη.* The proper *ἕξις* (*habitus*) of the gnostic is thus the *ἀπάθεια,* as God Himself is *ἀπαθής,*[8] so that he does not need *fortitudo* and *temperantia*; for no misfortune or injury makes an alteration in him.[9] This Stoical path leads also to the Stoical distinction of the double stage; the *καθῆκον officium medium* (the stage of *πίστις*), and of the *κατόρθωμα perfectum* (the stage of *γνῶσις*).[10] For the same work is different according to the principle that inwardly determines it.[11]

[1] IV. 6 p. 576 sq., 22 p. 626; vi. 9 p. 776, 14 p. 798.

[2] *τελειότατον ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ἡ γνῶσις,* vi. 12 p. 798. *μέγιστον ἄρα ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ Θεοῦ,* vii. 7 p. 859.

[3] I. 19 p. 370; v. 14 p. 732; vi. 14 p. 794.

[4] IV. 23 p. 623; vii. 16 p. 95: *ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολῶν Θεός.*

[5] VI. 22 pp. 499–502; v. 14 p. 705.

[6] Strom. iv. 22 p. 136: *εἰ γοῦν τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν προθείη τῷ γνωστικῷ, πότερον ἑλέσθαι βούλοιτο τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν αἰώνιον εἶη δὲ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐν ταυτότητι ὄντα, οὐδὲ καθ' ὁτιοῦν διστάσας ἕλοιτ' ἂν τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

[7] Cf. the author's Antike Ethik, p. 49. Aristotle puts the dianoëtic virtues above the ethical virtues; see Antike Ethik, p. 66.

[8] VI. 9 p. 775 sqq.; iv. 3. 12; iv. 22. 139. 141; iv. 24. 149, etc.

[9] VI. 9. 76; vii. 3. 188.

[10] IV. 26. 166; vi. 13. 111.

[11] *τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον διάφορον ἴσχει, ἢ διὰ φόβον γινόμενον, ἢ δι' ἀγάπης τελεσθὲν ἢ ἤτοι διὰ πίστεως ἢ καὶ γνωστικῶς ἐνεργούμενον.*

In this there is already manifested the difference between Clement's mode of thinking and that of the ancient philosophers. For although it seems to be completely identical with theirs, it is nevertheless specifically different in root and effect, and has another soul. For what is only an abstract ideal with the Stoics, is regarded by him as a reality which has been made possible by the manifestation of the Logos in Jesus Christ; and the sacred triad of faith, love, and hope form the real ground of that gnosis and its goal of perfection.[1] These, however, are realities springing from the principles of freedom and grace. Thereby a new soul is also put into this new life of knowledge; and this soul consists of love to God and Christ and our neighbour, with all its virtues. For what we have here is not a merely theoretical, but a life-renewing moral knowledge; for the knowledge of God is only the highest, because it is a moral energy.[2] Accordingly γνῶσις is ἀρχὴ καὶ δημιουργὸς πάσης πράξεως λογικῆς (vi. 8. 69). Hence Clement can also combine with the gnosis the requirement of active life, of εὐποιΐα and its exercise in the concrete relations of life.[3] For as the cognition is one on the way of moral acting, it is also accompanied by the ἔργον as by its shadow.[4] With this Clement gains a positive estimation of the relationships of the earthly life. This appears in his judgments on marriage[5] and fasting,[6] and in his repudiation of the merely negative ethic which ascetically misestimates the material life. It lay in the character of the time that he should call martyrdom an ἀποκάθαρσις ἁμαρτιῶν μετὰ δόξης.[7]

This positive relation to real life is expounded in a special relation in the very beautiful treatise τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος; This work, under reference to Matt. xix. 21–24, lays down a purely evangelical judgment on the right atti-

[1] Strom. iv. 7. 54: πρόκεινται δὲ τοῖς εἰς τελείωσιν σπεύδουσιν ἡ γνῶσις ἡ λογική, ἧς θεμέλιος ἡ ἁγία τριὰς πίστις, ἀγάπη, ἐλπίς.

[2] ταύτῃ σώζεται τὸ ἀνακόβλητον τῆς ἀρετῆς· ὁ δὲ ἀγνωκὼς τὸν Θεὸν ὅσιος καὶ εὐσεβὴς· μόνος ἄρα ὁ γνωστικὸς εὐσεβὴς ἡμῖν εἶναι δέδεικται, vii. 7. 47.

[3] τοῦ γνωστικοῦ—τελείωσις ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰς ἐνέργειαν εὐποιΐας προβαίνει, iv. 6 p. 581, 16 p. 607; vii. 14 p. 797, etc.

[4] σκιά, vii. 13 p. 883, etc.

[5] II. 23; iii. 1. 12; vii. 12. Against Neander's statement, that "Clement is not free from a certain overestimate of celibacy."

[6] VI. 12 p. 791.

[7] IV. 9. Cf. Winter on this (p. 226 f.).

tude of the Christian to earthly possession. It contains a series of most excellent and fruitful thoughts,[1] and in this connection it repeatedly speaks of the Christian virtues. Love, faith, hope (in this order) are the foremost virtues (c. 3) and "the indissoluble bonds of salvation" (c. 29); and to them are attached the following four: knowledge, meekness, mercy, chastity (c. 3, c. 18: faith, hope, love; brotherly love, wisdom, meekness, humilty, truth,—whose reward is salvation).

Thus the two currents meet here, still moving side by side without having yet completed an internal union. The new life in God, which came into the world with Jesus Christ, which has attained reality in the Christian in faith, love, and hope, and which looks to the future, is here presented along with the ideals of the ancient philosophical culture with its material of thought, and these ideals are to find their truth and reality in the Christian. It may be still asked, what is the specific nature of Clement's thought and spiritual life? The view has been lately widely spread, that Clement's conception of the world was only formally a Christian one in that it put everything under the point of view of the union that is to be attained by man through Christ the Logos, but that it was materially dependent on the Greek philosophy, being dependent primarily on the philosophy of the Stoics, in the second line on that of Plato, and influenced in many points by Philo.[2] This has been maintained on the ground that Clement's doctrine makes all virtue a mode of knowledge, apprehends virtue as a striving after apathy, and describes God and the Logos Himself as pure apathy. But the relation in question is in reality to be inverted.[3]

§ 32. *The Ethics of the Alexandrian Philosophy.*

2. *Origen.*

In *Origen* († 254)[4] the consciousness of the difference between the ancient and the Christian system of morality is.

[1] *E.g.* c. 11, 12, 14. [2] Cf. Merk's closing judgment.

[3] Cf. Overbeck against Merk, and his later treatment of the question generally in Schürer's Theol. Lit.-Zeitung, 1879, Nr. 20, p. 475 ff.

[4] Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Panegyrica oratio in Originem (de la Rue, T. iv.),

stronger than in Clement. His "Logos" is conceived in a much more personal and ethical way, and is put into closer connection with Jesus; and it is thereby much more sharply distinguished from the Logos of Plato and the Stoics than was the case with Clement. This leads to Ethics being religiously determined and conditioned in quite another way than was possible in the extra-Christian systems with their autonomy. Therein lay also really the roots of the power of Christian Ethics, as Origen himself showed in his personality and life. According to the apologetic tendency of his treatise against Celsus, he gives emphatic prominence to the superiority of the moral reality in the Christians compared with the heathen;[1] and he puts the Christian doctrine of morals with its activity and universality in the same relation to the ancient pagan doctrines.[2] And although he connects the Christian ethic with the ancient ethics, yet he holds that it is only in the former that the cardinal virtues are realized.[3] His ethical doctrines are to be gathered from his treatise against Celsus, his *Homilics,* and his dogmatic work, *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* (of which the Third Book treats of anthropology), his *Περὶ εὐχῆς* (*de oratione*), and his *Εἰς μαρτύριον προτρεπτικὸς λόγος* (*exhortatio ad martyrium*). Of these writings the treatise on prayer deserves to be specially considered. After giving an explanation of prayer in general in Book. I., he gives in Book II. an explanation of the Lord's Prayer, where, in dealing with the Fifth Petition (c. 28), the various classes of duties are briefly described. They are—1. duties to brethren (in the religious and bodily sense), to fellow-citizens, to men generally, and specially to strangers and to the old; 2. duties to ourselves, to the body and the soul; 3. duties to God in the maintenance of the right mood of the soul, to Christ who has redeemed us, to the Holy Spirit whom we are not to grieve, and to our particular angels. Thereafter the special duties of certain individuals

describes Origen specially as a teacher of Ethics. Redepenning, 2 Bde., Bonn 1841, 46 (esp. ii. 32 f.). Möller, Herzog, P. R.-E.[2] xi. 92 ff. Bestmann, Orig. u. Plotinos, Ztschr. f. kirchl. Wissensch. 1883, 4. Mehlhorn, Orig. L. v. d. Freiheit, Ztschr. f. histor. Theol. i. 2.

[1] C. Cels. i. 5, 26, 31, 46, iii. 29.

[2] C. Cels. i. 8, iii. 29, iv. 5.

[3] V. 28, 34, ii. 79.

are treated, including those of the widow, the deacon, the presbyter, the bishop, and of husband and wife towards one another.

The following extracts from this work may here find a place. In Book I., after the introductory observations (c. 6), Origen repels the arguments commonly adduced against prayer from the omniscience or predestination of God. God also foreknows, he says, how we will conduct ourselves in virtue of our free self-determination, so that our prayer is therefore likewise taken already into account by God. Regarding the right kind of prayer, he proceeds as follows: "One should not use many words, nor desire trivial things, nor pray for what is earthly." "On the one hand, without purification from sin one should not entertain the idea that prayer will find acceptance; and, on the other hand, he who prays can obtain no forgiveness of sin unless he forgives from the heart his brother who has injured him and who prays for forgiveness" (c. 8). "He who prays ought to raise pure hands (1 Tim. ii. 8), in this respect that he forgives all who have done him a wrong" (c. 9). "The Son of God is the high priest for our offerings and the advocate with the Father; He prays with those who pray, and supplicates with those who supplicate" (c. 10). "The angel who is assigned to every one, even to the little ones, in the Church, and who 'always beholds the face of the heavenly Father' and contemplates the Godhead of our Creator, prays with us and helps us according to his power to that for which we ask" (c. 11). "But pray without ceasing; he who combines prayer with his dutiful labours, and appropriate employments with his prayer, will find that in such circumstances even the works of virtue or the fulfilment of the commandments are of avail as prayer. For we can only consider the expression: Pray without ceasing! as capable of being fulfilled, if we regard the whole life of the Christian as a great uninterrupted prayer. And what is commonly called 'prayer' (which ought to be offered at least thrice a day) forms a part of this prayer" (c. 12). "How much does not every one of us know to tell of when, full of thanks, he remembers the benefits bestowed upon him and will praise God for them! In fact, souls that were a long time unfruitful and felt the powerlessness of their reason and the unfruitfulness of their understanding, have conceived of the Holy Ghost in consequence of their constant prayer, and have brought forth saving words full of the doctrines of truth. And how many enemies have thus been beaten, often when many thousands of the hostile powers made war against us and wished to make us fall away from the holy faith!" (c. 13).

"We are to pray for what is heavenly, and the earthly will then be added unto us. Prayer is fourfold: petition, adoration with ascription of praise, intercession, and thanksgiving. Petition, intercession, and thanksgiving may also be addressed to the saints, as when we have before us a Paul or a Peter, so that they help us and make us worthy to participate in the authority bestowed upon them to forgive sins; and they may be addressed unreservedly to Christ" (c. 14). But adoration (προσευχή) is only to be addressed to God, and not even to Christ. For Christ has taught us to pray to the Father, and has Himself prayed to Him; and thus we likewise give adoration "solely to God, the Father of the universe, yet not without the High Priest," and therefore "through Jesus Christ," "by means of the High Priest and Intercessor" (c. 15). "They commit a sin of ignorance who in their great simplicity without examination and inquiry pray to the Son." "Every one who asks for earthly and trivial things from God, gives no heed to His commandment to ask God for heavenly and great things" (c. 16). "If we possess the spiritual gifts, and if we are instructed by God that we are wholly to attain the true goods, we shall not be anxious about trivial shadowy things" (c. 17). The second part of this treatise (Book II.) contains the exposition of the Lord's Prayer, after an explanation of the introductory words of Jesus in Matthew about ostentation and using many words. Origen's observations on the Fourth Petition may be referred to, in which that Petition is explained as not relating to the bread of the body, for (c. 27): "How should He who commanded us to ask for what is heavenly and great, give the injunction to ask the Father for what is earthly and petty?" Reference is made to John, chap. vi. "The bread which is indicated by the term ἐπιούσιος is that which is wholly correspondent to the spiritual nature, and is even related to the substance (οὐσία), which lends to the soul at once health, well-being, and power, and communicates its own imperishableness, —for the word of God is imperishable to him who eats of it." As regards the external form (c. 31), we ought to pray kneeling before God with outstretched arms and upturned eyes, and making confession of our own sin. If Paul could be present with his spirit in Corinth, much more will "the departed saints come in the spirit to the assemblies of the Church." It is most fitting to pray in the direction of the east, "as a sign that the soul is looking towards the rise of the true light" (c. 32). Prayer, however, should have the following *four elements*. "In the beginning and introduction of the prayer we should praise God according to our power through Christ, who is thus praised along with God, and in the Holy Spirit, who is thus

glorified along with God. To this every one should attach thanksgivings, both general, for the benefits bestowed on all men, and particular, for those specially received from God. After the thanksgiving I consider that we should in the pain of repentance for our own sins accuse ourselves before God, and supplicate, first, for healing and deliverance from the propensity to sin, and, secondly, for forgiveness of previous trespasses" [this order is characteristic]. "After the confession of guilt I consider we ought, in the fourth place, to add the petition for great and heavenly things, particular as well as universal, praying also for one's relatives and friends; and after all this the prayer is to be closed with a doxology to God through Christ in the Holy Spirit" (c. 33).

From the treatise on *Martyrdom* we quote a passage which in a characteristic way sets forth the Christian virtue of piety in contrast to the ancient virtues. "Those who have to go through conflicts may see how life is full of struggles for many virtues. It will, in fact, appear that even many who did not belong to God have struggled for *continence;* that many have died *heroically* in order to maintain their fidelity to the sovereign of the State; that those who are skilled in scientific inquiries are diligent in *prudence;* and that those have consecrated themselves to *justice* who have striven to live justly. And, in fact, the carnal sense on the one hand, and most external things on the other, are engaged in conflict against every virtue; but it is only the elect race that struggles for *piety* or religion, while other men do not even put on the appearance of their being ready to die for religion, and to prefer a pious death to a godless life" (c. 5). For the benefits which we receive from God there is "no other equivalent which could be given to God by a well-disposed man but the death of the martyr" (c. 28).

Origen agrees with Clement in laying emphasis on *knowledge*[1] as well as on *freedom.*[2] But he is distinguished from Clement by the smaller extent of the philosophical elements of his thought and a more decidedly Christian method in his exposition, as well as by a stronger representation of the *ascetic element.* He complains about the weakening of the moral energy in the Christendom of his time, which led him to distinguish between perfect and imperfect Christians. The former get the whole reward of victory, the latter only a part of it. This ideal was connected with the accentuation

[1] C. Cels. iii. 45: *βούλεται ἡμᾶς εἶναι σοφοὺς ὁ λόγος.*
[2] De Princip. i. 5. 8, iii. 1. 2; De Orat. vi. 16–20.

of almsgiving, praying, and fasting. To these also virginity was added, and indeed with peculiar emphasis, as an expression for elevation above the sensuous existence. But however intelligible this is from the relations of the time and the historical development, yet it was rooted in a false spiritualism or dualism that mistook the significance of the earthly life, which was not again rightly recognised till the Reformation. Origen emphatically represents this ideal. This is shown, for example, when, as we have seen, he rejects prayer for earthly things, and therefore interprets the Fourth Petition of the Lord's Prayer as applying to the eucharist.[1] He thus likewise judges of marriage more ascetically than Clement; he holds military service and public offices as unsuitable for the Christian; and he represents the higher morality of the *consilia evangelica* in contrast to the *præcepta* more definitely than Clement.[2] Origen expounds the history of the rich youth quite otherwise than Clement does.[3] And while Clement represents as a victor one who in the relations of marriage, propagation of children, and providing for his household, overcomes suffering and pleasure in union with God, Origen says: "If a man gives himself up entirely to God, if he divests himself of all care for the present life, if he keeps himself separate from other men who live according to the flesh, and seeks no longer what is of the earth but only heavenly things, he is truly worthy to be called holy" (On Lev. xi. 1). In this we already see the emergence of monasticism.[4]

It is easy to perceive how this agrees with his whole view about the earthly life. The soul, banished from a higher spiritual existence into this material life, which is a state of

[1] De Orat. c. 8, 13, 17, 21, 27.

[2] Comm. in ep. ad Rom. p. 707, de la Rue: cum omnia præcepta fecerimus, meminerimus tamen quid simus et dicamus: servi inutiles sumus Luc. 17, 10.— Si autem addas aliquid præceptis, tunc non jam inutilis servus eris sed dicetur ad te; euge serve bone et fidelis. Quid autem sit quod addatur præceptis et supra debitum fiat. Paulus apost. dicit: de virginibus autem præceptum domini non habeo, consilium autem do. Hoc opus super præceptum est. Qui ergo completis præceptis addiderit etiam hoc ut virginitatem custodiat non jam inutilis servus sed servus bonus et fidelis vociferetur. Et iterum præceptum est, ut hi qui evangelium annunciant, de evangelio vivant, Paulus tamen dicit (1 Cor. ix. 14, 15, etc.).

[3] Orig. ad Matth. xix. 16 ff.

[4] Uhlhorn, p. 203.

humiliation and discipline, must strive towards what is higher and heavenly on the way of conflict and abstinence.[1] Origen indeed lays great emphasis on the moral character of this conflict, and his spiritualism has not the despair of existence at its basis, as was the case with the Neo-Platonic philosophy of the ageing world; but it rests upon the certainty of the higher ideal and of its possibility. Nevertheless, the ethnical foundations which identify the moral and immoral with the opposition of the spiritual and sensible are yet distinctly enough to be recognised, and they continue to work in the moral ideas of the Greek theology.

This is seen particularly in *Methodius* († 311),[2] a pupil of Origen, but afterwards an opponent, who became Bishop of Olympus and then of Tyre. The only work of Methodius which has been completely preserved is his *συμπόσιον ἢ περὶ ἁγνείας* (*Convivium decem virginum*) in ten discourses. In this work Methodius still follows Origen. The body is represented as a prison and limit of the soul, and hence pure virginity is the highest ideal of virtue, and the greatest possible annihilation of the sensible life is the goal of the moral striving. As Christ when He became man "preserved His flesh in unspotted virginity, we must also make it a matter of honour to highly estimate virginity" (*φιλοτιμώμεθα τὴν παρθενίαν τιμᾶν*, Orat. i. 5). This view he indeed afterwards retracted in his treatise, *Περὶ ἀναστάσεως*, of which only a fragment has been preserved. In this writing his representation of the spiritual corporeity of the nature of man and his more realistic tendency, remind us of Tertullian and the Stoics; but he expresses in these Platonic thoughts a widespread way of thinking, and he does not deny it even here. As a Greek, however, he lays more stress upon freedom than Tertullian does.[3] We are quickened and impelled to the good by the law dwelling in us (*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν*), so that we are able either to yield or not to the desires that arise in us. Our virtues are shadowy

[1] Exhort. ad Martyr. c. 20, c. 5.

[2] Gallandi, Bibl. vett. patr. t. iii. A. Jahn, Methodii opp., Hal. 1865. Möller in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ix. 497 ff. Gottfr. Fritschel, Meth. v. Ol. u. s. Philosophie, Inaug. Diss., Lpz. 1879.

[3] He wrote a treatise against Origen, entitled Περὶ αὐτεξουσίου; but this is not what has been handed down to us under that name.

copies of the ideal virtues, the sum of which is the divine *σοφία* in which we specially participate by *ἁγνεια, i.e. παρθενία.*

Gregory Thaumaturgus, Origen's most celebrated scholar, became Bishop of Neo-Cæsarea. In his panegyric on Origen (*Εἰς Ὠριγένην προσφωνητικὸς καὶ παν*ηγυρικὸς λόγος) he connects Christian ethics with ancient ethics, inasmuch as the latter finds its truth in the former. The effects which the irruption of the Goths had upon the Christians in leading them to lapse or to fall into other sins, induced Gregory, in concert with other bishops, to draw up canons regarding the penances to be imposed upon such. These rules were afterwards declared canonical by the Trullanian Synod at Constantinople in 680, and they defined the three degrees of penitents, called the weepers, the hearers, and the standers.

§ 33. *The Gnostic Ethics.*[1]

In the Ethics of the Greek Church the ancient philosophical views and conceptions served as a means for expounding and communicating the new Christian experiences and cognitions, although undoubtedly not without various other material influences. In the Gnostic systems the new Christian thoughts are conversely only means for expounding and communicating the heathen views and sentiments. But the characteristic of the heathen way of thinking is the mixing up of the physical and moral, and the identification of the moral with the spiritual and non-sensible. Accordingly the idea of redemption which Gnosticism derived from Christianity (or brought to it in a way in a naturalistic sense) shaped itself out of a moral experience and moral task into a physical process, which aimed at freeing the higher spiritual elements from their mixture with sensible matter. In consequence of this, Ethics assumed in Gnosticism pre-

[1] LIPSIUS, Der Gnosticism, s. Wesen, etc., Lpz. 1860. JACOBI in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] v. 204 f. KOFFEMANE, Die Gnosis nach Tendenz u. Organis. 12 Thesen, Bresl. 1882. HILGENFELD, Die Ketzergesch. des Urchristenthums, Lpz. 1884. A. HARNACK, Dogmengesch. i., 2 Aufl. (p. 158 ff.) 186 ff.

dominantly the character of ascetic deliverance from sense, which might indeed again turn round into sensuous licence. The seeming affinity of Gnosticism with Christianity in connection with its alleged satisfaction of the higher impulse of knowledge, gave it the diffusion and influence which it attained. In conflict with it the Christian way of thinking was destined to become conscious of its essential difference. This opposition came specially to be expressed in the Western theology. Certain effects of Gnosticism, especially of its dualistic mode of thinking, reached down through the whole Middle Ages.

1. *The heathen root of Gnosticism.*—In distinction from the catholic γνῶσις of the Alexandrian theology, the widespread and influential heretical (ψευδώνυμος) Gnosis early developed itself and claimed to be Christian, although presented in particular communities or schools alongside of the Catholic Church. It appeared as the product of an impulse to knowledge which was heightened by the entrance of Christianity into connection with the development of the universal spiritual life, and it received its nourishment from the adoption of Christian thoughts. It was a sort of philosophy of religion, or even a philosophical religion.[1] As a speculation, it sought to solve the problem of being, and to lead its disciples to a higher existence. This was generally the problem and interest of the outgoing ancient philosophy, and it was influenced by the state of the mixed religions of the time. Hence the fundamental views of the Gnostics were essentially the ancient conceptions, although connected in part with various Oriental elements; whereas the Christian materials which they appropriated were only taken into connection with the extra-Christian thinking and deposited around it.[2] Reaching back to the close of the Apostolic age, this

[1] This at least holds true of Manichæism. Cf. Kessler on "Manichæismus" in Herzog, 2 Aufl.

[2] Among the various views held on this subject, those which accentuate the difference between Gnosticism and the Church (*e.g.* Jacobi in Herzog, 2 Aufl. v. 205 f.) deserve to be preferred to those that lay stress on their affinity (*e.g.* Baur, Lipsius, Harnack). Thus Harnack (*l.c.* p. 191) says: "The great difference consists essentially in this, that in the Gnostic formations the acute

Gnosticism took a wide flight from the middle of the second century, but it also experienced energetic repulsion. The common basis of the manifold forms of Gnosticism was heathen in its nature. Its interest in connection with the problem of existence and the origin of evil, was how to conceive the mixture of the spiritual and sensible in the world.[1] Its dominant view was that the spirit was the truth and therefore also the moral, and that sense was the opposite of spirit, and therefore what ought not to be, or the immoral. Accordingly it was maintained that evil has its seat in matter, in the body. The goal of Gnosticism therefore was the deliverance of the spirit from the bonds of sense; and the moral task was the physical process of desensualization. This looks like the Biblical opposition of spirit and flesh, yet it is essentially different from it. It is only the Platonic antithesis which is allied with Oriental dualism, and which completes itself in Stoical or Neo-Platonic consequences.[2]

2. *The idea of redemption.*—It was above all the Christian idea of redemption which offered the solving word for the pre-Christian thinking and striving, and which called forth the mental ferment out of which Gnosticism arose. And Gnosticism promised to bring about this redemption by means of the ancient philosophy. The ancient moral philosophy, as philosophy, saw the means of salvation in thinking. From Socrates downwards we can trace the high position assigned to thinking and the primacy of cognition over the will, which, being regarded as a manifestation of the lower nature, had to be guided by the reason. Gnosticism shares in this intellectualism. But all intellectualism is aristocratic in its nature, and looks proudly down upon those who are not qualified for it. Gnosticism is likewise thoroughly aristocratic, and sharply and proudly distinguishes the knowers from the common merely believing Christians. If the world, however, is a mixture of the antitheses or opposites of the spiritual and sensual, individuals represent the differences of this mixture.

secularization or Hellenizing of Christianity exhibits itself, whereas in the catholic system this process was a gradual one. In short, the Gnostics were the theologians of the first centuries."

[1] Cf. Euseb. H. E. v. 37. Tertull. De præscr. hær. c. 7; adv. Marc. 1. 2.

[2] Cf. the author's Antike Ethik, pp. 175, 185 f.

Hence arise the natural distinction of the Pneumatici, the Psychici, and the Hylici, in virtue of which individuals stand under this law of natural necessity; and accordingly the gnosis of the Gnostics is a result of natural endowment, whereas that of the Alexandrian theology is a moral acquisition of faith.[1] The accentuation of freedom, of the *αὐτεξούσιον*, of the *ἑκούσιον*, of the will, on the part of the Greek Fathers is therefore the definite line of demarcation which sharply separates churchly theology and Gnostic philosophy of religion from each other. Gnosticism has appropriated Christ as the principle of redemption from Christianity, but in its own sense, and as modified somewhat after the presuppositions of Oriental natural religion. Christ having descended from the world of spirit into this world of sense, is destined to draw the elements of spirit to Himself, and to make them free from mixture with matter or evil. This then is the process which takes the place of the moral task of the will in the individuals.

3. *The moral task.* — If the spiritual is thus something given by nature, and is itself the good, then there is no moral task requiring to be accomplished by the will, but only a natural process which is to be accompanied by knowledge. If the spiritual is of itself the good, it carries its law in itself. The Pneumaticus is therefore as such a law to himself, and is subject to no other law. Gnosticism is antinomian. The Pneumaticus can only validate his law in two ways. Either he releases the pneuma from the bonds of sense by the way of an unsensualizing asceticism: certain abstinences from what is sensuous being as such the way of morality, because the way of spiritualization. Or, conscious of his higher spirituality, he exhibits his contempt of the sensible, reducing it by enjoyment to exhaustion; and he thus lives to the flesh, and so at bottom proves his morality by immorality.

4. *Evidences of Gnosticism as early as the time of the Apostles* are found in the New Testament.—Before this form of speculation entered into alliance with Christianity it seems to have sought to master Judaism for its own purposes, and with these Judaistic ingredients it also combined Oriental

[1] Cf. Hackenschmidt, Die Anfänge d. kath. Kirchenbegriffs, Strassb. 1874, p. 134.

heathen elements[1] in order to pass with them to Hellenic soil. In later times, Simon Magus was represented as an adherent of the heretical gnosis.[2] What is related of him in the history of the Apostles shows that confusion of the moral and physical sphere which was characteristic of Gnosticism. The asceticism of the Colossian heretics was also determined by dualistic Gnosticism. Paul sees this danger threatening the Church, and considers it in the Pastoral Epistles. John had to battle with it both in his conflict with Cerinthus who came from Egypt, and with the immoral gnosis of the Nicolaitans in the Epistles of the Apocalypse.

5. *Individual Gnostics of the post-Apostolic time.*—In the post-Apostolic age, Gnosticism reached a higher flight, and became in various forms a decided danger for the Church. *Basilides*, who belonged to Egypt, according to the accounts of Clement and Hippolytus,[3] represented the bodily nature as the source of sin. In consequence, the death of Christ, the microcosm, has saving significance, inasmuch as the mixed elements of the corporeal and spiritual separate in Him in order to go each to its place. Thus the way of asceticism is sketched out for individuals; but this was a moderated asceticism which did not necessarily exclude marriage. "The ethical task is how to attain a rest of soul free from all impure passions and moved by no desire, and reaching its highest satisfaction in the contemplation of God. The struggle of virtue must therefore be directed against the sensuous desires and other evil properties which cleave to the soul from the lower stages of life." As expounded by Irenæus, this form of Gnosticism appears dualistic in principle. The supreme Father sends the Nous in the form of Christ for the redemption of the Pneumatici, and His form is purely docetic without contact with matter. To recognise the Redeemer in this Christ (not in the crucified Jesus who was Simon of Cyrene) is redemption; and in contrast to this knowledge of spirit, the distinctions of good and evil,

[1] Cf. Kessler, "Mandäer," in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ix. 221: "The real source of all gnosis is the highly developed old Babylonian religion."

[2] So also Hilgenfeld in his "Ketzergeschichte des Urchristenth." in opposition to the negative position of Baur's School towards the whole tradition about Simon Magus.

[3] Cf. Jacobi in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] v. 222.

which belong to plurality of sense, disappear, and the heathen customs and such like are indifferent; so that the moral attitude of the beginning here turns round into immorality.—*Valentinus*[1] likewise holds that Christ's death is only a symbol of the redemption, which is realized by the way of knowledge "in elevation to perfectness by communication of gnosis to the Pneumatici." "The Pneumatici are by their nature sure of return into the pleroma, and the only matter of importance is that they be raised by gnosis to the knowledge of it." The Pneumaticus cannot therefore be defiled by anything, just as the ocean cannot be defiled. From this position it was not far to the excesses which Irenæus charges on the Valentinians.—*Bardesanes*, at first in Syria and later farther in the East, adopted a strong dualistic element; and *Tatian* the Syrian was also led by his later dualism to sheer asceticism and encratitism, including the rejection of marriage and wine. According to the dualistic gnosis of *Saturninus* (Satornilus) the Syrian, the Pneumatici were to be saved from the bonds of sense by their gnosis and their asceticism, which rejected marriage. Likewise among the *Ophites* the attracting of the elements of light from matter and the gathering of the Pneumatici out of the world of men by the Ἄνω-Χριστός, is treated as a natural process, only under ethical titles. The Gnosticism of *Carpocrates* of Alexandria (in the first half of the second century), as distinguished from these ascetic tendencies, is monistic and antinomian. His son *Epiphanes* drew out the ethical consequences on the side of immorality. Everything has emanated from unity and returns to it from individuality and plurality, — theoretically in gnosis as the knowledge of the divine unity (γνῶσις μοναδική), and practically in life, κατὰ φύσιν, *i.e.* in setting aside the limitations of law in life. For the following of Jesus in faith and love is contempt for the laws which the Demiurge has given. "So long as all laws are not transgressed and all fetters snapped, the soul is banished by the creators of the world into the metempsychosis; it remains in the prison of the body till it has paid the last farthing (Matt. v. 26)."[2] Clement of Alexandria mentions several other Gnostics of

[1] Jacobi in Herzog, *l.c.* p. 227.
[2] Jacobi, p. 237.

kindred nature whose exercise of virtue consisted in conquering sensuous pleasure by sensuous pleasure, or who, like the Antitacti, asserted that the Creator of the world was to be combated through transgression of the moral law, and that blessedness was to be obtained from the supreme God.

6. *Marcion*[1] holds a position by himself. In his ultra-Paulinism, notwithstanding the influence of the Syrian Gnostic, Cerdon, he has preserved most distinctly religious and ethical elements of a Christian kind. His system is dominated by the antitheses of justice and grace, law and gospel, Old Testament and New Testament, Judaism and Christianity; and these are viewed as really irreconcilable. He did not wish a school, but a church, yet with the distinction of the *perfecti* (electi) and *catechumeni*. He required the whole austerity of asceticism only from the former, and it included abstinence from marriage and restriction to the simplest and most needful food. His Christianity of grace, of the forgiveness of sin, and of the new life, breaks with the world of the Creator, and thereby makes the fulfilment of a vocation in the world, and consequently of the vocation of the Church in the world, impossible. His relatively greater affinity with the Christianity of the Church made Marcion just the more dangerous, and consequently sharpened the opposition of the Church to him. Polycarp is said to have called him "the first-born of Satan," and to have repulsed him when greeted by him at Rome. In Marcion's system the natural principle of Gnosticism appears as still mostly ethical, and is overcome by the accentuation of the will; yet it is also negatively retained here in the rejection of the world of the God of the Jews.

APPENDIX.—MANICHÆISM.[2]

Manichæism, although starting from wholly different presuppositions, coincides in its result in many respects with Marcionism. Manichæism sprang from the old Babylonian Semitic religion

[1] Harnack, Dogmengesch. i. 226 ff.

[2] Cf. Kessler in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ix. 223–259, and Ad. Harnack, Dogmengesch. i. 737 ff. The Western form of Manichæism is particularly to be studied in the relevant writings of Augustin.

of nature, but it borrowed also some elements from Christianity and leaned variously upon it. Especially in its later Western form, it rests very decidedly upon its naturalistic basis, which therefore makes its ethics also naturalistic. For, its dualism between light and darkness is physical, and is only so far likewise regarded as ethical. This antithesis pervades the world, so that the elements of light, robbed by darkness and bound, have to look for redemption; and the same holds also of the human race, which carries in itself more or less of the elements of light that are destined to become free by the way of gnosis. To introduce this process through the corresponding knowledge is the task of Jesus, that is to say, of the proper passionless docetic Jesus; and Mani and his imitators, the "elect," were destined to bring this work to completion. In consequence, the moral task comes to be the ascetic one of abstaining from sensuous enjoyment by means of the three so-called "seals:" the *signaculum oris*, which forbids all enjoyment of impure food (flesh and wine); the *signaculum manus*, which forbids all occupation with unclean elements; and the *signaculum sinus*, which forbids all sexual community. This asceticism was combined with rigid and extensive fasting, which took up almost the fourth part of the year, and with numerous definitely arranged prayers, preceded by ablutions. As everywhere in similar cases, this ascetic ethic had as its consequence the establishment of a double morality: the higher stage of the "elect," who had to subject themselves to the full severity of that requirement, but who in return enjoyed the highest recognition from the others, and occupied the position of redeeming mediators; and the lower stage of the common members of the community (auditores), who had only to keep to abstinence from the coarsest offences (idolatry, magic, lying, fornication, all killing of living things, etc., included in the ten commandments of Mani).—Its semblance of higher knowledge and of a consistent explanation of the world made Manichæism of the greatest danger for the Church. Its influence extended far down into the Middle Ages, even to the Cathari, the Paulicians, and the Bogomils. In Manichæism and its dualism the heathen root of the whole theory of Gnosticism comes most decidedly to light. For the naturalizing of the ethical, which is the specifically heathen element, forms the common charac-

teristic of Gnosticism and its specific difference from the Christian mode of thinking. Yet Gnosticism has not failed to stir and influence certain related tendencies and frames of mind in the Christian sphere, which have found their most characteristic expression in Monasticism.

§ 34. *The Monastic and Mystico-ascetic Ideal in the Ethics of the Greek Church.*[1]

The duty of the Christian to flee from the world and its transitory pleasure, and to combat the flesh, was opposed to the surrounding heathen worldly life, and soon also to the worldly life in the Church, or to what was regarded as worldly life in it; and the mode of life it implied became early transformed into the external conduct of ascetic renunciation which was at first practised in society and then in retirement from it, and in associations formed for the common regulation of the separated life. Although it was not taken from heathen exemplars, but was occasioned by special Christian moral motives and by a justified repugnance to the corruption of the civilised life of the time, and by the endeavour to preserve the original earnestness of the Christian life, yet this Monasticism grew at bottom out of the root of the heathen view of the world which identifies the sphere of the spiritual with that of the moral, and the moral task with the process of desensualization. It therefore places perfection in the realiza-

[1] Mangold, De monachatus originibus et causis, Marp. 1882. Möhler, Gesch. des Mönchth., in seinen v. Döllinger, herausg. Schriften, ii. 169. Zöckler, Krit. Gesch. der Askese, Frkf. a M. 1863, p. 393 ff. Weingarten, Ursprung des Mönchth. im nachkonstant. Zeitalter, Gotha 1877, u. P. R.-E.² x. 758–792. Lucius, Die Quellen der älteren Gesch. des ägypt. Mönchthums, in Brieger's Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch. vii. 2. Hase, Das Leben des h. Antonius, Jahrbb. f. protest. Theol. vi. 418–448. A. Harnack, Das Mönchth., seine Ideale u. s. Gesch., Giessen (1882), 3 Aufl. 1886. Gass, Gesch. der christl. Ethik, Berl. i. 1881, p. 121 ff. Bestmann, Gesch. der christl. Sitte, ii., Nördl. 1885, pp. 483–534. Th. Zahn, Forschungen zur Gesch. des neutest. Kanon ii., Der Evang.-Komm. des Theophilus u. Ant., Erl. 1883, p. 183 ff. Bornemann, In investiganda monachatus origine quibus de causis ratio habenda sit Origenis, 1885. Alb. Eichhorn, Athanasii de vita ascetica testimonia collecta, Halis Sax. 1886. (He recognises the genuineness of the *σύνταγμα διδασκαλίας πρὸς μονάζοντας*, etc., the de virginitate, and the vita Antonii.)

tion of the Stoical ideal of apathy, and seeks union with God on the way of contemplative immersion into Him, and of the alleged angelic life. This ideal is combined by the Greek teachers with the motives which they had more or less adopted from the theology of Origen.

1. *The Ascetics of the first centuries.*—There is early mention of Ascetics and Encratites in the midst of the Christian society.[1] Hegesippus already makes the younger James their model.[2] Athenagoras speaks of them,[3] and Tertullian often mentions them as *continentes*.[4] Clement of Alexandria (Strom. vii. p. 711) and Origen (Com. in Ep. ad Rom. t. iii. p. 507) speak, although in terms of blame, of those who abstain from marriage, flesh, and wine, and lead a *βίον μονήρη*, at first in the world and afterwards in external retirement. But an ascetic inclination was present in the Church from the beginning, and exhibited itself in the practice of fasting, and especially in the high estimation of virginity. Directions and examples in the Holy Scriptures appeared to justify and to favour this tendency. It was supported by the state of the world at the time, which could not but give rise to perplexity regarding the actual state of the whole of the common life. The ideal seemed as if it could be found only in complete opposition to that life, in connection with the non-Christian mode of thinking of the ancient world which had pressed into the Church and which placed the moral task in desensualization and identified it with it. Now, as Christianity was regarded as the higher truth of the previous heathen stage, and as it had actually to manifest and exhibit itself to the heathen world as such in the moral conduct of life, asceticism in the form of fasting, and especially of virginity, appeared to be the triumph of Christianity. In the "Teaching of the Apostles" fasting is already several times prescribed, and the Shepherd of Hermas in its expressions regarding *statio* presupposes it as a regular practice, although it is still held in moderate estimation. In Tatian, however, and the Encratites, as well as in various Gnostic

[1] Th. Zahn, Forschungen, i. 285–7. [2] Euseb. H. E. ii. 23. [3] *πρεσβεία*, c. 28.
[4] Apologet. 9; de patientia, 14; de cultu femin. 9; ad uxorem, i. 6; de virginibus velandis, 3.

expositions, it is founded in principle on a dualistic view. And although this dualistic way of thinking was rejected by the Church,[1] yet fasting as a necessary and meritorious exercise has had a rich history in the Church, and has had its virtuosi.[2]—The centre of asceticism, however, was *virginity*. It formed the boast of the apologists, and all the more that the accusations against the heathen world were most justified just in the sphere of the sexual life. However much the Church brought the dignity of marriage into recognition, yet from a misunderstanding of Pauline words and Biblical examples complete abstinence from marriage was regarded as more worthy.[3] With this there is renewed the double stage of the ancient ethics of Aristotle and the Stoics in a Christian form. There are δύο βίων τρόποι with the distinction of the πρῶτος and δεύτερος βαθμός,[4] the former being the stage of the common Christian life, the latter the higher stage of celibacy and withdrawal from the usual secular employments of the earthly calling.

2. *The Eremites.*[5]—This asceticism was practised at the outset in the world, and within the Christian community, but it was partly the persecutions under Decius and Diocletian which led many, according to Jerome, into solitude, and partly the hyperculture of the surrounding world and of the life of the cities which produced in many minds an almost Rousseau tendency towards a state of nature and an inclination to live with nature.[6] Further, the secularization of Christendom itself

[1] *E.g.* Can. apost. 50 (cf. Const. ap. vi. 26); Syn. of Ancyra 314, and of Gangra *c.* 360–370, can. 2.

[2] Cf. Linsenmayr, Entwicklung der kirchl. Fastendisciplin bis zum Koncil v. Nicäa, Münch. 1877.

[3] Cf. Clem. Rom. 38. 2; 48. 5, 6. Ignat. ad Polyc. 5: εἴ τις δύναται ἐν ἁγνείᾳ μένειν εἰς τιμὴν τῆς σαρκὸς τοῦ κυρίου, ἐν ἀκαυχησίᾳ μενέτω. ἐὰν καυχήσηται, ἀπώλετο. Athenag. 34. Clem. Str. iii. 68, p. 542, vii. 69–83. Apost. Constit. vii. 10. Tert. de virg. vel.: continentiæ virtus. Tertullian uses the term spadones (εὐνοῦχοι in Melito). Dionysius of Corinth, in a letter to the Cnossians in Euseb. H. E. iv. 23. 7, says: μὴ βαρὺ φορτίον ἐπάναγκες τὸ περὶ ἁγνείας τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, etc. "To take the yoke of the Lord upon oneself" was the designation used for voluntary sexual continence, particularly for the monastic vow. Cf. Th. Zahn, Forschungen, ii. pp. 185–192.

[4] Euseb. Demonstr. ev. i. 8.

[5] Cf. Burckhardt, Die Zeit Konstantin's d. Gr. 1853, p. 431 ff.

[6] Cf. *e.g.* Jerome to Marcella, c. 3: "During the heat of summer the shadow of a tree will furnish a cooler retreat; in the autumn the mild air and the fallen

became also for many a strong motive, and it always became the stronger for adopting this mode of life. Thus it was that in the course of the third century not a few had given up their possessions and goods and distributed them among the poor, and had abandoned human society and withdrawn themselves into the solitude of the desert, where they united into associations. All this went on the more that the world appeared to be given up to corruption and to be advancing to its end. However intelligible, therefore, this was, and however much we may recognise the moral energy and the pervading ideal sense which expressed itself in this resolution, yet it presented at the same time a renunciation of the calling of the individual in the world, and fundamentally also of the world-calling of Christianity in general. — The historical reliability of the account of Paul of Thebes and of the descriptions in the *Vita Pauli Monachi* of Jerome, is indeed questionable; but the existence of such anchorites or hermits (*ἐρημῖται, μοναχοί, μονάζοντες*) is unquestionable, as they had not only precursors on non-Christian soil, but they had an apparent justification in Scripture in the withdrawal from society of Elijah and John the Baptist.

3. *Monastic Unions* were formed, as was natural. They furnished at the same time a protection against the dangers of unregulated anchoretism, and they appeared to realize the ideal of Christian fellowship. The tradition of them is especially connected with Pachomius († 348), the scholar and follower of St. Anthony († 356). Pachomius instituted labour along with prayer and asceticism, as a part of the latter. The work engaged in was the making of baskets and mats out of bulrushes, and the weaving of linen, and tanning; and the remains of the proceeds were distributed to the poor. It is neither necessary nor correct to go back with Weingarten in explanation of this to the example in the Egyptian worship of Serapis, as the phenomenon is explicable in itself. How rapidly this monasticism laid hold and spread over Palestine (Hilarion, † 371) to Asia Minor and elsewhere, is proved by

foliage will show us a resting-place; in the spring the field adorns itself with flowers, and amid the plaintive songs of the birds the psalms are sung more pleasantly; amid the cold and snow shower I shall buy no wood, and yet offer my prayers more warmly at night or fall asleep."

the already reforming activity of Basil in Asia Minor. Everywhere monkish settlements were formed in the region around Lake Moeris (where, in the time of Valens, there were ten thousand monks), in the Nitrian desert west of the delta, on the shore of the Mediterranean and of Lake Mareotis, and above all in the district of Tabenna in Upper Egypt, where in the time of Jerome no less than fifty thousand monks were wont to celebrate Easter.[1]

4. *The monkish ideal.*—With these external motives in the whole condition of the time, there were also connected certain internal motives from the beginning. It was believed that the words of Jesus concerning the renunciation of material possession and such like, were thus externally fulfilled, and that the Christian ideal was to be in this way realized. The monastic life, with its continence (ἐγκράτεια), combating of desires (κρυπτὸς ἀγών), and contemplativeness, appeared as the divine and angel-like life (φιλόθεος, ἰσάγγελος), as the true divine philosophy (ἡ κατὰ Θεὸν φιλοσοφία), the realization of the Stoical perfectness (κατόρθωμα) and "apathy," etc., and as the way to perfection (τελείωσις) and to the enjoyment of God (γεῦσις τοῦ Θεοῦ). Monasticism is therefore the combination of asceticism and mystical contemplation; the former is the beginning and way, the latter is the goal. The Western monasticism is distinguished from this contemplative mysticism, with its renunciation of the world, which took form in the Greek Church, by having become more actively practical, and having entered into the service of the hierarchical tasks of governing the world. The first mediator of monasticism between the East and West was Athanasius.

§ 35. *The representatives of the ascetic Ideal in the Greek Church.*

1. *Athanasius*[2] († 373) is to be named before all others as a decided representative of the ascetic morality, and an influential friend and promoter of monasticism. The follow-

[1] J. Burckhardt, Die Zeit Konstantin's d. Gr. p. 440.

[2] Möhler, Athan. d. Gr. 2 Aufl. 1844. Voigt, Die Lehre des Athan. 1861. Böhringer, 2 Aufl. vi.

ing works of Athanasius are related to the present subject: *Περὶ παρθενίας ἤτοι περὶ ἀσκήσεως. Σύνταγμα διδασκαλίας πρὸς μονάζοντας καὶ πάντας χριστιανούς*, etc. (both Athanasian, according to A. Eichhorn). *Τοῖς τὸν μονήρη βίον ἀσκοῦσιν ἐπιστολή.* Vita Antonii (composed according to the common view in 365, but according to Eichhorn in 357),[1] described in the preface as a model of asceticism for monks (*μοναχοῖς ἱκανὸς χαρακτὴρ πρὸς ἄσκησιν*), and called by Gregory of Nazianzum, Or. 21. 5, "a legislation of the monastic life in the form of history." Athanasius is an ardent eulogizer of virginity. "How great then is the good of virginity! It is enjoined on every one by the law to practise the other virtues, but virginity surpasses the law; it strives after a higher end with the whole leading of life, it is a token of the other world, a picture of the purity of the angels." God the Logos has chosen a virgin to become man, "that as the world arose through Him virginity might also take its beginning from Him, and that this grace might be bestowed through Him on men." "But what happened to Mary redounds to the glory of all virgins; for they hang henceforth as virgin offshoots on her as the root."[2] "Now those who possess this virtue of virginity are wont to be called by the Church 'brides of Christ.' When the heathen see them, they wonder at them as a temple of the Logos, for nowhere but only among us Christians is this honourable and heavenly mode of life really cultivated."[3] His *Vita Antonii* is a glorification of monasticism, but its description is sometimes so extravagant that we have difficulty in thinking of the great theologian Athanasius as its author. The monk appears as the ideal of the Christian, and at the same time as the realization of the ancient ideal (c. 14). Morality is represented as desensualization: a spiritualism resting at bottom on dualism (cf. c. 45, 47). On this way Athanasius seeks the realization of the goal of Christianity which God has willed with the incarnation of Christ, and

[1] Against Weingarten's denial of the Athanasian authorship and later date of this work, cf. Hase, Jahrbb. f. prot. Theol. vi. p. 418 ff., and Gass, Gesch. d. chr. Ethik, i. 122 ff. Also Lipsius, Prot. K.-Z. 1877, Nr. 38 f. Hilgenfeld, Ztschr. f. wiss. Theol. 1878, 1. A. Eichhorn, *l.c.*

[2] Comment. in Luc. Gallandi, v. p. 187 (Nirschl, Lehrb. der Patrologie, 1883, ii. p. 53 f.).

[3] Apol. ad imperatorem Constantinum, c. 33.

which is not merely revelation, but essential communication of God for the purpose of our deification.

Reference may be made to some of the details in the *Vita Antonii*. In c. 3, Athanasius relates how Antony gave away all his property to the poor in order to live alone by himself, and devote himself to asceticism. "At that time there were not yet such numerous monastic settlements in Egypt;" nor did any monk yet know the depths of the desert, but every one who wished to live by himself practised asceticism only a little distance away from the place of his home. But Antony soon withdrew deeper into the desert in order to escape from the throng of his visitors. "He watched so much, that he frequently spent the whole night without sleep." "He ate once a day after sunset, sometimes, however, only after two days, and even occasionally he only took something after four days. His food was bread and salt, and his drink water only" (c. 7). This was the natural reaction from the luxury of the prevailing life of the previous time. But the very excess of the attempts to get rid of sense awoke the spirits of temptation and assault. Agonizing visions, which translated themselves into seeming reality, visited him as they did afterwards the other anchorites. The demons appeared as serpents, lions, bulls, wolves, scorpions, leopards, and bears, all growling and threatening. But even in the desert to which he had retired, when sought out by numerous visitors, he appeared after twenty years unchanged as before. "He remained completely identical with himself, because he was guided by reason and held fast by an excellent nature." This is remarked by Athanasius in chap. 14 in reference to the ancient ideal. "But he spoke to all, exhorting them to esteem nothing that is in the world higher than love to Christ;" and so, continues Athanasius, in this way he put genuine Christian motives directly beside ancient thoughts. The monks who gathered around him are exhorted by Antony in a long address; we shall "reign ages of ages" for the seventy, or eighty, or even hundred years of our endurance (c. 16). Virtue is not difficult "if we only will." Quite in the manner of an ancient philosopher, he calls to mind in c. 20 that "if the soul by its nature only wills what is rational, virtue obtains existence." Farther on he treats in detail of the conflict with the devil and with the evil spirits from his own experience. All sorts of miraculous and wonderful events, visions, healings, etc., are then added, mixed up with some striking reminiscences and discourses about the contests arising out of the struggle of life and the heresies which devastated the Church.

2. *Jacob Aphraates*,[1] or Mar-Jacob, was abbot and bishop of Mar Mattai. He is the oldest Father of the Syrian Church, and is called "the Persian sage." Twenty-three Tractates, mostly of a moral ascetic character, are attributed to him, and his authorship of them is regarded as having been established by Wright since 1869. "The basis of our whole faith is the true foundation-stone, our Lord Jesus Christ. Upon this foundation-stone faith is built, and then upon faith rises the whole building to its completion.—Man first believes; after he believes, he loves; after he loves, he hopes; after he hopes, he is justified; after he is justified, he becomes perfect; after he is perfect, he is complete."—"For all sufferings there is a remedy by which a wise physician can remove them. But the medicine for those who are wounded in our conflict is penitence, which they must allow to be laid upon their wounds in order to be healed."—"Sacred fasting is pleasing before God; it is a treasure which is preserved in heaven, a weapon against the evil one, and a shield which wards off his arrows."—God "has instituted marriage for the populating of the world, and it is very good; but virginity is more excellent."[2]

3. *Ephraim the Syrian*[3] (*c.* 350) composed many homilies and other works of a moral kind. Among these the following may be mentioned: *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν. Λόγος ἀσκητικός. Περὶ τῶν παθῶν. Περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς νεώτερον ἀσκητήν. Λόγοι παραινετικοὶ πρὸς ἀσκητάς. Περὶ τοῦ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μοναχόν.* He demands moral austerity and continence in the sense of self-control generally; and he exhorts frequently to humility and repentance, and to striving after "perfection" in the sense of "a total severance from every shameful passion, and complete devotion to the highest virtue, which is the purification and sanctification of the heart by participation in the perfect and divine spirit."[4] For this purpose he recommends the ascetic life, especially in his long ascetic discourse; he warns against unchastity, and blames worldly employments; and he thereupon calls to mind that "the united exercise of prayer and the contemplation of the

[1] Nirschl, Lehrbuch des Patrologie, p. 250 ff.
[2] Excerpts from the treatises on Faith, Penitence, Fasting, and Virginity.
[3] Spiegel in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] iv. 255 ff.
[4] From the last-mentioned work, his guide to perfection.

word of God, is to be preferred to the practice of every commandment and of every other virtue," making reference (as others of the Church Fathers such as Basil do) to the preference which the Lord had given to Mary before Martha. He shares with the Alexandrian Church a predilection for the Proverbs of Solomon. In all these points, as well as generally, he exercised a great influence for a long time.

4. *Basil the Great*[1] wrote Homilies (*Homiliæ diversi argumenti* xxxi.) and Discourses (*Sermones* xxv.) on the virtues and vices, alms, riches, and poverty, coveteousness and fasting, a special discourse on the renunciation of the world and spiritual perfection (*Sermo asceticus de renuntiatione mundi et de perfectione spirituali*), and a sermon on ascetic discipline and the moral adornment of the monk (*Sermo de ascetica disciplina, quomodo monachum ornari oporteat*). The Ἀσκητικά (Opp. ii. 199–582) are made up of his religious moral writings collected under this title, and with these are also to be taken his Ἠθικά, which give general Christian precepts of life based on passages of Scripture. The longer and shorter rules for the life of brotherhood exhibit the dominance of the ascetic point of view in his ethics, and show the successful promoter of monasticism "the anticipated life of the angels."[2] A few details may be quoted. In the sermon on *fasting*, he says: "Fasting brings gain to the soul;" "it kills the sin that is deeply hidden within, when it penetrates the soul and really deserves this name" (c. 1). "It is older than the law; it is as old as the human race; it was already commanded in Paradise." "The words: ye shall not eat, are a law of fasting and abstinence." "We have become sick by sin; we must be healed again by repentance; but repentance without fasting is useless" (c. 3). "Because we did not fast, we lost Paradise; let us fast then in order that we may return to it" (c. 4). But he also says in c. 10: "The true fasting consists in abstinence from evil." Basil repeatedly returns to the subject of *abstinence* and continence in his rules on the life of brotherhood. "Continence is an abolition of sin, a removal of passion,

[1] Klose, Basil d. Gr. nach s. Leben u. s. Lehre, Strals. 1835. Böhringer, vii. 1 (1875). Möller in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ii. 116 ff.

[2] Constitt. monast. Cf. περὶ τελειότητος βίου μοναχίου, Ep. 22 (Opp. iii. 98). The writings referred to are given together in Migne, iii.

a slaying of the body in its natural inclinations and desires; it is the beginning of spiritual life, and an expectancy of eternal good in that it destroys the sting of sensuous pleasure. For sensuous pleasure is the great bait of the Evil One, which tempts us men the most to sin." "Thus continence is indispensable to those who are struggling for piety, for the mortification of the body." These precepts are connected with directions regarding the limit of external expense, and about external behaviour and appearance; and they go most carefully into such details as the wearing of the girdle. Even in the "shorter rules," along with excellent directions and references to experiences of life, there are also such rules as that "the believer should never have time for laughing," seeing that "the Lord condemns those who laugh now." We find also in Basil the distinction between what is commanded for all and the higher stage of evangelical perfection: the *προσθήκη τῶν τελειοτέρων*, the realization of the *κατόρθωμα* of the Stoics. Churchly discipline is treated by Basil in his "three Canonical Letters," which are addressed to Bishop Amphilochius of Iconium on the subject, and which have obtained canonical authority. His care for the poor and wretched was shown by his great institution called the Basilias, before the gates of Cæsarea. It was a poorhouse or hospital, and was called by Gregory Nazianzen "a new city." Basil was also an emphatic preacher of neighbourly love; and he particularly stood up for the slaves, and opposed their legally authorized sale.

5. *Gregory of Nyssa.*[1] — Reference may be made to the following works: *Περὶ τοῦ βίου Μωυσέως τοῦ νομοθέτου ἢ περὶ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν τελειότητος.* *Εἰς τὴν προσευχήν*: an exposition of the Lord's Prayer in five discourses, in which the forgiveness of sin is emphasized more strongly than elsewhere. *Εἰς τοὺς μακαρισμούς.* *Κατὰ τοκιζόντων* (*contra usurarios s. feneratores*). *Περὶ εὐποιΐας* (*de pauperibus et de beneficientia*). *Περὶ τοῦ βίου τῆς μακαρίας Μακρίνης τῆς ἰδίας ἀδελφῆς*: a glorification of virginity; the highest thing according to Gregory is the *ἐμφιλόσοφος καὶ ἄϋλος τοῦ βίου διαγωγή*, a life freed from all earthly cares and bonds, the *ἀγγελικὴ καὶ ἐπουράνιος ζωή*. Further, *Περὶ τελειότητος καὶ*

[1] Rupp, Greg. v. Nyssa Leben u. Meinungen, 1834. Böhringer, a. a. O. viii. Möller in Herzog, 2 Aufl. v. 396 ff.

ὁποῖον χρὴ εἶναι τὸν Χριστιανόν (*ad Olympium monachum*). Περὶ παρθενίας (*de virginitate*). Chap. xii. of this treatise contains a connected exposition of his anthropological and soteriological views.[1] It is a description of the κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν βίος, or the contemplative life; and the ideal is τὸ μόνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ζῆν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων δυνάμεων πολίτειαν, "travelling upon the dove wings of the soul to heaven, and therefore leading a life only of the spirit." Ὑποτύπωσις (*summaria descriptio veri scopi vitæ ascticæ*). Περὶ τοῦ τί τὸ χριστιανῶν ὄνομα ἢ ἐπάγγελμα (*quid nomen professione Christianorum sibi velit, ad Harmonium*). This work represents the ascetic element most strongly. The same position is also found in his Homilies on the Song of Solomon, with allegorical application to the soul.[2] This ideal is more that of the Platonists than of the Stoics, and it is got by learned study. The longing of his heart is not for the grace of the forgiveness of sin, but for purification from sin. Hence his thoughts turn towards the resurrection and the apokatastasis; for in these the purifying punishments of God attain their purpose. The way to freedom from sin is elevation above the earthly and sensuous in a striving after the ideal, and this is met by the grace which comes to fill the dying soul with heavenly light and life. The Christian doctrine of grace and ancient moralism are here presented side by side. Man as the bond of the two worlds of God and matter, as the unity of the spiritually moral and sensuous nature, is subject to the powers of sense, without, however, having lost his freedom even for what is good. In virtue of his freedom he has accordingly to return to God by collecting himself out of his dividedness into the plurality of sensible things and retiring upon himself. He thus raises himself to the light in order then to be filled by it through the grace that finds him. For as in Christ human nature is raised to its last and highest goal by union with the Deity, so in virtue of the connection of Christ as the ἀπαρχή of humanity with man, we also ought to realize our conformity to the image of God by progressive imitation of Christ and of the invisible

[1] Cf. Luthardt, Lehre v. freien Willen, Lpz. 1863, p. 18 ff.

[2] *E.g.* Hom. 1: συμφοιτολεῖται τρόπον τινὰ ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὴν ἀσώματόν τι καὶ πνευματικὴν καὶ ἄϋλον τοῦ Θεοῦ συζυγίαν (Migne, i. p. 765).

God through putting ourselves under the enlightening and purifying influence of the Holy Spirit. For, *χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς θείας φύσεως μίμησις*. This is at bottom a Christianized Platonic morality.

6. *Gregory of Nazianzum*[1] treated ethical themes in many of his sermons, and discourses, and letters. Thus his 14th Sermon treats of love to the poor, the 37th Sermon treats of the indissolubleness of marriage, etc. He has also treated moral subjects in a poetic form. Thus in his forty moral poems he deals with love to virtue, and with the married, priestly, and virgin state. Virginity is the special theme of two separate poems. "Marriage is a good thing, but I cannot say how much more sublime is virginity." "Virginity and the unmarried life is great; it is to be reckoned among the order of the angels, and as like to the simple (purely spiritual) beings." "O virgin, bride of Christ, always praise thy bridegroom; purify thyself by doctrine and wisdom, in order that thou mayest live shining with the shining ones to all eternity. For such marriage is much more glorious than the corruptible union. In the body thou imitatest the heavenly powers, and leadest the life of the angels on earth" (Carmen, iii. p. 632). He chose "the ascetic life for his bride," and living along with Basil on an estate in Pontus, he "revelled in privations." Monasticism is his ideal, the philosophy *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, which seemingly unoccupied yet put the highest task before itself; *ἀπράγμων γὰρ ἡ ἡσυχία τῆς ἐν πράγματι περιφανείας τιμιωτέρα* (Epist. 76), for in the midst of the world it has burst the bonds of the flesh, and it fills the deepest poverty with the highest divine riches.[2]

7. The changes and storms of the political life made monasticism appear as the haven of rest, and as the foretaste of heaven. The character of the age concurred with the tendency to asceticism, and it was recommended by the most important representatives of the Church, and by the authority of monkish writers. Among these we may refer to *Macarius* the Great († *c.* 390). His fifty Homilies are hortatory addresses to the monks on asceticism and Christian perfec-

[1] Ullmann, Greg. v. Naz. 1825. Böhringer, a. a. O. viii. Gass in Herzog's p. R.-E.[2] v. 392 ff.

[2] Gass, *l.c.*

tion, out of which the seven *Opuscula ascetica* have been excerpted by Simeon Logotheta. We may quote from his letters a statement about prayer: "Above all, you must continue in prayer; for it is certainly the leader in the choir of the virtues; for he who perseveringly gives himself to prayer shares and rejoices in a mystical and spiritual power, and an inexpressible mood of soul. For if he has received the Spirit through prayer as a guide and fellow-combatant, he is kindled into love to the Lord, and glows with longing." There are other discourses and writings by other Egyptian abbots and monks regarding monasticism and ascetic precepts. To these belongs *Evagrius*[1] of Pontus, a scholar of Macarius, who was led by love to the "philosophical" life to the Nitrian monks in Egypt. Of his writings, mention may be specially made of his *Μοναχὸς ἢ περὶ πρακτικῆς* (*monachus s. de vita activa*), an introduction for monks who busied themselves not only with contemplation, but with labour. In his "sentences" addressed to the virgins, he says that at the resurrection of the dead "the eyes of the virgin will see God, and the ears of the virgin will hear His voice; the mouth of the virgin will kiss her bridegroom; the hands of the virgin will touch the Lord, and the chastity of the flesh will be agreeable to Him; the virgin soul will be crowned, and live for ever with her bridegroom." *Nilus*[2] gave up a respectable position in life in Constantinople in order to betake himself as a monk to Sinai with his son, while his wife and daughters found their way to the Egyptian convents. Besides 1061 Letters, he composed numerous writings on moral and ascetic subjects, *e.g.* *Περὶ τὰς ἀντιζύγους τῶν ἀρετῶν κακίας* (Definitions of the commonly accepted eight cardinal vices); and in more detail on the same subject: *Περὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ πνευμάτων τῆς πονηρίας*; *Περὶ διαφόρων πονηρῶν λογισμῶν*, and *Λόγος περὶ προσευχῆς*, in 153 short chapters. He also wrote various works on the monastic life and other subjects, and probably also christianized the Encheiridion of Epictetus for his monks, putting Paul, for instance, in place of Socrates. There also exist several collections of "sentences" under his name. He loved proverbial wisdom, and acquired a reputation in connection with it. He represents a thorough monastic morality.

[1] Gass in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] iv. 421 f. [2] *Ibid.* x. 579 f.

Hermits and monks are to him the true philosophers. Christ and the Apostles were the first to exhibit this contempt of the world; and the μονάζοντες are their true followers. The Christian "philosopher" must be free from all passions, earthly cares, and bodily hindrances; turning away from all that is sensuous is the means for the liberation of the soul and for union with God. Joyful contemplation is the goal of the struggle which brings the spirit to supremacy. But he also knows the by-ways of the monkish life in its arrogance and inactivity, and in the disordering, suicidal consequences of an overstrained monasticism.

8. *Chrysostom*[1] combines appreciation of the active life in the world, and a combating of the overestimate of monasticism, with high respect for monastic contemplativeness. Among his Discourses (which are about a thousand in number) there are many which deal with themes from the sphere of morals, and indeed his significance lies more in ethics than in dogmatics. He extols the virtue of prayer with particular emphasis: "As soon as any one stretches out his hands to heaven, he withdraws his heart immediately from all earthly things, and is transported in the spirit into the future life." "Prayer is a haven for those who have been driven hither and thither by the tempest, an anchor for those who have been tossed by the billows, a staff for the stumbler, a treasure for the poor, a security for the rich, a help against sickness, and a protection for health, etc."[2]

Among the virtues he particularly celebrates *mercy*, and in accordance with the development which the thinking of the Church had taken in this connection, he glorifies the sin-forgiving power of alms. In a homily on repentance, he says: "Mercy is the queen of the virtues; she quickly raises men into the air of heaven, and she is the best intercessor. Mercy has powerful wings; she cleaves the air, rises above the moon, soars above the radiant sun, and ascends to the very heights of heaven. But even there she does not stop, but wings her way through the very heavens, hastens through the troops of angels and the choir of the archangels and all the higher powers, and presents herself before the throne of the King Himself. Learn

[1] Neander, Der h. Chrysos. u. die Kirche bes. des Orients in dessen Zeitalter, 3 Ausg. 1848.

[2] Or. de consubstantiali, contra Anomocos, vii.

this from the Holy Scripture, which says: 'Cornelius, thy prayer and thine alms have come up before the face of God.' This expression, 'before the face of God,' means that if thou hast however many sins, but hast alms for an intercession, then fear not. For none of the higher powers is opposed to alms; it demands the debt, and carries its manuscript in hand. For the Lord Himself says: 'What ye have done to one of the least of my brethren, ye have done it to me.' With whatever sins thou art then at any time burdened, thy mercy surpasses them all."[1] Again he says even more strongly in the same course of sermons: "Now to-day there begins a business in alms, for we see the prisoners and the poor. God has opened such an annual fair for us. Buy the works of righteousness cheap, in order to realize them in future at a high value, if it is permissible to call the recompense a valuation. Here we buy righteousness cheap for an insignificant bit of bread, for a paltry bit of clothing, for a cup of cold water. As long as the market lasts, let us buy alms; or more correctly, let us purchase salvation with alms."[2] Again in another place he says: "Throw the poor man a coin, and thou hast reconciled the judge. In truth, the philanthropic judge lets himself be gained by money, which he, indeed, does not take himself, but which the poor receive. Repentance without alms is dead, and wants wings. Repentance is not able to fly, unless it has the pinion of alms."

Chrysostom likes to dwell upon the nothingness of earthly greatness and of earthly joys, the foolishness and prejudicial effects of the passions, and similar subjects. As he holds the priestly office in high estimation in his *Περὶ Ἱερωσύνης* (*De sacerdotis*, l. vi.), he is at the same time a great friend of monastic asceticism in his *Πρὸς τοὺς πολεμοῦντας τοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μονάζειν εἰσάγουσιν* (*Adv. oppugnatores vitæ monasticæ*, lib. iii.). In his *Περὶ παρθενίας* he defends marriage against its despisers, but extols virginity as better, and as an angelic state (c. 10 ff.). We may also mention his *Εἰς νεωτέραν χηρεύσασαν* (*Ad viduam juniorem de non iterando conjugio*, lib. ii.). To him monasticism is "philosophy." This tendency dominated the age.

9. *Isidore of Pelusium*[3] († *c.* 450) is a representative of the better Greek monasticism. More than 2000 of his

[1] Hom. iii. 1. Uhlhorn, a. a. O. p. 271 f.
[2] Hom. iii. 6. Uhlhorn, a. a. O. p. 272.
[3] Möller in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] vii. 361 f.

letters are still preserved, and moral questions are frequently dealt with in them. Retirement from the world, voluntary poverty, and abstinence, after the example of John the Baptist, is, according to Isidore, the basis of the true practical philosophy of the Gospel. In the pursuits and turmoil of daily life, the soul does not find leisure for knowing God. The greatest possible absence of needs is the way to the true freedom. Thus monasticism and practical Christianity are practically identical: ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ βασιλεία ἡ μοναχικὴ ἐστι πολιτεία οὐδενὶ μὲν ὑποκύπτουσα πάθει, μετέωρα δὲ φρονοῦσα καὶ ὑπερουράνια κατορθοῦσα. Sins are so much the worse in fact, in this state of perfection. — *Theodoret* († 458) in his φιλόθεος ἱστορία ἢ ἀσκητικὴ πολιτεία (*religiosa historia*) has written biographies of thirty monks and hermits in order to glorify the ascetic life, and he concludes with a discourse upon divine and holy love (λόγος περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ἁγίας ἀγάπης), in the power of which the ascetics practised their great austerity, and worked numerous miracles.

10. *John Klimakus* († 606) was abbot of a monastery on Mount Sinai. In his Κλίμαξ τοῦ παραδείσου (*scala paradisi*) he describes in the sense of monasticism the various inner states and processes by which the soul attains from renunciation of the world through silence to union with the divine light-nature. The description proceeds in the form of thirty Steps of the Ladder, corresponding to the thirty years of Jesus up to His baptism, by which this process is represented. The treatment does not exhibit any logical progress; but virtues and vices, commandments and counsels, are discussed together.—About the same time the Abbot *Dorotheus* composed in Palestine twenty-four ethical and ascetic treatises for monks.—The monk and hermit *John Moschus* († *c.* 620), in his "Spiritual Meadow" (Λειμὼν πνευματικός, *pratum spirituale*), in 219 chapters, relates the wonderful deeds and experiences, and the virtuous examples of monks and anchorites whom he had learned to know during his travels, or of whom he had heard. It shows us a fantastic world, such as grew up on the soil of the monastic and anchorite life, especially of Egypt. This, however, was in accordance with the taste of the time, and it was in accord with

the romantic descriptions already given by Jerome. And another instance of it is given by *Sophronius*,[1] Patriarch of Jerusalem († 638), a friend of Moscus, in his life of Mary the Egyptian (*βίος Μαρίας αἰγυπτίας*). This Mary was a contemporary of Sophronius, who had been a public sinner in Alexandria, but was afterwards smitten by a wonderful ray of divine grace in the church dedicated to the honour of the holy cross. Thereafter she lived forty-eight years in a forest on the Jordan, far from all human society, and practising the greatest austerity. She is described by Sophronius according to the account of Zosimus (*vir quidem a puero doctus loqui et agere divina*), a monk belonging to a monastery on the Jordan, who met her in the desert by divine arrangement a year before her death. He brought her heavenly food and buried her body, in which office a lion gave help by scraping out her grave. Zosimus learned the history of her life and conversion from Mary's own mouth. She is described as a zealous worshipper "of the holy mother of God" the "sempiternal virgin, the chaste, the wholly pure and immaculate in body and soul," to whose grace she owed it that she "was vouchsafed the life-giving vision of the cross," and to whom, during her solitary stay in the desert, she always fled for aid amid the internal conflicts occasioned by the remembrance of her earlier life. "Often she lay weeping and mourning day and night on the earth till she saw herself surrounded by a light, and then she again had rest."

11. *Maximus the Confessor*[2] lived somewhat later († 662). He gave up his high public office at the Court of Constantinople in order to become a monk from enthusiasm for this higher life of "divine philosophy." With inflexible dyothelete orthodoxy he combined a speculative faculty and holy moral austerity. Of his many writings, one class belongs to the ethico-ascetic sphere. They are partly

[1] Cf. Nirschl, a. a. O. iii. 1885, p. 580 ff.

[2] Maximus is treated of by Baur, Die christl. L. v. d. Dreieinigk. ii. Dorner in his History of the Person of Christ (Entwicklungsgesch. d. L. v. d. Person Christi, ii.). Gass, Die Mystik des Nikol. Kabasilas, pp. 49 ff., 154 ff. Christlieb, Leben u. Lehre des Skot. Erig. p. 104 ff. Huber, Die Philos. der KVV. p. 341 ff. See especially Wagenmann in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] xx. 114 ff. Nirschl, a. a. O. p. 593 ff.

ethical tracts, as his *Ad Joann. Cubicularium de caritate;* and his *Ad eundem de tristitia secundum Deum;* and especially his Λόγος ἀσκητικός (*liber ad pietatem exercens*), which treats of the principal duties of the spiritual life: love of God and of our neighbours, denial of the world and of self. This work is reckoned among the best that has been preserved from the ascetic literature of the Greek Church. An appendix to this treatise is formed by his Κεφάλαια περὶ τῆς τελείας ἀγάπης καὶ ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα (*capita de caritate*). Mention may also be made of his 400 Sentences, containing mostly ethical matter, as well as other similar collections (both of his own and of others), entitled Κεφάλαια θεολογικὰ ἤτοι ἐκλογαὶ ἐκ διαφόρων βιβλίων τῶν τε καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ τῶν θύραθεν, divided into seventy-one sections (λόγοι, sermones). Such collections of moral Sentences were frequently formed in that later time, and were especially used in monasteries. According to Maximus, the goal of man is θέωσις κατὰ χάριν, deification by grace; on the one hand by the gracious coming down (κατάβασις) of God, and correspondingly on the other hand by the proper moral ascension (ἀνάβασις) of man to God,—an ascension out of the dominion of the πάθη into which he has sunk, by practice and gnosis to the knowledge of God and to the life in God, to ἀπάθεια. This ethico-mystical union with God is realized by faith which effects the immediate union (ἄμεσος ἕνωσις) with God, from which standpoint the Christian life consists in the observance of the divine commandments and in the imitation of Christ (μίμησις Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ), and is completed in love. Love is the greatest of all virtues, the principal thing in the divine image and in likeness to God; it is, on the one hand, the passive feeling of ecstasy in reference to the loved one (πάσχειν ἔκστασιν πρὸς τὸ ἔραστον); and, on the other hand, it is living energy which leads to God and manifests itself in single activities.[1] In Maximus there is united the ascetic mysticism of the Egyptian and other monasticism, which had its roots in Stoicism, and the speculative mysticism of Dionysius the Areopagite, which had its root in Neo-Platonism.

[1] Cf. Wagenmann, a. a. O.

12. *Dionysius Areopagita*,[1] in writings which belong to the fourth century, represents the speculative mysticism which had its root in Neo-Platonism (*Περὶ τῆς ἱεραρχίας. Περὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἱεραρχίας. Περὶ μυστικῆς θεολογίας*). To the chain of beings descending from the divine essence, there corresponds the ascending movement up to union with God. It proceeds according to the order of purification, enlightenment, and completion of the lower beings always through the higher being. In order to bring man back from his fall to union with God, the divine has entered in Christ into human reality, and the human in Him has been elevated to God in order from God to raise human nature also to the mystical union. This is realized in the individuals by the consecrations of the Church, purification and enlightenment (baptism), communion (*σύναξις*) and anointing with sacred oil. For, the Church comes here into consideration essentially as a liturgical institution. This speculation thus seeks to connect the process of subjective assimilation to God and union with God, or of elevation to the intuition of the One and Essential, with the order of worship in the Church; and it thereby seeks to overpass the ancient principle of cognition by the Neo-Platonic principle of real mystical experiences and elevations, and thus to attain to participation in the essential world of the divine. This Neo-Platonic mode of thinking was transmitted by Dionysius to the subsequent theology of the Middle Ages, and even to later times.

13. *John of Damascus* († *c.* 760) was the last theologian of the Greek Church. Besides his *Ἱερὰ παράλληλα*, he composed a very extensive collection of Sentences, mostly moral, but also partly dogmatic in their contents, as well as several tractates on the eight principal sins (*περὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ τῆς πονηρίας πνευμάτων, de octo vitiis*), on the virtues and vices (*περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*), and on the sacred fasts (*περὶ τῶν ἁγίων νηστειῶν*). The one-sided intellectualism of the Greek theology, which had ultimately passed into the camp of the Neo-Platonic mysticism, had as its obverse the

[1] J. G. B. Engelhardt, Die angebl. Schriften des Ar. Dion. 1823. K. Vogt, Neoplatonism. u. Christenth., Berl. 1836. Baur, Dreieinigk. ii. 207 ff. Möller in Herzog, 2 Aufl. iii. 616 ff. Nirschl, ii. 131 ff.

legal externalization of Christian morality, and the worldliness and worldly implication of the Church had as their obverse the ascetic flight from the world; and by this ideal the life of the Christians and of the servants of the Church was judged and regulated in the world.

The theology of the Greek Church having proceeded from a one-sided accentuation of the intellectual factor, could not but give to the sphere of the moral a parallel independent position along with the predominantly intellectually apprehended faith, to which the γνῶσις formed the higher stage. Ethics sought its grounding in the mystical mental state and mode of thinking instead of in the moral nature of faith; and thus it came to assign a high position to asceticism and monasticism. In comparison with this, the accentuation of the moral duty of active life according to the vocation of the individual in the world, as it is found in Chrysostom, could be the less carried out as its semi-Pelagianism relegated it from the outset to the individual's own doing, and consequently the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary doing was always ready to take from. The mystical root of this morality gave it a subjective character to which the fellowship of worship formed the only counterpoise. It was otherwise in the West.

III. The Ethics of the Western Church.

§ 36. *The Ethics of the Western Church in their distinction from the Ethics of the Greek Church. The Period of its Foundation.*

1. *Irenæus.*

The Western Church shares with the Greek Church in the early obscuration of the Pauline knowledge of justification in its significance for Ethics. Thereby the moral relation of man's conduct towards God lost its conditionedness through the relationship of justification, and it thus assumed a false independence and the character of legality. But its Ethics are distinguished from the Greek Ethics by the more practical and more sober spirit of the West, and especially of Rome. In consequence of this, it is further distinguished by the stress laid upon the will and upon action, in place of the one-sided importance attached to knowledge and contemplative reflection in the Greek Church, as well as by the stronger accentuation of the grace of redemption by which there was also produced a stronger consciousness of the antithesis of the new Christian thinking and life to the pre-Christian heathen life and thought. This grace of redemption had its place and the organ of its activity in the organism of the Church, and in consequence morality appears here to be determined by objective and ecclesiastical conditions in a higher degree than in the Greek Church. This determination of morality by the Church does not proceed from it merely as a fellowship for worship, but as a religious and moral fellowship of life, or as a Kingdom of God. The more decided accentuation of the new Christian principle of the moral life which correspondingly showed itself, was undoubtedly purchased with a

certain ecclesiastical legal externalization. After Irenæus, the mediator between the East and West, Tertullian was the most prominent representative of this Western spirit in theology and also in ethics during the period of the founding of the Roman Church. Cyprian modified the views of Tertullian and translated them into Catholic form. Tertullian and Cyprian were followed by Minucius Felix (?), Lactantius, and Zeno of Verona.

1. *The natural soil of Rome* made its influence felt in the moral reflection and the ethical development within the Western Church, as well as in other spheres of thought. In the ancient Greek moral philosophy, and also in the theological treatment of Ethics within the Greek Church, thinking had always a preponderance over acting, as is shown, for instance, in the importance assigned to γνῶσις among the Alexandrians, and by the contemplative tendency of the Greek monasticism later on. But while this is the case in the East, the Roman mode of contemplating things (as, for instance, in Cicero's De officiis) always recognises *actio* as at least fully justified along with *scientia ;* and action becomes an essential factor in virtue, while the idea of certain merely theoretical virtues is rejected.[1] This tendency now passes into the Christian Ethics of the Western Church ; and if it is not yet manifested in the Greek Irenæus when he became connected with the West, it shows itself clearly in Tertullian.

2. The fundamental thought of *Irenæus*[2] is the Kingdom of God in its advancing development in historical continuity, and within the one Church, in harmony with itself. Thus he accentuates, in his emphatic opposition to the gnosis of Marcion, the unity of the Old and New Testaments in the historical progress of salvation,[3] and consequently also the unity of the revelation of Christ with the moral contents

[1] *E.g.* Cicero, De off. i. 43, 153. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit, i. 6. 19.

[2] Erbkam, De s. Irenæi principiis ethicis, Regiom. 1856. Böhringer, ii. Ziegler, Iren. u. s. w., Berlin 1871. Lipsius, Ueber die Zeit des Iren. u. die Entstehung der altkath. Kirche, in Sybel's Histor. Ztschr. xxviii. p. 241 ff.

[3] Especially in Book IV. of the work *Adv. hæreses ; e.g.* iv. 9. 3 : una enim solus et unus deus—autem—non pauci gradus, qui ducunt hominem ad Deum.

of the Old Testament law. In consequence, Christianity appeared in contrast to the Old Testament Law of externality and slavery, as the new Law, the new Law of love and liberty.[1] This conception of Christianity as law subserved at the same time the necessary opposition to the Antinomianism of the Gnostics, which, in putting the internality of the pneumatic state or of the disposition into a false opposition to action, declared action to be indifferent, and thereby annulled all objective difference between good and evil.[2] But, in fact, while Irenæus sought to establish the historical connection of the New Testament revelation with the pre-Christian revelation, he wandered into the path of that false mode of generalization which, through the influence of the ancient Stoic way of thinking, had gained entrance into theology since Justin Martyr, and he thereby neutralized or at least endangered the specific conception of revelation. The Decalogue is likewise to him only the natural moral law (iv. 16. 3) which the Patriarchs possessed (the *naturalia et communia præcepta* written in the heart), and which, having come to be forgotten in Egypt, was on that account positively established in the Decalogue and renewed by Christ as a law of inwardness and liberty,[3] while He set aside the ceremonial law imposed upon the Jews. This seems to amount to holding that the universalism of the New Testament grace is to be regarded as identical with the universalism of that law of nature and its natural way of salvation.[4] Irenæus undoubtedly deceived himself regarding this agreement; for the highest commandment of the Old

[1] IV. 9, 2: major est legislatio quæ in libertatem, quam quæ data est in servitudem, et ideo non in unam gentem, sed in totum mundum diffusa est. iv. 12. 4: an inner law. iii. 10. 2; 13. 3; 33. 14. iv. 13. 2, 3: a law of liberty. iv. 13. 2: etenim lex quippe servis posita, per ea quæ foris erant corporalia, animam erudiebat,—verbum autem liberans animam et per ipsam corpus voluntarie emundari docuit. iv. 13. 3: non dissolventis sed adimplentis et extendentis in nobis, tanquam si aliquis dicat, majorem libertatis operationem et pleniorem erga liberatorem nostrum infixam nobis subjectionem et affectionem.

[2] I. 25. 4; ii. 32. The principle of the Carpocratians: sola humana opinione negotia mala et bona.

[3] IV. 9. 2; 13. 1. Cf. Diestel, Geschichte des A. T. in der christl. Kirche, Jena 1869, p. 59 f.

[4] Cf. iv. 13. 1: et quia dominus naturalis legis, per quæ homo justificatur, quæ etiam ante legis dationem custodiebant qui fide justificabantur et placebant Deo [Heb. xi. 6] non dissolvit. iv. 13. 4: quia naturalia omnia præcepta sunt

and New Testament legislation is in his view love to God (iv. 12. 3). Along with this, however, we have his emphatic accentuation of grace and of the new spirit of regeneration which has its place and operation in the Church. For, ubi ecclesia ibi et spiritus Dei, et ubi spiritus Dei, ibi ecclesia et omnis gratia. This spirit, however, is a spirit of regeneration and of renewal[1] which realizes itself in the process of an advancing development going on to eternity (iv. 38. 3), and to the perfect vision of God, combined with *ἀφθαρσία* and the nearness of God. Thus in connection with these views the (chiliastic) eschatology of Irenæus has also its moral significance. With Irenæus then, as in the Greek form of doctrine, the specifically Christian element proceeds side by side with traditional moral views without the two being inwardly connected with each other; only that what is specifically Christian receives a more energetic accentuation in Irenæus, and is viewed more in connection with the history of the Kingdom of God. Both sides are likewise found represented in Tertullian.

§ 37. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Foundation.*

2. *Tertullian.*

Tertullian[2] represents both the thought of universality and the principle of historical continuity in the Roman spirit[3] which was wont to accentuate before everything else the validity of law. Tertullian wrote a very large number of

communia illis et nobis. iv. 15. 1 : naturalia præcepta quæ ab initio infixa dedit hominibus.

[1] III. 17. 1 : voluntatem patris operans in ipsis et renovans eos a vetustate in novitatem Christi. v. 9. 1 : spiritus patris emundat hominem et sublevat in vitam Dei.

[2] Neander, Antignosticus, Geist des Tertullian u. Einl. in s. Schriften, Berlin (1825) 1849. Hesselberg, Tert.'s Lehre, i. Leben u. Schriften, Dorp. 1848. Möhler, Patrologie, herausg. v. Reithmayr, Regens. i. 1840, pp. 701 – 790. Nielsen, Tert.'s Ethik (in Danish), Kjöbenhavn 1859. Böhringer, iii. 1, 2. Hauck, Tert.'s Leben u. Schriften, Erl. 1877. Ludwig, Tert.'s Ethik, Lpz, 1885. Hauber, Tert.'s Kampf gegen die 2 Ehe. Stud. u. Krit. 1845, p. 617 ff. Nöldechen, Tert. von der Keuschheit. Stud. u. Krit, 1888, 2, p. 331 ff.

[3] Kahnis, Lehre v heil. Geist, p. 287.

ethical monographs, both before and during his montanistic period. Their moral austerity becomes intensified into a rigorous severity in the later period;[1] but these writings present otherwise no essential difference. The following works were written before he became a Montanist: *Apologeticum* (which contains much ethical matter); *Ad martyres*; *De Spectaculis* (against taking part in public heathen shows); *De idololatria* (against taking any part in anything heathen, even in the preparation of heathen idols); *De patientia*; *De oratione* (explanation of the Lord's Prayer); *De pœnitentia*; *Ad uxorem* (exhortation to his wife not to marry again after his death because of the questionableness of a second marriage, with the celebrated description of the happiness of Christian marriage, that Church in miniature, ii. 8. 9[2]); and *De cultu feminarum*. The following writings belong to his montanistic period: *De corona militis* (the crowning of soldiers and the profession of a soldier generally incompatible with the Christian confession); *De fuga in persecutione* (flight in persecution is not allowable); *Scorpiace* (on the duty of confession in persecutions); *De virginibus velandis* (virgins ought never to appear unveiled at public worship); *De exhortatione castitatis* and *De monogamia* (unconditional rejection of second marriage from the point of view that marriage is only a satisfaction of the sensuous nature); *De pudicitia* (rejects the milder principles set forth in the De pœnitentia; and holds that the Church has not the right to forgive deadly sins); and *De jejuniis* (defence of the practice of the Montanists with regard to fasting against the Psychici, *i.e.* the Catholics).

With proud self-feeling which rises even to scorn, he contrasts the Christian morality with the heathen mode of life. In heathendom we have the world of immorality, in Christianity the world of morality; in the former a morality of words, in the latter a morality of deeds.[3] The principle of

[1] The division and chronological sequence of his writings is not certainly ascertained. See Uhlhorn, Fundamenta chronologiæ Tertullianeæ, Gött. 1852. Neander, Hesselberg, and Hauck, *ut supra*. Bonwetsch, Die Schriften T.'s nach der Zeit ihrer Abfassung, Bonn 1878.

[2] Unde sufficiamus ad enarrandam felicitatem eius matrimonii, quod ecclesia conciliat et confirmat oblatio et obsignat benedictio, angeli renuntiant pater rato habet?

[3] Apol. 46, 50.

Christian morality is the will of God, and particularly as manifested in the progress of His historical revelation: first as natural law, then as the Old Testament law, thereafter on the New Testament stage, and now through the Paraclete.[1] For as the Old Testament law only commands what the law of nature testifies to,[2] there is no contradiction between the law of Christ and that of the Old Testament (against Marcion); only that the law of Christ not merely commands or forbids the act, but also the will, and thus it perfects the law of the Old Testament.[3] In like manner, the revelation of the Paraclete does not indicate really any alteration of the *regula fidei* which remains unaltered, but the perfecting progress of the *disciplina*.[4] The development of the moral order of life thus stands in connection with the progress of the Kingdom of God.[5] While in the Greek theology the accentuation of the law was conditioned by the one-sidedly intellectual apprehension of faith, and bore in consequence of this a more subjective and individual character in itself, in the West it is the Roman spirit which presses towards the moral order of life, and more particularly towards the social order of the life of the community.

Now as the revelation of grace in Christ is a new principle of life, Tertullian demands that it shall embrace and permeate the whole of life. But instead of accentuating the positive relationship of the Christian spirit to the life of the world, and laying stress upon the permeation and appropriation of the world by the Church, Tertullian, in view of the complete moral corruption of the heathen world and the dangers which

[1] De virg. vel. 1: Nihil sine ætate est, omnia tempus exspectant.—Adspice ipsam creaturam paulatim ad fructum promoveri.—Sic et justitia (nam idem deus justitiæ et creaturæ) primo fuit in rudimentis, natura deum metuens. Dehinc per legem et prophetas promovit in infantiam, dehinc per evangelium efferbuit in juventutem, nunc per paracletum componitur in maturitatem.

[2] Adv. Marc. iv. 16; De virg. vel. 16; cf. Diestel, Geschichte des A. T. in der chr. Kirche, p. 60.

[3] De pœnit. 3; De orat. 7; De pat. 6; Adv. Marc. 2. 19, 20. So also the App. Constitut. vi. 23.

[4] De virg. vel. 1: Regula quidem fidei una omnino est, sola immobilis et irreformabilis — — cetera jam disciplinæ et conversationis admittunt novitatem correctionis operante scilicet et proficiente usque in finem gratia dei, etc.

[5] De præscr. 13: Jesum Christum prædicasse novam legem et novam promissionem regni cœlorum.

he saw growing out of contact with this world for the moral state of the Christians and of the community, lays all emphasis upon the opposition to the world. In this he was determined by the tendency of his own severe nature, which was inclined to pay no regard to consequences, and which tended towards the fanatical. In all things, Christians ought to show that they are governed by a new spirit, even down to the most trivial externalities of life and its appearances. For life ought to flow in one current. Thus he represents the principle of separation from heathen society, and always the more unreservedly. This separation applies to eating and drinking, to ornaments and clothing, to the use of garlands, to the visiting of shows and plays, to trade and conduct, to the discharge of magisterial offices, to military service, etc. And as the Church did not follow him entirely on his path, and did not subject itself unconditionally to the revelations of law by the Paraclete, he took a sectarian position towards the world even in opposition to the Church. This is especially shown in his writing *De pudicitia*, and in his attitude against Callistus in Rome, who, according to Tertullian, widened the bounds of church discipline far too much, as he permitted full reception again into the Church in the case of those who had been guilty of sins even against the Seventh Commandment; so that of the three old capital sins: idolatry, murder, and adultery, only the first two still maintained their earlier position. It was by pædagogic and ecclesiastical political reasons that Callistus had been guided in the interest of the universal vocation of the Church, while Tertullian represented the inexorability of the moral principle. Thus Tertullian maintained the inalienable truth that the Christian life is a new and independent thing, because it has to be the witness of the new principle of the Christian spirit. And this truth is set forth by him in such a way that Christianity appears only as the judgment and not as the redemption of the world, and has its task in and on the world, whereby the universality of the nature of its Kingdom is overlooked. Moreover, this view is held in connection with the position that the new moral life is not immediately derived from the new relationship of grace to God in Christ; rather were *regula fidei* and *disciplina* put as

two independent legal quantities beside one another, and, moreover, the *disciplina* is grounded upon the sporadic revelations of montanistic prophecy.

The characteristic of Tertullian given above, and the general judgments indicated, may be illustrated by the following passages from his works. His view of *Idolatry* is thus expressed in his *De idololatria*, c. 1: Principale crimen generis humani, summus seculi reatus, tota causa judicii idololatria. c. 3: Idololatria omnis circa omne idolum famulatus et servitus, inde et omnis idoli artifex eiusdem et unius est criminis. On the incompatibility of idolatry and the making of idols with taking part in Christian worship, he says, c. 4. 7: Christianus ab idolis in ecclesiam venit, de adversaria officina in domum Dei, attollit ad Deum patrem manus matres idolorum, his manibus adorat quæ foris adversus Deum adorantur, eas manus admovet corpori domini, quæ dæmoniis corpori conferunt! Adleguntur in ordinem ecclesiasticum artifices idolorum. Against trading in incense and beasts for sacrifices, c. 11. 12: Quo ore Christianus thurarius, si per templa transibit, fumantes aras despuit et exsufflabit, quibus ipse prospexit? On fellowship with the heathen, c. 14: Licet convivere cum ethnicis, commori non licet. Convivamus cum omnibus, conlætemur ex communione naturæ, non superstitionis. Pares anima sumus, non disciplina, compossessores mundi, non erroris. The Christian may take part in private heathen feasts which are not connected with idolatry, but not in sacrificial feasts (c. 15. 16); but the Christian is not to wear purple and gold, c. 17. 18: Purpura vel cetera insignia dignitatum et potestatum insertæ dignitate et potestatibus idololatriæ ab initio dicata habent profanationis suæ maculam. —*On crowning the head with garlands*, we have his *De corona militis*. Although the words in the *Apologet.* 37: Hesterni sumus et vestra omnia implevimus—castra ipsa, are rhetorical, yet it is evident from them (cf. also c. 42: Navigamus et nos vobiscum et vobiscum militamus) that not a few Christians were found among the soldiers. So much the more necessary was the instruction of them. Tertullian gives it in his own way. In c. 11, he appears, indeed, not to forbid the profession of a soldier, if a Christian was a soldier before he became a Christian (si quos militia præventos fides posterior invenit, alia conditio est, as in the case of the centurion of Capernaum and others); but then he requires the giving up of it: dum tamen suscepta fide atque signata aut deserendum statim sit, ut a multis actum, aut omnibus modis cavillandum, ne quid adversus Deum committatur, quæ nec ex militia

permittuntur, aut novissime perpetiendum pro Deo. For there were, in his view, too many idolatrous usages connected with this profession; and he even held the use of garlands or wreaths as not permissible, as they were applied to heathen festivities and such like (c. 2). It cannot be said that it is not forbidden by Scripture, and that it is therefore allowed. Rather: "what is not expressly allowed is forbidden" (c. 2, extr.). In addition to this, there is the tradition and custom of the Church, which are to be held in honour because they are an expression of what is conformable to reason (c. 4). This is a canon that is regulative with Tertullian, namely, the canon of original reason or naturalness. Again, to wear flowers upon the head is contrary to their natural destination (c. 5), and has its origin in heathenism (c. 7). It is not becoming for the Christian as such to be a soldier (c. 11). "He has sworn his divine oath of allegiance—how can he put a human one above it? Christ has forbidden the use of the sword;—is the Christian to order arrestment, torture, and the punishment of death? How can he take the word of command from a captain when he has already received it from God? The Christian nowhere becomes anything else than a Christian. The position of a soldier, however, requires that from him. Fixed faith, which always remains the same, knows nothing of compulsory relationships. There is no compulsion to sinning for those for whom there is only a compulsion not to sin." The garland is also connected with other offices. "One should either flee from offices in order not to fall into trangressions, or suffer the martyr's death in order to break with offices." This is the necessary consequence of the standpoint that makes the words of Christ which refer to the internal attitude of the disposition directly into a law for the external orders of life.—The Shows and Plays (*De spectaculis*) stand in connection with the heathen religion; the demons take delight in them (c. 11); they are therefore not suited for the Christians who have renounced idols (c. 13); for "the world belongs to God, but the things of this world to the devil" (c. 15). The plays excite the passions (c. 16) and are schools of vice; even the public prostitutes are produced upon the stage as sacrifices to the public licentiousness (at the feast of the Floralia): Plus miseræ in præsentia feminarum, quibus solis latebant, per quæ omnis ætatis, omnis dignitatis ora transducuntur, etc. Taceo de reliquis, ea quæ in tenebris et in speluncis suis delitescere decebat, ne diem contaminarent. Erubescat senatus, erubescant ordines omnes, etc. (c. 17). The art of wrestling is likewise devilish. The first who threw man to the ground was the devil (c. 18). Plays are to be

reprobated, for God loves the truth and not a deception (c. 23). Again, all that is not of God, or that displeases God, is of the devil (c. 24). How can the Christian hasten from the congregation of God to the congregation of the devil? (c. 26). The spirit has nobler pleasures and spectacles (c. 29): the revelations of God, the life in God, etc.: Hæ voluptates, hæc spectacula christianorum sancta, perpetua, gratuita; in his tibi ludos circenses interpretare, cursus seculi intuere etc. metas consummationis exspecta, societates ecclesiarum defende, ad signum Dei suscitare, ad tubam angeli erigere, ad martyrii palmas gloriare. Vis autem et sanguinis aliquid? habes Christi.—Tertullian has often treated of the *dress and adornment of women.* Women ought to consider that sin and all misery came into the world through their sex. De habitu muliebri (c. 1): Tu es diaboli janua, tu es arboris illius resignatrix, tu es divinæ legis prima desertrix, etc. Wherefore this unnaturalness, this ornamentation, etc.? c. 2. 5–9: non placet Deo quod non ipse produxit, nisi si non potuit purpureas et ærinas oves nasci jubere. Si potuit, ergo jam noluit; quod Deus noluit, utrique non licet fingi (c. 8). On adorning the person, colouring the hair, etc., he thus speaks: Quantum a vestris disciplinis et professionibus aliena sunt, quam indigna nomine christiano, faciem fictam gestare, quibus simplicitas omnis indicitur, effigie mentiri quibus lingua non licet, appetere quod datum non sit etc. (De cultu feminarum, c. 5). Against elaborate coiffures he says (c. 7): Mirum quod non contra domini præcepta contenditur: ad mensuram neminem sibi adjicere posse pronuntiatum est. On excess in ornamentation (c. 9. 13): Nescio an manus spathalio (a sort of armlet) circumdari solita in duritia catenæ stupescere sustineat. Timeo cervicem, ne margaritarum et smaragdorum laqueis occupata locum spathæ (a broad two-edged sword) non det. Quare, benedictæ, meditemur duriora et non sentiemus, relinquamus lætiora et non desiderabimus—projiciamus ornamenta terrena si cœlestia optamus—ne dilexeritis aurum—tempora Christianorum semper et nunc vel maxime non auro sed ferro transiguntur; stolæ martyriorum præparuntur. Tertullian in his writings of the Montanist period (*De exhortatione castitatis, De monogamia,* and *De virginibus velandis*) judges more harshly of marriage, second marriage, and celibacy, than in his earlier pre-Montanist treatise, *Ad uxorem,* in which he describes the happiness of Christian marriage. In his Advers. Marcion. i. 29, and in his *De anima,* c. 27, he defends marriage: Natura veneranda est non erubescenda. Concubitum libido, non condicio fœdavit. Excessus, non status est impudicus. Ad uxor. i. 2: Non

quidem abnuimus conjunctionem viri ac feminæ, benedictam a domino etc. But here already he extols (i. 4) the celibacy of the sorores quæ maritis sanctitatem anteponunt,—Deo sunt puellæ, cum illo vivunt, cum illo sermocinantur, illum diebus et noctibus tractant etc. Sic æternum sibi bonum domini occupaverunt, ac jam in terris non nubendo de familia angelica deputantur. He places the state of a *widow* almost even higher (Ad uxor. i. 8); for although in virginibus integritas solida et tota sanctitas,—tamen vidua habet aliquid operosius, quia facile est non appetere quod nescias. In respect to *second marriage*, we have passages in his *De monog.* 3, 8, 9, 11, 13, to the effect that although the relative words of Paul were to be understood as a permission, yet if Christ abrogated what Moses permitted (namely, divorce), cur non et paracletus abstulerit quod Paulus indulsit? In reference to *fasting*, he represents the rigid Montanistic practice: Arguunt nos, quod jejunia propria custodiamus, quod stationes plerumque in vesperam producamus, quod etiam xerophagias observemus, siccantes cibum ab omni carne etc. (De jejun. c. 1). Reference may also be made to Tertullian's treatise on *prayer*, in which he gives a short exposition of the Lord's Prayer, that "breviarium totius evangelii" as he calls it, and in which he prefers to interpret the fourth petition spiritually according to John vi. 33. He closes his exposition with a series of observations and directions about prayer. When any one prays, he ought not to cherish anger against a brother (c. 11); he should approach prayer with a pure spirit; for it is a contradiction to pray with washed hands but with an impure spirit. "This is true purity, not that which so many zealously practise in a superstitious manner who use water at every prayer, although they have just come from a washing of the whole body." "Besides, the hands which are once washed with the whole body in Christ (namely, in baptism) are pure enough" (c. 13). We spread out the hands in praying, thus representing the suffering of Christ, and we also confess Christ in prayer (c. 14). To put off the upper garment before offering prayer, as the heathen do, is a superstitious practice (c. 15); as is the habit of sitting down like the heathen after prayer, as is mentioned in the Shepherd of Hermas (c. 16). We ought only to raise our hands moderately in prayer and not to lift up the look too confidently, and we should moderate the voice; for God hears even those who do not speak (c. 17). To withhold the kiss of peace from the brethren after prayer when one is fasting, is reprehensible. "Can a prayer be complete with the refusal of the sacred kiss?" (c. 18). According to tradition, we ought to keep ourselves from kneeling as well as from every sign of fear

only on the day of the resurrection of the Lord. On the fast days and on the Station Days (Wednesday and Friday), however, there is no prayer without kneeling and the other customary marks of humiliation (c. 23). "With regard to the times for prayer, there is nothing prescribed, but only to pray at all times and in all places." But it is never superfluous to observe certain hours, such as "the third, sixth, and ninth hour, which are also mentioned in Scripture. In addition to these there are the regular prayers, which we are also due without special exhortation, at the beginning of the day and of the night. However, to enjoy food and to take a bath before one has offered up a prayer, is not becoming for believers" (c. 25). We ought to worship God in the spirit and in truth. "We are the true worshippers and the true priests who, praying in the spirit, present prayer in the spirit as an offering corresponding to God and well-pleasing to Him.—This sacrifice is consecrated to Him with the whole heart, and is nourished by faith and presented in truth; its blamelessness consists in our innocence, its cleanness in our chastity, its crowning in brotherly love.—Such a sacrifice we must bring to the altar of God with the pomp of good works, amid the singing of psalms and hymns, and it will procure all things from God" (c. 28). Again Tertullian writes on the power and fruit of prayer thus: "It turns away the wrath of God; it watches for enemies; and it supplicates for persecutors." "It likewise wipes out transgressions, drives away temptations, extinguishes persecutions," etc. "Prayer is the wall of faith, and our armour for defence and attack against the foe who lurks for us on all sides. Let us then never go about without our arms" (c. 29)

§ 38. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Foundation.*

3. *Cyprian.*

Against this breach of the continuity of the Christian spirit in the Church, which had led into the path of fanaticism and into the narrowness of a pietistic sect, the ecclesiastical spirit reacted in *Cyprian*[1] († 258), who opposed to the sporadic spirit of the Montanistic prophetism the continuity and community of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. He

[1] Rettberg, Cyprian, dargest. nach s. Leben u. Wirken, Gött. 1831. Böhringer, Biogr. i. 2. Leimbach in Herzog's P. R.-E.² iii. 409 ff. Fechtrup, Der h. Cyprian, 2 Th., Münster 1878. Gass, 72 ff. Nirschl, i. 301 ff.

thus translated Tertullian into the Catholic form by making the Montanistic legalism the legalism of the episcopally constituted Church, and at the same time moderated Tertullian's rigorism.

Cyprian's *Letters* contain considerable moral material, and especially those addressed to Donatus (also called *Liber de gratia*) in sixteen chapters. In these Letters Cyprian makes pass before the eyes of his friends, as from the summit of a mountain, a picture of the corruption of the world and the struggling of men after the unreal things and honours of this life. Having been enrolled in the heavenly service, Donatus has to maintain the pure discipline of the Christian virtues. His constant occupation was to be prayer and reading. In the former he would speak with God, in the latter God would speak with him.[1] The following writings of Cyprian also belong to the department of morals: *De mortalitate* (twenty-six chaps.), written on the occasion of the plague in the year 252 A.D., and setting forth the consolations and encouragements which the Christian draws from his faith—a book which, according to Augustine's testimony, was much read; *De exhortatione martyrii*, probably written in the year 253 A.D. in expectation of a persecution—designed to warn against idol sacrifices, and composed almost wholly in words of Scripture: Illa sunt militaris tubæ hortamenta, illa pugnantium classica (the signals).[2] The following works of Cyprian are also worthy of consideration in this connection: *De oratione dominica* (thirty-six chaps.), which is akin to Tertullian's treatise on the same subject, but more detailed and more intelligible—highly valued and recommended by Augustine. The fourth petition is here likewise referred to the body of Christ (c. 18), although it may also be understood of the necessary daily support of life (c. 19). *De opere et eleemosynis* (twenty-six chaps.): by good works and especially almsgiving the sins committed after baptism are cancelled. *De bono patientiæ* is an elaboration of Tertullian's treatise *De patientia;* it treats of the blessing of the virtue of patience and the unblessedness of impatience, and was written on occasion of the controversy regarding the baptism of heretics and the excitement which was thereby evoked. *De zelo et livore* (of

[1] Nirschl, i. 305. [2] Præf. c. 4.

envy and jealousy, in eighteen chaps.); envy springs from the devil, who fell through envy, and is a source of many sins. The Christian ought to keep himself free from these pernicious passions; for having become a heavenly man in baptism, he must also be of a heavenly disposition in love. *De habitu virginum* (twenty-four chaps.) was written in the year 249. Virgins consecrated to God are the joy and ornament of the Church; they represent the life of the angels, and anticipate the future glory. Their dignity comes immediately after that of martyrdom. Their mode of life must be so much the more circumspect; they ought to avoid finery and luxury. Augustine praised this work; and Jerome recommended it to Eustochium for reading. The three treatises, *De spectaculis*, *De disciplina et bono pudicitiæ*, and *De laude martyrii*, are probably spurious, but they certainly belong to about this date.

Cyprian's fundamental thought is the unity of the Church. This thought is expounded in his treatise *De unitate ecclesiæ* (in twenty-seven chaps.), written in the year 251 on occasion of the Schism of Novatus and Felicissimus in Carthage and Novatian in Rome. The foremost moral duty of the Christian is therefore obedience to the Church, and schism and heresy are the gravest crimes. In this position he already completely represents the views of the later Roman Church, as he does likewise in the doctrine of the meritoriousness and sin-cancelling power of individual good works, especially of alms. He holds the same relation also to the distinction made between the common Christian morality and the higher perfection of the virgin state, and other similar doctrines.

Passages from Cyprian's writings.—Of *the Sin of Schism and Heresy*, which he regards as greater than that of the lapsed, who can be received again after sufficient penitence, he thus writes in his De unitate ecclesiæ, c. 19: Pejus hoc crimen est quam quod admisisse lapsi videntur, qui tamen in pœnitentia criminis constituti Deum plenis satisfactionibus deprecantur. Hic ecclesia quæritur et rogatur; illic ecclesiæ repugnatur. Hic potest necessitas fuisse; illic voluntas tenetur in scelere. Hic qui lapsus est sibi tantum nocuit; illic qui hæresin vel schisma facere conatus est, multos secum trahendo decepit etc. Et cum lapsus semel peccaverit, ille quotidie peccat. Postremo lapsus martyrium postmodum consecutus potest regni promissa

percipere; ille si extra ecclesiam fuerit occisus, ad ecclesiæ non potest præmia pervenire. Even a martyr death cannot extinguish this crime; indeed there can be no martyr outside of the Church (c. 14).—On the *meritoriousness of good works, and especially of alms*, he thus speaks in his De opere et eleemosynis (c. 2): 'As the fire of hell is extinguished by the bath of the wholesome water, so the flame of sins (after baptism) is put out by alms and good works. And because in baptism there is vouchsafed forgiveness of sins once, persevering and constant beneficence, like baptism, again bestows the grace of God." How benign then is the divine goodness, considering that there is none without wounds, seeing that it has furnished a wholesome means in that way by which we can again be healed and made sound from our wounds (c. 3)! The meritoriousness of alms is then shown by Cyprian from Scripture, especially from the Old Testament Apocrypha, and particularly from Sir. iii. 33. The last point considered (c. 26) is that as martyrdom acquires the purple crown of victory, so does charitableness acquire the white shining crown. And so he exclaims at the close of his treatise: Præclara et divina res, salutaris operatio, solatium grande credentium, securitatis nostræ salubre præsidium, munimentum spei, tutela fidei, medela peccati, res posita in potestate facientis, res et grandis et facilis sine periculo persecutionis, corona pacis, verum Dei munus et maximum, infirmis necessarium, fortibus gloriosum, quo Christianus adjutus perfert gratiam spiritalem, promeretur Christum judicem, Deum computat debitorem!—"To those who conquer in peace, He will give the white crown for good works; to those who endure in persecution, He will present the purple crown for suffering." This treatise became a standard work in all the following periods down to the Reformation.

In his *De habitu virginum*, Cyprian expresses his judgment to quite the same effect as Tertullian on the reprehensibleness of the love of finery (c. 11); and he speaks of fine ornaments as an invention of the apostate angels (c. 14), as a deformation of the work of God (c. 15), and on artificial ornamentation as a sinning against truth. "Thou hast soiled the skin with false paint; thou hast falsified the hair with an untrue colour; thy face is possessed by lies; thy form is distorted; thy countenance is made strange. Thou wilt not be able to look upon God with the eyes which God did not form, but which the devil has deformed. Thou hast followed after him; thou hast imitated the ruddy and glittering eyes of the serpent; thou hast decked thyself up after thy enemy; and thou shalt also burn with him" (c. 17). Virgins ought not to take part in luxurious

revellings (c. 18), nor to visit the common public baths: such a bath defiles; it does not wash; it does not clean the limbs, but soils them. Although thou dost not look unchastely on any one, yet thou art thyself looked upon unchastely, etc. (c. 19). On the other hand, the dignity of virgins stands next to that of martyrs; their reward of grace is the second in order (c. 21). "What we shall be in the future, ye have already begun. Ye have the glory of the resurrection already in this world; ye step through this world without defilement from the world. When ye continue to persevere in chastity and virginity, ye are like the angels of God" (c. 22). "The Lord does not command abstinence, but encourages to it." "A greater holiness and truth of regeneration belongs to you, as the desires of the flesh and of the body are alien to you" (c. 23). In this there is united an exuberant rhetoric with a false estimation of an external state. — In his treatise on the *Lord's Prayer* there is much that is good and beautiful. But prayer is represented as unfruitful if it is not combined with the fruits of good works. "Prayer is good with fastings and alms, says the Scripture" (Tob. xii. 9). "He who will dispense the reward for good works and alms at the day of judgment, is also to-day a gracious Hearer for him who comes to prayer with the works of charity" (c. 32). The hours of prayer—the third, sixth, and ninth—include all three the mystery of the Trinity (c. 34). We Christians, however, as we are always in the light, ought not to cease from prayer even during the night. The hours of the night ought to make no interruption in supplication; nor should idleness and inertness keep any away from prayers (c. 36).

§ 39. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Foundation.*

4. *Minucius Felix. Lactantius. Zeno.*

1. *Minucius Felix*[1] belongs to the time of Tertullian,— Ebert and others putting him even before Tertullian. His *Octavius* contains much relating to morals. While intentionally leaving in the background the deeper contents of Christianity, he justifies it as the higher truth of the heathen

[1] Ebert, Gesch. der Liter. des M.-A. i., Lpz. 1874, p. 25 ff. Mangold in Herzog's P. R.-E.² x. 12 ff. R. Kühn, Der Oct. des Min. Fel., eine heidn.-philos. Auffassung v. Christenth. Dissert., Lpz. 1882.

knowledge, and as the higher morality of life. His apologetic representation of the morals of the Christians enables us to recognise what was commonly recognised among them as Christian. He declares that it was forbidden to eat blood,[1] to marry more than once,[2] and to accept places of honour among the heathen.[3] In opposition to the heathen sacrifices, he says: "A good soul, a pure spirit, and an honest conscience is a worthy sacrifice. He therefore who practises irreproachableness of life, prays to God; whoever practises justice, sacrifices to God. He who uses no deceit reconciles God; and he who rescues a fellow-man from a danger, slaughters the best beast of sacrifice. These are our sacrifices; this is our worship" (c. 32). Of martyrdom he says: "What a beautiful spectacle must it be for God when the Christian struggles with pain; when he bears himself up against threatenings, sentences of death, and tortures; when he mocks with scorn and contempt at the clamour of an execution and the fear of the executioner; when he holds high his liberty in opposition to kings and princes, and yields alone to God, to whom he belongs!" "Our boys and girls mock at the tortures of the cross and of the rack, at wild beasts and all the kinds and terrors of death, in heavenly endurance of pain" (c. 38).

2. Lactantius[4] († *c.* 330 at Treves) was, according to Jerome, a scholar of the African Arnobius, although a native of Italy. He was originally a heathen rhetorician, but although only a Christian layman, he was well instructed in theology. His style led Jerome to designate him as the "Christian Cicero." In his writings he is predominantly controlled by the ethical interest, and he is fond of presenting Christian ethics in relation and opposition to the ancient philosophical ethics. In his *De mortibus persecutorum*, he seeks to demonstrate the divine judgment by a reference to the deaths of the emperors

[1] Tantumque ab humano sanguine cavemus, ut nec edalium pecorum in cibis sanguinem noverimus, c. 30.

[2] Unius matrimonii vinculo libenter adhæremus cupiditatem procreandi aut unam scimus aut nullam, c. 31.

[3] Nec de ultima statim plebe consistimus, si honores vestros aut purpuras recusamus, *l.c.*

[4] Stäudlin, iii. 19 f. Heinig, Die Ethik des Laktantius, Lpz. Inaugur.-Dissert. 1887.

who were hostile to Christianity. His *De ira Dei* justifies the doctrine of the wrath of God in opposition to the philosophical denial of the affection of anger in the divine, or at least of such a form of affection. His principal work in which his ethical doctrines are embraced is his *Institutiones divinæ* (in seven Books), in which he opposes the true Christian wisdom, religion, and morality to the heathen errors. The first three Books are predominantly polemical, being directed against the practical and scientific heathenism. Book I., De falsa religione, proves from the harmony of the world the providence and unity of God in opposition to the folly of the heathen polytheism. B. II., De origine erroris, refers idolatry to the seeming miracles of demons and such like. B. III., De falsa sapientia, shows up the nothingness of the heathen philosophy. The last four Books are of a positive character, and are largely ethical in their contents. B. IV., De vera sapientia, shows how, in opposition to the vain searchings of the heathen philosophy for truth, God has revealed the true wisdom through the prophets and through His Son, Jesus Christ, which knowledge is the presupposition of the true worship of God; and that this worship is therefore only to be found in the Christian Church. B. V., De justitia, expounds the true justice or righteousness which the heathen did not know, as the highest virtue and source of virtue (v. 15), and as consisting in the true worship of God in disposition and action. In support of this position, Lactantius gives a survey of the principles of the Christian morality in contrast to which the heathen life is injustice or unrighteousness. B. VI., De vero cultu, shows how the worship of God consists in two things: piety towards God, and beneficence towards men, pietas and æquitas (beneficentia, misericordia, humanitas). B. VII., De vita beata, treats of the goal of man, of immortality as the reward of righteousness, and of the punishment of the last judgment. Lactantius himself afterwards summarized this text-book, for the use of his brother in his *Epitome divinarum institutionum ad Pentadium fratrem*, in which the relative sections recur, although with a more or less independent exposition in detail.

Lactantius himself sums up his Ethics (Inst. vii. 7. 1) in the words: The highest good is immortality; we are born

for it; and the way to it is virtue.[1] This indicates the arrangement of his thoughts which we have to follow. These thoughts express from the outset the specific relation of the ethical reflection of Lactantius, both to the ancient philosophical and to the Christian way of thinking. It was the longing for a certainty of immortality which chiefly filled and moved the thoughts and hearts of the ancient world in the first centuries of the Christian era,[2] but they were not able to attain to this certainty. The Christianity of that time approached this world with the proclamation of *ἀθανασία* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, and specially in the sense of an immortality and eternal life in the other world. In this the followers of Christianity believed they possessed a superiority over the heathen world. But this indication of the essential Christian good did not reach the speciality and fulness of the fellowship of salvation as it is revealed in Christ and realized for us, and as it is summarily comprehended by Paul in the proposition of justification by faith; and accordingly the designation of virtue as the way to this goal is a falling back upon the pre-Christian stage, although virtue itself is more christianly determined.

Lactantius is fond of relating his ethical investigations to the ancient views and attaching them to these, although predominantly in opposition to them. This is seen by his investigation of the *highest good*.[3] He establishes its essential marks: it must only belong to man, must relate only to the soul, must presuppose knowledge and virtue, must make the individual happy, must always remain identical with itself, must have no end, and must include no evil in it.[4] By these marks he tests the various views set up by the ancient moral philosophy, and finds them all insufficient.[5] But if, according to Cicero's definition,[6] which he adopts, man is made for justice,

[1] Unum est igitur summum bonum immortalitatis ad quam capiendam et formati a principio et nati sumus. Ad hanc tendimus, ad hanc nos provehit vertus.

[2] Cf. Burckhardt, Konst. d. Gr. p. 14 ff. "The heathenism of the third century had become a religion of the other world."

[3] Inst. iii. 7–13; Epit. c. 33 ff. [4] Cf. Heinig, a. a. O. p. 28.

[5] Inst. iii. 11. 5: Miror itaque nullum omnino philosophorum exstitisse, qui sedem ac domicilium summi boni reperiret.

[6] De Leg. i. 10: Nihil est profecto præstabilius, quam quod intelligimus, nos ad justitiam esse natos.

and justice has to endure suffering in life, yet according to the opinion of all philosophers happiness should belong to man, then, concludes Lactantius, this happiness must be referred to the other life, and the highest good therefore consists in immortality.[1] The highest good is thus a thing that belongs purely to the other world; it is not already a thing of this life. To the present life belongs only the striving after it[2] in the knowledge of God and the worship of God;[3] and therefore it is to us as something which we have to do, and not a possession in which we rejoice. This divergence of the conception of "immortality" from the New Testament conception of "eternal life," which already forms the present possession of faith, shows the presence of a false dualism between the present world and the next. It was occasioned by divergence from the line of the Pauline knowledge, whereby the relationship to God was set forth as performance and counter-performance, and it proceeds in misunderstanding of the knowledge that "where there is forgiveness of sins, there also is life and blessedness."

The *way* to that goal is *virtue*. For there are two ways,[4] one going to heaven and one to hell, as the narrow and the broad way, the way of virtue and the way of vice. This old scheme, founded on the Old Testament and on Matthew vii. 13 f., and on the designation of Christianity as "the way" absolutely,[5] may be traced through the well-known "Two Ways" of the literature of the early Church[6] down to Lactantius. Now the way of virtue advances through conflict. It is God's will that we were to live in conflict. It has been willed by God Himself, and for this purpose evil has also been ordered by God.[7] Thus evil is subservient to

[1] So the Deduction in Epit. c. 33 ff.

[2] Inst. vi. 18, 35: Immortalitatis quasi candidati sumus. vii. 5. 18: Idcirco hanc præsentem vitam dedit, ut illam veram et perpetuam aut vitiis amittamus, aut virtute mereamur.

[3] Inst. vii. 6. 1: Ideo nascimur, ut cognoscamus deum; ideo cognoscimus, ut colamus.

[4] Inst. vi. 18. 35: Duæ sunt viæ.

[5] Acts ix. 2, xix. 9.

[6] Cf. *supra*, § 28. 2.

[7] Epit. 29: Summa igitur prudentia Deus materiam virtutis in malis posuit; quæ idcirco fecit, ut nobis constitueret agonem, in quo victores immortalitatis præmio coronaret.

the good.[1] Not as if God immediately willed the evil, but it is produced through the medium of Satan, and is only permitted by God.[2] The occasion for it is furnished by man's *passions*, among which the most powerful, according to Lactantius, are anger, cupidity, and sensuous lust. These form means for the exercise of virtue, and they are therefore so far necessary.[3] Now according to Lactantius, as in the ancient moral philosophy virtue consists in the control of the passions, this is the right fortitude.[4] Virtue mounts upwards by three stages—abstinence from bad works is the first stage; abstinence from bad words is the second stage; and abstinence from bad thoughts is the third and highest stage, reaching to resemblance to God.[5] This is certainly not effected without renunciation and suffering. Virtue is endurance of evils,[6] and denial of the enjoyment of the present, which specially includes the avoidance of plays as an exercise and school of immorality (Epit. c. 63). If this self-denial appears at first as folly, it ultimately exhibits itself as wisdom. The right form of the Christian life which grows out of this suppression of the passions, is described by Lactantius negatively and positively: negatively, as *not* cursing, swearing, lying, deceiving, envying, stealing, or being harsh, etc. (Epit. c. 64); and positively, as the practice of mercy, fidelity, and stedfastness of faith (Epit. c. 66), for which the reward is blessedness.

Virtue and its manifestations are taken together by Lactantius under the title of *Justice*. While he refers to Cicero for this view (De Leg. 1. 10), it has, as is well known, connections going much farther back, especially to Aristotle, to whom justice is "virtue absolutely" and the sum of all the others.[7] After this precedent it has been a

[1] Inst. vii. 5, add. 1: Nulla virtus esse poterat nisi diversa fecisset, nec omnino vis boni apparere potest, nisi ex mali comparatione. Adeo malum nihil aliud est, nisi boni interpretatio.

[2] De ira, 15: Ideo malum permisisse, ut et bonum emicaret.

[3] Inst. vi. 15. 5–8.

[4] Inst. i. 9. 4: Animum vincere fortissimi est.

[5] Inst. vi. 13. 6–8: Qui primum gradum ascendit, satis justus est; qui secundum, jam perfectæ virtutis, siquidem neque factis neque sermone deliquat; qui tertio is vero similitudinem Dei assecutus videtur.

[6] Inst. vii. 1. 17: Virtus est tolerantia malorum.

[7] Cf. Luthardt's Antike Ethik, p. 78 f.

practice in the ethics of the Roman Church till to-day to embrace under the virtue of justice the practice of religion and the love of one's neighbour—evidently a scheme that corresponds little to the subject. Lactantius, then, comprises in justice the attitude of man towards God as well as towards others; to worship God and to esteem and love one's neighbour as the image of God (*humanitas*), *i.e.* piety (*pietas*) and equity (*æquitas*),[1] are the two principal virtues. As in general, so likewise here in the requirement of *humanitas* and *æquitas*, Lactantius attaches his view mainly to Cicero; but, like Ambrose after him, he overpasses the ancient philosophical ethics by placing *pietas* in the foreground, and thereby returning to the pre-Aristotelian common ethics.[2] Thus it appears here too, and this is entirely characteristic of the doctrine of the Roman Church, that Christianity is regarded as something added to what already existed, and specially to the ancient philosophy; and that in this external sense it is regarded as a supernatural thing—an *accedens* and *superadditum*. Now we owe this higher thing to Christ, *i.e.* to His doctrine and to His example. It is characteristic of this whole way of thinking that Lactantius was not able to attain to the right appreciation of Christ and of His death on the cross.[3] He is essentially a "Doctor justitiæ."[4] It is only for the authentication of doctrine in life that the body and suffering of Christ were required.

Piety, as Christ teaches it to us, is, according to Lactantius, essentially renunciation of the earthly for the sake of the heavenly. Both of these spheres and goods, the *terrena* and the *cœlestia*, stand exclusively opposed to each other. It is the right wisdom to renounce these transitory goods, honours, etc., "terrena calcare," in order to win the imperishable heavenly goods, and above all the highest good of immortality. We should have earthly goods only in order to bestow them richly as alms, etc.,[5] being contented if we have

[1] Inst. v. 14. 9: Justitia quamvis omnes simul virtutes amplectatur, tamen duæ sunt omnino principales, quæ ab illa divelli separarique non possunt: pietas et æquitas.

[2] Cf. Luthardt's Antike Ethik, pp. 142 f., 59 f..

[3] Cf. Epit. c. 50, 51.

[4] Inst. iv. 13. 1.

[5] Inst. vi. 17. 17: Pecuniæ minime temperandum est.

only what is necessary for the support of life.[1] It is the well-known ascetic way of thinking as conditioned by that exclusive opposition of the heavenly and earthly which meets us here again.

Equity (*æquitas, humanitas*) towards one's neighbour is described by Lactantius as universal, self-sacrificing, and unselfish (Inst. vi. 10). It exhibits itself particularly in hospitality, the ransoming of prisoners, the defence of widows, interment of strangers and of the poor,—certainly with the thought that by such good deeds unavoidable sins were to be compensated for (Inst. vi. 13). It shows itself in particular as *innocentia, i.e.* as keeping oneself from committing sin against one's neighbour, in conformity with which the natural impulse of self-preservation is subordinated to consideration for the wellbeing of others. From that point of view he decides the collisions of duties on which he enters in detail.[2] The Christian will not save his life by snatching a plank from a shipwrecked man, or by taking away his horse from one who had been wounded in battle; but in such cases he will rather die himself, even at the risk of appearing a fool![3] For the Christian does not know of this life only, but of the future life. This whole explanation appears as a sort of Christianized revival of explanations of the Stoics; and in fact the ideal of Lactantius is just the wise man of the Stoics, only in the sense of the Christian.

In *marriage* justice manifests itself as fidelity, chastity, and mutual patience. But higher than marriage is god-like *celibacy*, which, as the height of the virtues, has to expect incomparable reward.[4] In the description of this highest

[1] Inst. v. 22. 8: Non amplius quærat, quam unde vitam sustentet.

[2] Following Carneades, Cicero in the Third Book of his De officiis deals with his subject, and the popular Moral Philosophy generally was fond of entering upon these questions.

[3] Inst. v. 18: Morietur potius justus quam occidet. Manifestum est, eum qui aut naufrago tabulam aut equum saucio non ademerit, stultum non esse, quia hæc facere peccatum est, a quo se sapiens abstinet.—Sapientissimus est, qui mavult perire ne noceat.

[4] Inst. vi. 24. 37: Si quis hoc facere potuerit, habebit eximiam incomparabilemque mercedem. Quod continentiæ genus quasi fastigium est omniumque consummatio virtutum, ad quam si quis eniti atque eluctari potuerit, hunc servum dominus, hunc discipulum magister agnoscet, hic terram triumphabit hic erit consimilis Deo, qui virtutem Dei cepit.

virtue, there is exhibited that non-Christian notion which identifies spirituality in the sense of what is not sensible with morality. In Lactantius this is established by its connection with his otherwise dualistic notion of the much-discussed two opposite principles of the good and the bad, Christ and the devil, according to which the body, because of the earth, the kingdom of the devil, is the seat of evil, whereas the spirit is from God.[1] From this point of view the ascetic way of thinking is a necessary consequence; and in like manner there follows the exclusive apprehension of the highest good in reference to the other world in the sense of "immortalitas," by which a correct appreciation of the earthly life and of its tasks could not be reached.

It was a matter of course from the connections of Christian morality that Lactantius rejected in detail the brothel, Plato's community of wives, child-murder, and abortion, as well as the exposure of children (which, if it did not lead to death, at least sent the boys to slavery and the girls to a life of immorality), together with the gladiatorial shows and theatrical plays.[2] It may also be added that he likewise unconditionally rejected lying and the taking of interest. In his opinion, the Christian will also avoid commerce and war, since he is sufficient for himself, and he keeps at peace with all men.[3]

On one side we see in the ethics of Lactantius the influences of Neo-Platonic ideas, and on the other side a connection with the ethics of the Stoics; and in contrast to both, the Christian Ethic shows itself to be the higher truth by its religious character. This is especially exemplified by refer-

[1] Inst. ii. 13: In hac societate cœli atque terræ quorum effigies in homine expressa est, superiorem partem tenent ea quæ sunt Dei, anima scilicet quæ dominium corporis habet, inferiorem autem ea, quæ sunt diaboli, corpus utique, quia terrenum est, animæ debet esse subjectum, sicut terra cœlo. Est enim quasi vasculum, quo tanquam domicilio temporali spiritus hic cœlestis utatur. Utriusque officia sunt, ut hoc quod est ex cœlo et Deo imperet, illud vero quod ex terra est et diabolo serviat.

[2] Inst. vi. 18 ff., 20, 27, 29: Histrionum quoque impudicissimi motus, quid aliud nisi libidines docent et instigant? Quid de mimis loquar corruptelarum præferentibus disciplinam.

[3] Inst. v. 18: Cur enim naviget aut quid petat ex aliena terra, cui sufficit sua? Non autem belligeret ac se alienis furoribus misceat, in cuius animo pax cum hominibus perpetua versetur. vi. 20. 16: Itaque neque militara justo licebit, cuius militia est ipsa justitia.

ence to Cicero. The line of this thought of Lactantius was taken up and pursued by Ambrose.

3. The date of *Zeno of Verona* is not settled, but ninety-three tractates or sermones are attributed to him. They are usually referred to the fourth century; but some assign them even to the middle or second half of the third century as their possible date. They often almost verbally coincide with passages in Tertullian, Cyprian, and Lactantius, as well as with Hilary's commentary on the Psalms. The tractates are discourses or read sermons, and several of them, especially in the First Book, treat of ethical subjects. The author presses for a practical Christianity in contrast to a Christianity of words and disputation. Thus the 1st Tractate emphasizes the practical nature of *faith*, which has nothing to do with philosophical demonstrations (c. 5), and avoids questions of controversy. "The servant of God ought not to dispute, because disputation is the enemy of love as well as of faith" (c. 6). The 2nd Tractate treats of *hope*, *faith*, and *love*. "Faith is the ground of hope, and hope is the glorification of faith" (c. 2), while *love* is the queen of all the virtues (c. 4). "Love loves no one from personal consideration, as she cannot flatter; nor for honour, because she is not ambitious; nor on account of sex, because to her the two sexes are one; nor a limited time only, because she does not change. She is not jealous, because she does not know envy; she is not puffed up, because she cultivates humility; she thinks no evil, because she is simple." Love is the connecting and animating power in all; love is therefore the highest commandment. "The whole Christian nature thus lies more in love than in hope and in faith" (c. 6). The 3rd Tractate contrasts Christian *justice* with the worldly justice of which the philosophers speak. The latter is a mode of speech; the former is selfless doing. The 4th Tractate celebrates the praise of *chastity*, with which its opposite is contrasted in vivid description. The 5th Tractate connects with the preceding one the praise of *continence*, of virginhood and widowhood, and blames second marriage, and still more marriage with the heathen. The virgin has only to please God and not man; she has not to be anxious about the loss of children, nor to sigh under the burden of pregnancy and the danger of childbed (c. 2).

"Subjecting the blossom of holy chastity to no yoke of marriage, preserve the treasure of faith; be holy in body and soul; quench the glow of the flesh by love to Christ, to say nothing of the glory of the resurrection which thou makest conquest of even here, when, as the Lord says, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but will be as the angels of God" (c. 3). The 6th Tractate celebrates *patience* as the bridling guide of the other virtues. It concludes thus: "Thou lendest to Poverty, so that satisfied with her own she may possess all when she bears all. Thou art a wall of faith, the fruit of hope, the friend of love.—Happy, happy to eternity, is he who continually possesses thee in himself." The 7th Tractate is a glorification of *humility* in opposition to the philosophers' doctrine of pride. The 8th Tractate treats of *fear*, of the fear of God in distinction from natural fear. "Blessed are all they who fear the Lord." The 9th, 10th, and 11th Tractates treat of *covetousness*, that universally spread vice, from whose kindling brand the whole world is enflamed (ix. 1). Its restless greed is vividly described. It is the root of all evils and the corruption of the life of society. And yet death puts an end to all, and there is no means against it (ix. 5). The 10th Tractate carries out this last thought in further detail. How unworthy this vice then is of the Christians! (x. 3). It is the going down of all the virtues (x. 4). How abominable it is, is described in the short sketch—for it is nothing more—which forms the next discourse. "It breaks fidelity, sets love aside, denies justice, has no feeling." "It rages more against him who loves it: but he who conquers it will have eternal life." There is here shown throughout an earnest, sober, moral spirit, which keeps to what is essential and moves in the traditional paths of the thought of its time. How the fundamental error of the time is therewith also shared, is shown by the 12th Tractate on the spirit and body. It indeed designates the life of the soul as won by faith out of the fountain of baptism, and just because the life of the soul is from the creation the eternal part in us, while the body puts us under the laws of nature which we have in common with the beasts. To this creational antithesis of man, in which two different and antagonistic things are internally linked with one another in

discordant union, and the soul is compassed about by the outlines of the body, Zeno refers the words of the Apostle: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and they are contrary to each other" (Gal. v. 17). Thus we have here also the perversion of the ethical into the physical.

§ 40. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its ascendancy.*

On the basis laid by Tertullian and Cyprian, the Ethics of the Western Church were developed in the same spirit. The chief representatives of this developed ethical thinking were Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and Gregory the Great. AMBROSE sought to justify the dominant Catholic thought with its combination of ancient and Christian elements, by the exhibition of Christian Ethics as the higher fulfilment of the Stoic Ethics. AUGUSTINE is the most characteristic representative of the Western spirit, and he became its standard representative for the following time. In conformity with this spirit he took his standpoint, on the one side, in the will of man, and, on the other, in the renewing grace of God, and made love to God the highest good, because the highest reality. This was the centre of his ethical thoughts. From this standpoint a better appreciation of the relationships and orders of the earthly life was possible to him, and it would have pressed itself upon him even through the necessities of actual life, if he had not been hindered by the traditional false conception of Christian perfection and the current ascetic ideal from forming a correct estimate of the worldly life and the tasks of its calling, and if he had not been held under the bane of a mysticism which was in affinity with Neo-Platonism. As the grace of the forgiveness of sin did not stand in the centre of his theological thinking so that the relationship to God did not present itself to him in its right bearing, neither was he able to find the right relationship to the world. In the case of JEROME, the ascetic ideal of the monk became entirely the controlling

thought of his life, which he set forth with energy and success, and represented in opposition to his opponents. GREGORY THE GREAT, again, combined this ideal with the hierarchical interest, while he represented and turned to account Augustine's thoughts in the rest of his theology. Thus it was natural that the various attempts at reform which were made, experienced a decided repulsion, so that the traditional moral thinking only established itself the more firmly, and it passed over into the Mediæval Church.[1]

1. *Ambrose.*

Ambrose († 397) was a man of the old Roman type with its ethical character. He has treated moral themes on many occasions both in his letters and in various writings. Of the latter, we must note the following: *De pœnitentia*, in two Books; *De virginibus ad Marcellinam sororem*, in three Books, —a summary of lectures which he delivered soon after entering on his episcopate, and which had made a great impression; *De viduis*, in fifteen Chapters, occasioned by a widow who wished to enter into a second marriage; *De virginitate*, in twenty Chapters, written *c.* 378, a justification of his high estimate of virginity and renewed praise of it; *De institutione virginis sive sermo de virginis virginitate perpetua ad Eusebium civem Bononiensem*, in seventeen Chapters, written after 391; *Exhortatio virginitatis*, in sixteen Chapters, written *c.* 393, a discourse delivered by Ambrose at Florence on occasion of the consecration of a church which a certain widow Juliana had

[1] LITERATURE ON AMBROSE: Pruner, Die Theol. de h. Ambros., Eichst. 1862. Förster, Amb., Bisch. v. Mailand, Halle 1884.

ON AUGUSTINE: Kloth, Der h. Kirchenlehrer August. Aach. 1840. Wiggers, Augustinism. u. Pelagianism., 2 Thle., Berl. 1883. Nirschl, Ursprung u. Wesen des Bösen nach d. Lehre des h. August., Regsb. 1854. Dieckhoff, Aug.'s Lehre v. d. Gnade, Theol. Ztschr. 1860. Luthardt, Lehre vom freien Willen u. s. w., Lpz. 1863, pp. 26 ff., 39 ff. Ernst, Die Werke u. Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach St. Aug., Freiburg 1871. A. Dorner, Aug., sein theol. System u. s. relig.-philos. Anschauung, Berl. 1873. Storz, Die Philos. des h. Aug., Freiburg 1882. Lösche, Plotin u. Aug., Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissensch. 1884, 7. Scipio, Aug.'s Metaphysik im Rahmen seiner Lehre v. Uebel, Lpz. 1886. Kahl, Die L. v. Primat des Willens b. Aug., Duns Scot. u. Descartes, Strassb. 1886. Herm. Reuter, Augustinische Studien, Gotha 1887.

erected, and who had consecrated her son Laurentius, her three daughters, and herself to the single life. The title of these writings already show on what his principal interest turned. It is the praise of virginity as the Christian ideal. But the most important of his writings in the present connection is his *De officiis ministrorum*, l. iii.,[1] in which he has compendiously expounded his ethics. This work is a sort of side-piece to Cicero's *De officiis*, the arrangement of which it follows.[2] In the First Book he treats of the *decorum*, in the Second of the *utile*, and in the Third of the connection of both. Primarily destined for the clergy of his diocese, this production is at the same time an outline of ethics for Christians generally. It is provided with many examples from Scripture which are used as a substitute for the art of systematic method with which he will have nothing to do.[3] The *decorum* is treated according to the four cardinal virtues. What promotes our piety and makes us perfect is useful. The Third Book discusses the final end of human life, *i.e.* likeness to God. Our duty is to strive after this perfection and to further others in it. The four cardinal virtues (*virtutes principales*, not till later called *cardinales*): prudentia or sapientia, justitia, fortitudo, temperantia, are Christianized, and they indicate respectively: prudentia, the relationship to

[1] Ed. by Krabinger, Tüb. 1857.

[2] Bittner, Commentatio de Ciceronianis et Ambrosianis officiorum libris, Braunsb. 1849. Hasler, Ueber das Verhältniss der heidn. u. christl. Ethik auf Grund einer Vergleichung des ciceron. Buchs u. s. w., Münch. 1866. Zeitmeier, Apologie der christl. Moral u. s. w., Münch. 1866. Dräseke, M. Tullii Ciceronis et Ambrosii episcopi Mediolanensis de officiis libri tres inter se comparantur; in the Rivista di filologia eccl. iv., Turin 1875. Reeb, Ueber die Grundlagen des Sittlichen nach Cic. u. Ambros. Vergleichung ihrer Schriften de off. Ein Beitrag zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen heidn.-philos. u. christl. Ethik. Progr. der kgl. Studienanstalt, Zweibrücken, 1876. Ewald, Der Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf die Darstellung der Ethik bei Ambros, Lpz. 1881. Förster, a. a. O. über die Ethik, pp. 175–199: the unmediated juxtaposition of two heterogeneous series of thoughts. Ewald in his review of Förster says: "The purely transcendent 'Christian' conception of the highest good, permits in all respects neither a fusion with the ancient elements, nor in general a really Christian, *i.e.* evangelical exposition of Ethics." Uhlhorn, Die christl. Liebesthätigkeit der alten Kirche, Stuttg. 1882, p. 296 ff.

[3] I. 25: Hoc artis est ut primo officium definiatur, postea in genera dividatur. Nos autem artem refugimus, exempla maiorum proponimus.—Sit igitur nobis vita maiorum disciplinæ speculum, non calliditatis commentarium etc.

God; justitia, the relation to our fellow-men; fortitudo, the relation to the events of life; and temperantia, the relation to one's own person. The Christian is the realization of the ancient ideal of the just and wise man: vir Christianus et justus et sapiens.[1] Christian virtue, otherwise than in Cicero, has thus gained by its inner connection by religion to God a transcendent goal which passes far beyond the state of the merely abstract virtue of the ancient ethics, and it has at the same time obtained active power. It is not merely, as in the ancient ethics, *ratio*, but "pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum,"[2] with the fundamental determination of humility[3] which was unknown to antiquity, and with accentuation of the inner disposition in its relation to God. Along with the impulse towards moral perfection implanted in human nature (perfectionis possibilitas) there now goes by its side the impulse of happiness. The two coincide at the goal of human life: ibi plenitudo præmii, ubi virtutum perfectio. For, virtue itself, the summum bonum, is to the Stoic happiness, whereas according to Ambrose virtue is only the means to it. The Christian knows happiness in God, and its realization is in the other world, in the vita æterna through God[4] as fructus bonæ operationis;[5] and not as the ancient way of thinking held, in the present world. From this purely transcendent apprehension of the highest good, no correct relationship to the orders and tasks of the earthly life could be attained. As the ethic of the Stoics and of Cicero distinguishes between perfect and imperfect, or middle and common duties (*perfectum* and *medium*), so Ambrose, in unison with the previous development of the ecclesiastical teaching, adopts this distinction and identifies it with the distinction between the evangelical counsels (consilia evangelica) and commandments (præcepta).[6] To fulfil the commandments: not to

[1] III. 4. [2] I. 27. 126. [3] II. 24. 122, 124.
[4] II. 1. 3. [5] II. 2. 5.

[6] I. 11. 36 ff.: Officium autem omne aut medium aut perfectum est, quod æque scripturarum auctoritate probare possumus. Habemus etenim in evangelio dixisse dominum: si vis in vitam æternam venire serva mandata etc. Hæc sunt media officia, quibus aliquid deest; denique dicit illi adolescens: omnia hæc custodivi a juventute mea, quid adhuc mihi deest? Ait illi Jesus: si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende omnia tua etc. Et supra habes scripturam (or ita est scriptum), ubi diligendos inimicos et orandum dixit pro calumniantibus et

kill, not to commit adultery, not to bear false witness, to honour father and mother, to love one's neighbour as oneself, — these, according to Ambrose, are middle duties; whereas to love our enemies, to sell our property and give to the poor, to fast voluntarily, to practise mercy, which Ambrose emphatically recommends,[1] and such like,—these are perfect duties. This evidently shows that there was lacking the appreciation of the proper calling of life, and a correct knowledge of Christian perfection. *Celibacy* is put by him particularly high. The Song of Solomon supplies him with imagery to describe marriage with the heavenly bridegroom. The narrative of the holy Thecla, who was condemned for her resolution of celibacy to be thrown to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, but who was caressed by the lion which they let loose upon her, and stories of similar alleged miracles, serve him as proof of the holiness of celibacy. And so he praises the daughters who resolve on that mode of life against the will of their parents. To him marriage is a proof of the fall and of weakness. The Roman laws against celibacy, which he severely blames, were instituted, according to his opinion, only from hatred against the vow of chastity. In his writings he has to defend himself from the reproach that he prevented marriages and the increase of the population.[2] With regard to the former point, he replied that he would rejoice at it; with regard to the second, he believed he could refute it. He praised as holy martyrs the virgins who killed themselves in order to save their chastity in the time of persecution,[3]—in another way certainly than Augustine did afterwards. He rejects *second marriage*, at least among widows, and does not admit any of

persequentibus nos et benedicere maledicentes. Hoc nos facere debemus, si volumus perfecti esse, sicut pater noster qui in cœlo est etc. Hoc est igitur perfectum officium, quod κατόρθωμα dixerunt græce, quo corriguntur omnia quæ aliquos lapsus potuerunt habere. Cicero puts it thus: i. 3. 8, iii. 3. 14: Media Stoici appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent, quæ et ingenii bonitate multi assequuntur et progressione discendi; illud autem officium quod rectum idem (Stoici) appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut idem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest. The Christian takes the place of the wise man with Ambrose.

[1] I. 11. 38: Misericordia perfectos facit, quia imitatur perfectum patrem.

[2] See the above-mentioned writings on virginity, and Stäudlin, iii. 56 ff.

[3] De virgin. iii. p. 478 sq.

the usual excuses or justifications of it.[1] Differing from Cicero, he rejects the doing evil to injurers and enemies; the Christian ought not even to defend his life against robbers when they attack him; for so he understood the well-known words of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount.[2] He is also averse to carrying on war,[3] although he does not venture to reject it absolutely; for there were too many Christian soldiers in the imperial army. He is also inclined to reject capital punishment on principle, but does not venture to speak it out directly, as Christian judges might happen to be placed in the position of having to pronounce such sentences. He recalls the fact that Jesus (John viii.) did not condemn the woman taken in adultery, and that we ought to be careful for the salvation of our neighbour. One cannot indeed keep back such judges from communion, but "one has wished that such judges would rather voluntarily absent themselves from the communion than be removed from it by the law."[4] We see how uncertain was the position of the ancient Church in relation to questions of the external life, as soon as it was compelled to enter into more direct relation to them through the change of circumstances. It had understood the words of Christ which applied to the internal disposition as a law for the outward conduct; and it did not recognise the significance of the earthly calling because it did not take its standpoint in the inner saving certainty of justification by faith, which would have made liberty possible in contrast to the external life in the world, without which liberty Christianity cannot attain any reality in the world in the proper sense, but can find its realization only in the monk.—This incapacity to gain the free and correct standpoint over against the reality of things, also showed itself in the question of *private property*. When he declares that the jus privatum is usurpatio,[5] we

[1] De viduis; De offic. ii. 6: Quid etiam tam decorum quam ut vidua uxor viro defuncto fidem servet.

[2] De offic. iii. 4: Vir christianus et justus et sapiens (an expression repeatedly used to indicate that the Christian is the reality of the ancient ideal of the just and wise man) quærere sibi vitam aliena morte non debet, utpote qui etiam si latronem armatum incidat, ferientem referire non possit, ne dum salutem defendat, pietatem contaminet.

[3] De offic. i. 35.

[4] Epit. v. 51. Cf. Ständlin, iii. 69.

[5] De offic. i. 28: Natura jus commune generavit, usurpatio jus privatum.

have certainly here again the influence of Stoic motives.[1] For to the Stoics nature is the regulative standard in which all men participate, and therefore the state of nature is the properly normal state. So the Cynics, too, in their own way realize it, and the Eremites take their flight to it out of a world of unnatural culture. This thought of natural rightful community is also at home in the Roman ethics of the following times. Undoubtedly Ambrose gives it a Christian turn in his emphatic recommendation of works of charity; only they do not appear logically under the idea of free love, but as the partial adjustment of a wrong. What was specially begun by Cyprian in his recommendation of *alms* as cancelling sin, is decidedly developed in Ambrose. "Thou hast money, ransom thy sins. God is not purchasable, but thou art purchasable; purchase the ransom of thy sins with thy works; buy thyself off with thy money."[2] As baptism only delivers from the sins that lie back in the past, so from the time of Cyprian alms appear as a second baptism. "Nay, I would like to say under reservation of faith, that alms procure forgiveness even more than baptism. For baptism is dispensed once, and it promises forgiveness once; but alms bring forgiveness as often as they are given. These two then are the sources of compassion which give life and forgive sins. He who observes both, will be presented with the honour of the heavenly kingdom; and whoever after he has soiled the living fountain (baptism) by sins, betakes himself to the stream of mercy, will also obtain mercy."[3] With vivid eloquence he advocates good works, especially towards the members of the faith, such as ransoming from imprisonment, saving from death, delivering woman from shame, restoring children to their parents and parents to their children.[4]

[1] Cf. Cic. de offic. i. 7. 21: Sunt autem privata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione—aut victoria—aut lege.

[2] De Elia et jejuniis, c. 20.

[3] Sermo de eleemosynis. 30, 31. Uhlhorn, p. 277.

[4] Stäudlin, iii. 71, refers to de offic. i. 32-34, ii. 15, 16, 18, 19, 21. Gravis culpa si sciente te fidelis egeat, si scias eum sine sumtu esse, famem tolerare, œrumnam perpeti, qui præsertim egere erubescat, si in causam ceciderit aut captivitatis suorum aut calumniæ et non adjuves, si sit in carcere et pœnis et suppliciis propter debitum aliquod excrucietur,—si tempore periculi, quo capitur ad mortem, plus apud te pecunia tua valeat, quam vita morituri.

He himself came into such circumstances when, on the invasion of the Goths, he made church vessels which had not yet been used, to be smelted in order to ransom those who were imprisoned and in danger, and he has justified himself for doing this with eloquent words.[1] He unconditionally rejects the *taking of interest*, as it was rejected in the ancient Church generally. He did not accept even the Mosaic concession of taking interest from strangers. He interpreted the passage as applying to conduct towards enemies in war.

§ 41. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Ascendancy.*

2. *Jerome.*

Monasticism, attaching itself to the example of the practical Stoics and Cynics, likewise found its way into the West, and here, too, the ascetic disposition was ready to receive it. The ascetic tendency, which regards the monk as the ideal of the Christian, has found its most decided expression in *Jerome* or *Hieronymus* († 420).[2] Of his works we may here mention the following: *Vita S. Pauli eremiti; Vita S. Hilarionis; Vita S. Malchi; S. Pacomii regula; Adv. Helvidium de perpetua virginitate beatæ Mariæ, c.* 383; *Adv. Jovinianum*, l. ii. (on the meritoriousness of fasting and of the unmarried life); *Adv. Vigilantium* (on the worship of martyrs and relics). He also wrote very many letters of a moral ascetic character, containing recommendations of the monastic life against the vices and follies of the time and bearing on the history of Christian morals, with directions for Christian (monastic) perfection, addressed to individuals in the circle of his friends, and especially to female friends, such as Paula and Eustochium, Marcella, Fabiola, and others who had gathered around him. Among those letters which contain practical precepts and counsels for married persons, we have his Ep. 107 ad Lætam, and Ep. 128 ad Gaudentium, relating to the religious education of children; Ep. 71 ad Lucinium and Ep. 122 ad Rusticum, containing exhortations to the

[1] De offic. ii. 28.

[2] Zöckler, Hieron., s. Leben u. Wirken u. s. w., Gotha 1865.

monastic and continent life in marriage. The following letters contain exhortations to widowers and widows: Ep. 66 ad Pammachium; Ep. 118 ad Julianum; Ep. 54 ad Furiam; Ep. 79 ad Salvinam; Ep. 117 ad matrem et filiam; Ep. 123 ad Ageruchiam. Others contain exhortations to virgins, as the celebrated Epistola, or rather libellus, 22 ad Eustochium (written in 384) de custodienda virginitate (pp. 88–226); Ep. 130 ad Demetriadem; likewise Ep. 38 ad Marcellam, and Ep. 117. The following letters contain counsels for monks and those who are about to become such: Ep. 14 ad Heliodorum; the famous Ep. 52 ad Nepotianum de vita clericorum et Monachorum, anno 394 (distinguished on account of the richness of its precepts as Jerome's principal practical theological work, and forming to some extent a sketch of a pastoral theology from a monastico-ascetic standpoint); Ep. 125 ad Rusticum monachum.[1] A despiser of marriage and a fanatical honourer of the unmarried state of the monastic life, Jerome thus writes: Laudo nuptias, laudo conjugium, sed quia mihi virgines generant.[2] Luther thus writes in reference to him: "I know no one among the Fathers to whom I am so hostile as Jerome; for he writes only of fastings, food, virginity, etc.. If he had, however, pressed the works of faith and prosecuted them, it would have been something; but he teaches nothing, neither of faith, nor of hope, nor of love, nor of works of faith."[3] The celebrated description which Jerome gives of his self-castigations for the conquest of carnal desire in his 22nd Letter (Ad Eustochium, c. 7), which were all in vain, enables us to perceive all the misery and hardship of this labour under the law, which strives after a moral perfection by the way of ascetic enthusiasm in contradiction with nature and with the will of God, instead of seeking the true Christian perfection in the thankful love which springs from the faith which is of grace.

[1] Zockler, *l.c.* p. 447 f.

[2] Ep. 22. 20.

[3] Tischreden, WW. 62. 120 [Tabletalk]. Cf. also 61. 210: "S. Jerome has written a shameful book against Jovinian about widows who break their first faith and fidelity; as if it were wrong for them to wed again when the text yet presses clearly in that direction and says: I will that the young widows marry, etc. S. Paul says it is good not to touch a woman. From this Jerome argues: Ergo, it is bad to marry, whereas Paul uses the phrase in the passage to signify that it is laborious, troublesome, or difficult."

Nevertheless the opposition to the worldly pursuits and the luxurious sensuous life that was laying hold in the Church under the semblance of piety, was justified and wholesome; and his moral severity and unsparingness towards himself inspires respect. In ethics proper he has nothing special to expound. In the doctrine of virtue, he founds upon the Aristotelian conception of the mean or measure;[1] and he accepts the well-known four cardinal virtues.[2] He has not yet connected them with the three theological virtues: fides, spes, caritas, which became the mode of treating them from Augustine onwards.[3]

How much Jerome lacked the right understanding of Christianity, is shown by his statements regarding the *Law of nature*. He shares this doctrine with the earlier time, which attached itself on that point to the Stoics; and it is primarily directed against Jewish pride when he states in his Commentary on Isaiah xxiv. 6, that the Jews ought not to think that they had alone received the law of the Lord: quod universæ primum gentes totusque orbis naturalem acceperit legem; but he then goes so far as to ascribe the spirit of God to the works of this natural law.[4] This agrees with his doctrine of the *freedom* of the human will, which in spite of all his polemics against Pelagius, is yet of a Pelagianizing character: In nostro consistit arbitrio, bonum malumve eligere. Velle et currere meum est (only God must undoubtedly also co-operate therewith). Nostrum est rogare, Dei tribuere quod rogatur; nostrum incipere, illius perficere; nostrum offerre quod possumus, illius implere quod non possumus. — Constat inter nos, in bonis operibus, post propriam voluntatem Dei nos niti auxilio. Nostrum quidem est velle et curerre, sed ut voluntas nostra compleatur et cursus, ad Dei misericordiam pertinet, atque ita fit, ut et in voluntate

[1] Life of S. Paula, c. 20: "According to the expression of the philosophers: μεσότης ἡ ἀρετή, ὑπερβολὴ κακία, observing the right mean is virtue, and excess is what is bad, which we express by the phrase: ne quid nimis."

[2] Ep. 52 ad Nepotianum, c. 13. The right ornaments are prudence, justice, moderation, valour. "Shut thyself into these four heavenly regions, let this four-yoked car bring thee as a right charioteer of Christ on a straight course to the goal," etc. In Ep. 64 ad Fabiolam, c. 21, he illustrates them by reference to the four sides of the breastplate of the high priest. In Ep. 66 ad Pammach. c. 3, he refers the four virtues to Paula (justitia), her two daughters Paulina (temperantia) and Eustochium (fortitudo, on account of her virginity), and her son-in-law Pammachius (prudentia).

[3] Zöckler, *l.c.* 455.

[4] On Gal. iii. 2: Sciebat Paulus Cornelium centurionem *spiritum ex operibus accepisse*, sed non ex operibus legis, quam nesciebat.

nostra et in cursu liberum servetur arbitrium, et in *consummatione* voluntatis et cursus Dei cuncta potentiæ relinquantur.[1] When it is said: "If thou wilt be perfect, sell all thou hast," etc., Jerome explains this passage in his letter to Pammachius, c. 8, as meaning that perfection is thus dependent upon the free-will. Therefore it is that virginity is not commanded, but is left to the free-will which has to struggle for the reward. Upon this basis of freedom also rests, according to Jerome, the recommendation of the perfection of *monasticism* and of *asceticism*. His attitude towards these may be indicated in the first place by expressions from his Letter to the virgin Eustochium. "Hearken, O daughter, and consider and incline thine ear; forget also thine own people and thy father's house; so shall the king greatly desire thy beauty." With these words he begins this letter, or rather treatise on virginity. Eustochium has to beware of looking back like Lot's wife after she had left Sodom (c. 2). For the weakness of the flesh (c. 3) and the temptation of the devil (c. 4) may bring about a fall which could not again be made good (c. 5). "Thus it would have been better to enter into an earthly bond of marriage and to walk upon the plain, than while striving towards the heights of perfection to sink into the depths of hell" (c. 6). Again, the confessions of Jerome himself (c. 7) are extremely characteristic with reference to the assaults of the sensuous nature with all his asceticism; and as is easily seen, they were occasioned just by its unnaturalness. "Oh, how often did I believe myself, not only then when I was in the desert and in that wild solitude, which under the burning glow of the sun furnished but a dreadful abode for the hermits, to be transported into the midst of the enjoyment of Roman pleasures! My limbs, disfigured with the sackcloth, became stiff, and the bare skin had taken the colour of Ethiopia. Daily my tears flowed; daily did I send forth my breath in sighs; and if at times sleep overcame me in my internal struggle, I threw my limbs that scarcely held together upon the bare earth. I will not speak of food and drink, since even sick monks drink only fresh water, and it is regarded as luxury to eat anything boiled. That self which I had myself condemned to this prison from fear of hell, and which was only the companion of scorpions and wild beasts, I believed, nevertheless, that it, that I myself, was often transported into the midst of the dances of girls. My face was pale with fasting, but the spirit burned in the cold body with hot desires, and before the phantasy of a man who was long since dead according to the flesh, there bubbled up only the forms of the impulses of

[1] Dialog. contra Pelag. ii. Cf. Stäudlin, iii. 86 f.

sense. Thus deprived of all help, I threw myself at the feet of Jesus, watered them with my tears, dried them with my hair, and kept down the flesh with week-long fasting. I am not ashamed of the miserableness of my unblessed state of heart. I remember how I often passed the day and night in cries, and that I did not cease to punish my breast with blows till the Lord reproved me and inward joy returned. I even feared my cell as the witness of my evil thoughts, and enraged and fierce against myself I pressed alone always deeper into the solitude. Wherever a deep valley, a shaggy mountain, or a craggy rock showed itself, I chose it as my place for prayer; there did I rear the prison of my wretched sinful flesh; and there I sometimes believed—the Lord Himself is my witness—that after many tears and with eyes raised eagerly to heaven that I dwelled at times in the midst of the society of the heavenly angel bands, and I then sang joyously and cheerfully: 'Because of the savour of thy good ointments, therefore do the virgins love me; draw me, we will run after thee.'"

However much rhetoric there may be in this description, there remains enough of reality in it to give an impression of the useless self-torture by which men strove to attain by their own efforts on this supposed way of salvation to peace, in order at the end by a similar self-deception only to reach a state of ecstasy like that of the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus. Men tortured themselves in the difficulty of their own ways because they did not know the way of peace which the certainty of the grace of justification gives. This is the root of all these aberrations of the prevailing ethics of that time. Hence the advice which Jerome gives to the virgins, is not to refer them in some way to the grace of God, but to direct them to all sorts of works of their own. Above all he says (c. 8): "Let the bride of Christ flee from wine as poison, for wine and youth are the two inflammatories of lust. Why should we pour oil into the fire?" Then generally he recommends fasting in order that "the hunger which satiety has driven out of Paradise, may again bring us back to it" (c. 10). "Not as if God, the Creator and Lord of the whole universe, takes pleasure in the hungry growling of our bowels, and in our empty stomach, or in the glow of our lungs; but chastity can be secured in no other way." When Job, the immaculate and innocent, says of the devil that his power is in his loins and his strength in his navel, it is the private parts that are meant by these words. In this sense we ought to hold fast the lamps of the gospel with ungirded loins. "All the power of the devil against men thus lies in their loins, and all his power against women in the navel" (c. 11).—Thus the whole moral task is reduced to a combating

of the sensuous nature; and, moreover, the combat is a very external one. Undoubtedly that age presented even among the Christian virgins in this very sphere a large amount of most reprehensible sin; and Jerome speaks in the further course of his discussion of the arts of sterilization and of abortion, etc. (c. 13), of the so-called Agapetæ, as suspected women in the houses of the clergy and monks (c. 14), and likewise of the flattering clergy (c. 16). He thus addresses Eustochium (c. 18): "Be a knightly cicada; wash thy couch every night, and wet thy bed with thy tears. Sing psalms in the spirit," etc. She would have to know nothing of the judgment of condemnation pronounced on the married: "With pain shalt thou bring forth children." "Thou shalt surely die" is the end of the married state. "But my life-calling is raised above the sex. Let the married keep their perishable union, and their title of honour; my virginity is consecrated to me in Mary and Christ."—Thus should she speak (c. 18). "The married may seek their glory in this, that they are the next after the virgins." "The storms of this world drive past and roll away over the chariot of God as rapid as its wheels. Those may stitch together a coat who have lost the unsewed robe which comes from above; and they may now find a delight in the cry of children who mourn and weep in the very first moment of their life that they are born" (c. 19). "I approve of marriages, I praise the married state, but only because it produces virgins. I gather the rose from the thorns, gold out of the earth, the pearl out of the oyster." He thus rhetorically addresses a mother: "Art thou unwilling that thy daughter whom thou hast carefully preserved in virginhood should not wish to be the spouse of a subordinate soldier, but of the King himself? She has done thee a great benefit: thou hast become the mother-in-law of God" (c. 20). In the old covenant the good of continence was only found on the side of the men. "Eve, on the other hand, continually brought forth children in pains. But when the virgin brought forth, then was that curse removed. Death is from Eve, but life is through Mary. Hence the gift of virginhood was poured forth more richly upon women because it had taken its beginning from a woman. As soon as the Son of God entered into this world, He founded a new family for Himself, that He who was formerly worshipped by angels in heaven should also have angels on earth" (c. 21). Jerome repeatedly brings forward "the great troubles of marriage" (c. 22), as if that was a right reason against it. He does not even shrink from the use of such sophisms as this, that the performance of the conjugal duty makes the fulfilment of the apostolic exhortation to pray without ceasing impossible,

as prayer must then cease; and therefore that the apostolical admonition is only compatible with virginity (c. 22). Jerome knew men sufficiently not to be ignorant of the dangers which threatened a virgin, especially in surroundings such as Rome then presented; and he gives a series of salutary exhortations and warnings against unnecessary going out (c. 25 f.), against an outward exhibition of piety (c. 27), and against those who were but seemingly pious. With great vividness he describes the gallant priests who carried the news of the city from house to house, and made themselves favourites with the women (c. 28); and likewise the flatteries and affectations of the women and such like (c. 29). In order to give a warning against improper reading, he relates his fever-dream, how he was beaten before the judgment-seat of God at the command of God as a Ciceronian, and was condemned to hell, and was only let off because he promised never to read worldly books again. After waking he found his shoulders still beaten blue, and he felt the blows (c. 30). In order to recommend poverty and the avoidance of avarice, he depicts the life of the Egyptian hermits, of the irregular so-called Remoboth (c. 34), and the monastic communities with their regulated day's work (c. 35), and the Anchorites (c. 36). He then passes on to injunctions regarding the *life of prayer*. "Every one knows the third, sixth, and ninth hours, primes and vespers. Further, one ought not to eat without a previous prayer; and as little should one rise from table except after offering thanksgiving to the Creator. We ought to rise twice or thrice in the night, and reflect in the spirit on what we may know by heart out of holy Scripture. When any one goes out of the house, let him arm himself with prayer; when any one returns from the street, let him pray before he sits down. At every act, at every beginning, let the hand make the holy sign of the cross of the Lord" (c. 37). Again the love of Christ surmounts all obstacles, and makes everything, even what is most difficult, easy (c. 39); and the heavenly reward indemnifies for all (c. 41). It is evident that this so-called Letter is a complete compendium of the ascetic conduct of life.

This *glorification of asceticism*, both by reference to its reward and by the description of it in the brightest colours possible, always comes up again in Jerome. Thus, when he writes to Rufinus about his friend *Bonosus* who had betaken himself to the Dalmatian islands in order to lead the life of a hermit, he says (c. 4): "He already climbs up the ladder beheld by Jacob in his dream: he sows in tears in order to reap in joy. His limbs stiffen under the repulsive penitential dress, but he will be enabled the easier to meet Christ in the clouds. He does not

taste the pleasantness of lovely fountains, but he drinks the water of life out of the wound in the side of the Lord."—He blames *Heliodorus* for having given up his intention of becoming a hermit. If this was out of respect for his old mother, then it is the case that whoever puts his parents above Christ loses his soul (c. 3). "If thou wouldest be perfect, says the Lord, then sell what thou hast and give to the poor." "Thou hast promised Him to be perfect." "But the perfect servant of Christ possesses nothing besides Christ, or he is not perfect if he still possesses something besides Christ" (c. 6). Such perfection, however, is not possible in the relationships of home. "But not to wish to be perfect is sin" (c. 7). "What art thou then pursuing in the world, O brother, thou who art greater than the world? How long shall the shadows of houses hold thee? How long shall the prison of smoky cities enclose thee?" On the other hand, he boasts of the desert thus: "Here one can get rid of the burden of the body and soar aloft to the pure splendour of the ether." In this he expresses the same mood as we find, for instance, in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, only that Jerome knows how to heighten its effect. "Dost thou fear poverty? But Christ calls the poor blessed. Does labour frighten thee? But no athlete obtains the crown without sweat. Dost thou think of the scanty nourishment? But faith does not fear hunger. Dost thou shrink from stretching thy limbs emaciated from fasting, upon the bare earth? But the Lord sleeps with thee. Does the uncombed hair of the shaggy head horrify thee? But Christ is even thy head. Does the immeasurable breadth of the desert frighten thee? Then wander in the spirit through Paradise. Does the rough skin shrivel up from want of baths? But he who is once washed in Christ does not find it necessary to wash himself again (c. 10)." Therefore the dirtier the holier. Jerome thus narrates of S. Hilarion in his description of his life (c. 10): "He never washed the coarse garment which he once put on, because he thought it was superfluous to seek cleanliness in the penitential dress. Nor did he change his tunic until it was all worn into rags." If the ancient world at its close revelled in natural enjoyment and the luxury of culture, this asceticism revels in the negation of culture and of nature, and even in the negation of God-willed natural feeling. In his letter to *Paula* (c. 5), Jerome extols the holy Melania on the ground that when she lost her husband and two sons in rapid succession, she did not even shed a tear, but "threw herself at the feet of Christ and smiled to Him as if she held Himself embraced in her arms." "Now, she exclaimed, I can serve Thee with less hindrance, since Thou hast freed me from such a burden!" So much had all consciousness of the

earthly calling and of its service of God vanished from this ascetic way of thinking. This is perhaps most strongly expressed in the *Life of the holy Paula*, in which he tells how she abandons her relatives and her children in order to retire to Bethlehem (c. 6). "The little Toxotius stretches out his supplicating hands towards her from the bank. Ruffina, whose marriage was at hand, conjured her silently with her tears that she should wait for her marriage. But she, looking with dry eyes to heaven, overcame her love for her children by her love to God. She wished to know nothing of her motherhood, that she might keep herself as the handmaid of Christ." "Among hostile bands and in the hard necessity of imprisonment there is nothing more cruel than when children are separated from their parents. Here, however, the fulness of faith endured this against the rights of nature."—Jerome is fond of describing *marriage* as "a slavish yoke" (*e.g.* in Ep. 77 to Oceanus on the life and death of Fabiola, c. 4); and it is one of his favourite themes to describe the troubles of the married state in order thereby to support his exhortation against it, as, for instance, in his letter to the young widow Furia, who belonged to an old Patrician family (c. 5). He asks the question, To whom then shall she leave her riches? The answer is: To Christ who does not die. Whom should she institute as her heir? Answer: He who is her Lord. Although her father will be sorry, yet Christ will rejoice. Her family will be sad, but the angels will congratulate her. But in order to preserve her chastity, continence and fasting (c. 8), abstinence from the enjoyment of wine (c. 10), and prayer and spiritual reading, are necessary (c. 11). "Let them eat flesh who serve the flesh, and whose unrestrained desire is for intercourse, etc. She whose bosom carries the fruit of the body may eat her fill of flesh." Thus he writes to Salvina (c. 7). He always returns to the subject of fasting. It is almost his Alpha and Omega, the chief means of deadening desire which he demands. And yet in his *Lives of holy Monks* (Paulus, Hilarion, and Malchus), with which he furnished a favourite romantic reading for his age, and in which the Christian ideal was meant to be presented before its eyes, he was himself compelled to show in his details how this unnatural mortification only stirred up the sensible nature the more. In his life of Hilarion he thus describes him (c. 7): "How often did it occur to him that when he was stretched upon his couch naked female forms disturbed him, or when he was hungry that the most savoury banquets presented themselves to his phantasy!"

This asceticism was thus self-refuted. It is easy indeed to understand how Jerome was driven to such ascetic excesses, when we read his descriptions of the vanity, love of finery, and

carnal pleasure which prevailed even among the women, virgins and widows, young and old, of the Christian community at Rome, as well as the unworthy conduct of which the obsequious and wanton clergy were guilty (*ad Nepotian.* c. 5, 6). It is a repulsive picture which is here presented to our eyes, even if, as we gladly admit, Jerome's pen has painted its outlines in excessive darkness. But it was not merely this opposition that occasioned his enthusiasm for asceticism. It was also due to the false conception of *Christian perfection* upon which he founds, and which he develops especially in his polemic against Jovinian, and which naturally and necessarily comes in wherever the right presupposition of the righteousness that is by faith is wanting.

§ 42. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Ascendancy.*

3. *Augustine.*

Augustine[1] marks the close of the previous development, especially of the Western Church, in what was distinctive and characteristic of it; and he forms the basis of the wider development of the Western Theology in its distinction from the Greek Theology, which remained outside of the influence of Augustine. Of his works which belong more or less to the department of Ethics, mention may first be made of his anti-Manichæan writings: *De moribus ecclesiæ cath. et de moribus Manichæorum; De natura boni; De continentia, c.* 395 (on Ps. cxli. 3, 4, concerning continence in opposition to the Manichæans); *De bono conjugali, c.* 400 (written against the Manichæans on the divine institution, dignity, purpose, and monogamic form of marriage, and the duties of the spouses to each other). Further, we have his *De sancta virginitate* (occasioned by Jovinian, having for its subject the sublimity and higher meritoriousness of virginity, and recommending to virgins humility, zeal in prayer, and retirement); *De bono viduitatis, c.* 414 (Ep. ad Julianam viduam); *De adulterinis conjugiis* (1 Cor. vii. 10, advocating that separated spouses may not marry each other again); *De fide et operibus, c.* 413 (on the necessity of good works for salvation); *Enchiridion*

[1] [The Works of St. Augustine, edited (in English translation) by Marcus Dods, D.D., 15 vols., T. & T. Clark.]

ad Laurentium de fide, spe, et caritate, 421; *De Sacra Scriptura speculum*, 428 (a collection and elucidation of moral sentences from Scripture); *De mendacio*, 395 (on the question as to whether under certain circumstances the so-called necessary lie is permissible); *Contra mendacium*, 420 (against the Priscillianists and their principle: jura, perjura, secretum prodere uoli); *De opere monachorum*, c. 400 (against the idleness, arrogance, and unsettled wandering about of the monks, and laying down the requirement of labour: a treatise which through Augustine's authority became important, both in connection with the development of the Western Monasticism and for the economic appreciation of labour generally); *De civitate Dei* (dealing with moral subjects in various places), and also his *Confessiones* (which frequently deal with moral questions). Augustine represents the Western tendency in its distinction from that of the Greek Church, inasmuch as to him the preponderating importance falls upon the relationship of man to God as it is realized in the will; and therefore he lays stress chiefly on the practical side, although the motives of knowledge also strongly influence his interest.

The tendency of his thinking, as well as the desire of his soul, even in the time of his aberrations, led him to find the goal and source of all being in *God*, and thus to make God the starting-point of his thoughts. Being, in the metaphysical sense and in the ethical sense, thus came to coincide in his view, so that God was to him the true reality because He is the essential Being, and He is likewise at the same time the only and true good, the *summum bonum*.[1] This is a fundamental thought which rules his whole thinking. Accordingly the goal of man is union with God. This, indeed, in its full reality is a thing of the future; the essential life is the life of the other world, the *future* life.[2] The philosophers transfer the highest good into this world, which, however, is refuted by the misery of this life and the constant struggle of virtue with the vices.[3] To the Christians it lies in the other world, the world beyond; it is perfect heavenly peace, and the

[1] *E.g.* De mor. eccl. cath. i. 13.

[2] De civ. Dei, xix. 4. Cf. on this point Herm. Reuter, Augustin, Studien vi. Welt. u. geistl. Leben, pp. 358–478.

[3] De civ. Dei, xix. 4.

enjoyment of God and in God.[1] In comparison with this the present life is not a *res* but a *spes*;[2] it is not to be regarded as life, but as death;[3] the Christians are but pilgrims to the eternal life, to the heavenly country.[4] This present life is *miseria*;[5] and this pessimistic way of regarding it holds not merely of the heathen world, but also of the (outwardly) Christian world of the Roman empire generally.[6] It is only in the other world that the Christian first finds rest in release from the labour and affliction of this life (quies, vacare),[7] and the ineffable vision of truth (visio).[8] In this way of determining it, it is evident that the Greek motive of knowing and of mystical vision, makes itself effective. But Augustine likewise seeks to combine with it the Western motive of movement and of the will. He designates that life as a "status motus," as an active beholding,[9] in the sense of loving;[10] and he speaks in this sense of gaudere, delectari, frui.

If the opposition between the world here and the world there, between the present and the future, thus comes prominently out, yet Augustine endeavours again to combine these opposites; and this he does both by the conception of *being* as he apprehends it, and by his determination of the Christian life as *love*.

He strives to mediate these opposites, in the first place, through the conception of *being*. It was especially the *opposition to Manichæism* which brought him to the appreciation of this present and material world, and led him to oppose "an æsthetico-metaphysical optimism"[11] to the Manichæan pessimism. For if God is the true being, He is also the being in all that is; and everything participates in the reality of

[1] *L.c.* 13: Pax cœlestis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo.

[2] Ep. 140, § 17, tom. ii. 559.

[3] In comparatione vitæ æternæ—non vitam sed mortem deputandam. Ep. 5 § 2, t. ii. 190 B.

[4] *E.g.* De doctr. christ. i. 4, t. iii. 7.

[5] De civ. Dei, xix. 10, t. ii. 323, § 25, 26.

[6] Not only in his De civ. Dei, but also in his Sermons. Cf. Reuter, 371.

[7] Sermo 339, § 6, t. viii. 1310 G. Summe vocabitur; Sermo 340, c. 30, § 31, t. viii. 1437.

[8] Patria contemplationis Angelorum, Sermo 38, c. viii. § 11, t. vii. 199, Ubi secura *quies* erit et ineffabilis *visio* veritatis. De genesi ad literam, c. xxvi. § 54, t. iii. 415 D.

[9] De civ. Dei, xxii. 30.

[10] De gen. ad literam, xii. 31, § 59, t. iii. 419 A.

[11] Reuter, p. 373.

being, in so far as it participates in God. The world, again, is supported and penetrated by the divine presence and divine orders; and thereby it is a magnificent work of art, a real thing, a good. From this standpoint Augustine finds the appreciation of earthly goods. Riches is not a sin; the rich man was not damned on account of his riches; the Synod of Diospolis condemned the proposition attributed to the Pelagians, that if rich men did not renounce their riches after baptism they would have no share in the Kingdom of God.[1] He thus finds a relationship to earthly possession, to labour, and to the State, etc.; although all these recognitions again become traversed by the ascetic way of regarding things.

The other mode of mediation lies in the moral attitude of *love*. With this we reach the special basis of the ethics of Augustine. For if the goal of man is likeness to God and fellowship with God, and if it is in this that his blessedness rests,[2] then the surrender of his will in love is that by which this goal of blessedness is realized.[3] That blessedness is union with God as the highest good; and therefore it is the bond between the heavenly world and the earthly world, between the future and the present. For, the Christian has the eternal life of the future already now, although hidden in hope;[4] and therefore Christians, although in this world of misery, are only, as it were, sad; whereas in truth they are always joyful.[5] This joy, however, is grounded in love, which already mediates the fruitio Dei.[6] This love to God as union with Him, the highest good, is accordingly the proper virtue; all other virtue which deserves this name is only the outward expression and unfolding of this love. Virtus est ordo amoris.[7] The four

[1] Divites baptizatos nisi omnibus abrenuntiarent, si quid boni visi fuerint facere, non reputari illis nec eos habere posse regnum Dei. On the other hand, Augustine has an apologetic view of the moral significance of the earthly good. Ep. 157, § 26, 27, 30, t. ii. 721. Cf. Uhlhorn, *op. cit.* 290 ff.

[2] De mor. i. 18: Secutio igitur Dei beatitatis appetitus est, consecutio autem ipsa beatitas. At eum sequimur diligendo, consequimur vero, non cum hoc omnino efficimur quod ipse, sed ei proximi, eiusque veritate et sanctitate penitus illustrati et comprehensi.

[3] *L.c.* i. 23: Fit ergo per caritatem ut conformemur Deo, etc.

[4] Habet vitam æternam, non quod patet sed quod latet. In ev. Io. c. vi. Tract. 26, § 11, t. iv. 659 D.

[5] In Ps. xlviii. Enarr. sermo, ii. § 5, t. v. 582.

[6] Ep. 118, 3, § 13.

[7] De civ. Dei, xv. 22.

cardinal virtues, therefore, become virtues in so far as they are manifestations of love to God:[1] temperantia, in opposition to love of the world; fortitudo, as the overcoming of suffering and pain by love; justitia, as service of God; and prudentia, as the right distinction between what is to be avoided and what is to be chosen.[2] Therein consists moral perfection;[3] and Augustine determines this according to one way of considering it, which certainly is broken through by another which is the current ascetic habit of thought. In this love to God the right self-love and neighbour-love are also grounded.[4] Now, if this is the proper morality, it follows that prior to this love we cannot speak of a true virtue, and therefore of morality in the proper sense, and that the virtues of the heathen when strictly taken do not therefore deserve this name; since the soul of all morality, namely, love to God, is wanting in them, while at their basis rather lies the prava concupiscentia which rules man by nature.[5]

Again, devotion to God in love is a work of the inwardly working grace. It is produced through the sacramental working of the Church, which is an institution of salvation; and as a mystical process it is effected through the influence of the will of the divine power. The stages of this moral transformation are the three of fides, spes, caritas. The believing acceptance of the Christian confession is naturally the first, and out of it grows the hope which is accompanied

[1] De moribus, etc., i. 25. 15: Itaque illas quattuor virtutes, quarum ita sit in mentibus vis, ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se præbens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, justitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adjuvatur ab iis quibus impeditur sagaciter eligens.

[2] *L.c.* i. 35–39, 40–43, 44, 45. This determination of the relation of love to the cardinal virtues is different from that of Thomas Aquinas, in whose view these four cardinal virtues form the preliminary stage (of natural morality) to the Christian virtue of love.

[3] *L.c.* i. 46: Hæc est hominis una perfectio.

[4] *L.c.* i. 48, 49.

[5] Cf. *e.g.* De civ. Dei, v. 12–19, concerning the virtues of the ancient Romans. The source of their virtues was the lust of power. Their virtues are therefore when measured by an absolute standard to be designated as *vitia* (xix. 25); although relatively to be called *virtutes*. Ep. 138, § 17: Rempublicam, quam primi Romani constituerunt auxeruntque virtutibus, et si non habentes veram pietatem erga Deum, etc.

by love.[1] But love is the highest and the deciding quality. For in the judgment about the goodness of a man, it is not asked what he believes or hopes, but what he loves; for he who loves rightly also believes and hopes rightly.[2] Love is thus the highest point, and yet again the presupposition of right faith and hope, that is, of their inner truth.[3] Here again we recognise that old infringement and misunderstanding of the true Biblical conception of faith, which, instead of recognising it as the principle, makes it only a theoretical beginning and stage of transition: a view which was to draw such far-reaching consequences after it, as the whole development of the Catholic way of thinking shows. Now this loss of faith had to be made up for by the accentuation of love, which—apart from the error referred to—led in Augustine to such beautiful inwardness of disposition and sentiment.

The accentuation of the *inwardness of the disposition* towards God as the deciding factor, likewise made possible to Augustine a *more positive relationship* to the things and orders of the *natural life;* and this he reached the more readily in connection with his anti-Manichæan attitude towards the world of creation. In this more positive relation to the natural life his position is also distinguished from the one-sidedly monastic attitude of Tertullian with its flight from the world. This difference was also occasioned by the difference of the actual historical relationships, as they had taken shape since Tertullian's time. For the world had become Christian at least outwardly, and there was thereby required an activity to be exerted from the side of Christianity upon the life of the world. This, however, presupposed such an estimate of that life as would make such an activity morally possible, and would justify it. In spite

[1] Ex ista fidei confessione, quæ breviter symbolo continetur—nascitur spes bona fidelium, cui caritas sancta comitatur, Enchir. c. 30. This order—fides, spes, caritas—has continued since Augustine to be the standing order in the Roman theology and teaching.

[2] *L.c.:* Cum enim quæritur utrum quisque sit bonus homo, non quæritur quid credat aut speret, sed quid amet. Nam qui recte amat, procul dubio recte credit et sperat.

[3] Enchir. c. 2: Sine quo (amore) fides nihil prodest. Proinde nec amor sine spe est, nec sine amore spes nec utrumque sine fide.

of the negative attitude, which there was an inclination to take up towards the earthly arrangements of marriage, the State and the service of the State, the office of a judge, the military life, commerce and trade, etc., yet it was not possible to withdraw oneself again from all these relations; and thus there was no certain judgment and attitude of conscience attained with reference to these things and questions in the ancient Church. Augustine, by falling back so decidedly upon the inner principle of the disposition of love on the one hand, and selfishness on the other, thereby made possible a more correct appreciation of the relationships of the domestic, civil, and political life. Yet the ascetic traditions worked also so strongly upon him that he did not advance beyond a divided sentiment and attitude, and he was not able to gain a self-consistent judgment. He would necessarily have had to start quite otherwise, namely, from the certainty of the justification of faith in order to become master of that ascetic error, and to gain from that standpoint a correct and single moral judgment. And thus this inner dividedness of sentiment and judgment, which prevents the attainment of a good and certain conscience of the natural tasks of life, goes down through the whole following period of the Middle Ages, and forms the inheritance of the Roman Church generally.

To show this by an instance in detail,[1] we may refer to his judgment concerning the *State*. His view of this subject is given mainly in his well-known work, *De civitate Dei*, which became a standard for the following time, although understood in a too external sense. Augustine, in this principal work of his life, contrasts the two *Civitates* with each other, as they proceed from Cain and Abel through all following time:—the earthly civitas with its principle of self-love going down to contempt of God, and the heavenly civitas with its principle of love to God going up to contempt of one's own self (xiv. 6). Hence these two Civitates, which he thus contrasts, are not to be at once identified with Church and State, although they find in these a certain outward organization, on which account what holds of the former has been directly transferred to the latter. For Augustine the

[1] Cf. Reuter, *op. cit.* 135 ff., 375 ff.

State in itself is not the organism of sin;[1] it is much rather the reaction against it. In it there rules a justitia, although in a relative sense; it is a moral commonwealth; and it has even, since Constantine and Theodosius, occupied a positive relationship towards Christianity. The times are now Christiana tempora, and the imperium is a Christianum.[2] The antagonism to the Donatists already gave Augustine occasion to stand up for the moral dignity of the State. "In this relation Augustine has accomplished more than any author before him."[3] But just because the vocation of the State is the felicitas terrena temporalis, it has only a relative end, whereas the Church has an absolute end; and the State can only realize that relative end by subordinating its task to that of the Church, and making itself serviceable for it. The Church alone is the supernatural magnitude and the infallible authority. It is the appearance of the Kingdom of God; and not merely as communio sanctorum, but also as the empirical Church. Thus there is still lacking here a correct appreciation of the State. Nor does Augustine show any inward interest for the State; we find no patriotic sympathy where we could not but expect it. It is not a member of the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God is conceived as exclusively transcendent, and as ecclesiastical, not as ethical. Hence there does not go out from this Kingdom of God any activity of moral renovation upon the political life. And the Roman empire perished in the storms of the great movement of the peoples, while the Church remained as the only external support. It appeared to carry the seal of imperishableness on its forehead, while the State appeared as a perishable thing. It was thus natural that the mediæval system should rise upon the basis of Augustine's views.

This dividedness of sentiment and attitude, likewise shows itself in relation to the other things of the natural life. Thus it comes out in reference to *earthly possession*. Augustine (and the Synod of Diospolis in opposition to the Pelagians) had recognised the right of earthly possession. The inequality

[1] Cf. Reuter, *l.c.* 138, against the view of Ritschl, Jahrbb. f. d. Theol. xvi. 201; and Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] xii. 603.

[2] De gratia Christi et de pecc. orig. ii. 17, § 18, t. xiii. 324.

[3] Reuter, *l.c.* p. 143.

of goods had already occasioned some internal unrest in the second century. We find a series of expressions in the old teachers of the Church which gave utterance to the communistic thought.[1] By nature, all men have the same right to earthly goods; wealth springs from injustice; and Ambrose even designates it as wicked usurpation.[2] And although there are expressions in the Fathers which run otherwise, some of them even in Ambrose, yet these only show that the Fathers did not wish to do away with property. On this point Augustine takes a more correct stand than Ambrose; the opposition to the Donatists drove him to a more correct view.[3] But he is not logical in detail. Poverty stands higher in his view. In one place, he knows that the external is not decisive, and that the rich and poor are capable of being equally saved and can be blessed.[4] Again, he designates external possession as a chain which it is well to shake off, and he recommends the consilium paupertatis. He who renounces the possessio rei privatæ, stands higher than he who only renounces the amor possessionis.[5] Works are also specially and highly estimated along with the disposition.[6] Augustine, too, regards alms as wiping away sin.[7]

He takes a similar position with regard to the question of *marriage* and *virginity*. Marriage is estimated as a sacramentum, and again virginity is sacred:[8] conjugal community is only permitted by the Apostle,[9] while the state of the unmarried is higher;[10] the palma majoris gloriæ,[11] the egregia gloria,[12] is assigned to the unmarried. Thus, on the one hand, we have the striving to reduce everything to the disposition;

[1] Cf. Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 289 f. [2] Förster, Ambrosius, p. 195.

[3] *E.g.* Ep. 175, § 36: "Our possession belongs in fact to the poor, for whom we are in a certain sense stewards; and we are not to appropriate their property by damnable usurpation."

[4] In Ps. 75, Enarr. § 3, t. v. 988. Sermo 50, § 5, 6 A, t. viii. 278.

[5] In Ps. 131, § 6, t. vi. 855 D, 866 A: Abstineamus ergo a possessione rei privatæ, aut ab amore, si non possumus a possessione et facimus locum domino.

[6] A. Dorner, pp. 212–219.

[7] Sermo 42, 1. 210, 12. 206, 2. 83, 2. Uhlhorn, *l.c.* 273.. Enchir. xvi. 70.

[8] De bono conjug. c. 24, § 32, t. xi. 755 D. De bono viduitatis, c. 4, § 5, t. xi. 802 F.

[9] De mor. eccl. cath. c. 78, 79: Nam non attingere mulierem summum ostendit esse—huic autem conjugalis castitas proxima est.

[10] De bono conjug. c. 22, § 27, 28. [11] De virgin. c. 18, § 18, t. xi. 770.

[12] *L.c.* 14, § 14, t. xi. 768 C.

and, on the other hand, we see again how the traditional way of thinking asserts itself, which lays value above all on works, and determines thereby the conception of perfection.

And, in like manner, the conception of Christian *perfection* in Augustine is also a divided one, and he has not overcome the traditional idea. In his view the true perfection is a heavenly goal and good, which we only advance towards here;[1] we do not possess it, for in Christians there is also still the concupiscentia carnalis,[2] while perfection consists in the dilectio Dei.[3] On the other hand, he shares the prevailing notion of the quantitative perfection of external achievements and abstinences. The peccata venialia can be cancelled by the Lord's Prayer, or fasting, or alms,[4]—these three ancient heads of legal righteousness (Matt. vi.),—so that they do not endanger the salvation of the soul. The fulfilment of the consilia evangelica, with their "flying above what is allowed," helps to the attainment of a height of the Christian life which overpasses the common Christian life: an excelsior perfectio, an excelsior sanctitatis gradus.[5] To withdraw from the political and social life to the spiritual ascetic life, and in this sense to realize the following of Christ, appears to him ultimately as the earthly perfection of the Christian man.[6] The Imitatio of the example of Christ has a greater significance in Augustine than was formerly the case, especially in Greek theology. This became a theme of the following times, especially of the Middle Ages. But this imitation refers particularly to His sufferings,[7] or at least to His humilitas; here we ought to walk in His ways in order to enter in through His door.[8]

This position is therefore at bottom that of the denial of the world as it is exhibited pre-eminently in the monastic

[1] Sermo 269, 14, § 18, t. viii. 818 C.

[2] De perfectione just. c. 8, § 19, t. xiii. 216 F.

[3] De moribus, etc., i. 46.

[4] Alms and fasting are "the wings of piety." Sermo 206.

[5] Vgl. De bono conjug. c. 23, § 30. Ep. 157, c. 4, § 29, t. ii. 222 D. De virgin. 30, § 30, t. xi. 779 A. Ep. 157, c. 4, § 25, t. ii. 721 A. De opere monachorum, c. 6, § 19, t. viii. 1833 B.

[6] Renuntiare huic seculo. In Ps. 113. Enarr. Sermo i. § 3, t. vi. 598 A.

[7] Vgl. Sermo 304, 2, t. v. 861 E.

[8] In Ps. 90. Enarr. Sermo i. t. iv. 722 F, 723 A.

asceticism. In short, Augustine's Christian ideal of life is also the monastic ideal. Accordingly he introduced monasticism into Northern Africa. It is true that he shows a keen zeal against the indolence, arrogance, and laziness of the monks; and in his important writing, *De opere monachorum*, he demands labour and secures it for the Western monasticism, thereby promoting its greater healthfulness in contrast to that of the East. Yet monasticism is in his view a higher state, and the monastery is an anticipation of the future heavenly Jerusalem.[1] Nor is labour advocated in such a sense that it would be a protection from mystical ecstasy. The inmost desire of Augustine still aimed at a rapi in Deum,[2] a subvehi, volitare to the amplexus Dei,[3] to the pulchritudinis contemplatio.[4] And although all this is only the expression of a not unjustified glow of love to God, yet the rapi in Deum sicut solet in vehementiori ecstasi[5] still sounds ecstatically, and the door is thus opened to the mystical manifestations of a Neo-Platonic, although falsely christianized, sentiment.

His accentuation of grace strongly reminds us of Paul, and it included a rich and correct evangelical element in opposition to the prevalence of the disposition to found upon works in the usual Christianity of those centuries. Nevertheless this was not able to overcome the fatal errors of the moral way of thinking as they then worked themselves out always more strongly, nor could it bring Augustine himself to a single consistent mode of thinking. The ground of this lies in the fact that he did not turn back sufficiently to the central point of the Pauline conception. His interest was not pre-eminently the personal relationship of the certainty of salvation in faith, but it is the striving after sanctification in love, which according to the determining power of the will of God has to be worked in the individuals through the mysterious operation of grace by means of the sacraments of the Church. Augustine thus reaches an ethic of a mystical character which is compatible with the externality of works. And because it

[1] De opere mon. c. 25, § 32, t. viii. 1840 D.
[2] De gen. ad lit. xii. 26, § 53, t. iii. 414 A.
[3] De mor. eccl. cath. i. 22, § 41, t. i. 881.
[4] *L.c.* i. 31, § 66, t. i. 897 B, C.
[5] Ep. 147, 13, § 31, t. ii 633.

does not possess the right order of the relationship to God, neither is it able to find the right relationship to the world. Nor did it lead beyond the limit of the false ascetic way of thinking, or consequently of the double Christian morality.

§ 43. *The Ethics of the Western Church in the time of its Ascendancy.*

4. *Pelagius.*

The leaders of *the Pelagian opposition*[1] did not differ with their opponents of the orthodox party in their view of the monastic ideal, but in accordance with that ideal they only drew from their standpoint other consequences in reference to the moral capacity of man. This is a proof that that ideal stands in a relation of indifference to the fundamental question of Christianity regarding divine grace, and therefore that it did not spring from essentially Christian roots, but arose on the basis of another way of thinking, and was only taken over and christianized by the Church. Pelagius (*Expositiones in Epp. Pauli, Ep. ad Demetriadem; Libellus fidei ad Innocentium;* all contained in Opp. Hieron. ed. Martianay, v.) believed that he was representing the interest of morality in setting himself in opposition to Augustine's doctrine of grace. For as all morality presupposes the moral self-responsibility of the individual and is conditioned by the self-activity of the will, while both of these conditions require the moral capacity, then on the ground of this divinely given capacity (posse) and the accessory divine support in the law and teaching and example of Christ, the velle et perficere must be conceded to man; and this accordingly refutes a doctrine of grace which denies that capacity to man, and consequently denies morality. Pelagius therefore is at one with his opponents in so far as he takes his position in the will, on the common Western basis; only he believes, in accordance with the superficial views of morality that obtain at all times, that he can only save morality by starting from the moral goodness

[1] Wiggers. J. L. Jacobi, Die Lehre des Pelagius, Lpz. 1842. Klasen, Innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Freib. 1882. Möller in Herzog, xi. 407.

of human nature as given in experience, and he does not perceive that he just thereby makes true morality impossible. Again, in his conception of freedom, he comes into touch with the Greek Church by deriving the (real) capacity for morality from the (formal) freedom which belongs to the essence of the human personality; but the accentuation of subjective freedom in the Greek Church had not only another ground of opposition than it has in Pelagius, namely, that of the gnostic doctrine of natural necessity and not primarily that of grace, but it was held in balance in the Greek Church by a much fuller and deeper appreciation of the objective revelation of God in the incarnation of Christ. Pelagius undoubtedly comes into touch with the moralizing tendency of the Greek Church, which had put the natural moral law and its fulfilment as a way of salvation along with faith and the divine saving operations of the sacraments, and he drew the consequence of this position. While in the Greek Church the two factors—moralism and the dispensing of grace by the Church — proceeded without mediation side by side, Pelagius and Cœlestius, from regard to the former, set aside the latter; and although they accepted in the grace of the Church a means of lightening the moral activity, they completed the consequent moralization of the Church.[1] On this way, again, Pelagius in his endeavour to promote a moral improvement of Christendom, came ultimately also to that moral estimate of the Christian perfection of the conduct of life which generally ruled the Church of that time, and which may be summed up thus: The bad is forbidden, the good is commanded, the intermediate is left free, and the perfect is counselled. We can do what is permitted with less reputation, or can keep ourselves from it for the sake of a higher reward.[2] The state of monasticism is therefore the state of perfection. Pelagius also wished by his own moral principles to prevent the degeneracy of this state, while according to his opinion the Augustinian doctrine of grace only promotes

[1] Cf. Reuter, Augustin. Studien, Gotha 1887, p. 39 f.

[2] Cf. Ep. ad Demetriadem (Aug. Opp. t. xvi.), c. 9 (152 A): overpassing the Law plus facere (c. 10, 152 D); c. 27 (179 F), voluntas perfecta faciendi reputatur a Deo pro perfectis. As sinlessness consists in the fulfilment of the divine commandments, perfection appears to stand above sinlessness, although Pelagius has not said as much in words.

laxity and slackness in the monastic life. Here we have the same view of the moral as before, namely, that a certain external form of the moral conduct, whether positive or negative, establishes a distinction in the essence of morality. This is again the common error.

§ 44. *The fruitless opposition.*

There were some who sought to set themselves against this error which identified the moral with its form, and asserted in consequence a double morality.

1. *Jovinian*[1] lived in the second half of the fourth century, and died probably before 406 A.D. Although himself an ascetic monk, he wrote a treatise, since lost, in which he argued on Biblical grounds against monasticism, and against the over-estimation of the unmarried life[2] and the requirement of the celibacy of the clergy, as well as against the meritoriousness of fasting and of martyrdom. There is only one Christian morality, and it has not such stages.[3] Baptism and faith make the Christian, and not differences in the outward conduct of life. There are only righteous men and sinners, sheep and goats, wise and foolish virgins; and the hire of the labourers in the vineyard is the same for all. But these thoughts stood in too strong opposition to the whole of the prevailing way of thinking in the Church for them to be able to assert themselves and to be carried out.[4] More-

[1] Hieron. adv. Jovin., Libri iii. (written c. 393 in Bethlehem). Br. Lindner, De Joviniano et Vigilantio purioris doctrinæ antesignanis, Lips. 1840. Zöckler, Hieronymus, 1865, p. 194 ff. Wagenmann in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] vii. 127.

[2] Not against celibacy itself: Non tibi facio, virgo, injuriam; elegisti pudicitiam etc. ne superbias.

[3] Sicut sine aliqua differentia graduum Christus in nobis est, ita et nos in Christo sine gradibus sumus.

[4] Jovinian was excommunicated in Rome by Siricius, and then in Milan by Ambrose. He died in exile before 406 A.D. Cito ista hæresis oppressa et exstincta est. Aug. de hær. 82.—Hieron. adv. Jovin. libri duo, sums up the heresies of Jovinian, i. 3, in the following terms: dicit virgines, viduas et mulieres, quæ semel in Christum lotæ sunt, si non discrepent ceteris operibus, eiusdem esse meriti; nititur approbare eos, qui plena fide in baptismate renati sunt, a diabolo non posse subverti; tertium proponit, inter abstinentiam ciborum et cum gratiarum actione perceptionem eorum nullam esse distantiam; quartum, quod est extremum, esse omnium, qui suum baptisma servaverint, unam in regno cœlorum remunerationem.

over his opposition appeared too abstract, and to be too little justified in principle. Neander and others have compared him with Luther; but in order to be entitled to this, he would have had to found his ethical opposition much more decidedly and in principle on the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith.

2. *Helvidius*, about the same time, in a treatise written before 383 A.D., further contested the high position assigned to the unmarried state by combating the view of the perpetual virginity of the mother of the Lord. He controverted the whole ascetic tendency of the time, including celibacy, self-chosen poverty, solitude, and the monastic ethics generally, while at the same time he specially set himself against the adoration of martyrs, which was designated by him as heathenish.

3. *Vigilantius*[1] objected to the worship of martyrs.[2] He asked whether the martyrs were omnipresent or fluttered about their relics, so that they should be invoked just there; and he set forth well-grounded critical objections to the alleged miracles which were connected with the martyrs and their relics. He maintained, against the view of monastic perfection, that the using of one's own goods in continual benefits to the poor is better than the divestment of oneself of them once for all. If the Christian perfection consisted in poverty, this asceticism would properly have to be exercised by all. But this is not possible; for who then would look after the Churches, etc. In thus rejecting monasticism proper, he also rejected the semi-monasticism of the clergy, and the questionable experiences already had of the celibacy of the priests appeared to justify his view. It is sound common sense which speaks in Vigilantius, whereas the kindred opposition of Jovinian was based on more learned grounds. Against the laws of fasting as in contradiction with Christian liberty, Aërius had already combated, *c.* 360. But the churchly development swept over all these stirrings of a sounder ethical way of thinking.

[1] Hieron. contra Vigilantium liber unus. Zöckler, Hieron. p. 303 ff. Uhlhorn, p, 311 f. Herm. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] xvi. 460 ff.

[2] Jerome, Ep. (Ep. 109 ad Ripar. c. 1), calls such cinerarios et idololatras, qui mortuorum hominum ossa veneremur. Contra Vigilant. c. 4: Inter cetera verba blasphemiæ ista quoque dicentum: Quid necesse est, te tanto honore non solum honorare, sed etiam adorare illud nescio quid, quod in modico vasculo transferendo colis?—Quid pulverem linteamine circumdatum adorando oscularis?

The representative spokesman of the dominant churchly view was Jerome; and his polemic likewise determined the personal judgment regarding these opponents for the following times. Jerome's polemic is violent and passionate even to the use of the strongest indignities; and it was all the more so that those thoughts found an echo here and there, especially in lay circles, so that it appeared to him advisable to intimidate his antagonists by the violence of his retorts, and thus to extinguish these movements in the germ. The opposition had only directed its attack against the external phenomena, it had not struck the root of the aberrations themselves. Jerome succeeded in killing the opposition for a long time, and saving the supremacy of the ascetic ideal in the Church.

§ 45. *Representatives of the Ascetic Ideal.*

This *ascetic ideal* found its representation in a whole series of ecclesiastical writers belonging to that age and the period immediately following it.

1. *Rufinus*,[1] born *c.* 345, in Aquileia or in its neighbourhood, became the mediator of the Greek literature by his translations and editions.[2] He also continued the Church History of Eusebius. He was a friend and representative of the ascetic life, and he describes its representatives in his *Vitæ Patrum* or *Historia Eremitica* (in thirty-four chapters) in remembrance of his visit to the famous hermits in the ascetic desert and the Nitrian mountains. This work was composed in compliance with the frequently expressed wish of the monks of the Mount of Olives, where he had settled in order to show to others the way of piety and of asceticism. The book was meant to act as a propaganda of monasticism,[3] and flight from the world with its temptations. It has at times something of the attractiveness of Robinson Crusoe;[4] and as

[1] On Rufinus, see Möller in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] xiii. 98. Ebert, Geschichte der Liter. des M.-A. im Abendland, i. 308 ff.

[2] Especially Origen's De principiis, etc.; the Instituta monachorum of Basil as well as Homilies of Basil and Gregory Nazianzen.

[3] Dum gestorum unusquisque inflammatus horrescere quidem seculi illecebris, sectari vero quietem et ad pietatis invitatur exercitia.

[4] Ebert, *l.c.* 313.

Luther acknowledges, with much that is foolish and insipid, it is not without edifying passages in which a sound morality is preached in a popular and practical way. But there are here found already in germ the manifold manifestations of the asceticism of a later time, and of the different monastic orders.—The ascetic tendency ruled the time, and we find it in a whole series of writers. Among these may be mentioned *Sulpicius Severus*,[1] who was born about 360 in Aquitania, and of a distinguished family. In his *Vita S. Martini* (Martin of Tours, the apostle of Gaul and the founder of monasticism there) he portrayed the life of a saint, which, with its massive narratives of miracles, was not less acceptable to the taste of the time than the *Vitæ Patrum of Rufinus*. That a man like Sulpicius Severus should so credulously accept and relate all these wonderful miracles, shows that the phantasy of the time had then obtained such power over the minds of men in consequence of asceticism as to create a new world of Christian legend.[2] The two *Dialogi*, which Sulpicius also wrote at a later date, *c.* 405 A.D., describe in the form of a romantic description of a journey, and with the adornment of all kinds of miracles, the monastic and hermit life of Egypt. They were designed to supplement on a wider scale the miraculous life of S. Martin. In these writings Sulpicius aims at appearing as the advocate of monasticism against the opposing secular clergy, who are undoubtedly described as greatly secularized; and he wishes to stir up an enthusiasm for the ascetic life. An interesting passage in the First Book of the Vita, shows how certain evangelical objections were raised against this mode of Christian perfection. They set forth the fulfilment of one's calling in the world as the more correct manner of life; but such objections were repudiated as diabolical temptations.[3]

[1] Cf. Ad. Harnack in Herzog, xv. 62. Ebert, *l.c.*

[2] Ebert, *l.c.*

[3] I. 22 tells of a young man who gave up his office as a military tribune, left his wife and little son, and became a monk in the desert. After four years he had almost reached the example of the old monks, cum interim subiit cogitatio, *injecta per diabolum* quod rectius esset, ut rediret ad patriam filiumque unicum ac domam totam cum uxore salvaret. Quod utique esset acceptius Deo, quam si solum se sæculo eripere contentus salutem suorum non sine impietate

2. *John Cassian*,[1] the semi-Pelagian, a contemporary of Jerome and Augustine, was one of the most influential representatives of monasticism in the West. He was born in the West, but was educated in the East, in a monastery at Bethlehem. From 390 he was for seven years a companion and always an admirer of the Egyptian hermits, as well as of Chrysostom. He introduced the Egyptian monasticism in a modified form into Provence. This occasioned his treatise *De cœnobiorum institutis* in twelve Books, which first contains regulations regarding the external life of the monks. In the last eight Books, under the title "Colluctatio adversus octo principalia vitia," he treats of the struggle and victory over the eight principal vices and temptations, especially of the monastic life: excess, unchastity, avarice, anger, sadness, gloominess, dulness (acedia), vainglory (cenodoxia) and pride,[2] a book being dedicated to each vice. The monks form the "family of Christ,"[3] and their life is the way to "the highest summit of perfection."[4] He who has once entered upon this "evangelical" way is not to leave it again in order to plunge into the whirl of the world; nor is he, contrary to Christ's word, "to descend from the roof of perfection" in order to fetch something from what he had renounced.[5] The monks are the "few who are elected."[6] Cassian further wrote a work, entitled *Collationes Patrum* xxiv.: Conversations with the Fathers of the desert, in which the ideal of the monastic life is presented,—a handbook for monks and hermits for the practice of perfection. On the one side, he regards the external severance from the world as only a means of sanctification, and not sanctification itself; the goal of all exercises and struggles is purity of heart, and perfect love is the highest of the virtues.[7] Again, on the other side,

negligeret. But as a punishment for this sin he became possessed, and had to be bound; and thus he was gradually delivered again from his *falsa justitia*, and became a model of the monastic life.

[1] H. Thiersch in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] iii. 156. Nirschl, Lehrb. der Patrologie, iii. 84 ff.

[2] Akin to the later number of seven (comprised in the term "Saligia"), but without invidia, and with tristitia and cenodoxia.

[3] Institt. iv. 5. [4] Institt. iv. 8. 38. [5] Institt. iv. 36. [6] *L.c.* iv. 38.

[7] Institt. iv. 39. 43. The order of the way to perfection: the beginning is the fear of the Lord; from it springs wholesome contrition, from this renun-

he does not deny the externalities and minutiæ of this life of sanctification,[1] and the more than Stoical dulling of those who belong to it both in respect of joy and sorrow.[2]

We may quote a few passages from Cassian.[3] "There are three things which make the restless spirit stable in itself (stabilem faciunt): watching, contemplation, and prayer. The constant and attentive exercise of these procures for the soul a fixed stability."[4] "There is no vice which so destroys all the virtues, and robs and divests man of all righteousness and holiness, as the evil of *pride*."[5] "Therefore let the warrior of Christ, who desires rightly to fight the spiritual fight and to be crowned by the Lord, strive to kill any way this savage monster which swallows up all the virtues." "For in no way will the building of the virtues be able to rise in our soul, unless previously the foundations of a true humility have been laid in our heart, which when firmly laid may be able to support the summit of perfection and of love."[6] "Humility is the teacher of all the virtues, the firmest foundation of the heavenly building, the most proper and glorious gift of our Saviour."[7] On *ascetic abstinence* from food, etc., he speaks as follows: "Hence not only must the excessive desire for food be slain by the contemplation of the virtues, but even the necessary demands of nature must not be satisfied without inner anxiety, just as if they were hostile to our purity."[8] "Through no virtue do carnal (bodily) men become so like the spiritual angels in their conduct as through the merit and the grace of chastity, by which while they still tarry on earth they have, like the apostle, their conversation in heaven (Phil. iii. 20), since they already possess here in the fragile body what it is promised they will receive only in the future after laying aside this corruptible flesh."[9] "It is a greater miracle to extinguish in our own body the tinder of evil desire than to drive out the unclean spirits from the bodies of others; and it is a more glorious sign

ciation, then humility, from it the slaying of the desires, from this purity of heart, and with this one possesses the perfection of love.

[1] Thus in Institt. i. 3 ff. he treats in detail of the different parts and kinds of the monk's dress; in ii. 2 ff. he treats of the number of the psalms and prayers that were to be gone over, of the posture at prayer, etc.; and in vi. 7 ff. he speaks of nocturnal pollutions, and of checking them.

[2] Collat. xxiv. 11. [3] Nirschl, *l.c.* 91 f. [4] Collat. x. 14.

[5] Institt. xii. 3. [6] Institt. xii. 32. [7] Collat. xv. 7.

[8] Institt. v. 14. This is the same view and attitude as is attributed to Plotinus.

[9] Institt. vi. 6, v. 14: "Although living in the flesh, the happiness of the future home is already enjoyed through the inner vision."

to subdue the wild movements of wrath by the virtue of patience than to command the powers of the air. And it is more to have excluded the gnawing diseases of sadness out of our own heart than to have driven away the bodily diseases and fever of another."[1]

3. *Prudentius*[2] describes the struggle of the virtues with the vices, as he was enjoined to do by Cassian. He was born in 348 at Terracona in Spain. At first he devoted himself to the political career of an advocate. Afterwards he applied himself to earnest Christian poetry in his *Psychomachia*, an allegorical poem consisting of 915 hexameters. In his picture of the conflict of the soul between the spiritual and the carnal man, there is at the same time exhibited the opposition of Christianity to heathenism. The conflict is opened, 1. by *Faith*, who appears on the scene in a peasant garb with bare shoulders, trusting to his strength, and challenging opponents. Against him there rises *Idolatry*, regarded in the ancient Church as the chief deadly sin, and according to Tertullian as including all the vices in herself. She is overthrown by Faith. Then appears 2. *Chastity* (Pudicitia), a virgin in glittering arms. She is attacked by the Sodomite *Libido*, the greatest of the furies, with a pitchy torch of burning sulphur; but the fury is cut down. After the untouched virgin has borne the God-man, lust has no longer any rights, and all flesh is now ennobled; and this is triumphantly proclaimed by Pudicitia in a long discourse. The 3rd virtue is *Patience*, already so beautifully celebrated by Tertullian. She appears with earnest countenance, and stands immovable amidst the uproar of the conflict. *Anger* rushes to attack her, but his bolts rebound from the triple mail which protects her. Then 4. *Pride* (Superbia) rushes to the attack in a fluttering mantle, on an unbridled horse, which is covered with a lion's skin, and threatens the poor crowd which is led by *Humility* (Humilitas), who has associated hope with her as her companion. They

[1] Collat. xv. 8; Institt. v. 41: "The monk must bridle the passions, forget injuries, despise sadness and pain, and contemn losses." This is the ideal of the Stoics.

[2] Clem. Brockhaus, Aur. Prud. Clem. in seiner Bedeutung für die Kirche seiner Zeit, Lpz. 1872. Bähr, Die christl. Dichter u. Geschichtschreiber Roms, 2 Aufl., Karlsr. 1872. Especially Ebert, Gesch. der christl. lat. Liter. pp. 241–283, and P. R.-E.[2] xii. 306 ff.

are followed by the always indigent *Justice*, poor *Honesty* (Honestas), dry *Soberness*, pale *Fasting*, softly blushing *Shame*, and open *Simplicity*. But Superbia plunges into the ditch which Fraus had dug for her; and Hope reaches Humility the sword with which she beheads her enemy. A new enemy appears 5. in *Luxury* (Luxuria), a drunken female dancer with scented hair, wanton looks, and languishing voice, seated on a magnificent four-yoked chariot, and with violets and rose leaves as her weapons of war. The army led by the Virtues make ready to draw their weapons against her, and Soberness (Sobrietas) plants the standard of the cross in the ground and encourages the Christian troops; Luxury falls; her army (Jocus, Petulantia, Pompa, Voluptas) flees, and the ground is covered with spoil. Then comes 6. *Avarice* (Avaritia) to pick up the spoil with her daughters: Care, Hunger, Fear, Anguish, Perjury, Terror (Pallor), Corruption, Deceit, Lying, Sleeplessness, Dirt (Sordes), and they ransack the field like wolves. The poet vividly describes the destructive work of Avaritia among men of every class; she assumes the form of economy and deceives the Christians. And now the army of the Virtues is wavering, whereupon Operatio, the beneficent mercifulness, springs forth to the duel, and throttles Avaritia. The Cares flee; Peace drives war away, and Concordia has the victorious eagles carried into the camp. Then Discordia, surnamed Hæresis, attacks Concordia; but Fides, the Queen of the Virtues, pierces her tongue, and the army tears her in pieces. A temple is then built according to the Apocalyptic model of the heavenly Jerusalem, in which Wisdom is enthroned.—We see how the fundamental truth of apostolical Christianity is here maintained; Faith is the queen of the virtues, just as Clement of Rome calls her παν́αρετος. But undoubtedly the conception of Faith itself has become changed. It designates the connection with the Church; and the thought of the allegory is that it is only through his firm attachment to the Church in dogma and morals that the Christian conquers heathenism, and prevails against the assaults that are also waged upon him within himself.

4. *Orientius* gives expression to similar thoughts in his *Commonitorium* (in two Books and 1036 verses),[1] in which

[1] Ebert, *l.c.* i. 395. Nirschl, *l.c.* iii. 172 ff.

he aims at showing the true way to life, and exhorting to it.[1] The First Book treats of chastity, envy, and avarice. The Second Book treats of vanity, lying, gormandizing, and drunkenness. While the punishments of hell wait on these vices, the just will shine like radiant lights. Great is the trouble which it costs to ascend from earth to heaven, but great also is the reward.[2] The melancholy state of Gaul gave occasion for such thoughts.[3] It is characteristic that the foremost place is given to chastity. That was the ideal of those times.

5. *Leo the Great* repeatedly gave expression to this ideal. We have it expressed in his Letters, in which he says that the clergy must be unmarried "in order to exhibit the purity of perfect continence,"[4] as well as in the Church prayer relating to the God-consecrated virgins[5] for whom supplication is made, that God "will not only repone them into the innocence of their first origin, but also lead them to participation in goods which are to be had in the new time, and that He will raise those who have stood fast in the state of mortals now, to resemblance with the angels." Blessed virginity "was betrothed to the marriage bed and to the bridal chamber of Him who is the bridegroom of the perpetual virgin, just as He is the Son of the perpetual virgin."

6. *Avitus*, Bishop of Lyons, *c.* 490 A.D., a chief pillar of the Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Burgundy, also wrote a poem on the same subject. It is entitled *De consolatoria laude castitatis ad Fuscinam sororem*, and it contains 660 hexameters. It is addressed to his sister, who was a nun from childhood, but who appeared to feel the burden of virginity. He comforts her by a glorification of it, and on the other hand by terrifying descriptions of marriage, which appears to him only as concubinage. — His contemporary, *Gennadius* of Marseilles, also says: "Good is marriage; better is continence: but more excellent than both is virginity."[6] He likewise rejects "the blasphemy" of Helvidius.

[1] Vita docenda mihi est, vita petenda tibi. [2] V. 87–90.
[3] Mors, dolor, excidium, strages, incendia, luctus, uno fumavit Gallia tota rogo, v. 183 f.
[4] Ep. 14, c. 4; 167, c. 3. [5] Liber Sacrament. n. xxx.
[6] De eccl. dogm. c. 63 f.

7. The ideal of asceticism was realized above all in *monasticism*, and it had its place in the monastery. *Benedict* of Nursia[1] (b. 480 at Nursia to the north of Rome, † 543) marks the beginning of the advance to the characteristic Western formation of monasticism by his epoch-making Rule (529 A.D.) with its seventy-three regulations. It enjoins the closed monastery—with humility as the foremost virtue, as well as the combination of manual labour and the reading of Scripture, for the monastic life.[2] For although labour was not alien to the Western monasticism, yet its characteristic was contemplation. Benedict himself had no thought as yet of any activity of the monastery directed outwards, nor of any task imposed upon it for the sake of the world and the Church. In his view the monastery is only a place of refuge and a school for the exercise of holiness. But his beginning found, especially through Cassiodorus and Gregory the Great, a richer development and high ecclesiastical estimation, and, in the course of history, many transformations and offshoots. The old fundamental thought remained continually the same, that monasticism is the realized ideal of Christianity. Entrance into the monastery was called Conversio; the monks were called conversi or religiosi; and monasticism was called religio. In these designations there is expressed that understanding of Christianity which lay at the basis of the system and which ruled the minds of the time.

8. *Cassiodorus*[3] († *c.* 570, aged ninety-three years) withdrew about the year 540 from the high position he held in the Ostrogoth Court to his monastery of Vivarium in Bruttium, which he had richly equipped with the means of erudition. There he began a great literary activity, and thus added this spiritual task to that which Benedict had imposed on his monks, so that corporeal labour was only to take the place of spiritual labour in the case of those who were incapable of it. After this example the monasteries became asylums of science, in which the ancient and the ecclesiastical literature

[1] Gregory the Great in Book II. of his *Dialogi*. A. Vogel in Herzog, P. R.-E.² ii. 277-286.

[2] Cap. 48: Otiositas inimica est animæ, et ideo certis temporibus occupari debent in labore manuum, certis iterum horis in lectione divina.

[3] Ebert, *l.c.* i. 487 ff., and P. R.-E.² iii. 158 f.

was collected and transmitted to following times. It is well known what importance the Benedictines acquired through such work in a later time. The work of Cassiodore, probably written in 554, and entitled *Institutiones divinarum et sæcularium literarum* (or more correctly *lectionum*), in two Books, is a characteristic expression of his thoughts. For the First Book introduces the reader into the science of God, and therefore aims at expounding theology, while the Second Book introduces him into secular science, and is a compendium of it. In his earlier writing, *De anima*, Cassiodore treats in chapter v. of the moral virtues or the four cardinal virtues, which he completed by the three virtues: contemplation, judgment (judicialis), and memory. Chapter vi. then expounds the five natural virtues or endowments of nature: Virtus sensibilis, imperativa, principalis, vitalis, delectatio. Further he contrasts the wicked and the pious with one another: the soul of bad men is ugly, their countenance is clouded and sad in the midst of joy, etc. The pious are the ascetics who combat the flesh, esteem themselves little, always accuse themselves, and displease themselves when they please all others. Their countenance is cheerful and calm, emaciated, adorned with paleness, joyous amid constant weeping, and venerable with a long beard; their look is virtuous, their voice regulated and soft; and their pace neither too slow nor too quick. It is an interesting portrait of his ideal which Cassiodore here sketches, and not merely of his own ideal, but of the ideal of that time generally. Some of its features remind us of Aristotle's description of the magnanimous man (μεγαλόψυχος) and of other ancient descriptions. We see that the Christian ideal of that time is the ancient ideal modified. But in this perversion of Christian truth the opposition of the Christian principle to the ancient way of thinking is not denied. Pride is represented as the origin of crimes; and humility is the source of virtues, and leads to God.

9. *Martin of Bracara*[1] († 580), a native of Pannonia, did not less promote the naturalization of monasticism in Spain, his new home. For his monks of the monastery of Dumeo

[1] Cf. Caspari, M. v. Bracara's Schrift De correctione rusticorum, etc., Christiania, 1883.

he supervised the translation of the *Verba seniorum* or *Interrogationes et responsiones Ægyptiorum seniorum* (a small unarranged collection in 109 numbers), and also of the *Ægyptiorum patrum sententiæ* (consisting of fifty-four chapters, and somewhat comprehensive) belonging to the sphere of the ascetic life. The best known of his moral writings is the *Formulæ vitæ honestæ* (in Isidore's *De Viris illustribus*, c. 22, called: *De differentiis quattuor virtutum*). In the Middle Ages this treatise was very generally regarded as a work of Seneca; and as such it was much read, copied, and quoted, because it was written for laymen and belongs to the common philosophical ethics, not like those other writings of the higher ascetic Christian morality which were designed for the clergy and monks. For, the development had passed into these two stages of natural and supernatural morality. The former was at bottom nothing but the Platonico-Stoic theory of morality taken from antiquity; and thus the *Formulæ vitæ honestæ*, c. 1–4, treat of the four Platonico-Stoic cardinal virtues, while c. 5–8 treat of observing the mean in them. To the same species of philosophical ethics belongs also his treatise *De ira*, which is hardly anything but an extract from Seneca's work of the same name. On the other hand, it is to Christian ethics that the three small connected tractates richly provided with Bible passages belong, entitled *Pro repellenda jactantia; De Justitia*, and *Exhortatio humilitatis*. Questions of Church law and of Church discipline are treated in the *Capitula*, a small collection of Canones, while the treatise *De correctione rusticorum*, which has been called "a peasant's sermon," is directed against heathenism in his Christian hearers, holds up before them their breach of the baptismal covenant, and exhorts them to repentance and to good works. It is evident that Christian ethics have lost their inner unity with the forgotten ruling principle of faith. It breaks asunder into a natural ethic for the common life, and into a supernatural or specially Christian ethic, which has its ideal in asceticism and its place in the monastery of the monks.

If monasticism is the denial of the world, then this denial of the world ought to become the very means for ruling the world. This application of the system was introduced by

Gregory the Great, and the later development of the Western Church successfully carried it on.

§ 46. *The Conclusion of the Ethics of the Western Church in Gregory the Great.*

Gregory the Great[1] († 604) embodied his dogmatic and ethical thoughts as in a repertorium in his *Expositio in beatum Iob s. Moralium*, L. XXXV., which dates from the years 583–590 A.D. He connects his thoughts, by an allegorical interpretation, with passages in the Book of Job. By the most arbitrary allegorizing of details, Job is represented as the Christian "athlete," who goes through the trials of the earthly life on the way to perfection. He has, besides, partly delivered and partly dictated *Homiliæ in evangelia* and *Homiliæ in Ezechielem*, which are of a practical religious character. His *Regulæ (curæ) pastoralis liber* was specially destined for the clergy. It treats of the requisites of the spiritual office and of the life of the clergy, and for centuries it continued to be their principal text-book. His letters likewise belong to our subject.—Gregory moves essentially on the lines of Augustine's thinking; yet so that, as a practical man, and without very deep scientific culture, as well as without speculative capacity, he blunts the points of the Augustinian thoughts, and bends them towards the side of Semi-Pelagianism. In this he was genuinely Romish, and exercised a determining influence upon the subsequent Romish development. In Gregory the Roman spirit embodied itself generally more than in any of his predecessors. It especially exhibited itself in the specifically Roman interest of universal government being determined in him through the Church, whereby the Roman character of the Western Christianity not merely differentiated itself from that of the Greek Church, but also from that of the African and Gallic Churches. It was not personal ambition that moved Gregory; he himself felt the weight of his burden deeply. It was the interest of the Church which ruled him, and its vocation as he understood it, and as it was still more definitely occasioned by the melancholy position of the time and its political state. In this sense he brought monasticism into the service of the Church.

[1] Lau, Greg. d. Gr. nach s. Leben u. Lehre, Lpz. 1845. Zöpffel, P. R.-E.²V. 364 ff.

He was prætor of Rome, but tired of worldly business and its turmoil, he surrendered his whole property and became a monk in the monastery which was built and equipped by himself in Rome. He then devoted himself to the monastic life with such zeal that his excessive fasting almost endangered his life. This period of retirement he afterwards always extolled as the fairest and happiest time of his life; and although he appreciated the active life, yet he always assigned the prize to the contemplative life, and sought to further it in its monastic form. The lamentable state of the devastated country, and the uncertainty of the public relations, might well occasion him to seek rest and security in the shelter of the monastery, and to turn his thoughts away from earth to heaven, and from the deceitfulness of earthly goods to heavenly things. Gregory was diligent in founding monasteries everywhere, but at the same time he brought monasticism into the service of the tasks of the Church. In his belief in miracles, adoration of relics, use of amulets, and such like,[1] he led the whole stream of heathen superstition, as he had inherited it, into the Roman Church, and this has continued to be at home in it till to-day, especially in the Romanic countries. Gregory was thus also in this respect the mediator between the ancient Church and the subsequent time.

His Ethics follow the usual lines.[2] Sin arises through temptation of the enemy and our own consent, by suggestio (of the devil), delectatio (of the flesh), and consensus (of the spirit). The virtues stand in contrast to the principal sins. From Superbia, as the root of all evil, proceed the seven principal vices: inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, ventris ingluvies, and luxuria, so that superbia at the beginning and luxuria at the end co-operate. Each of these principal vices leads a whole army against us. Five of these vices are of a spiritual nature, and two are of a carnal nature.[3] To these seven sins Christ opposes His spirit of sevenfold grace. There

[1] Lau, *l.c.* 305: "He was extraordinarily credulous even in silly nursery fables. It is wonderful how he could have believed a great deal of what he narrates in his Dialogues." "He frequently gave presents of keys which had been blessed over the body of the Apostle Peter, in which portions of the chains of Peter were found, and which, when worn as amulets around the neck, would preserve from sickness and evils, and even deliver from sins" (lib. iii. epist. 33).

[2] Lau, *l.c.* 527. [3] Mor. xxxi. c. 45; Lau, 383.

are likewise also seven virtues: first the four known cardinal virtues, which together form the structure of the Christian life, but they only become properly Christian and saving through the accession of the three sisters: faith, love, hope.[1] Faith is the first-fruit of the Spirit in us and the presupposition of all else, and with it hope is combined; yet it must be moderated by fear, in order to avoid security. Love again is the root of all that is good; it is infused by God, and suppresses the vices arising in the heart; it is never idle, but heals our hearts and drives away love for the world, and its measure is the measure of our approach to heaven.[2] This is the old error which makes the relationship to God to be conditioned and measured by our own principle of conduct, although worked in us by God. Faith, indeed, is the beginning, but it is only a faith that holds by the truth of God and His commandments, or also by the incarnation of God. To such a faith good works must evidently be added in order to lend it meritorious worth, or even in some ways to supply its place.[3] Thereby is brought about the subjective justness which in this form of doctrine occupies the place of Biblical justification. Such a just or righteous man is described by Gregory as follows.[4] The righteous man dies to the world, and recognises himself through himself as a sinner, but as made right by grace. In the heart of the righteous man Christ sits supreme; he regards himself as constantly present to God, feels dissatisfied with life, seeks the edification of his neighbour in words and works, despises the fame of the world and the joys of this life, tests his life daily in the scale of truth, is simple in all his doing, and brave in conflict; he improves himself through blame, learns from the faults of others to look upon his own, judges himself severely, and hates all deception against God and men. He does not

[1] On this connection of the several virtues, see Mor. i. 32: Valde singula quælibet virtus destituitur, si non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur.—Ergo alternato ministerio virtus a virtute reficitur.

[2] Mor. xxviii. c. 22; Lau, p. 530.

[3] Zech. i. Hom. 9: Unum enim sine altero nil prodesse valet quia nec fides sine operibus, nec opera adjuvant sine fide, nisi fortasse pro fide percipienda fiant, sicut Cornelius ante pro bonis operibus meruit audiri quam fidelis existeret. Qua ex re colligitur, quia bona opera pro fide percipienda faciebat.

[4] Lau, p. 503 f.

become angry at unjust treatment, returns evil with good, begins with fear and ends in love, is afraid on contemplating the divine judgment, and recognises himself to be lost if he were judged without mercy by God. He also fears for what is his good, and does the good only in order to please God; he openly confesses his sins, but his virtues only when he must; he fears no future evils, but is more afraid of happiness than unhappiness; he praises God even in suffering, and remains stedfast in all the positions of life. He cannot certainly be without sin, but his fall is even useful to himself; he is improved by punishment, and is never abandoned by grace. In all this, although it contains much that is good and beautiful, we miss one thing by which it is distinguished from the exhortations and descriptions of the apostle at the close of his Epistles: it is the want of any reference to man's calling in the world. There is not a word about this, and therein consists its defect as a description of right Christianness. Here, as likewise in Augustine, it is at bottom only the ideal of the contemplative life, and not of the active life, that is described. But if our righteousness is based upon our own mode of conduct, it is natural that the old errors of the expiatory effect of our own works, such as alms,[1] should be repeated, as well as that of the two stages of Christian morality: the distinction of the ordinary and the extraordinary morality, and the fulfilment of the commandments and of the evangelical counsels. It will be understood of itself that among the latter virginity and voluntary poverty[2] specially appear. At the same time, this view stands in connection

[1] Mor. xxvi. 27: Quidquid illicitum aliquando fecerunt, ab oculis judicis eleemosynarum superductione co-operiunt.

[2] Mor. xxvi. 27. In distinction from the common Christians who have blotted out their sins with the tears and their alms, and who, although through the judgment, obtain part in the dominion of Christ, it is said of the others: Alii autem non judicantur et regnant, qui etiam præcepta legis perfectione virtutum transcendunt, quia nequaquam hoc solum, quod cunctis divina lex præcipit, implere contenti sunt, sed præstantiori desiderio plus exhibere appetunt, quam præceptis generalibus audire potuerunt.—Speciali namque jussione paucis perfectioribus et non generaliter omnibus dicitur hoc quod adolescens dives audivit Mt. xix. 31 vade et vende omnia, etc.—Mor. xv. 16: Carnis enim virginitas nequaquam jussa est, sed tantummodo laudata; et tamen multi virtute virginitatis pollent, ut videlicet plus impendant obsequio, quam acceperunt præcepto. Lau, *l.c.* p. 504 f.

with the doctrine of penitence as it developed itself especially since Cyprian, and as it thereafter dominated the Middle Ages. God indeed forgives sin, but we must ourselves expiate its punishment. He who has done what is not allowed, must as a satisfaction abstain from what is allowed; he who has committed sin, must make it good again by good works.[1] The three well-known good works are: praying, fasting, and almsgiving; and of these three almsgiving is the best and most efficacious. "Fasting is good, but almsgiving is better. If any one can do both, both are good; but if he cannot do both, almsgiving is the better. If it is not possible to fast, almsgiving is enough; fasting with almsgiving is doubly good."[2] Augustine had indeed repeatedly called to mind that it is not the external work which alone accomplishes anything, but that the chief thing is the giving of one's own person. Gregory renews this thought. He says that the matter of chief importance is the disposition and not the greatness of the external gift; and that almsgiving is not a charter for sinning, otherwise it might happen that one might give himself to the devil while giving his possessions to God.[3] But these reminders and limitations were of very little avail in practical application, nor did they alter the position itself. In this view, it is still always the person's own mode of conduct upon which his salvation is based.

In this way, however, the redemption through Christ is made ineffective, and the certainty of salvation is exchanged for a constant uncertainty and fear as to whether enough has now been performed. Of course, Christ was regarded by Gregory as the atoner. But the place of the atonement through the death of Christ, is at bottom occupied in his teaching by the doctrine and the example of Christ, which are effective only to quicken zeal. It is noteworthy what a significant place this view wins in the thoughts of Gregory.[4] His semi-Pelagianism lacked the full appreciation of sin. This

[1] Moralia xiii. 18. Evang. ii. hom. 34; i. hom. 20. Uhlhorn, p. 278.

[2] So Cæsarius of Arelate on the pseudo-Augustinian Sermons, Serm. 142. Uhlhorn, pp. 278, 410.

[3] Cura pastor. 31.

[4] Lau, pp. 432 ff., 458: "The whole significance of the redemption and atonement is concentrated in the sinless life of Christ, which gives us an example for imitation." *E.g.* Mor. ii. 24: Venit inter homines mediator ad præbendum exemplum vitæ hominibus, etc.; xxi. 6: Ad hoc dominus apparuit in carne, ut

turn in doctrine became normative for the following time and down through the whole Middle Ages. The following, or even the imitation, of the life of Christ now becomes the catchword of the Middle Ages, and especially so in the case of mysticism. With this the whole basis, not only of the doctrine of salvation, but of ethics has become displaced.

§ 47. *The summing and transmitting of results by Isidore of Seville and Boethius.*

1. *Isidore of Seville* (Isidorus Hispalensis, † 636) rests principally on Augustine and Gregory the Great. His erudition was a means of transmitting to the following ages the knowledge of the heathen and Christian antiquity which he summarized in collections and extracts.[1] In his work *Libri differentiarum* ii., *sive De proprietate verborum*, he already enters upon ethical questions in determining the different meanings of words. Amor and dilectio may refer both to what is bad and what is good; caritas only refers to what is good; wherefore God is also called caritas ipsa. He determines the four cardinal virtues as follows.[2] Prudence is the knowledge of the true faith and the science of Holy Scripture in its threefold sense. Justice is the love of God and of our neighbour. Fortitude is strength of soul, contempt of honours and riches, patience in suffering, equanimity in happiness, and stedfastness in labour. Moderation is the observing of the proper measure in words and actions; it accompanies shamefulness, preserves humility, brings rest of soul, embraces chastity, nourishes honour, limits desire by reason, suppresses anger, and does not return wrong. It is evident that it is only the ancient scheme of virtues that is here specially preserved; but, on the other hand, it is filled with a Christian content, and has become a form for the usual Christian morality.

humanam vitam *admonendo* excitaret, *exemplo* præbendo accenderet, moriendo redimeret; resurgendo reparavit. Mor. viii. 30, v. 34, xviii. 45; Hom. Ev. i. 10. Examples of humility, patience, and gratitude towards God in every position in life; Mor. ix. 38, xvi. 33, etc. Christ might have redeemed us even without dying: His death was only to show us the greatness of the love of God, Mor. xx. 36.

[1] Stäudlin, *l.c.* iii. 177 ff. Wagenmann in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] vii. 364 ff.

[2] According to Stäudlin, p. 178.

He treats questions of ethics in a similar way in his work entitled *Synonymorum*, L. ii., *s. Soliloquia.* It is a Dialogue between a "Homo deflens," a man whom the sorrows of life oppress, and the "Ratio admonens," Reason or the Logos who points the complaining soul towards the way to blessedness, which leads through expiation and forgiveness of sin and through contemplation to perfection. In short, commandments and moral maxims, the rules of a virtuous and religious disposition in life, are what is here summarized. It became a much used book of edification. Isidore's principal work is his *Sententiarum*, L. iii. (*s. De summo bono*[1]): a compendium of the Christian doctrine of faith and morals, mostly excerpted from Augustine and Gregory the Great, and especially from the latter, and chiefly from his Moralia on Job. The First Book is dogmatic in its contents; the contents of the Second and Third Books are ethical. More particularly, the Second Book, in forty-four chapters, contains mostly his general ethics, while the Third Book, in sixty-two chapters, contains mostly his special ethics. These Sentences remained a long time a favourite text-book, and they became the model of numerous productions in mediæval literature; and this holds more especially of the ethics in this work. It begins with an account of the Christian principal virtues: wisdom, faith, love, hope. Isidore reckoned wisdom along with the other virtues, and prefixed it to them; and in this he followed Augustine, who frequently comprehended the whole of virtue under it. In his arrangement of the three theological virtues, Isidore deviates from the usual order. Thereafter he expounds the doctrine of grace and predestination—and indeed in the double form of electorum ad requiem et reproborum ad mortem, in the same way as was afterwards done by Gottschalk; and he does this because, following Augustine, he sees in grace the principle of virtue (ii. 1–6). As from the virtues other virtues proceed, so from the vices other vices proceed. He sets the virtues and vices into contrast with each other; every vice must be combated by the opposite virtue (ii. 33 f.). Advance must be made from the easier virtues to the more difficult ones, from the lower to the higher; and it is the victory over vice that first secures virtue (ii. 36). This progress is accomplished by self-

[1] From the opening words: Summum bonum Deus est, etc.

humiliation and repentance, etc. And although fear of God gradually yields more to love to God; yet repenting may not cease throughout the whole of life, because the mercy of God is hidden, and the Christian without such constant repenting would easily fall into security and thus lapse into vice. This whole way of thinking lacks certainty of divine grace and the joyfulness of the love that rests upon it; it founds salvation upon the person's own attitude of repentance, etc., although the efficient grace of God lies at the basis of this attitude. In this connection Isidore sets forth a series of Sentences about the difference between sins and their distinction into lighter and heavier, open and secret; about bad thoughts, individual sins and vices, etc. The Third Book then treats "of the different conditions and states of the Christian life, of divine visitations and judgments, of the temptations of the devil and the means against them, of ascetics and monks, of teachers and superintendents in the Church, of rulers and subjects, of princes, judges, and advocates, of the oppressors of the poor, the lovers of the world, the friends of mercy, and of the brevity and end of human life."[1] As means of virtue, the examples of the saints are presented, in the mirror of which the vicious behold and punish themselves, and which they ought to imitate. Further, prayer is a means of virtue. It ought to be a matter of the heart and not merely of the lips, and it should accompany good deeds; for it is the humility of prayer that first makes the act meritorious. With prayer is to be combined the reading of the Holy Scripture in which God speaks with us, and which the books of the heathen and of worldly learning do not come up to.—According to Isidore, the first place among the several conditions of life and their duties, is held by the monk. For it is wholesome to avoid worldly intercourse, not merely in the spirit, but also externally in order to live to the heavenly sense (iii. 17–22). Isidore exhorts the ministers of the Church to be careful of purity of morals and scientific culture, and to promote the wellbeing of the people entrusted to them, even against the oppressions of the powerful (iii. 35 f., 45). And in like manner, he also exhorts the princes to observe the laws, to protect the Church, and to support the priests in their efforts (iii. 49–51).

[1] Wagenmann, *l.c.* 368.

The fundamental tendency of Isidore's way of thinking is the ascetic and contemplative. He regards the eating of flesh and drinking of wine as not permissible; for it did not take place in Paradise, and the later permission (to Noah) has been recalled by Christ through His apostle (Rom. xiv. 21) because it excites the sensual feeling. The eating of fish is only now allowed after the example of the risen Christ.[1] To this example of the risen Christ held up for those who live in the flesh, corresponds Isidore's preference of the contemplative life to the active life. For the active life has to do with the practice of good works, whereas the contemplative sinks itself wholly into the love of God. The former is upon the way to the goal, the latter is already at the goal. It is only through action that we attain to contemplation, but contemplation becomes the grave of action. Undoubtedly the active life is also necessary so long as we belong to this earthly existence; but the saints flee always as soon as possible out of it into the stillness of contemplation, in order thus to enjoy already here the future blessedness which consists in contemplation.[2] —This is the old tendency to pure spirituality in which the dominant way of thinking found a point of agreement with Neo-Platonism, and although based upon another foundation, it yet involved a misconception of the earthly calling.

2. *Boëthius*[3] was descended from the noble Roman family of the Anicii. He was born *c.* 480 A.D., was imprisoned by the Ostrogothic king Theodoric on false suspicion, and executed in 525. His erudition was many-sided; and while belonging to an earlier time, he was also a summarizing and transmitting medium in another way than Isidore. The theological line from Augustine downwards and through Gregory the Great, finds its point of mediation with the Middle Ages in Isidore; and Boëthius holds the same relation to the philosophical line in the form of a philosophical eclecticism. For the Aristotelian conceptions (especially of the Logic) which the Middle Ages adopted, the Platonic basis of the whole system, as well as the Neo-Platonic theology and the Stoical thinking

[1] De offic. eccles. ii. 44.

[2] Sentent. iii. 15; cf. De different. ii. 29.

[3] F. Nitzsch, Das System des B. u. die ihm zugeschriebenen theol. Schriften, Berlin 1860. P. R.-E.[2] ii. 521 ff.

with a certain religious colouring, were all combined in the ethics and doctrine of Providence of Boëthius, nor was a certain involuntary Christian influence wholly wanting in them. The ancient philosophical thoughts had at that time passed over into one another,[1] and the position of Boëthius was an eclectic one. In the Middle Ages he was regarded as a Christian and as a martyr of the Catholic faith. But the theological writings on the Trinitarian and Christological question,[2] which represents him as orthodox, are not to be regarded as his,[3] although some hold them to be genuine.[4] His five books, *De consolatione philosophiæ*, which he composed in prison, consist of a dialogue between a languishing prisoner and personified philosophy. This work became a favourite with the educated class in the Middle Ages. In combination with metaphysical questions about God's existence and eternity, providence and fate, the origin of the world and human freedom, Boëthius presents an ethic which has the manner of the religiously philosophical ethics of antiquity, and especially of the Stoic system, and which reminds us of Seneca. Philosophy appears in the place of the Muses as a comforter. Through her instruction she raises the prisoner in his need of consolation above his earthly circumstances with their darkness, and above the transitory pleasure of earth, by bidding him seek in God the highest good and the highest end, and consequently the highest happiness.[5] This is a good and happiness which the wicked cannot attain, and which the good cannot lose even in suffering, but rather only

[1] Cf. Nitzsch, Abh. p. 84. Others accentuate the Christian element more strongly, *e.g.* Ebert, *l.c.* 464 ff. Gass, i. 177 ff. Ritter, Gesch. der christl. Philos. ii. 580 ff., compares the attitude of Boëthius towards Christianity with that of Synesius, against which, as against any comparison with Dionysius Areop., Nitzsch protests.

[2] De unitate trinitatis. Utrum patur et filius ac spiritus sanctus de divinitate substantialiter prædicentur. Brevis fidei christianæ complexus. De persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium.

[3] Nitzsch, *l.c.*

[4] *E.g.* Bach, Dogmengesch. des M.-A. ii., Wien 1875, p. 6.

[5] Z. B. iii. 10: Confitendum est, summum Deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum; sed perfectum bonum veram esse beatitudinem constituimus; veram igitur beatitudinem in summo Deo sitam esse necesse est.—Et beatitudinem et Deum summum bonum esse collegimus, quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinem quæ sit summa divinitas.—Deum veramque beatitudinem unum atque idem esse monstravimus.

thereby rightly attain. Thus should he learn by philosophy to despise all the earthly goods of this world and to raise himself above it, to direct his look always to God, to approach Him in prayer, and to keep down the passions which threaten to frustrate the purpose and the natural order of God.—It cannot be said that what is here presented is Christianity. Boëthius according to his external confession was a Christian; but his way of thinking was that of the ancient philosophy.[1] That his thinking and especially his ethics could be held to be Christian, only shows how much the knowledge of the distinction between the ancient, especially the Stoical, and the Christian ethic had come to be lost sight of. As we have already seen, the ethic of the Stoics had, in fact, at an earlier time already obtained entrance into many of the monastic circles in an external Christian investment; and it had found a home in the monastic morality. The more Boëthius came to be regarded in later times as a martyr of the Catholic faith, this belief could not but procure more acceptance for his writings. In Thomas Aquinas we find him regarded as an authority along with Aristotle. Apart from the importance which he acquired in the Middle Ages in connection with the question of the reality of Universals, he further contributed to transmit the Platonico-Stoic habit of mind to the ethical thinking of the Middle Ages, while along with this there also moved in him the new ethical thoughts of Christianity.

§ 48. *The moral state of the Ancient Church.*[2]

The new spirit of Christianity made its moral power effective in the internal and external life of many Christians, without its being possible, however, to exhibit it correspondingly in detail; and it revealed itself in the public life especially through a charity and beneficence such as was unheard of in the pre-Christian world. On the other hand, this richly practised charity had undoubtedly its dangers;

[1] Nitzsch, Abh. p. 174.

[2] J. Burckhardt, Die Zeit Konstantin's d. Gr., Basel 1853. Uhlhorn, Die christl. Liebesthätigkeit in der alten Kirche, Stuttg. 1882 [Christian Charity in the Ancient Church, T. & T. Clark].

and as the christianised masses pressed with the new turn of events into the Church, they carried with them and continued the ancient heathen immoralities, while in the higher classes and among the ministers of the Church the worldly nature was in many respects unbroken. Against this worldliness the spirit of asceticism reacted, and it received nourishment and strength from the melancholy state of the public relationships. This asceticism appeared as the ideal of Christian perfection, and in consequence it lost the conception and understanding requisite for Christianity becoming exhibited in the labour of the common earthly calling.

1. The *cultivation of charity*, as the active exercise of the common Christian spirit, appeared to the heathen a characteristic mark of Christianity.[1] The words of Jesus: "Give to him that asketh of thee," were usually interpreted in the sense that one was to give to every one that asked without much questioning about desert.[2] The prevailing tendency of the mind to the superterrestrial and future made earthly possession appear more indifferent. But how sound the thoughts still were about possession, poverty, and beneficence, is shown by the beautiful treatise of Clement of Alexandria on the words spoken by Jesus to the rich youth. That the Christians applied themselves to labour in the midst of the rest of the world, is emphatically accentuated by Tertullian.[3]

Nevertheless the Christians were distinguished by the simplicity of their life and the limiting of themselves on principle to what was necessary. Almsgiving appeared to them always as the best application of property. The Christian community, that special creation of Christianity, formed the frame and the basis of this exercise of charity; its character lay essentially in caring for the community. Gifts were connected with public worship. They were an offering which the members of the community presented; and the bishop administered these gifts. For special cases special collections were held. The Bishops of Numidia applied to

[1] Cf. *e.g.* Lucian, Perigrinus, c. 13.
[2] Pastor Hermæ, Mand. ii. Justin, Apol. i. 18. Clem. Alex., Quis dives, c. 13.
[3] Apolog. 42.

Cyprian for help for the Christians who had become prisoners of war in their district. The collections which were appointed by Cyprian amounted to £877, 1s. Cyprian in sending the money added a list of the names of the givers, "in order that ye may remember in your prayers the brothers and sisters who have gladly and quickly given their help in this necessary work, and that ye may vouchsafe to them a recompense for their good work in offerings and prayers." The giver was specially thought of at the celebration of the Lord's Supper. Cyprian himself had at his conversion sold his lands and gardens in order to bestow the proceeds on the Church and the poor; and similarly afterwards in times of need he gave repeated directions for the disposal of his private property. This frequently occurred at that time.[1] Another method was to practise fasting in order to spare something for the poor.[2] The Apostolical Constitutions[3] regulate in detail this whole method of support in the Church, in such a manner that only the really needy were considered, while recipients who were not needy were regarded as having stolen their bread from the poor. In times of special misfortunes and visitations, Christian love manifested itself with special prominence in contrast to the heathen hard-heartedness. We have examples of this at Carthage in the time of the plague in the days of Cyprian, at Alexandria in the time of Bishop Dionysius, and frequently elsewhere.

All this charity was unquestionably much abused by unworthy recipients, and it certainly gained not a few for the Christian cause from ignoble motives. Yet it was a shining testimony to the new spirit of love which ruled in the Christian community, and could not exist without making an impression upon the heartless heathen world.

When the great revolution under Constantine had been accomplished, and the Church had thereby come into the possession of unusual riches, there was opened a rich field of organized beneficence in the form of donations, and the founding of almshouses, orphanages, hospitals, hostels, and other institutions for common advantage. This beneficence could not but make the greater impression, as the State came into contact with individuals only through soldiers

[1] Uhlhorn, p. 148. [2] App. Constit. v. 1. Uhlhorn, p. 149. [3] IV. 1 ff.

and violent tax-gatherers.[1] Further, the complaints about the increasing burden of taxation were always growing; and the harshness of exacting it went hand in hand with its increase.[2] The ideal of such institutions was the famous Basilias of Basil the Great before the gates of Neo-Cæsarea. "They were predominantly institutions for those who were really helpless; and as such, they were a truly glorious innovation on the ancient heathen world, although it had also at length begun to be active in this direction through the State."[3] Nerva, Trajan, Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Severus devoted large sums for the education of poor children; but it was "not in a general philanthropic sense, but only for the freeborn, and as it appears, only for Italians; and it had been done with the object of increasing the free population of the central districts which had become very sparse."[4] This beneficence is indeed not unfrequently based upon a false notion of the nothingness of all earthly goods, and a misconception of the duty of the earthly calling; and there is at the same time combined with it the error that there is a meritorious and specially sin-cancelling power in such acts, especially from the time of Cyprian. Nevertheless there is always expressed in this beneficence a high heavenly sense, even when it is in error; and this is all the more conspicuous in contrast to the heathen selfishness and worldliness.[5]

2. The new sense of love also showed itself towards the *slaves*. Christianity could not indeed abolish slavery all at once. Nor did the teachers of the Church think of this, however often they may speak of the original liberty and equality of all men.[6] To have done so would have been a social revolution; for the whole order of society in the ancient world rested upon the institution of slavery. But the slaves, as well as their masters, were taught to put little value upon the difference between slaves and free men in comparison with their equality and unity in Christ. The masters in particular were taught to see Christian brethren

[1] Jak. Burckhardt, Die Zeit Konstantin's d. Gr. p. 414.
[2] Uhlhorn, p. 227 ff. Salvian, De gubernat. v. 4 ff.
[3] Burckhardt, *l.c.* p. 429.
[4] Burckhardt, *l.c.* p. 429.
[5] Burckhardt, *l.c.* p. 428.
[6] Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 363 f.

in the slaves, and, with all their preservation of the social distinction, to take a corresponding attitude towards them. The ill-treatment of slaves by their Christian masters was visited with the penalties of the Church.[1] And although such decisions show that they were necessary, yet Christianity in the course of time indicates a gradual coming in of that whole order of society which was prepared on the line of liberty until it was afterwards legally regulated. The conversions of persons in good circumstances were not unfrequently distinguished by numerous manumissions of slaves. Towards the end of the fourth century in particular, such manumissions occurred in extraordinary numbers within the circle of Jerome's experience.[2] The convert made a renunciation of his slaves, as others made renunciations of their property, "for the salvation of the soul," as is often said in epitaphs. Thus by testamentary disposition particularly, the manumission of slaves often took place in great numbers, and they were taken charge of by the Church. The ecclesiastical Canons came to the aid of those efforts by various decisions passed in the interest of the slaves.

3. As the Church regarded itself generally as the protectress of the poor, the weak, the needy, and the oppressed, it also took this attitude specially towards the excessive burdens of *taxation* and *usury*.[3] The bishops often exercised their influence, and successfully, against the former, which weighed with particular heaviness on the rural population. In like manner, the Church set itself against usury, and combated it with all emphasis. The necessity of the time, or perhaps inexperience, compelled many to accept depreciated money, for which they had to pay the greedy usurers exorbitant interest, and by this many were dragged into extreme distress. Under these circumstances it appeared to the teachers of the Church that all taking of interest was unjust usury. The Christians were forbidden to take any interest; and the attempt was made to prove this as a

[1] Synod of Elvira, 305 A.D., can. 5. Synod of Epaon, A.D. 517, can. 34, and frequently.

[2] Thus Melania when she left Rome to begin a monastic life liberated all her slaves. According to Pelladius, there were 8000 of them.

[3] Cf. Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 375 ff.

Biblical position from Luke vi. 34 f., and from passages in the Old Testament (Ex. xxii. 25; Deut. xxiii. 19). As it was legally allowed, the taking of interest was at least forbidden to the clergy;[1] and the same was made a moral duty incumbent on the laity. Fallen debtors were often freed by the bishops from the hands of the usurers.

In like manner, the Church gave its care to *orphans* or *foundlings*, of whom there was no lack from the long prevailing evil habit of exposing children at pleasure, and thus giving them up to bodily or spiritual destruction. Against this evil habit of child-exposure, and also of child-murder, the Church earnestly combated at the synods. It also showed particular interest in those who were taken prisoners and carried away by enemies; and it ransomed such prisoners in great numbers, at the expenditure of large sums taken from the property of the Church.[2]

4. *Troubles of the time.*—The continually growing need of the time, and the accumulation of extreme misery, accompanied the gradual destruction of the ancient world. "The sword everywhere! Death everywhere! I am weary of life"—thus does Gregory the Great close one of his sermons.[3] This prevailing need and misery gave the more occasion for such beneficence, and could not but make the Church appear as the only helper in times of need. Exhortations to beneficence formed a standing theme of the great Church orators of that age, such as Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzum, Ambrose, and Augustine.[4] But not only were its motives often erroneous, as we have seen, but even its ways were not unfrequently impure, as is shown by the legacy-hunting of the clergy, and the unjust disinheriting of children.[5] It was in this very matter of testamentary dispositions, and keeping up the memory

[1] Syn. of Elvira, can. 20; Laodicea, can. 5; 3 Karth. can. 16; Hippo (393), can. 22 u. a.; Uhlhorn, p. 415, Anm. 62.

[2] Candidus, Bishop of Sergiopolis, once ransomed 12,000 prisoners for 14,400 solidi (£9136, 16s.). The Gallican Church, as the inscriptions show, was particularly zealous in this work. Private persons also devoted their means to it. Thus we read on the tombstone of Eugenia, a Christian: "With her treasures she freed prisoners from unjust chains." Uhlhorn, p. 385.

[3] In Ezech. 18, last sermon. Uhlhorn, p. 237.

[4] Cf. Uhlhorn, p. 266 ff.

[5] Cf. Uhlhorn, p. 249 ff.

of the dead, that heathen practices and modes of thinking pressed in. Alms had always won more and more significance for the cancelling of sin in the view of the Church. Again and again the proposition was preached, that "as water extinguishes fire, so do alms extinguish sin." And thus almsgiving from being a manifestation of love to the poor had become a substitute for love in the case of the givers themselves, or those for whom their saving influence was intended. Accordingly it came to be a practice supported by the Church that sins were to be wiped away by large almsgiving, and thus they were supposed to be also beneficial for the souls of the departed.

In Tertullian's time it was already a practice to present oblations for the departed on the day of their death, in order thereby to obtain the intercession of the community. From this practice the idea was developed that the manifestation of the piety of the survivors in prayer, offerings, and alms goes to benefit the dead. This almsgiving on the funeral day, or the memorial day of the dead, was connected with ancient practices. At no point have these practices maintained themselves more strongly than on this side of the adoration of the dead. As the ancient pagan practice recognised "memorials," decorations of the grave, feasts, distributions of gifts, and similar foundations, in memory (in memoriam) of the dead on their birthday, it also became a Christian practice; only that such things were held on the day of the death, and not as in the former cases from vanity, or merely in order to do honour to the departed, but for the purpose of beneficence. But, in fact, these observances often enough degenerated into heathenish feastings, which the Church sought to oppose by endeavouring to transform them into masses for the souls of the dead, combined with alms.[1] It is well known what influence was specially exercised in this matter by Gregory the Great. This idea became a strong impulse to almsgiving. The more alms, so much the more merit. Moreover, it could be made applicable to others. The idea and the practice of Christian beneficence thus became completely distorted. Still beneficence was always richly exercised; and the Christian tombstones fondly celebrate it, and thereby show the estima-

[1] Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 283 f.

tion in which it was held. Yet a series of noble Christian men and women whom we know from history will continually arouse our admiration by their magnificent sacrifices, although we cannot but reject the ideal which they strove to realize as an unevangelical one, and although we completely miss the right attitude towards the earthly calling in their self-chosen poverty and ascetic mode of life.

5. *The Monastery in the West.*—Asceticism lay unavoidably in the character and tendency of the time.[1] The strongest oppositions of the old and new had come into hard collision with each other, and had removed many out of their natural relations, so that they sought their salvation in an extreme resolution. The irruption of the migration of the peoples and the threatening collapse of all relationships (*orbis ruit*) could only increase the mood of renunciation. The monasticism that had been transferred from the East to the West thus found at this time a fruitful soil. The *monastery* offered a protection from the temptation of the world and the individual's own weakness, as well as a refuge from the confusions of the public conditions and the oppression of the political life. It was also open for runaway slaves who withdrew themselves from their service under the pretext "of being pious."[2]

Under these circumstances it was significant that Augustine, in his treatise *De opere monachorum*, had pressed with all emphasis for the monks engaging in labour, and he thus set himself against the inclination to a one-sidedly contemplative life, as well as against mere comfortableness. Thus the Western monasticism became distinguished from that of the East, and it became a power in the culture of the coming centuries. In this connection the foundation of Benedict obtained an unexampled significance and importance. "The Franks and the rest of the Germans learned agriculture, trades, and arts from the monks."[3] And although the monks of the East were not lacking in labour, beneficence, and the work of educating children, yet all this obtained firmer order, greater extension, and higher significance in the West.

6. *The position of the Church during the going down of the ancient world.*—"The ancient world went down, and all its

[1] Cf. Burckhardt, *l.c.* p. 483. [2] Uhlhorn, p. 370. [3] Uhlhorn, p. 351.

glory was borne to the grave in thousandfold sorrow, and in a misery such as has been hardly known at any other time, and perhaps has only once approximately returned during the Thirty Years' War in Germany. Like billow after billow, the German peoples fling themselves over the empire; they shatter to pieces the ancient forms and orders of the political and popular life, and yet are themselves still incapable of creating again new lasting forms and orders. They come in the freshness of youth to be soon enough enervated by the unwonted warmth of the climate as well as unnerved by the enjoyments of a foreign civilisation, and to perish when corrupted by the sins of the conquered, and drawn by them into destruction. Salvian, in reproving the Romans, describes the Vandals as having obtained the victory from God on account of their chastity; yet how soon do they become as morally corrupt as the Romans! How do the Visigoths degenerate in Spain; how tragically do the Ostrogoths go down in Italy! There arises at first a chaos that is without parallel. The new Christian Germanic world is born with a thousand pangs, but centuries pass before fixed, enduring political and national forms emerge out of the floods of the popular migrations. But in the midst of this chaos stands the Church as the only power that survives the general destruction; and it administers its office as the refuge of all the oppressed and needy. In those times of collapse, when every other hold gave way, she alone still offered a helping hand to the poor, hunted, and anxious stricken people. Although a storm of invaders had rushed over the land, and although villages and cities lay in ashes, she was still there, and at once began her labour again. Churches, chapels, hospitals, and monasteries, and houses of mercy, were the first which rose again. There began once more the dispensing of alms; the poor day by day found the stores of the Church opened of themselves, and they received food and drink, care and shelter, as far as the Church could give them. Along with this material help they also received spiritual gifts. The dispensing of alms was willingly connected with the worship of God. The poor man who came to get bread to still his hunger, or for a garment to cover his nakedness, or even for advice and medicine for his sickness, heard at the same time

God's word as well as the Church knew to preach it, and he drew consolation from this source of all consolation, and received power whereby he was able to endure further and to hope. If the people did not entirely despair, they owed it to the never-resting charity of the Church.—The Church could not save the ancient world, but it sat with help and consolation by its deathbed, and glorified its dying hour with the evening glow of a love such as the ancient world, in its time of bloom and with all its glory, had never known."[1]

7. *The Christian Society of Rome.*—The Church could not save the ancient world, not merely because the ancient world was incurably sick, but also because the medicine of the Church itself was not the right one, and its moral power in wide circles was gone. The whole charity of the Church, admirable as it was, was nevertheless corrupted by false motives, as we have seen. Moreover, heathenism was for the most part not yet internally overcome; it continued to last largely in its superstitions, and it was increased by the Christian superstition of such distinguished representatives as Gregory the Great. Above all, however, Christian society since the second half of the fourth century, had always become more degenerate.[2] It was possible to be very correct dogmatically, and yet to keep morally by the old heathen modes of life. This is shown particularly in the case of the Christian society of Rome. In the letters of Jerome, we have very vivid descriptions which give a most terrible picture of that society. On the occasion of the dispute between Damasus and Ursinus for the Roman bishopric (A.D. 366), one day there lay 137 dead bodies in the Sicinian Basilica. The observations of Jerome in his letter to Eustochium (xxii. c. 13) show how prevalent the heathen custom of killing unborn children still was. Two of the common people married, and the man had already buried twenty wives, while the woman had buried twenty-two husbands. People were on edge to see which of the two would die first. It was the woman, and the man led her body through the whole of Rome like a conqueror.[3] Jerome again describes to us, especially in the said letter to Eustochium, how matters stood among

[1] Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 387 f.
[2] Burckhardt, *l.c.* p. 480 f.
[3] Ep. cxxiii. ad Ageruchiam.

the genteel classes and among the clergy. Among those who had become widows the old coquetry remained. "Carried in their fashionable chairs, they are preceded by a whole train of eunuchs; their cheeks are painted; and their well-fed skin is distended." "Their house is full of flatterers and full of gormandizings. Even clergy kiss the heads of the matrons, and receive the reward for their attendance with hand outstretched as if they were giving the blessing, if one did not know better. In consequence these women, when they see priests seek their protection, become very arrogant; and as they have formerly experienced the tyranny of their husbands they prefer the free life of the widow class, are called continentes and nuns, and dream after a suspicious meal about their apostles" (c. 16). "They cover the leaves of parchment with purple colour, have the letters written in gold and the manuscripts set with precious stones, but Christ dies naked before their doors. If they reach a hand to a needy one, they trumpet it about; when they are going to give an invitation to a love-feast, a herald is hired" (c. 32). In another letter,[1] Jerome describes the men "with girdled loins, dark tunic, and long beard," "who live under the same roof with women, hold feastings with them, and are only not married with them in name." Again, in another letter to Nepotian (lvi. c. 5, 6), he describes the dandified young clergy with their curled hair, and how they often give little presents to women, such as fine handkerchiefs, ribbons, and kerchiefs, recherché dishes, and billets-doux, while others again, hunting after legacies, perform to childless old men and old women ignominious services, which Jerome specially names. Again he elsewhere dwells upon the hypocrisy and wantonness of the consecrated virgins and others.[2]

8. It may be gathered from various writings of those centuries that things were not better in the *Provinces*. The disorders of the time had often suggested the question regarding divine Providence. The heathen blamed Christianity as

[1] To the monk Rusticus, cxxv. c. 6.

[2] Matters do not appear to have been much otherwise in Constantinople, as we learn from Chrysostom, nor in Carthage, as is shown by Augustine and Salvian. On the moral condition of that time, and especially on its excessive luxury, much information has been gathered by P. E. Müller in his Comment. hist. de genio, moribus et luxu aevi Theodosiani (i. 7–10, 97–100, 108–123; ii. 2–18). Cf. Stäudlin, iv. 251, 257.

the cause of these disorders, as it was only since it arose that misfortune after misfortune had come over the Roman empire. The Christians defended themselves against this accusation. Augustine's great work *De Civitate Dei* starts from this question. In the fifth century the Spaniard *Orosius* wrote by Augustine's advice in 417 A.D. his historical work *Historiarum* L. vii. *ad paganos*, or as it was more characteristically called, *De cladibus et miseriis totius mundi*, or again, *De totius mundi calamitatibus*. The object of the work was to refute those objections of the heathen by the historical proof that the world had been of old a vale of sorrow in which error and wickedness had always reigned, and that without Christianity it would be much worse with the world.[1]

But the chief writer of the class is *Salvianus*, a presbyter of Marseilles († 470), who treats the theme in his work *De gubernatione Dei* or *De presenti judicio*. In order to exhibit the fall of the Empire as a divine punishment for the degeneracy of the population, he gives in undoubtedly strong colours a thrilling picture of the manners and vices of his time; and in his account the Christians appear to be not a whit better than the heathen.[2] After the introductory considerations of the first two Books, the Third Book gives a criticism of the morality of the time. It especially describes the Romanic Christians, giving a dreadful picture of them, and declaring that all vices and crimes were at home among them, and were not practised merely by the *servi*, but also by the *ingenui*. "The Church itself, which ought to reconcile God in everything, what else does it but embitter God? With the exception of individuals who keep themselves from evil, what is Christendom but a collection of the dregs of vices? How few are found in the Church who are not drunkards, revellers, adulterers, whoremongers, robbers, gormandizers, bandits, or murderers!" "Into such a low state of morals almost the whole of Christendom has fallen, so that to be less vicious is regarded among the whole of the Christian people as a kind of holiness" (iii. 9). "What, then, is the life of business people but deception and perjury, that of judicial officers but injustice, that of court sycophants but calumny, and that of soldiers but robbery? (iii. 10)." "Let us see whether any one

[1] Herzog, P. R.-E.[2] xi. 144 f. [2] Ebert, i. 427 ff. Hauck, P. R.-E.[2] xiii. 317.

is free from the two principal vices, namely, from murder and lust. Who has not reddened himself with human blood? who has not soiled himself with filthy lust?" The Fourth Book continues this description by a comparison of the morality of the Christians with that of the heathen barbarians; the latter are less guilty because they have less knowledge. The Fifth Book compares the Catholic Christians of his neighbourhood with the heretical (Arian) barbarians (Goths and Vandals), and shows how much higher the latter stand morally than the former. "The barbarians love each other, while the Romanic people mutually persecute each other; the poor and insignificant find a refuge with the former," etc. In short, the Roman world had survived itself and degenerated into selfishness, and it needed a renovation through the Germans. The Sixth Book describes the immoralities of the theatres. "All this is so vicious that one cannot bring it to light and discuss it without violating the feeling of shame." "The impurities of the plays are equally infamous both to the actors and spectators." "Thus at these representations of whoredom, the whole people have lust excited in their minds" (vi. 3). "We have renounced the devil in Baptism, but these plays are works of the devil" (vi. 6). Nevertheless we prefer them to the churches; we despise the altars and honour the theatres (vi. 7). "Thus are viciousness and impurity, as it were, affiliated with the Romans; they are their soul and nature; for the vices are dominant wherever there are Romans" (vi. 8). In the midst of the turmoil of war, people give themselves up to these worthless plays. While the walls of Cirta and Carthage were stormed by the weapons of the barbarian peoples, "the Carthaginians were revelling in mad pleasure in the racecourses." "Outside men were slain, within lust was indulged in." And what happened there was repeated in his neighbourhood at Trèves. There was revelling and wantonness on the part of old and young while destruction was threatening the city. That city, the richest in Gaul, was four times conquered, but the continued misfortunes only caused crimes to increase. And similar things took place in the other cities of Gaul.[1] The Seventh Book repeats these

[1] VI. 12–14. On the passion for shows and plays, against which Chrysostom also preached strongly (*e.g.* Hom. contra lud. et theatri, vii. 273 sqq.), see

accusations. The whole Roman world is wretched and luxurious at the same time. "The barbarians themselves are shocked at our impurity." "We love unchastity, the Goths condemn it; with them fornication is a crime and draws punishment after it, with us it is a matter of respectability." "And then we wonder when the possessions either of the Aquitanians or of ourselves are given by God to the barbarians, since the lands which the Romans stain through vice must be purified by the barbarians through chastity" (vii. 6). "It is the divine judgment which the barbarians execute" (vii. 12). And so it is too with the Vandals in Africa. For, "some few servants of God excepted—what was the whole region of Africa but a single house of vice?" (vii. 14). "As all peoples have their own peculiar vices, so they have also certain virtues; but among the Africans I know only what is bad" (vii. 15). In this, Carthage takes the first place. "Who is still chaste among the numberless multitudes of that city? Who is not a whoremonger or an adulterer, and indeed without end, without limit?" (vii. 17). "The most shameful things were there done openly." "The whole city looked on, and let it happen; the judges saw and were silent; the people looked on and clapped their applause" (vii. 18). "And do we wonder that we are as wretched as we are impure? do we wonder that we are excelled in power by the enemy who excel us in honesty? do we wonder that they possess our goods who abhor our vices? They do not conquer by the natural strength of the body, nor do we succumb through natural weakness. No one can persuade himself of anything else, no one can be of another view than that our vicious morals alone have conquered us?" (vii. 23).

Whatever exaggeration may be in these descriptions, the one thing is certain that the Roman world was ripe for judgment. But Christianity was not able to save it; the salt itself had lost too much of its virtue.

Salvian sees one principal reason of this moral decay in

Stäudlin, iv. 244 ff. It was only the want of the necessary means, occasioned by the irruption of the northern peoples, that put an end to them; cf. Augustine, De consensu Evangeliorum, i. 33: Unde enim cadunt, nisi inopia rerum, etc. It was only in Ravenna and Rome, according to Salvian, that they were still maintained. There only survived bands of Mimes and players who danced and played at marriages and feasts. And it was the same in the East.

the false love to earthly possession. Accordingly he had already published before his historical work a treatise specially directed against avarice, *Ad ecclesiam catholicam*, or *Adversus avaritiam*, in four Books. For, this is the most pernicious pestilence with which the devil has infected the Church; and it had seized not only the laity, but also clergy and monks. The clergy should renounce their property, and at least they ought, as well as the virgins and others, to leave it by testament to the Church. "They disinherit themselves (for eternity) in order not to disinherit others" (Adv. avar. ii. 48). If they have during their life been lacking in good works, they ought thus to make up for what they had neglected, at least at the close. If they have done good works, they ought to reflect that one can never do enough of them; if they must now appear before the throne of the Judge of the world, they must seek so much the more to reconcile Him to themselves (iv. 133). As for the wicked, again, it is always better at least for them to try this than to do nothing (iii. 181). The Church had then the whole of the support of the poor in its hands. The motive of Salvian in laying down his requirement, however, was that of the meritoriousness of divesting oneself of possession. "Even if there is nothing bad in the past which we might have to expiate, yet there are eternal goods which we have to prepare for ourselves; if we have no punishment to fear, yet there is the Kingdom of Heaven to strive after. If the saints have nothing from which they have to ransom themselves, there is still something which they have to buy" (ii. 65). His ideal which he opposes to the corruption of the time as a remedy, was the ascetic ideal. The religiosi are in the state of perfection, because they are following Christ. But it was evident that this was not saving society, but giving it up.

§ 49. *The Church Discipline.*

The dominant ethical way of thinking in the Church fixed itself, in behoof of ecclesiastical discipline and for the forming and securing of ecclesiastical practice, in the determinations of the Law of the Church, which determinations combined the elements of morality, discipline, and worship.

1. *The Synodal Canons.*—Occasioned by the relationships of the time, many Synods drew up disciplinary canons which related partly to the discipline of penitence, partly to the relation to heathen things, partly to conjugal and sexual relationships, or to military service, commercial affairs, usury, etc. Thus the Synod of Carthage, held under Cyprian in 251 A.D., sought in these matters to keep the mean between the laxer tendency of Felicissimus and the rigorous position of the Novatians.[1] The canons of Petrus Alexandrinus, with reference to penance, were occasioned by those who had lapsed during the Diocletian persecution. Further, we may specially note the Synod of Elvira (Concil. Illiberitanum) in Spain, A.D. 306, with 81 canons; that of Arles, A.D. 314, with 22 canons; that of Ancyra in Galatia, A.D. 314, with 25 canons; that of Neo-Cæsarea, A.D. 314–325, with 25 canons; that of Nicea, A.D. 325, with 20 canons; Laodicea, *c.* 364, with 60 canons; Gangra in Paphlagonia, *c.* 360, with 20 canons; Sardica in 344; Carthage in 397 and 419 (concluding the canons for Africa); Mileve in 416; Angers in 543; Tours in 461; Rome in 465; and the many Synods of Toledo.[2] Most of these Synods laid down strict legal regulations; and some of them, as those of Ancyra and Gangra, were partly in opposition to the false hyperascéticism.

2. The collection of the so-called Apostolical Constitutions[3] (*Constitutiones apostolicæ*, *Διαταγαί*, *Διατάξεις τῶν ἀποστόλων*, in eight Books) contains partly moral regulations, and partly rules of the Church order, belonging to the first four centuries. The first six Books, which date from the second half of the third century, and originated in Syria or Asia Minor, form an independent whole, which was long unknown in the West and never recognised, and which in

[1] Cf. the *Libellus* mentioned by Cyprian (Eph. 2 lib. de lapsis, c. 31, 52), ubi singula capita conscripta sunt, according to which examinentur causæ et voluntates et necessitates singulorum.

[2] Cf. Mansi, Collectio Conc. i. ii. iii. Hefele, Conziliengesch. Bd. 1–3.

[3] Bickell, Gesch. des Kirchenrechts, Giessen 1843, i. 1. Jacobson, P. R.-E. 1 Aufl. i. 477 ff. (1854); otherwise Mejer, P. R.-E.[2] i. 562 ff., where the other literature is given. The question has again been lately discussed anew in connection with the recently discovered "Teaching of the Apostles," inasmuch as this work forms the basis of the first half of Book vii. of the Apostolical Constitutions. Cf. Ad. Harnack, Texte u. Unterss. zur Geschichte der altchristl. Liter. ii. 2. 2, Lpz. 1884, p. 170 ff.

the East was rejected at the Trullanian Synod of 692 A.D. in its can. 2, but was nevertheless used. These books contain a mixture of dogmatic, liturgical, moral, and legal regulations, which enable us to know the state of the Church of the third century on various sides. According to the generally accepted view, the Seventh Book arose in Syria in the fourth century *c.* 340–380. In the Eighth Book there is a summary from the third century, of rules regarding worship and the old Law of the Church.

Survey of the contents of the Apost. Constitutions.—I. 1–10, *περὶ λαικῶν*, contains exhortations against avarice, hatred, the desire of revenge, luxury, idleness, and heathen books, and treats of the relation to women according to Proverbs.—II. 1–63 treats of the qualities and duties of bishops, presbyters, and deacons.—III. 1–15 treats of widows, their moral qualities, rights, duties, and limits (16 ff. being liturgical).—IV. 1 ff. treats of widows and orphans, and of care for them. 11–13 deals with the relationship of parents and children, masters and servants, ruler and subjects, and of virginity.—V. 1 ff. treats of stedfastness in confession and martyrdom. 13 ff. refers to the ecclesiastical festivals and feasts.—VI. 1 ff. treats of schismatics, etc.; 17 of the once marrying of the clergy; 18 of separation from heretics; 19 ff. of the law of Christ and the law of the Old Testament, and specially of purity and impurity. There prevails throughout the view of Christianity as the new law of free willingness and inwardness in distinction from the Old Testament law of compulsion and externality. Christ has gone back to the original law (Decalogue), and has renewed it by laying aside the later ceremonial law which was added in consequence of the falling away of Israel. This *δευτέρωσις* embraces *τὰ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ τοῖς μοσχοποιήσασι* (referring to the golden calves at Sinai) *δοθέντα ἐπείσακτα.*—*ἃ δὲ ἁμαρτήσασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπετέθη δεσμά, σὺ σεαυτῷ μὴ ἐπισπάσῃ.* This second law is abrogated for us. The bishop must therefore distinguish and keep the two well asunder.[1] The law of the

[1] To the parts that have been abrogated belong the rules as to legal impurity, after touching a dead body, after sexual intercourse, pollutions, etc., vi. 27; so that communion is allowed to Christians in such cases. Further, marriage is recognised, but celibacy is regarded as higher (vi. 10, 11, 14, iii. 14). Second

decalogue, which is identical with the law of nature, is confirmed but also sharpened by Christ, in so far as He not only forbids murder, but also anger; not merely adultery, but also desire; not merely false swearing, but swearing at all, etc.; and therefore the law is extended to the disposition, and thus internalized (vi. 23). — VII. and VIII. were added later. VII. 1 ff., *περὶ πολιτείας*, treats of discipline, an elaboration of the old work, Duæ viæ vel judicium Petri, which forms in different recensions the beginning of the *διδαχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων* (cf. § 28. 3, *supra*), and the close of the Epistle of Barnabas on the way of life, *i.e.* the fulfilment of the law of Christ and the way of destruction, or the transgression of the law; c. 8 ff. treats of individual virtues, long-suffering, patience, etc., and duties to the poor, to masters and servants, to parents, and relatives, and rulers, and such like; 24 ff. treats of prayer and thanksgiving, etc., and 39 ff. of the order of baptism. VIII. 1–32 treats of ritual matter; 33 ff. of the Sabbath and Sunday, the six hours of prayer, and forms of prayer.

The Christian life appears here as a life regulated by the idea of fellowship, borne up by prayer, and undoubtedly enclosed by determinate external orders, and thus legally determined. But at bottom it is a life determined by the law of love, although certainly not without a confusing of what is properly moral with what is conformable to the order of the Church.

3. *The Apostolical Canons*,[1] which were recognised as valid and apostolic by the Trullanian Synod of 692 A.D., sprang from the fourth century and from Syria, although really in part of earlier origin. They were attributed to the apostles, and, according to Dionysius, were collected by Clement of Rome. The Apostolical Canons are 50 in number, and to them other 35 are added, containing determinations taken from the Scriptures of the Old Testament and tradition, and from other synodal canons. The Western collection of Dionysius

marriage is allowed; third marriage is regarded as incontinence; and fourth marriage is designated as manifest unchastity. Second marriage is expressly conceded to younger widows, iii. 2: *διγαμία μετὰ ἐπαγγελίαν, παράνομον, οὐ διὰ τὴν συνάφειαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος· τριγαμία δὲ ἀκρασίας σημεῖον· τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν τριγαμίαν πρόφανὴς πορνεία.—Νεωτέραις μετὰ τὴν τοῦ πρώτου σελευτὴν συγκεχωρήσθω καὶ ὁ δεύτερος.*

[1] Cf. Drey, Neue Unterss., Tüb. 1832. Hefele, Konciliengesch. i., 2 Aufl. 1873, Anhang, p. 793 ff.

Exiguus, *c.* 500 A.D., contained only 50 canons, and they were regarded in Rome as spurious. These so-called Apostolical Canons mostly consist of regulations regarding the discipline of the clergy. In them ecclesiastical rules about fasting and such like, are repeatedly put on an equality with divine commandments as regards the consequences of their transgression in deposition or exclusion. This was a consequence of the ecclesiastico-legal tendency which the churchly way of thinking took, and it furnishes at the same time a proof of the disorders that had early rushed in.

There were also various related collections, such as the *Apostolic Church Order*, *Αἱ διαταγαὶ αἱ διὰ Κλήμεντος καὶ κανόνες ἐκκλησιαστικοὶ τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων*, dating from the beginning of the third century, and agreeing in many points with the Apostolical Constitutions VII. and VIII.[1]

4. Further, there are the regulations of certain Bishops which became canonical. Thus the *Canons of Gregory Thaumaturgus*,[2] for the order of the mode of penitence, were declared to be canonical by the Trullanian Synod at Constantinople in 680 A.D. They embodied the distinction of the three degrees of penitence: the weepers before the door; the hearers behind the catechumens, who took no part in the prayer; and those standing with the fideles taking part in the prayer, but not in the Lord's Supper. The *Three Canonical Letters of Basil the Great* († 379) on ecclesiastical discipline also obtained canonical authority.

5. *The Penitential Books*[3] arose out of these works, along with the synodal canons mentioned above. Thus *Joannes Scholasticus*, Patriarch of Constantinople († 578), when presbyter at Antioch produced the first large *Collectio canonum* (*σύνταγμα*) in fifty titles, and into this collection he received eighty-five so-called apostolical canons. The Trullanian Synod of 692 confirmed this collection (c. 2). Further, there are two collections ascribed to Joannes Jejunator, Patriarch of Constantinople († 595), entitled: *ἀκολουθία καὶ τάξις τῶν ἐξομολογουμένων* (an order of penitence or confession); and *λόγος πρὸς τὸν μέλλοντα ἐξαγορεῦσαι τὸν*

[1] Reliquiæ juris ecclesiastici antiquissimæ, Ed. de Lagarde, Lips. 1856.
[2] Ryssel, Greg. Thaum., Lpz. 1880, p. 29 f.
[3] Mejer in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] ii. 20 ff.

αὐτοῦ πνευματικὸν υἱόν (directions for father-confessors). The ecclesiastical ordinances exercised a wide-reaching influence on the political legislation, especially from the time of Theodosius the Great, and they were supported by it, as they likewise supported it on another side.

6. *Some of the ordinances of the Church Law.*[1]—The first task of the legislation of the Church in the time of the persecutions appeared to be the duty of dealing with the danger of lapsing into heathenism, and to provide that those who had fallen away should be taken under penance. Thus the Synod of Ancyra decreed that the presbyters who had fallen away, but had afterwards returned and had authenticated their fidelity, might retain their seat in the Church, but should no longer perform priestly acts. A similar rule was also to be applied to the deacons. A Christian who had taken part in a sacrificial feast had to pass for several years through the stages of the penitents; those who led away others to do this were to continue ten years in penitence. Basil, however, wished the sacrament not to be again administered to those who had denied Christ till immediately before death.

In connection with all this was the struggle which the Church had to carry on with the usages and reminiscences of *heathenism* generally. A great many heathen practices and customs had been preserved, as was to be expected, even after Christianity had obtained the supremacy. The bishops were directed to take steps against these in the sharpest way, and to work hand in hand with the civil judges. Thus a Synod at Toledo decreed perpetual excommunication for soothsaying and casting lots; while others, as that of Narbonne (can. 14), even decreed bodily punishment and sale. The practice had been kept up of paying honour to old heathen sanctuaries, such as stones, springs, and trees, or still continuing to celebrate heathen festival days. Against these practices various synods proceed with severity.[2] A synod at Narbonne decrees the penalty of excommunication for one year (can. 15) for celebrating Thursday (Jovis dies). The Trullanian Council (Quinisextum, 692 A.D.) by its can. 79 forbids the making gifts of cakes on Christmas professedly in honour of the delivery of Mary (undoubtedly a heathen

[1] Cf. Stäudlin, iii. p. 364 ff. [2] Arelat. ii. can. 23. Tolet. xii. can. 11.

custom at births), as that immaculate birth was to be otherwise judged of. In like manner, there are repeated prohibitions of the heathen festival fires, of the Brumalia in honour of Bacchus, and of soothsayings, magical spells and usages; and they were punished with some six years' penance.[1] In order to secure the Christians against such non-Christian influences, all questionable intercourse with heathens at any common festival[2] was forbidden the Christians; and marriages with them at least subjected the party to temporary exclusion from communion.[3] The same rule applied to marriages with Jews, especially in Spain;[4] and the civil laws of the Roman empire or of the Visigoths proceeded against marriage with Jews with the severest penalties. Not less severe were the ordinances against heretics, both in the code of Theodosius and in the Visigothic law-book.

With great emphasis the Church turned itself against the *shows* and *plays*, partly because of their connection with idolatry, and partly on account of their immoral representations. But against the deeply-rooted universal inclination to these plays, as we see it for example in the descriptions of Salvian, the Church after it had received the masses into itself was able to proceed only to a certain limit. Several Synods of Arles[5] excluded the Christians from the communion of the Church so long as they were drivers or players in the circuses. The Third Synod of Carthage (can. 1135) forbids the visiting of plays, because blasphemies occur in them, but players are allowed to be received again if they have given up their calling. If an actor in a deadly illness had received baptism and the Lord's Supper, he was not allowed to return to the theatre; and actresses converted to Christianity were to be free from the theatre.[6]

Constantine had already, in 321 A.D., ordained the celebration of Sunday. The Synod of Laodicea (can. 29) had decreed, under penalty of excommunication, that the Christians should not work on the Sabbath, and that on the Sunday they should abstain from work as much as possible.

[1] Basil. Epp. can. 72, 83. Narbonne, c. 14. Quinisext. c. 61.
[2] Laodic. c. 37, 39.
[3] Arelat. i. c. 11.
[4] Aurelian. (Orleans) ii. c. 19, iii. c. 13. Tolet. iv. c. 57, 58, u. a.
[5] Arelat. i. can. 4, ii. c. 20.
[6] According to the Cod. Theodos.

Similar decrees were also repeatedly given forth by other synods, and bodily punishments were partly combined with them.

Murder and *homicide* under every form were subjected to severe punishment. Even in the case of self-defence, and when unintentional, homicide was punished with excommunication, lasting from five or seven to ten years. Of homicide in war, Basil judges that those who commit it, since they have not pure hands, at least do well to absent themselves three years from communion.[1] Killing the fruit of the body in the womb, was punished according to the older canons with exclusion from communion till death; and, according to the later canons, with exclusion for ten or seven years.[2]

Particularly incisive are the ordinances regarding the *Clergy*, their conditions and duties. Grave sins committed since baptism, falling away in persecution, former service in war and at the court, irregular marriage, self-circumcision and self-mutilation, excluded from the sacred office.[3] If a presbyter confessed that he had committed carnal sin before his nomination, he was not to be allowed to administer the sacred offices; and the same held of any one who in ignorance had previously entered upon an irregular marriage.[4] Among the offences for which deposition, or excommunication, or other punishments were ordained, the following are mentioned: usury, the giving away of sacred writings and vessels, betrayal of fellow-Christians in times of persecution, the deserting of offices, indulgence in lust, adultery, incest, bathing in the company of women, magic, astrology, soothsaying, preparing of amulets, swearing, cursing, perjury, abduction of women, gluttony, theft in churches, forging of papers, false witnessing, turbulence, conspiracy, murder.[5] All this gives us glimpses into the moral state of the time. Moreover, the clergy, except on journeys, were never to enter into an inn, still less to keep one.[6] They were

[1] Epp. can. c. 43, 8, 56, 57, 13.
[2] Ancyra, c. 21. Basil. Epp. can. 2, 33, 52.
[3] Nicæa, c. i. 10; Arelat. ii. c. 7; Carthago, i. c. 8; Basil. c. 27; Carthago, iv. c. 67, 68, etc.
[4] Neocæsar. c. 9, 10; Basil. c. 27.
[5] Stäudlin, *l.c.* p. 424, where the relevant Synodal Canons are quoted.
[6] Laod. c. 24; Carth. iii. c. 6; Trull. (Quinisext.) c. 9.

not to assist at the marriage of a *digamus*, and they were to withdraw from marriages generally before the dancers and players appeared.[1] They were not to look on at horse races, comedies and such like; nor were they to allow their children to do so.[2] They were not to tarry in companies where love-songs were sung or unseemly dances were presented; still less were they themselves to sing or to dance.[3] They were not to let their hair grow long; they were to be without ornament in their clothes and shoes; they were not to wear purple clothes, nor to stroll about needlessly in the streets and public places.[4] They were not to pursue any trade for the sake of gain, but they might procure their maintenance and clothing by manual labour and agriculture.[5] They were not to be present at any torture or any judgment which condemned a man to death.[6] They were not to carry weapons, nor to hunt with dogs; and in no case were they to shed blood. If they deserted their spiritual office, they were to be excommunicated.[7]

But above all it was the question of the marriage of the clergy with which many synods and canons were occupied. Most of them had lived in earlier life in marriage, but many of them in full continence; and many of them were unmarried. If a presbyter took a wife, he was to be deposed according to the ordinance of Neo-Cæsarea (can. 1). The proposal made at the Council of Nicea, that the clergy should entirely keep themselves from their wives, was rejected in consequence of the opposition of Paphnutius, a bishop and confessor from Egypt, who maintained that it was enough if, according to the old tradition, the priests were forbidden to enter into a new marriage. The Synod of Gangra (can. 4, 9) expressly rejected the assertion that married priests should not administer the communion, as well as the continence that consisted of rejection of the married state itself, which was thus regarded as a falsely ascetic way of thinking. In Rome, however (as seen by Bishop Siricius, † 398), the tendency towards the complete

[1] Neocæsar. c. 7; Laodic. c. 54; Quinisext. c. 24.

[2] Quinisext. c. 24, 50; Carth. iii. c. 11.

[3] Ne auditus aut obtutus sacris mysteriis deputatus turpium spectaculorum atque verborum contagio polluatur. Venetic. c. 11; Carth. iv. c. 62.

[4] Carth. iv. c. 4, 46, 47; Narbon. c. 1; Quinisext. c. 27, u. a.

[5] Arelat. ii. c. 14; Carth. iv. c. 51, 53.

[6] Tolet. iv. c. 31, u. a.

[7] Chalced. c. 7; Turon. c. 5, u. a.

celibacy of the clergy early showed itself. It was at least held that as the Jewish priests must keep themselves from women in the time of their service, so the clergy must observe continence from the date of their ordination, as they had daily to sacrifice to God. If they begot children, these were not to inherit, but to become slaves of the Church; and such clergy were themselves to be deposed, or at least were not to be advanced, and were always to remain under supervision. This was ordained by numerous synods. In any case, however, second marriage and marriage with widows were interdicted in the case of the clergy. The Greek Church (at the Trullanian Synod) did not go so far as the Western Church. It was satisfied with the so-called Apostolical Canons (17. 18). Any one who had married twice after baptism or had a concubine, and any one who had a widow, a divorced woman, or a hetæra, or an actress as wife, could not become a bishop, presbyter, or deacon; nor could any one marry after receiving the higher consecrations. But regular legal marriages remained valid, according to the Apostolical Canon 5, after ordination; yet the clergy ought to abstain at the time of performing the holy offices, and the bishops ought not to live in the same house along with their wives.[1] Moreover, the other social intercourse of the clergy with women was regulated and limited by the synods. No visit to women was to take place without witnesses, nor was it to last very long, in order to avoid evil-speaking or temptation.[2]

Very special are the determinations relating to the questions of *marriage and the whole sexual life*. For in this connection it was especially incumbent to oppose the power of heathen practice and immorality. Thus the conduct of the priests after pollutions was regulated according to their occasion. In most cases Gregory the Great determined that they should not exclude the individual from communion and the administration of worship; but according to Gregory III., on the basis of older determinations, Christians generally should in such a case do penance for several days, and sing penitential psalms.[3] The

[1] Quinisext. c. 3, 6, 13, 48. [2] Carth. iii. c. 25; Tarracon. c. 1.

[3] Si semen fuderit in ecclesia dormiens, cantet psalterium vel tres dies pœniteat; si voluntarie semen fuderit in ecclesia mala cogitatione, si clericus est, 14 dies, diaconus 22, presbyter 40, episcopus 50.

monthly purification of women should not exclude them from attending church and from the Lord's Supper, yet it was declared to be laudable if they kept away from the communion during this time. Unnatural vice, however, was visited with the strongest penalties of the Church, with excommunication for ten, fifteen, and twenty years, and even till death. Marriages were forbidden with heathens, Jews, and heretics, with a presbyteress or deaconess, with the betrothed of another, with blood-relations, and with those who were related by marriage. Marriages entered into without the knowledge or against the will of the parents, were visited with excommunication; and even where the consent of the parents was afterwards given, a penance of some years followed upon them. In like manner digamists had to do penance for a long time. Third marriage, or oftener, was no longer to be regarded as marriage, but as polygamy, and as a blot on the Church. To marry during penance was punished with life-long excommunication. With regard to forbidden degrees the Mosaic determinations were at first made the basis, *e.g.* by Basil; only the rules of the Church went further, as in the often repeated prohibition to marry the sister of a deceased wife, which is also in Basil, and later also in the prohibition of marriage between cousins. And in course of time they began also to extend the prohibition of marriage to the so-called spiritual affinity which was produced by sponsorship in the case of baptism or confirmation.

During the quadragesimal fasts no marriages were to be celebrated. During these fasts moderation was to be observed, and the church utensils were not to be abused in connection with them.[1]

In regard to Adultery the determinations of Basil are specially of interest. In the case of the husband it was his unfaithfulness only with a married woman and not with an unmarried one, that amounted to adultery, and which brought him under penance for it. On the other hand, the husband could divorce his wife for any unfaithfulness. The arbitrary divorce of a wife and marrying another woman, was declared by Basil to be adultery. A separated wife was to remain unmarried during the life of the husband, in order not to

[1] Laodic. c. 52, 53.

become an adulteress.[1] The punishment laid down for adultery was excommunication from the Church from seven to fifteen years.[2] These ecclesiastical ordinances likewise influenced the civil legislation in the way of increasing its severity.

The Church, and in consequence also the imperial legislation, proceeded with special severity against the widely-spread vice of pæderasty. And the Christian Church succeeded in banishing this vice till the period of the renaissance, when it was again renewed with the revival of antiquity.

In such ways did the Church seek to work upon the formation and establishment of Christian morals. That this took place in such a legal way was natural; nor would it have been questionable in itself, if the difference between the external legal regulations and the internal world of the proper morality of the disposition and the purity of the moral motives, had been preserved in consciousness. But it was necessary to take the masses that had passed into the Church, yet had remained at bottom in many respects heathen, under external discipline; and this as well as the pædagogic task which had sprung up for the Church in connection with the new Germanic peoples brought the danger of regarding this legal discipline as the chief task of the ecclesiastical activity, and of thus increasing the legal character of the system which was otherwise unfolding itself with the right foundation displaced. Moreover, this tendency to a legal regulation of the whole life of the Church was natural to the Roman spirit. Thus the Church of the West always tended more and more to become a legal institution. The Church of the Middle Ages continued to develop itself always more into such an institution in the course of time; and this has continued to be the character of the Roman Church.

[1] Basil. c. 21, 9, 48, 77. [2] Arelat. i. c. 10.

II.

THE ETHICS OF THE CHURCH OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

LITERATURE.

MARHEINEKE, Gesch. der christl. Moral in den der Reformation vorhergehenden Jahrhh. i. 1806. This work contains a general exposition of the theological spirit, of the ecclesiastical constitution, and of the canonical Jurisprudence in relation to the Ethics of Christianity and the ethical reflection of the Middle Ages. A second part entering more into details was to follow, but it never appeared. DE WETTE, Christl. Sittenlehre, ii. 2, Berl. 1821. Stäudlin, Gesch. der Sittenlehre Jesu, Bd. 4, Gött. 1823, p. 269 ff. V. EICKEN, Gesch. u. System der mittelalt. Weltanschauung, Stuttg. 1887. ZIEGLER, Gesch. der Ethik, ii. 243–413. GASS, Gesch. der christl. Ethik, i. 241–417.

The Ethics of the Church of the Middle Ages.[1]

§ 50. *General Character of Mediæval Ethics.*

The historical task of the Mediæval Church in relation to the peoples whom it embraced in itself, determined also the ecclesiastical treatment of Ethics. This had reference partly to the regulation and education of the peoples by the rules of the Canon Law, especially those relating to the Confessional, and partly to the reproduction of the results of the Ancient Church in the Collections of Sentences and in Scholastic Science. In all this the externalization and legalization that distinguished the earlier period, as well as the operation of the non-Christian ancient influences, continued to go on. The moral Ideal, however, continued to be monasticism and the asceticism of desensualization; and this holds even of mysticism and its strivings.

1. While the Church of the East passes out of the historic movement, *the historical task of the Church of the Middle Ages in the West* was primarily that of a mission to the peoples and their education, and more especially to the Germanic race which had now appeared upon the theatre of history. This undoubtedly involved the danger of Christianity becoming regarded as a law of the outward formative

[1] Marheineke, Gesch. der christl. Moral in den der Reformation vorhergehenden Jahrhh. i., Nbg. u. Sulzb. 1806. Allgem. Darstellung des theol. Geistes der kirchl. Verfassung u. kanon. Rechtswissenschaft in Beziehung auf die Moral des Christenth. u. die eth. Denkart des Mittelalters (the second part, which was to deal more with the details of the subject, did not appear). De Wette, Christl. Sittenl. ii. 2, Berl. 1821. Stäudlin, Gesch. der Sittenlehre Jesu, Bd. 4, Gött. 1823, p. 269 ff. V. Eicken, Gesch. u. System der mittelalterl. Weltanschauung, Stuttg. 1887. Theob. Ziegler, Gesch. der Ethik, ii. 243-413. Gass, Gesch. der christl. Ethik, i. 241-417.

shaping of life, and of the Church being made a legal institution whose function is to regulate and direct every individual action externally. The moral principle thereby became an external law, and morality became convertible with the legality of individual action. It was on this basis that the various guides for confession, the penitential books, and the casuistic writings were composed. Their aim was to guide the clergy how to form the right judgment about the various sinful actions in individual cases, and how to dispense the corresponding penance. This led to a quantitative lowering of the moral element, and to an external and temporal measuring of penitence. This penitential practice was, moreover, supported by the German legal custom of making compensation for evil deeds by corresponding satisfactions of a money kind. Accordingly the rules applicable to particular cases were drawn up at different synods; and through these the external life in its moral states, both in the clergy and laity, was to be taken under moral discipline.

2. *The Canon Law.*—In order to fulfil this function the Church of the Middle Ages, in continuation of the ancient Roman tradition, saw its vocation in the government of the peoples embraced within its pale; and it accordingly unfolded itself into a jural commonwealth which, as such, ascribed divine authority to itself. In consequence of this, its Canonical Law is permeated on the one side with moral thoughts and principles, while on the other the legal regulations of the Church and the divine moral Law are identified and confounded with each other. The moral principle was thus lowered and brought down to the level of the jural legislation; and thereby the pre-Christian confusion of morality and legal right was renewed.

3. The *Popular Treatment of Morals.*—The Church of the Middle Ages regarded it as its vocation to communicate and elaborate scholastically the conceptions of the Ancient Church in order to make them available as a means for the education of the peoples, and to convey the product of the ancient and ecclesiastical past to the new world of the nations. Thus arose popular treatises on moral themes, especially on the virtues and vices; and corresponding to this end, and in conformity at the same time with the whole mental idiosyncrasy

of the Middle Ages, they exhibited a preference for schematic treatment. Thus there were reckoned 7 capital sins (or 8 if superbia and cenodoxia were distinguished), 7 works of mercy, 7 sacraments, 7 principal virtues, 7 gifts of the spirit, 8 beatitudes, 10 commandments, 12 articles of faith, and 12 fruits of faith. This numerical schematism may be traced from Isidore through Bede and Alcuin, and it always became more strongly developed. The combination of 4 and 3 plays here a special part, and this is explained by the numerical symbolism of the Bible. Thus, for instance, Bede enumerates the 4 wounds of original sin as ignorantia, malitia, infirmitas, concupiscentia.

4. Out of this beginning grew the *scientific treatment* of Morals which attained its height in the system of Thomas Aquinas. But in this system the Christian ethic appears only as a superstructure on the substructure which the ancient ethics, especially Aristotle's, had laid, so that it is only an *accedens*, and not a power that renews the whole moral thinking and life from the foundation. Notwithstanding all the elements of truth which the ethical doctrine of the scholastics has preserved, it does not pass beyond the quantitative mode of regarding the subject, or the method which is proper to the casuistic and juridical treatment of ethics in estimating individual and external works. It therefore also fails to overcome the ancient error of the distinction between a lower and a higher morality.

5. And just as little can *the Ethics of Mysticism* be regarded as having risen above these limitations, notwithstanding their accentuation of the inwardness of the relationship to God, since they lacked the correct moral conception of God and the fundamental truth of the righteousness of faith as the standard of knowledge. On the contrary, in its denial of the reality of the Ego in contrast to the absolute being of God, the ethic of Mysticism only diverges the more into the path of that false ideal of perfection which consists in the negative morality of asceticism, and which is therefore equivalent to the morality of monasticism.

6. On this standpoint the doctrine of morals does not advance beyond the discord involved in the alternatives, that if it is to become master of the world, it must become legal

and be an external government of life; and if it would save and preserve the character of inwardness, it must become ascetic and monastic. It is in the combination of the two sides of an external control of the world, and at the same time of a negation of the world, and of the determination of the one through the other, that the characteristic peculiarity of the Mediæval Church consists.

§ 51. *The Collections of Canons and the Penitential Books.*[1]

1. The ecclesiastical training of the christianized peoples was carried on especially through the confessional and its questionings. This required direction and guidance for those who heard the confessions, *i.e.* the father-confessors. An enumeration of the particular cases and sins dealt with, may serve to indicate the moral state of those times. As a condition of absolution, there was required, in addition to contritio and confessio, the satisfactio operis. This was a work of penance which was at first regarded as an active exhibition of repentance, but afterwards as a compensation for an act that was displeasing to God by means of a work which was pleasing to Him, and which the father-confessor determined according to the gravity of the sin. Guidance for the discharge of this function was given by the *Libri pœnitentiales* which were founded upon the canonical decisions of the Church. The visitations of the bishops on their episcopal journeys assisted and supported the work of the confessional. As a help to examining into the moral state of the individual, definite questions were directed to the assembled people regarding the various cases of murder, adultery, unchastity, theft, and the robbery of churches, perjury and false witness, witchcraft and superstition; and the offences were punished

[1] Wasserschleben, Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche, Halle 1851. Hildenbrand, Unterss. über die german. Pönitent.-Bücher, Würzb. 1851. Kunstmann, die latt. Pön.-BB. der Angelsachsen, Mainz 1844. Eine übersichtl. Zusammenstellung v. Busskanonens. Zachariæ, Dissert. de locis moralis theologiæ (prefixed to the 3rd ed. of the work of Alph. Liguori). Schmitz, Die Bussbücher u. die Bussdisciplin der Kirche, Mainz 1883 (vgl. die Anzeige v. Wasserschleben in d. Theol. Lit.-Zeitung, 1883, Nr. 26). Mejer, Bussbücher, P. R.-E.[2] iii. 20 ff. Wasserschleben, Kanonen- u. Dekretalensammlungen, P. R.-E.[2] vii. 474 ff.

with corresponding penances.[1] No doubt this was a wholesome discipline in connection with the moral rudeness and unbridledness of the time, yet it was carried out only by means of a practice of law which bore in itself more of a politico-juridical than a spiritual and evangelical character. This whole regulation of the penitential discipline of the Church was devised in behoof of an equitable judgment and punishment of particular moral transgressions, and especially of those of a coarser kind. It introduced into ethics an important juristic element and a quantitative view and treatment of individual cases. This arose from the fact that judicial decision in the confessional, could deal with the individual case less as an object of judgment in its internal subjective motives than in its external actual manifestation. This mode of dealing was occasioned by the pedagogic function of the Church in relation to the newly christianized peoples and the barbarism of the time.[2] The moral condition showed itself also in the increasing profligacy of the clergy, especially of the monks from the ninth till the eleventh century; and it even required legal suppression.[3]

2. *Collections of Canons.*[4]—The Canons of the Greek and

[1] Cf. Gass, i. 257 ff., and Regino's Libri duo de synodalibus causis et disciplinis ecclesiasticis (c. 906 A.D.), ed. Wasserschleben, Lpz. 1849, where there are not less than eighty such questions enumerated, and as many cases are considered anticipatively. A very great number of Provincial Synods occupied themselves with these disciplinary questions.

[2] The Canons of the Church treat of usury, of assassination, of self-defence, of violation of the peace of God (which was commanded by the Treuga), of unbridled lust, of the robbing of pious pilgrims, and of the irregularities of thaumaturgists and sorcerers. Cf. Rietter, Die Moral des h. Thom. v. Aquin., Münch. 1858, p. 132, where are also stated the objections to this way of dealing with morality.

[3] See the accounts of the morals of that time, *e.g.* Gieseler, ii. 1, p. 255 f. Descriptions of the decay of the monastic discipline in the tenth and eleventh centuries are to be found in Vogel, Rotherius v. Verona, Jena 1854, pp. 41 ff., 67 ff., 267, 350, as well as in Peter Damiani († 1072) in his Liber Gomorrhianus. What had to be provided for in the case of Bishops and Clergy, may be seen from the sections in Regino's work referred to above (De Syodalibus, ed. Wasserschleben), where we find the following: De incontinentia clericorum, i. 85–100; De ebriosis clericis, 135–150; De his qui eucharistiam vomunt, i. 151; De clericis inter epulas cantantibus, De clericis maledicis,—jurantibus—detractoribus—lascivis et superbis—seditiosis, de clericis in mutuam cædem prorumpentibus, i. 152–170, etc. Gass, i. 260.

[4] Cf. the sources given in the Text-books of Church Law; *e.g.* Friedberg, 2 Aufl., Lpz. 1884, § 34 ff.

Western Synods were collected and arranged together. An influential collection in the West, was that which was produced by Dionysius Exiguus, a monk of the fifth century. He put together the Oriental Canons (including 50 Canones Apostolorum, 165 numbers taken from a Greek collection of the Canons of Nicea, Ancyra, Neo-Cæsarea, Gangra, Antioch, Laodicea, and Constantinople; twenty-seven Canons of Chalcedon, and twenty-one of Sardica), along with various Roman (Papal) Decrees, and Decisions of African Synods (the Acts of the Synod of Carthage of the year 419, with the decisions of the Synods from 393 A.D., in 138 numbers). Similar collections were prepared by *Fulgentius Ferrandus*, a deacon of Carthage, *c.* 547 A.D. (Breviatio Canonum, an excerpt from the Greek Canons of Dionysius Exiguus and the African Canons up till 427 A.D., in 232 chapters), and by the African bishop *Cresconius*, *c.* 690 A.D. (Concordia Canonum, containing the matter of the collection of Dionysius under three hundred titles). In Spain, again, there existed in the sixth century a collection of Canons (decisions of Councils) and Papal Decretals (Isidorian), supplemented by the collection of Archbishop *Martin of Bracara* († *c.* 580),[1] and afterwards adulterated in France by spurious interpolations and observations (forming the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals).—Similar collections of Canons also arose in the ancient British, Scottish, and Irish Church, as well as in the Anglo-Saxon Church (*v.* the Penitential Orders of Theodore, Bede, Egbert). The Irish collection, which probably arose in the eighth century (Collectio Canonum Hibernensium), may be particularly referred to.—In the Frank Empire the enlarged Dionysian collection was introduced (probably at the Imperial Synod of Aix-la-Chapelle in 802); and later there was also introduced the great Spanish collection with the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, to which a series of other collections were afterwards added. The great number of these collections, and the contradictions among the canons, made a harmonized summary of them necessary. This was done by the monk Gratian at Bologna in the *Decretum Gratiani*[2] about the middle of the twelfth century. The first part of this work

[1] Cf. § 45. 9, *supra*.

[2] Called by himself Concordia discordantium canonum, in order to indicate its main purpose.

consists of 101 Distinctiones relating to the sources of law and to ecclesiastical persons (Tractatus ordinandorum). The second part contains 36 causæ, *i.e.* legal precedents, with questions annexed to them and answers given by canons, and relating especially to spiritual jurisdiction, ecclesiastical crimes, and judicial procedure. But from causa 27 they treat of the right of marriage (Tractatus conjugii), and under causa 33 there is a special Tractatus de pœnitentia. The third part, entitled De consecratione, treats in 5 Distinctiones of the religious actions, namely, the Sacraments. Further collections followed, containing especially the papal decrees from the twelfth century, and canons composed under papal authority (quinque compilationes). These were compiled and arranged by Raymund of Pennaforte (A.D. 1230–1234) in the Five Books of the Decretals of Gregory IX., to which were then added the *Liber sextus* of Boniface VIII. and the *Constitutiones Clementinæ* of Clement V. These productions along with the Decretum Gratiani were afterwards arranged and edited together under the collective name of a *Corpus juris canonici*.

In accordance with the legal character of the Roman Church, these collections make no distinction between jural and moral laws; and the Law and the Gospel are embraced under the conception of the jus and justum. This is a renewal of the theocracy on Christian soil. On the one hand, it presents an ethic which becomes a jurisprudence; and, on the other hand, it exhibits the attempt to regulate all the relationships of life from the standpoint of a universal ecclesiastical supremacy, and an asceticism standing in the service of the Church.

'Gratian's work may be characterized on the side of its moral views. It begins with the following general consideration:[1] "The human race is ruled by two things, by natural right and by moral practice. The natural right is contained in the Law and the Gospel. By it every one is commanded to do to another what he would wish done to himself, and by it every one is forbidden to do to another what he would not have others do to him. Wherefore Christ in the Gospel says: 'What ye would that men should do to you, etc. . . . For this is the law and the prophets.'" By "right," Gratian understands all that the law and the gospel command or forbid, so that he

[1] Stäudlin, iv. 464 ff.

makes no difference between prescriptions of right and of virtue. "Moral practice" is a matter of custom. "All laws are either divine or human. Divine laws exist through nature, human laws through practice; and hence these latter laws are so various among the peoples.—Right is the general name; law and practice are species of right. The law is a written constitution; practice is a long habit or custom. Custom is a right introduced by practice, and it is accepted instead of the law when a law is wanting. It is all one whether it exists in Scripture or reason; for reason recommends also the written law. If all law exists in reason, then everything will be law which rests merely upon reason, which is in harmony with religion and discipline, and which conduces to salvation."[1] Here then ethics in the proper sense is also embraced under the conception of right, and the whole is like a combination of the moral and legal as in the Old Testament law of Israel.—When Gratian further says of *natural right* that it has the prerogative both in time and dignity among all rights, and that it began with the beginning of the rational creation and is immutable, we easily recognise in this the influence of the old ecclesiastical notions which had their root in the views of the Stoics. For the moral commandments of the Old Testament also belong to natural right. As this natural right is immutable, there is no dispensation from it, except when two sins come into collision with one another so that the one of the two must be chosen. A multitude of ethical questions are mixed up with the questions of right. Thus in connection with the case of a priest having murdered any one in madness, the subject of imputation and of the will, and of the sins proceeding from it, is dealt with mostly according to Ambrose and Augustine. This mixing of the ethical and juridical was thereby communicated to the whole thinking of the age.

3. Many of these canons relate to penitence, and were therefore collected and published in special *Penitential Books* for the use of the clergy in the Confessional (ut secundum id quod ibi scriptum est interroget confitentes ut, confessor modum pœnitentiæ imponat). The Penitential Books were widely diffused from the seventh and eighth centuries in Britain and Ireland, and thence even in the Frank and German lands. What John Jejunator and John Scholasticus were for the Greek Church, Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury (a Greek by birth, † 690), was for the Anglo-Saxon Church, although the *Pœnitentiale Theodori* was not composed

[1] Lib. i. Distinct. i. cap. 1–5.

by him, and it is generally uncertain whether he wrote himself on the subject. Penitential Orders are likewise ascribed to the Venerable Bede († 735), and to Egbert, Archbishop of York († 767). The Irish and Anglo-Saxon Penitential Orders were transmitted by Columba († 615) to the Church of the Frank empire in the *Liber de Pœnitentia* (de pœnitentiarum mensura taxanda) and the *Regula Cœnobialis* (de quotidianis pœnitentiis monachorum). These works form the foundation of many later penitential books, but their variety and confusion called forth repeated interposition from the side of the Church, and thereby occasioned attempts to improve them. Thus arose the *Liber pœnitentialis* of Bishop Halitgar of Cambrai in 829 A.D., the Sixth Book of which was, however, of Frankish origin, and is entitled Pœnitentialis Romanus, quem de scrinio Romanæ ecclesiæ adsumpsimus. Further, the *Liber pœnitentiæ* of Rabanus Maurus, who died in 856 as Archbishop of Mayence, was republished by Rabanus himself in his Epistola ad Heribaldum Autissiodorensem by way of answering questions put by Heribald, Bishop of Auxerre, in 853. Besides these works there were also many others the matter of which passed into the collections of the Canon Law down to Gratian. The many individual questions embodied in the Penitential Books were increased both by the Canon Law and by the formalism of the Scholastic moral science. Connected as they were with auricular confession, which required the judicial decision of the priest on the several actions, they led to the development of casuistry, and occasioned a systematic treatment of the manifold material in the *Summæ* by the Casuists or moralists, or as they were also called the Summists, in distinction from the Canonists. The first production of this kind is considered to be the work of Raymund of Pennaforte, in the thirteenth century, entitled *Summa de casibus pœnitentialibus*, in four alphabetically arranged books. It was widely circulated, and was followed by many similar works. Among these may be specially mentioned the *Astesana* (Summa de casibus conscientiæ, in eight Books 1330, Norimb. 1482, Venet. 1519, etc., by the Franciscan Astesanus of Asti), distinguished by its more systematic arrangement, and by having prefixed to it the general doctrine of the divine commandments, the virtues and

vices; the *Pisanella* (by Bartholomew of Pisa, *c.* 1338; published at Paris in 1470, at Venice in 1476, at Milan in 1494, and at Lyons in 1519); the *Pacifica* (by Pacificus of Novara, *c.* 1470, printed at Venice in 1574); the *Rosella* (by the Genoan Tronnamala, printed at Strasburg in 1516); and the *Angelica* (by the Genoan Franciscan Angelus of Clarosio, † 1495, first published in 1486). *Sylvester Prierias*, known as an opponent of Luther, also published a *Summa casuum conscientiæ*, which is likewise called *Summa summarum* in 1515, 1518. This work was merely a summary of the other works in an alphabetical form.

4. *Certain special determinations of Church Law.*[1]—The *synods* continued the conflict against the survivals of *heathenism* and heathen practices, such as offerings to the dead, soothsaying, amulets, sorcery, offerings at fountains, trees, stones, etc. Social intercourse with the *Jews* was forbidden. The evidence of Jews against Christians was declared to be invalid, and what Jews had gained from Christians by usury, they had again to restore. The laws against *heretics* were made more stringent. The bishops were enjoined to exercise precise supervision, and the authorities were urged to carefulness and severity. Those who were condemned for heresy were to be handed over to the magistrate for condign punishment; and the support of heretics was to be punished with excommunication.[2] As the *clergy* were the light of men and the salt of the earth, it was their duty to preserve this salt, to know well the Canons and the "pastoral rule" of Gregory the Great. They were enjoined to exhort the people diligently, and the bishop was specially to take charge of the poor before the courts, to give a good example, and to preach

[1] Stäudlin, iv. 473 ff.

[2] Stringent decrees were passed in reference to heretics, particularly by the Synods of Avignon in 1209 (c. 2), and Toulouse in 1229 (c. 1–3, 6, 7, 9–13, 15). In connection therewith, the latter Synod also prohibited the laity from having or using the Scriptures, c. 2.: Prohibemus etiam nec libros V. T. aut N. laici permittantur habere, nisi forte psalterium vel breviarium pro divinis officiis aut horas b. Mariæ aliquis ex devotione habere velit. Sed ne præmissos libros habeant in vulgari translatos arctissime prohibemus. The Synod of Tarracon in 1234 ordained (c. 2) not merely that no one should have any Books of the Old and New Testaments in the Romanic language (in Romanico), but that whoever did not give up such to the bishop to be burned, should lie under the suspicion of heresy until he purged himself of it.

diligently.[1] The bishops were to read much; whenever possible, they were to learn by heart the Gospel and the Epistles of Paul, and to make themselves acquainted with the works written by the holy Fathers upon them. Further, they were to plant schools, and to inquire as to whether the parochial priests knew and taught the Decalogue, and had knowledge of the deadly sins, the seven sacraments, and the articles of the Christian faith. — Numerous canons were promulgated against *Simony*. Various synods forbade the taking of anything for the performance of clerical acts.[2] The old canons against the marriage, concubinage, and licentiousness of the *clergy*, and their living with females, were often repeated and made more stringent. The same holds with regard to the other determinations regarding the clergy in the matter of luxury of dress and worldly modes of life; against their visiting public houses, engaging in common trades, or being guilty of theft, turbulence, assault, arson, intoxication, false coining, and such like;[3] which undoubtedly show a questionable condition of society. It was not merely in regions like Hungary that such decrees were necessary; the moral state of the clergy, and even of the bishops in the Franco-Gallic Church, furnishes examples of a similar kind.[4] —In regard to the *monastic Orders*, many decrees are found which are directed to the preservation of chastity. No women were to live or serve in the monasteries; the monasteries were not to be double so as to include both monks and nuns; and mutual access was forbidden. It appears that the *nunneries* often needed thorough reform, and their members required rigid supervision and limitation; for they were not seldom the seat of incredible licentiousness and immorality.[5] In the synods, we meet again and again prohibitions directed

[1] Tours, iii. (813) c. 17: Quilibet episcopus habeat homilias continentes necessarias admonitiones, quibus subjecti erudiantur, *i.e.* de fide catholica, etc. Et ut easdem homilias quisque aperte transferre studeat in rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscam, quo facilius cuncti possint intelligere quæ dicuntur.

[2] But with the addition: nisi quod fideles sponte dare vel offere voluerint.

[3] Salzburg, 1281, c. 17; Gran (Strigon.), 1114, c. 48, 58; Ofen (Budens.), 1279, c. 7.

[4] Cf. H. Rückert, Kulturgesch. des deutschen Volkes, ii., Lpz. p. 496 ff.

[5] Cf. *e.g.* the narratives of Gregory of Tours, x. 39–43, 15–17, regarding the scandalous happenings in the monastery of St. Radegundis at Poitiers in 589. Rückert, *l.c.* 522 f.

against unchastity and various other vices. One gets the impression from these decrees that the monasteries and nunneries must have given much cause for such regulations.

The duties towards the *poor*, *widows*, *orphans*, and *slaves*, and towards strangers and travellers, were often pointedly laid down by the synods and specially impressed on the bishops. As regards *marriage* and the sexual life generally, the earlier decisions, which were already very detailed, were repeated in their essentials.—*Duelling* was put on a level with murder by the Synod of Valence in 855 A.D. Any person who killed or severely wounded another in a duel, was to be excommunicated as a murderer and robber; and whoever fell in a duel was to be regarded as a suicide. If trial by duel, as well as other ordeals and judgments of God, became more frequent, this did not rest upon any synodal decrees. In like manner, those who perished in tournaments were not to receive ecclesiastical burial; and tournaments were regarded as duels.[1] In order to counteract the influence of feuds, the synods caused the oath of peace (*treuga*) to be sworn from time to time under the threat of heavy penalties.[2] *The punishment of death* was also now regarded with general aversion from the side of the Church. A clergyman was never to pronounce a sentence of death, and he was not to promote revenge for blood. Suicides, persons executed for crimes, and those who were excommunicated, or who stood under interdict, robbers, and all criminals who died without absolution, were excluded from *ecclesiastical burial*.

A few further details may be cited from the older Penitential Books.[3] Gluttony and drunkenness were punished by the penance of fasting from three to forty days, according to the circumstances of each case. Sexual sins, which are referred to in all conceivable forms of excess, and with the most specific, obscene details, were punished with penance for years, and even, under certain circumstances, till death. Homicide, according to its circumstances, was visited with the penalty of from forty

[1] Lateran. iii. 1179, c. 20; iv. 1215, c. 18.

[2] Narbonne, 1054. Rouen, 1096, c. 1–4.

[3] Gass, Gesch. der Ethik, i. 253 f., especially in reference to the Pœnitentiale Theodori. Details are given by Friedberg, Aus deutschen Bussbüchern. Ein Beitr. zur deutschen Kulturgesch., Halle 1868.

days to ten years. The killing of a priest was doubly punished. Child murder and exposure, on the other hand, were punished mildly. But to celebrate Easter with the Jews on the 14th day of the month, in opposition to the Nicean Council, was punished with full excommunication, and therefore much more severely than murder. This shows that the commandment of the Church was put higher than the commandment of God (cf. Matt. xv. 1 ff.). Perjury was visited with a penance lasting for years, yet with a difference according as the false oath was made before a consecrated or unconsecrated cross; in the former case the penance was for three years, and in the latter for one year. Anything suffocated or accidentally killed, was prohibited as food. Heathen sacrifices or magical practices were to be expiated by years of penance. The combination of the moral, legal, and what came under social practice, showed a relapse from the height of Christian morality to the stage of the pre-Christian moral view. This as well as the isolation of moral cases and their decisions, which, by the nature of things, could not but be confined, more or less, to the external act, and which mixed up the function of the pastor, the judge, and the teacher, could only confuse and externalize the moral judgment, and ultimately lead ethics aside into the path of probabilism. Moreover, the transmutation of penance into money payments in connection with the old German legal practice of expiating offences by means of money, and the perversion of what is most inward into a most external performance, could not but do more harm to the conscience than all the teaching and discipline of the Church could possibly make up for.

§ 52. *The Pre-Scholastic Treatment of Ethics.*

The beginning of the Middle Ages presents a series of works which, like the writings of Isidore of Seville, seek to be the means of communicating the product of the Patristic Period to the Church of the Middle Ages.

1. The Venerable Bede (*Beda Venerabilis*, † 375) exhibited the zeal of a collector. His *Scintillæ patrum*—if this is indeed his work—is a collection of short moral sayings on the most various virtues and errors. It is arranged in eighty chapters, and the material is derived from the Holy Scriptures and the Fathers. Its object is to guide to conduct in accordance with its maxims. In his exegetical labours he has also,

by means of the allegorical method which he followed, introduced many moral observations and elucidations.

The Anglo-Saxon monk *Aldhelm*,[1] who died in 709 as a bishop, continued the earlier works on virginity and the principal vices, and in special connection with the above-mentioned poets who treated these ethical themes. He addressed a treatise to an abbess and the nuns under her charge, entitled *De laudibus virginitatis, s. de Virginitate Sanctorum*. Aldhelm says that as honey excels all other kinds of sweetness, so does virginity excel the other virtues. Marriage is not indeed to be despised, but it is on a lower grade. To this view he attached his explanation of the eight principal vices, and of pride as the worst of them, with which the ascetics have to combat, so that they thus need the support of the other virtues. He refers to Cassian and the Moralia of Gregory the Great. As an "example," he added (c. 20 ff.) a short characteristic of a series of ascetics and (c. 40) of women. He further treated this theme in a poem, *De laude virginum*, containing 2905 hexameters, which in the last 419 hexameters treats de octo principalibus vitiis, and of the struggle with these principal vices. This poem only repeats what former writers had said.

2. A new age, both of ecclesiastical and theological literature, begins for the Western Continent with Charlemagne. His influence extended through wide circles, and reached beyond the time of Louis the Pious. The Ancient Church had already in its scientific representatives more or less consciously regarded it as its task to combine the ancient element and the Christian element with each other. Christian Rome set up this alliance for the West. Charlemagne considered it his duty to be the means of communicating the culture of Rome to his new Frank dominions. With this he inaugurated the theme of the Western Middle Ages. The Roman Church has continued to be till to-day the combination of these two elements, the ancient and the Christian. And assuredly it has been an external combination, in which the Christian element has had only the significance of an accessory completion instead of an internally renovating power, and even in many respects only that of an external vesture, behind which

[1] Ebert, i. *l.c.*

the ancient, or rather heathen, nature has remained unchangedly the same. The man who chiefly aided Charlemagne in communicating the old culture of Rome to the Franks of his new empire was the Anglo-Saxon Alcuin.

Alcuin[1] realized the necessity of making the traditional knowledge available for a new scientific elaboration, and he thus formed the transition from the patristic to the scholastic time. His *De virtutibus et vitiis*, in thirty-six chapters, was composed as a manual for a Frank Count named Wido.[2] It is a collection of Bible passages and other Christian ethical sentences, but without the names of the authors. It treats of the genuine wisdom and of the three theological virtues, and then in irregular order of other virtues and duties, as well as of the eight principal sins (following Cassian) and the four cardinal virtues.[3] Among the means of virtue the reading of the Holy Scripture is particularly recommended, because we thereby learn to know ourselves and have love to God kindled within us. Further, the confession of sins and fasting, combined with repentance and improvement, are required. His treatise *De ratione animæ* (Liber ad Eulaliam virginem) seeks to prove from the nature of the soul that man is destined for the love of God. It is a need of the soul to love, and naturally to love the good; but God is the highest and most perfect good; and therefore love to Him is the deepest need and the highest satisfaction of the soul. The rational soul is called to rule over the lower powers, which include the faculty of desire and of aversion (the concupiscibile et irascibile); and it has thus to realize morality, which is described under the four cardinal virtues, whose higher unity is love. Sin, on

[1] Stäudlin, iv: 271 ff. K. Werner, Alcuin u. s. Jahrhundert, Paderb. 1876. Ebert, ii. 12 ff.

[2] As a manualis libellus in which he could daily contemplate himself and find what he ought to do in order to attain to the culmen perfectionis, which is possible for laymen as well as for others. For the qualitas secularis conversationis is not an impediment to entering into the Kingdom of Heaven. It is the non-monk Alcuin who here speaks.

[3] On the Cardinal Virtues: Prudentia est rerum divinarum humanarumque, prout homini datum est, scientia, in qua intelligendum est, quid cavendum sit homini vel quid faciendum.—Justitia est animi nobilitas unicuique rei propriam tribuens dignitatem.—Fortitudo est magna animi patientia et longanimitas et perseverantia in bonis operibus et victoria contra omnium vitiorum genera. Temperantia est totius vitæ modus etc. Gass, i. 264.

the other hand, consists in the domination of the lower impulses over reason. From unbridled desire there arise excess, licentiousness, covetousness; from the uncontrolled faculty of aversion (irascibile) there arise anger, melancholy (tristitia), and inertness or dulness (acedia); and reason again degenerates into pride (superbia, the source of sins) and vainglory (cenodoxia), from which the other capital vices arise.

Finally, his treatise *De confessione peccatorum* belongs to the practical works which were composed as aids to church discipline, the confessional, and the cure of souls, and which turned ethics into casuistry.

3. In consequence of his being called upon by Archbishop Ebbo of Rheims to produce a work which would overcome the differences and contradictions of the Penitential Books, and the disorders in the practice of the confessional which were thereby occasioned,[1] *Halitgarius*,[2] Bishop of Cambrai, in the reign of Louis the Pious, wrote his *De virtutibus et vitiis et de ordine pœnitentium*. It is properly a Penitential Book, and hence was also entitled Libri quinque pœnitentiales. The matter of it was taken from other works. Book I. treats of the eight principal vices, with their offshoots, and the means to be adopted against them. It is almost entirely taken from Augustine, Prosper, and Gregory the Great. Book II. treats of the active and contemplative life, the theological virtues, virtue generally, and the usual cardinal virtues. Books III. and IV. discuss the penitence of the laity, its time, kind, and manner, and the penances to be undergone for particular sins and vices. Book V. deals, in conclusion, with the penitences of the clergy.[3]

Jonas,[4] Bishop of Orleans, a contemporary of Halitgar, found occasion through Count Matfrid of Orleans to write on the question: How those who live in marriage have to lead a life

[1] Ita confusa sunt judicia pœnitentium in presbyterorum nostrorum opusculus atque ita diversa et inter se discrepantia etc. So runs the letter of the Archbishop to Halitgar.

[2] Stäudlin, iv. 280 ff.

[3] Under the special title, Regulæ de ministris ecclesiæ, si deviaverint, canonice prolatæ. The whole concludes with a luctuosa descriptio carnaliter viventium sacerdotum.

[4] Stäudlin, iv. 282 f. Amelung, Leben u. Schriften des Bisch. Jon. v. Orl. Inaug. Dessert., Dresd. 1888.

well-pleasing to God? His treatise, *De institutione laicali*, in Three Books, is made up of a collection of passages from the Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church. He occupies himself with this question in Book II., but goes beyond it and gives instruction concerning the whole Christian life, so that the work, on account of its rich ethical contents, is of importance for the history of Christian Ethics.[1] According to Jonas, Christian morality is founded in baptism and in penitence, which were put from of old into close relation with each other. He indicates as the religious duties that rest upon these,[2] diligent attendance on church and constant prayer. Prayer is to be practised in all places, and not merely in the church. Passing on to marriage[3] and conjugal fidelity, he calls to mind that married people ought to care for the salvation of the souls of their households. He explains at length thereafter the duties of the clergy[4] and the poor,[5] the sins of the tongue,[6] and the duty of hospitality.[7] He then proceeds to explain the principal Christian virtues and the principal sins.[8] He next treats of other sins of the tongue,[9] and the duty of mercy in contrast to avarice,[10] calling to mind that one ought to be merciful to his own soul before he exercises mercy to others; and that one should not think that he can purchase permission from God to sin by performing many good deeds. He lays the chief importance all through upon the disposition. He also wrote a treatise of instruction for a king, entitled *De institutione regia*, which was dedicated to Pepin, and which was recapitulated in the decrees of the Synod of Paris of 829 A.D. along with part of the De institutione laicali.[11] Of the two powers, the priestly and the royal, the first, according to him, stands far above the second. He connects the general moral precepts with the duties of the regent. Love, bona voluntas, is the unity of the virtues. But to the law of God incumbent on all there are to be added for the ascetic who flees from the world the precepts of the gospel (consilia evangelica). It is evident that we have here again the traditional way of thinking.

[1] Amelung, *l.c.* p. 48 f. [2] I. 11–20. [3] II. 1 ff.
[4] II. 19–21. [5] III. 22–24. [6] III. 26–28.
[7] II. 29. [8] III. 1–6. [9] III. 7–9. [10] III. 10, 11.
[11] So Amelung in opposition to others.

Smaragdus,[1] Abbot of St. Michael, in the diocese of Verdun, wrote a similar treatise, entitled *Via regia*, and dedicated it to Louis the Pious. It treats of the Christian duties generally, and the duties of a ruler in particular. The "royal way" which the earthly king must walk upon in order to attain to the heavenly kingdom, is described by the author. In his description he treats first of the love of God and of our neighbour, then of the fulfilment of the commandments of God which that love requires, of the fear of God, and of the sacred wisdom, of which fear of God is the beginning, and of prudence, simplicity, and patience (c. 1–7). He then turns to the more special royal duties and virtues, to justice, the protection of orphans, widows, and the poor, and to mercy, through which works God is to be honoured. In this connection he mentions the tithes and firstlings with which the king has to honour God, *i.e.* the Church, in order thus to lay up treasure for himself in heaven. He ought not to boast of earthly treasures, but humble himself before God, and this will conduce to his peace. He ought to be zealously concerned for the Church, etc. (c. 8–20). The treatise then deals with errors, and gives warning against them (c. 21 ff.). Pride, which brought Satan to his fall, is as usual named first, and then jealousy and envy. Goodness of heart is the means of saving one from the first, and brotherly love from the others. The king should not requite evil with evil; he should suppress anger, should not listen to flatterers, should guard himself against covetousness and avarice. He should charge judges that they ought not to ask any reward for the exercise of justice; and he should be anxious for the manumission of the serfs in his kingdom, as we are all created equal by nature (c. 30).[2] The book closes with an exhortation to the king to pray for God's help, that he may be able to fulfil such duties. Another treatise by the same author has much affinity with the one now mentioned. It is entitled *Diadema Monachorum* vel de ecclesiasticorum et monachorum maxime virtutibus. As the preface says, it is an anthology of expressions of the Fathers, taken mostly from Cassian's Collationes patrum and from

[1] Stäudlin, iv. 286 f. Ebert, ii. 108 ff.

[2] Considerans (the master of the servants) quia non illi eos natura subegit sed culpa; conditione enim æqualiter creati sumus.

"various doctors," Gregory the Great being particularly used. It surveys the duties of the Christians generally, and of the monk in particular, and contains 100 chapters. It was designed for the evening reading of the monks, as Benedict's rule formed their morning reading. It was held in respect through the whole of the Middle Ages, and was repeatedly printed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

4. The impulses given by Alcuin were continued most successfully by his learned and zealous scholar, the German Hraban, better known as *Rabanus Maurus*.[1] He was Abbot of Fulda and Archbishop of Mayence († 856). He carried on Alcuin's work both by oral instruction and by varied literary activity. He wrote various disciplinary ascetic and ethical treatises. Of these may be named his *De virtutibus et vitiis et peccatorum satisfactione*, which gives a survey of the duties of the several classes of society; and his *De vivendo Deo*, puritate cordis et modo pœnitentiæ, in Three Books. He likewise dealt with the relations of his time, especially with the imprisonment and dethronement of Louis the Pious by his sons in 833 A.D., and exhibited his remarkable stedfastness of character in his treatise *De reverentia filiorum erga patres et subditorum erga reges*, in which he inculcates the divine commandment to honour parents, on the ground of Holy Scripture, and then shows how displeasing to God is the insubordination of subjects to those entrusted with the royal dignity. In his Sermons he also often treats of moral themes. Thus, in his 42nd and 43rd Homilies, he combats the remaining traces of heathen superstition, all the absurd practices kept up during the waning moon, as well as the consulting of soothsayers and interpreters of signs in cases of sickness, as also those vices of the time,[2] which were regarded as of no consequence, or even boasted of as virtues, such as revelling and drunkenness (comessatio and ebrietas) in the case of the rich and poor, and even of the clergy. It is easy to understand that the contemplative life stands in his judgment, as a monk, higher than the active life, although he himself was active enough, and represented in many respects a sound ethic. The gospel demands purity of heart, for it is only the pure in heart who see God; and the world of the higher morality is, therefore,

[1] Ebert, ii. 120 ff. [2] Homil. 63.

the inward life of the soul. But the way to it goes through conflict (agon Christianus), the conflict of virtue (virtus non vis), and its four cardinal virtues (according to the number of perfection), against its enemies the seven or eight vices (according to the number of the seven nations which Israel had to overcome at the conquest of Canaan, or eight with Egypt included); and this conflict is to be carried through by means of asceticism. He thus expounds the subject in his explanation of the Rule of the Benedictines.

Undoubtedly the Gottshalk controversy about predestination and the question of the sacraments, was what most employed the minds and pens of that active time, so that the questions of ethics received less consideration. *Paschasius Radbertus* († 865), who is known in connection with the history of the doctrine of the eucharist, wrote, however, on the three theological virtues, *De fide, spe, et caritate*, in Three Books, *i.e.* De tribus istis virtutibus, sine quibus nemo est Christianus, as he says in his conclusion. He expounds in detail that principle which afterwards became through Anselm characteristic of the thinking of the Middle Ages: Credo ut intellegam.[1] *Hinkmar of Rheims*[2] († 882) found time, along with his extensive activity and his taking part in the predestination controversy in his *De prædestinatione et libero arbitrio*, to compose certain political and moral writings. Thus, by the wish of Charles the Bald, he wrote his *De regis persona et regio ministerio*, on the duties of a ruler, consisting mainly of a collection of passages of Holy Scripture and expressions of the Fathers of the Church, especially Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory the Great. In this work he lays down the positions that only just wars are to be waged; that for those who have fallen in such wars oblations, alms, and prayers should be offered; and that crimes ought to be impartially punished. At the close, he gave special consideration to the question how a king should behave to such near relatives as offend against God,

[1] Porro illa quæ de Deo divinitus dicuntur, credibilia quidem sunt simul et intelligibilia; sed nisi credantur primo, nunquam intelliguntur; ideirco necesse est credantur ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota virtute, ut Christo illustrante hic ex parte et in futuro ex toto intelligantur; et tanto amplius vel perfectius hic aut illuc, quanto mundiores corde mandatorum Dei præceptorumque observatores erimus, i. 7. 2.

[2] Ebert, ii. 247 ff.

the Church, and the sovereign authority, a discussion occasioned by occurrences that had taken place in the Carlovingian dynasty. His other treatise, *De cavendis vitiis et virtutibus exercendis*, is likewise addressed to Charles the Bald. It is specially founded upon the Moralia and Homilies of Gregory the Great. It gives a vivid description of the (six) principal vices: avaritia, superbia, luxuria, gula, invidia, ira, as well as other minor vices. He then proceeds to deal with the question from which he started as to how far works of mercy can wipe away guilt, and he holds that this cannot be done without repentance, which demands abstinence from sin.

5. *John Scotus Erigena*[1] resided at the Court of Charles the Bald as a teacher. He came from Ireland, and died *c.* 880 A.D. His philosophical works and impulses influenced the following centuries of the Middle Ages. What Scotus was the means of introducing to the West was chiefly the emanistic Neo-Platonic Mysticism of Dionysius Areopagita and the kindred thoughts of Maximus Confessor, the "Divinus Philosophus." His principal work is entitled *De divisione naturæ*. In Book V. he expounds his general ethical thoughts in connection with his acosmistic system. The world and man, in whom the oppositions of nature are embraced, constitute the modes of the manifestation of God, who cannot be conceived without the creation, as the cause is not without the effect. The sensible existence of man and of the world is itself already a consequence of sin, through which the original, spiritual, and sexless corporeity of man became sensible, material, and sexual. The goal of man is therefore the return out of this contradictory material existence to God, from the effect to the cause (adunatio, deificatio); and this has taken place in principle with the ascension of Christ. Man raises himself through mystical contemplation to union with God,—a process which is being continually realized in the course of the world, in which God becomes all in all and manifests Himself as the proper reality, and in whom all other being is merged. From

[1] Christlieb, Das Leben u. die Lehre des J. Scot. Erig., Goth. 1860. Ders., P. R.-E.[2] xiii. 788–804. Huber, J. Sc. Er. Ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der Philos. u. Theol. im M.-A., München 1861. Noack, J. Sc. Er. Sein Leben u. s. Schriften, Lpz. 1876. Ebert, ii. 257 ff. Further, see the Histories of the Philosophy of the Middle Ages.

this Scotus Erigena deduced a mystically grounded ascetic morality, which on its own peculiar path concurred with the monastic ideal of the time, and which also revealed its non-ethical, but speculative and acosmistic root. For, the properly historical and moral redemption has for this ethic of desensualization hardly any significance at all. These speculative thoughts of Erigena gave a certain impulse at that time to thinkers in the Church, and they afterwards exercised an influence upon mysticism. Yet the fact that not merely the followers of the St. Victors referred to him, but that the pantheists, Amalrich of Bena, and David of Dinanto, and other mystical sects of the Middle Ages went back to him, had the effect of bringing him into suspicion in later times, and the censure of the Church was repeatedly called forth by his work, *De divina natura*.

6. The brilliant time of Charles the Bald, with the shining meteor of Erigena, was followed in the tenth century by what has not been wrongly called the century of barbarism. In France the fragments of better days were still to be found, but Italy was completely sunk in sin and darkness; and this was especially the case at Rome and with the Roman clergy, who were only restrained by a crude belief in miracles. The descriptions of *Ratherius of Verona*[1] († 974), although rhetorical in form, give us a dark picture of that time. He employed the leisure of a long imprisonment to write his *Prælquia* in Six Books, in which he treated of the duties of every rank and class in opposition to the external secularization of the time. He sought reform in the strict observation of the canons as the discipline inspired by God Himself, and in the restoration of the authority of the spiritual office, or, in short, in the intensification of an external ecclesiasticism. In this sense he punished all disregard of the canons (de contemtu canonum), and impressed on his clergy strict observance of the laws of the Church.—The quiet life of the learned monk *Hermann of Reichenau*,[2] surnamed the Lame (Contractus, † 1054), forms a contrast to the restless life of

[1] Herm. Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im M.-A. i., Berl. 1875, p. 69 f. On Ratherius specially, Alb. Vogel, Rath. v. Ver. u. das 10 Jahrh., 2 Thle., Jena 1854. Id. P. R.-E. xii. 503 ff.

[2] Baumann, Stud. u. Krit. 1869. Wuttke, i. 472, note 49, by L. Schultze.

Ratherius. His didactic poem on the moral life of his time, and especially on the abominations that prevailed in the nunneries, was written for certain friendly nuns, and it treats of the conflict against the eight principal sins.—*Hildebert of Tours*[1] († 1134) revived the ancient popular moral philosophy of the Stoics. He was greatly celebrated, was a friend of Anselm, and was lauded by Bernard of Clairvaux; but in his ethics he was more dependent on Cicero and Seneca than a properly Christian moralist. His *Philosophia moralis de honesto et utili* is an elucidation of the four ancient principal virtues. It contains, in a way that entirely recalls Cicero, an investigation of the *honestum* with a comparison of the *honesta*, and then of the *utile* with a comparison of the *utilia*, and finally an elucidation of the relation between the *honestum* and the *utile*. He further wrote a *Libellus de quattuor virtutibus vitæ honestæ*. This treatise stands entirely on the ground of the ancient ethics.[2] It served to hand down the ancient elements, a process which went side by side with the transmission of the doctrine of the Church in the Middle Ages. What we have here is a juxtaposition, an external connection of these two things: and, as we have seen, this was characteristic of the Middle Ages.

7. About the middle of the eleventh century a new movement arose in France and Italy, which in various forms ruled the whole of the following period of the Middle Ages. It was partly of a scientific nature; and it had partly its origin in monasticism. In France it was due to the impulses exerted upon wide circles by the celebrated Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester II. († 1003), the results of which were carried on by men like Lanfranc and Anselm. They also found a home in Germany in the flourishing schools of Hildesheim, Bremen, Lüttich, Reichenau, and Hirschau.[3] With this concurred the reform of the Benedictine Order carried out in Clugny and from that centre in the spirit of monastic severity. It soon ruled the mental attitude of the age, and showed the Church

[1] Wagenmann, P. R.-E.[2] vi. 109 f.

[2] *E.g.* de fortitudine: stultum est timere quod non possis vitare. Mora non metuenda viris. Hac conditione cuncta gignuntur: quod cœpit, etiam desinet.

[3] Herm. Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufkl. im M.-A. i. 85 ff.

the goal of universal sovereignty by the way of renunciation of the world. For if the monk was the ideal of the Christian, the moral renewal of Christendom appeared to coincide with that of monasticism, a view which certainly took the rest of Christendom only indirectly into consideration. But the essence of monasticism was renunciation of the world; and therefore the task of life was to be accomplished by a completer release from the world, which, however, according to the Roman view from the time of Gregory the Great, was to be carried out so as to subserve the government of the world by the Church.—*Peter Damiani*,[1] born at Ravenna in 1007, was a representative of this monastic severity. In his thirtieth year, after the example of predecessors in the ancient Church, he suddenly abandoned his learned position in life and joined a community of hermits, whose prior and abbot he became. He was soon honoured in wider circles as the saintly head and energetic advocate of the new austerity which was then introduced into monasticism. He carried out the so-called discipline of monkish flagellation, in connection with his scholar Dominicus (Loricatus[2]), to an incredible extent, and practised it with a real fanaticism. The reading of the Psalms at prayers was accompanied with strokes of the scourge; 1000 strokes were given for every ten Psalms; and therefore 150,000 were delivered during the reading of the whole Psalter. The strokes were at first given with rods, but afterwards with leathern thongs, in order thereby to make expiation for hundreds of years. Damiani was himself compelled to check this frenzy for flagellation among his scholars. It was laid down that no one was to be compelled to undergo scourging; and every one as a rule was to be satisfied with forty Psalms at one time, and therefore with 4000 lashes. He embodied his view of this ascetic way of thinking in various writings (*De virtutibus; De Simonia; De correctione episcopi et papæ; De eleemosyna; De perfectione monachorum; De ordine regulæ cremiticæ*, etc.); and he sharply criticised the moral state of the clergy in his book written for Pope Leo IX. concerning the Gomorrhian wickedness of the clergy

[1] Neukirch, Das Leben des P. D., 1 Th., Gött. 1875. A. Vogel, Vortrag über P. D., Jena 1856, and P. R.-E.[2] iii. 466 ff.

[2] So called from the coat of mail which he wore on his bare body.

(*Liber Gomorrhianus*). He also practically applied the same critical severity to the clergy in church discipline, as well as in numerous writings relating to the Pope and the cardinals, in which he earnestly held up before them their duties, and blamed their worldly luxury. He advocated this ascetic denial of the world on the part of the Hildebrand party, whose efforts he incessantly promoted, in order to bring the Church to supremacy over the world. He represents the two sides of the theocratic idea of the Middle Ages which had taken shape from the time of Gregory the Great, namely, the universal supremacy of the Church over the world, and the realization of this supremacy by the way of ascetic denial of the world; and he may be said to have given the idea its most characteristic and most impressive popular form.

The authors of the other ethical productions of this time mostly move on the usual paths. This holds of the distinguished *Fulbert of Chartres* († 1029), who treated ethical subjects not only in his numerous letters and sermons, but also in special treatises (*De laicorum et mulierum pœnitentia; De virtutibus; Sententiæ antiquorum de virtutibus*).—*Peter of Blois* († *c.* 1200) is distinguished for his bold censure of the moral abuses of the clergy and for his judgments on the relative value of external ceremonies. He wrote on the duties of a father-confessor and of a bishop, and on Christian friendship.—*Peter of Celle*, who became bishop of Chartres († 1183), is of interest from the way in which he treats of monastic discipline, comparing Christian monasticism with the analogous phenomena on the soil of heathenism and Judaism.[1] Philosophy, *i.e.* heathenism, goes the way of the natural life of the spirit; Judaism seeks earthly prosperity by sacrifices, etc.; and Christianity seeks the grace of God. But this it does in

[1] De disciplina claustrali, c. 8: Scintilla naturalis boni, quæ remansit in homine, multiplices adinvenit disciplinas.—Unaquæque gens pro capacitate rationis disciplinam sibi confinxit ad quam viveret.—Intendit philosophia gloriam humanam et favorem; Judæi bona terræ, Christiani spem veniæ et gratiæ, et claustralis cumulum gratiæ et gloriæ. Philos. abjicit impedimenta carnis et onera seculi; Jud. hostiis et muneribus studet ad emendationem carnis; christ. sacramentis eccles. emundatur ab operibus mortuis; claustralis non solum abstinet ab illicitis sed etiam licitis. Phil. seminat in spiritu non De sed suo et vano; Jud. in carne; christ. in fide spe et caritate; claustr. in filiali adoptione etc.

two stages: that of the common Christian life, which abstains from what is forbidden, and keeps itself pure from dead works by faith, hope, and love; and the higher stage of monastic perfection, which abstains even from what is allowed in order to attain to the proper sonship of God. Here the dominant ecclesiastical way of thinking is brought into connection with a more general historical reflection. The moral reflection itself keeps entirely upon the path of the previous development, conditioned as it was by the fundamental error which makes the attitude and conduct of the individual in less or more elevated stages the basis of the relationship to God.

Scholasticism starts from this presupposition; and it sets itself to justify the ecclesiastical doctrine by the aid of the pre-Christian philosophy, and to exhibit it in its systematic connection. And the fundamental presupposition of Mysticism was really the same, to whatever degree it may have appeared to deviate from this path.

53. *Ethics in the Beginning of the Scholastic Period.*[1]

Anselm stands at the head of the first period of Scholasticism, and he combines in himself the dialectical and the mystical element. These two elements then become separated, and the former is represented by Abelard in his Ethics, which he seeks to construct from the conscience, while the

[1] Literature on Anselm: Hasse, Ans. v. Cant., 2 Bde., Lpz. 1843. Cremer, Die Wurzeln des Ans. Satisfaktionsbegriffs. Stud. u. Krit. 1880, 1. A. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers., 2 Aufl. i. 31 ff. Erdmann, Gesch. d. Philos. i., Berl. 1866, pp. 256 ff. Jacobi, P. R.-E.[2] i. 433 ff.—On Abelard: Neander, Gesch. der Ethik, p. 272. Bittcher, Ueber die Schriften, den philos. Standpunkt. u. die Ethik des P. Ab. Ztschr. f. histor. Theol. 1870, 1, pp. 1–90 (the Ethics, pp. 68–90). H. Reuter, Gesch. der Aufklärung im M.-A. i. pp. 183–259. Fr. Nitzsch, P. R.-E.[2] i. 6 ff. Deutsch, P. A., ein krit. Theol. des 12 Jahrh., Lpz. 1833. Gass, Gesch. d. Eth. i. 303 ff. Theob. Ziegler, ii. 262 ff.—On Bernard: Neander, Der. h. Bernh. u. s. Zeitalter, 3 Aufl., Goth. 1865. Plitt, Bernhs. Anschauungen v. christl. Leben. Ztschr. für hist. Theol. 1862, 2, pp. 164–238. Ders., Festpredigten des h. Bernh., ein Zeugniss für die evang. Wahrheit aus der mittelalterl. K. Erl. 1860. H. Reuter, Brieger's Ztschr. f. hist. Theol. i. 36 ff. A. Ritschl, Lesefrüchte u. s. w. Stud. u. Krit. 1879. Ders., Gesch. des Pietism. i. 46 ff. Preger, Gesch. d. deutschen Mystik im M.-A., Lpz. 1874, i. 218 ff. Jacobi, P. R.-E.[2] ii. 324 ff.

latter is represented by Bernard of Clairvaux, in whom the mystical tendency of ethics and the monastic disposition of the age is effectively embodied.

1. *Anselm.*

Scholasticism generally — at least in its first period — represents the alliance between reason and revelation or the doctrine of the Church; and the position which it occupied was that the traditional dogma had to be systematically elaborated and justified before the rational thinking. *Anselm of Canterbury* († 1109) marks the beginning of these scientific efforts in an epoch-making manner, and with the youthful joyousness of an unbroken and undoubting confidence. According to Anselm, thinking and being coincide, since all our thinking is preceded by the realities which our thinking grasps in conceptions. This mode of thought is undoubtedly of importance for the speculative comprehension of dogma, but it is of less significance for the problems of ethics. And, accordingly, Anselm composed no writings on ethical subjects. His well-known theory of the doctrine of the Atonement, views the death of Christ as the satisfaction paid for the violation of the honour of God by sin, according to the German idea and practice of right; but in this form, and with the side of the subjective appropriation remaining entirely undeveloped, it furnishes no material for a proper moral grounding of the Christian conduct of life. Moreover, Anselm's theory rests upon the usual view of works as going beyond duty, and being therefore meritorious. Nevertheless, it is based upon an earnest moral appreciation of sin and guilt ("nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum"),[1] to which the evangelical accentuation of the Divine forgiveness on account of Christ's death corresponds.[2] But this

[1] Cur Deus homo, c. 21.

[2] Cf. the Admonitio morienti, which even Chemnitz quotes in Ex. Conc. Trid. (ed. Preuss, p. 164*b*). Credis quod propter te mortuus est dominus J. Chr. filius Dei? credis te non posse salvari nisi per mortem eius? — Age ergo, dum superest in te anima, in hac sola morte totam fiduciam tuam constitue, in nulla alia re fiduciam habeas. Huic morti te totum committe, hac sola te totum contege, hac morte te totum involve etc. Migne, 158, i. p. 686 f. So in Meditat. 2, 3.

knowledge is not turned to right account, so as to give a foundation for Christian morality. It is directly accompanied with the position that good works open heaven to us;[1] or that it is our pœnitentia which wipes away sins.[2] And although we find in the Meditations and Prayers of Anselm the expression of an Augustinian fervour and inwardness of devotion to God, which has for a long time promoted the cultivation of piety in the mystical sense, yet it is not so much the certainty of the forgiveness of sin from which the relation of the love of the Christian is derived, as the example of Christ's humiliation and His voluntary surrender to death.[3] And although this mode of reflection has unquestionably a good right of its own, yet this holds true only when it is taken in connection with the other regulative thought. It is correct when Anselm bases the question on the death of Christ: Et quis non amet Christum dominum?[4] He does not tire of celebrating the sweetness of God and the *dulcis* Jesus;[5] and how often this has been echoed again in the ascetic literature of the later Churches need hardly be mentioned. But it is above all the humility of Christ in His incarnation, in the lowliness of His life, and in His death of suffering which has made manifest the divine love,[6] which demands and produces love in return, as is shown in the following of Christ.[7] This Augustinian thought dominates the subsequent times on various sides. It is expressed both in an accentuation of the humanity of Christ, which became regulative for the Western and Mediæval Church quite otherwise than it had been for the Greek and Ancient Church, and in the fertile thought of the Following

[1] Medit. v.: Videamus quo ordine bona opera animam illius qui bene vixit ducant in cœlum (Migne, i. p. 734 C).

[2] Medit. vi. p. 737 D, 738 A: In vera confessione mundatur omnis macula delicti.

[3] Cf. the relevant sections in Cur Deus homo, and Medit. xi. p. 765 C, 766 A, B.

[4] Medit. ix. In.

[5] Especially in his Orationes.

[6] Medit. xi. pp. 764-5.

[7] Medit. xii. De humanitate Christi, p. 770 A, B, 771 A: Et certe nescio, quia nec plene comprehendere valeo, unde hoc est, quod longe dulcior es in corde diligentis te in eo quod caro es, quam in eo quod verbum; dulcior in eo quod humilis quam in eo quod sublimis.—Hæc omnia formant et adaugent magis ac magis exsultationem, fiduciam et consolationem, amorem et desiderium. Cf. the accentuation of the example of Christ, Medit. ix. De humanitate Christi, pp. 750-1.

of Christ, or even the Imitation of Christ. And as the cultivation and recommendation of mystical contemplation became readily combined with this, Anselm likewise in this connection lays stress upon the contemplative life in preference to the active life, and he brings into application for this purpose the life of Mary as well as that of Jesus. For our *affectus* should be twofold: affectus mentis and affectus operis. The latter consists in virtutum exercitatione, and the former in spiritualis gustus dulcedine. This blessedness of feeling and love is described in detail and with enthusiasm.[1] In consequence, the moral worth and task of life in the world retreats into the background, and the certainty of reconciliation loses its moral significance. In short, Anselm, notwithstanding his evangelical knowledge, also moves wholly in the paths of the Mediæval ideal of perfection.

The form of his piety otherwise corresponds to this ideal. It is not the perfect righteousness of Christ to which the eye of the soul is directed, and in which the Christian finds his peace, in order that he may then move joyfully through the tasks and duties of life; but it is his own perfection, whether it be of repentance, or of renunciation, or of love to God, after which his always unstilled longing is directed in order that by reaching this goal he may find peace, which, however, is never won on this way. This makes his piety unsound and unfit for solving the moral task. We must so regard it, for instance, when Anselm in his *Orationes* prays for the gift of tears as a sign of the love of Christ, the fulfilment of which he supplicates in words of urgent longing. He asks for tears, whose fountain does not go dry, in order that such tears may be an evidence of the love of Jesus to him and of the love of his soul to Jesus.[2] This is virtually making a sentimental

[1] Medit. xv.–xvii. to his sister, p. 785 ff.

[2] Orat. xv. p. 892: Dulcis Christe, bone Jesu, sicut desidero, sicut tota mente mea peto, da mihi amorem tuum sanctum et castum, qui me repleat, teneat, totumque possideat. Et da mihi evidens signum amoris tui, irriguum lacrimarum fontem jugiter manantem ut ipsæ quoque lacrimæ tui in me testentur amorem, ipsæ prodant, ipsæ loquantur, quantum te diligit anima mea, dum præ nimia dulcedine amoris tui nequit se a lacrimis continere, etc. Also cf. *e.g.* Exhortatio ad contemptum temporalium, etc. p. 679: sine cessatione lacrimus funde; p. 680: ora cum lacrimis indesinenter; p. 681: esto semper paratus ad lacrimas. Planctum et lacrimas nunquam deseras, etc.

state of feeling out of the moral attitude of the will in love. This gift of tears plays, as is well known, a great part in the description of the lofty state of Roman Catholic piety. To such a subjective state of feeling, the object to which it is directed ultimately loses its significance, the principal thing being the subjective state itself. Hence, along with the most touching words of prayer in the expression of love and the longing of love to God and Christ as the "unique" love, we find that the most fervent prayers to the mother of the Lord are also joined, and her name is described as "the sweetest food of his soul."[1] Then the other saints are also joined on to Mary.

This, however, is just the ascetic mood of mind which, in denying the life in the world, takes away thereby from the Christian life its God-given substantiality, in order to make the immediate relationship to God the exclusive content of life instead of that which ought to be its power. It is in the latter sense, for instance, that the Apostle exhorts us to pray without ceasing, whereas this piety, even in Anselm, understands and interprets continuous prayer in such a way that it ought to fill up the course of life, and to furnish its material content in a real sense. He expresses such a view in his "Exhortation to contempt of the temporal and to desire after the eternal,"[2] when he lays down the demand that we must pray day and night without ceasing, with sighing and weeping, with deprivation of sleep and of food, with pale face, and with arid body, etc.[3] But by the nature of things this cannot be carried out. And thus on account of the pauses and defects in this mode of conducting life, penance must again be done with a continued increase of asceticism. This contradicts itself and never leads to peace, because the Christian life is not grounded upon the work of God in Christ, but upon the work of the individual himself, although this is apparently of great spiritual elevation. This mood

[1] *E.g.* Orat. xlix. p. 948, or Orat. liv. p. 960: Dulcis es in ore te laudantium, in corde te diligentium, in memoria te deprecantium etc.

[2] Migne, *l.c.* p. 677.

[3] *E.g. l.c.* p. 680: Ora cum lacrimis inde sinenter, ora jugiter, insiste orationi frequenter — geme semper et plange. Surge ad precem in nocte, pernocta in oratione et prece —. Adime tibi et saturitatem panis — jejuniis et abstinentiæ intentus pallida ora gere, aridum porta corpus, etc.

and way of thinking ruled the whole of the following period. Even Abelard's divergence from the prevailing path altered nothing essentially.

§ 54. *Ethics in the Beginning of the Scholastic Period.*

2. *Abelard.*

Abelard († 1142) gave prominence to the thought of the revelation of the love of God in Christ towards us, by which our love is called forth in return; and he treated it as the centre of the atonement,[1] opposing this morally subjective element in a one-sided way to the religiously objective apprehension of the doctrine of the Atonement by Anselm. But however much the theology of Abelard makes the ethical element the predominating point of view, yet his ethic is not deduced from it, but stands unconnectedly beside it. Thus it is that his large *Ethica s. Liber dictus: scito teipsum*,[2] of which only the first half was completed, is more a philosophico-theological introduction, in a scholastic and dialetical method, to moral philosophy than a Christian ethic in the proper sense. He treats of the fundamental moral conceptions, and especially of the nature of sin and its imputation. The sensible impulses and inclinations themselves, the suggestio and even the delectatio, are not sinful in themselves; they ought to be ruled by reason. Sin arises only through the consent (consensus); and so far virtue is not attained without conflict, by which it becomes a merit. Accordingly, the essential matter is not the external action, but the consent or the intention. It is the motive (animi intentio) which makes an action good or bad, moral or immoral;[3] and it is the measure of moral knowledge which determines the degree of sin. The deciding element is the disposition; and sin is what takes place against conscience.[4] With this he takes the

[1] Bernard of Clairv. in his Tractatus de erroribus Abælardi summarizes Abelard's doctrine in the following words: Totum esse quod Deus in carne apparuit nostram de verbo et exemplo ipsius institutionem, sive, ut postmodum dicit, instructionem; totum quod passus et mortuus est, suæ erga nos caritatis ostensionem vel commendationem.

[2] Migne, pp. 634–678.

[3] *E.g.* c. xi.

[4] C. xiii.: Quod peccatum non est nisi contra conscientiam.

starting-point from the moral subject as an individual and his natural endowment. On the other hand, the objective divine factor disappears; and in place of the Christian starting-point there comes in the *lex naturalis* which the heathen also have, and which contains love to God and justice towards our neighbour.[1] Christianity appears only as a restoration and purification of the lex naturalis. For, this moral law belongs to the original equipment of human nature, is inalienable from it and immutable, and is older than all supernatural revelation.[2] Its commandments are everywhere the same. Hence it is rightly regarded as the exhausting rule of all acting, as a sufficient condition of salvation, and as the basis of all historical religion. These are the fundamental thoughts which are applied to the religion of the Old and New Testament in Abelard's "Dialogue between the Jew and the Christian."[3] This thought undoubtedly lies on the line of the view, handed down from the Ancient Church and rooted in the thoughts of the Stoics, that Christianity is to be regarded as a renewal of the law of nature; but thereby ethics is loosed from the dogmatic basis, and takes up an independent position beside it.[4] This was the consequence of the setting aside of the primacy of faith for ethics in the Ancient Church, and the parallelizing of "faith and works." Abelard in making conscience the moral principle, and thus taking his standpoint in natural ethics, recognises the natural moral faculty. This leads him to see in heathenism a series of idealized moral examples; and thereby he was led to a complete misapprehension of what is specifically Christian. "According to Abelard, the Greek philosophers were not only equal to the Christians in knowledge, but they excelled them even in moral practice. Their life entirely corresponded to the scientific ideal. As the ethics of Socrates and Plato especially unfolded love to God, the highest good, as the inmost motive of moral action, they were themselves also full

[1] Dial. inter Philosophum, Judæum et Christianum, Migne, pp. 1619-1627.

[2] Naturali lege, quæ et prima est, contentus sum.—Prima non solum tempore, verum etiam natura.—Quæ omnibus naturaliter inest ratio. Reuter, *l.c.* i. 198 f., 318 ff.

[3] See on this in this detail, Reuter, *l.c.* 201 ff.

[4] Ziegler, p. 270. Id.: Ab's. Ethica. Ein Beitrag zur Gesch. der Ethik, in the "Strassburger Abhandl. zur Philos." 1884, 197-222.

of it."[1] There thus remains ultimately for Christ and Christianity no other glory than the popularizing of the already existing esoteric truth and wisdom, to which the life and conduct of the Christian humanity of the present does not at all correspond in the same degree as was the case with the heads of those philosophic schools. Now if Abelard, following Augustine, designates the love of God as the good, because it corresponds to God, and sin as contempt of God, this is neither a new Christian cognition nor even the consequence of a new operation of grace. But it is the self-will from which not only sin but its converse proceeds. In this sense he gave his ethics the title: Scito te ipsum; for all moral judgment must proceed from self-knowledge, and the intention is the deciding element. It was in conformity with this accentuation of the "intention" as the deciding element that he also required of the practice of confession that not merely the action but the disposition must be taken into account, and that the judicial judgment should be determined accordingly. This was a criticism of the practice of confession with which the ecclesiastical institution could not be made to agree. For, as we have seen, it was based entirely upon the estimation of the individual action. But Abelard had far too little singleness of moral character to be able to become the moral teacher and moral preacher of his time, as he fain would have been. In his doctrine of pœnitentia, he likewise did not advance beyond the idea of satisfaction by fasting, mortifications, and alms.

Bernard of Clairvaux was not only a decided opponent of Abelard and of his whole dialectical method, as fraught with danger to the faith of the Church, but he also censured his moral doctrine, and rightly so. For Abelard's limitation of sin to consent overlooks the significance of the habitual direction of the will; and accordingly the Synod of Lens, in 1140 A.D., declared against him.

[1] Reuter, *l.c.* 191. Seeberg, Die Versöhn. Lehre des Abäl. etc. Mittheil. u. Nachr. für die ev. Kirche, in Russl. März-Apr. 1888. Abdr. p. 19 f.

§ 55. *Ethics in the Beginning of the Scholastic Period.*

3. *The Mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux.*

Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153), Abelard's great and inexorable opponent, combined, as hardly any other has done, mystical inwardness and ascetic austerity with influential external activity. He who would have most gladly had converse only with God in his quiet cell, entered into the life of the Church more than any other of his contemporaries, and moved the world. Monasticism was his ideal, and the life of the monk was regarded by him as the proper Christian life. Monastic mortification was in his view the conflict of the spirit with the flesh, and flight from the world seemed to him the only security. All this, however, was not conceived by him in a merely external form, but internally; and the height of blessedness was to his mind the transportation of the soul to heaven through the means of contemplation. And yet this Mystic proved himself at the same time to be a man of practice and action. He counselled and punished popes, and kindled peoples to enthusiasm for the Crusades, while he also set himself to oppose with word and pen the dangers which threatened the faith of the Church, and its science from an arrogant dialectic. — His treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* is more of a dogmatic nature, but for this very reason it lays down fundamental principles. To ethics belong specially his *De consideratione ad Papam Eugenium* (in 5 Books); the tractate *De diligendo Deo*, and his 86 sermons on the first two chapters of the Song of Solomon, besides less important treatises, as his *De moribus et officio episcoporum; De conversione ad clericos; De gradibus humilitatis et superbiæ.* The theology of pious inwardness, that of contemplation as well as that of love, is opposed by him to the dialectical method. Quid sit pietas quæris? vacare considerationi.[1] For, tantum Deus cognositur quantum diligitur. Orando facilius quam disputando et [illegible]nius Deus quæritur et invenitur facilius.[2] For it is [illegible] in contemplation (the intuitus animi, in which considera-

[1] De consider. i. 7. [2] Conclusion of the De consider. v. 14.

tion, consideratio, attains its goal) and in the affection of love that the soul rises above the sphere of sense, so that it experiences and enjoys the immediate nearness of God, like the angels (more angelorum). The two sides of cognition and will which afterwards are sundered in Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, still appear combined in Bernard. In both cases, however, the advance to perfection is an operation of grace, and yet also the proper life of the soul itself.

In his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, Bernard seeks to combine the two with each other. All is grace, and yet again it is human merit; the free-will has nothing of itself, but everything only through grace.[1] All is from God; and all is grace; yet the will must co-operate in virtue of the liberum arbitrium. For to this we are created, this freedom from necessity, which abides even where it is not liberty from sin (libertas a peccato) and from misery (libertas a miseria). This liberty is only where there is the willing of the good; and the willing of the good presupposes grace. Grace effects both the willing of the good and the ability to do it. But grace does not make us blessed against our will; if God terrifies or agitates us, He wishes to make free-willers out of us, so that we impel and compel ourselves; and thus the free-willed determination combines with the divine will and becomes God's fellow-helper.[2] Grace is prevenient in our case, in that it arouses, alters, and strengthens the free-will, but what it has begun the free-will must complete in combination with it; and the two united bring the whole to pass.[3] In this *consensus* the *meritum* of man consists.[4] Bernard must also find room for such meritum. The whole thinking and practice of the Church required it.

Bernard knew very well that God's mercy is our merit, and the forgiveness of sin is our righteousness. Perhaps no other teacher of the Middle Ages has spoken so definitely to this effect as he has done. All our righteousness before God is only a filthy rag. "It is only as justified through faith that

[1] C. 14: Crearis, sanaris, salvaris. Quid horum tibi *ex te*, o homo? quid horum non impossibile libero arbitrio?—Qui fecit quod salvaret, etiam dat unde salvet. Ipse, inquam, merita donat, qui fecit quibus donaret.

[2] C. 13. [3] Cf. Plitt in the Ztschr. f. histor. Theol. 1862, p. 189.

[4] De grat. et lib. arb. 14, 46: Non quidem quod vel ipse consensus, in quo omne meritum consistit, ab ipso sit.

we have peace with God." "Only those are righteous who have obtained forgiveness of sins through God's mercy." "Freedom from sin is God's righteousness; the righteousness of man is God's pardon."[1] "The mercy of the Lord is my merit." But with Bernard the honouring of the saints and of Mary is combined with the unique righteousness of Christ, and through their mediation the sinner draws near to Christ; for as men they stand nearer sinful man. Moreover, Bernard specially glorifies Mary, through whom we are to have all things according to God's will.[2] The principal thing is that Bernard, like Anselm, does not find, as is the case with Luther, the way from that righteousness of the forgiveness of sin to the moral attitude of the Christian and the normal relationship to the world and its affirmation. Liberation from guilt is not to Bernard also the means for liberation from the power of sin; but he would win this by means of his own conduct in love, which, with all his mystical fervour, does not deny the semi-Pelagian basis of his whole Christian order of life.

Hence it was that *monasticism* could also be to him the true exhibition of Christianity. To him, as to the whole Church of his age and for a long time thereafter, the monks were, in contrast to the mass of other Christians, the perfect ones. It is true that he conceives monasticism inwardly, that is to say, not merely as a particular form of the outward life, but as a task and exhibition of the inner disposition. For if sin is the false self-will of man against God, whereby he has given himself up to the world, which is the sphere of the dominion of

[1] *E.g.* In festo omnium Sanctorum, Sermo i. 11: Quod potest omnis justitia nostra coram Deo? Nonne juxta prophetam velut pannus menstruatæ reputabitur? Et si districte judicetur, injusta invenietur omnis justitia nostra? Propterea tota humilitate ad misericordiam recurramus, quæ sola potest salvare animas nostras. In cantica sermo 22: Qui suis pro peccatis compunctus esurit et sitit justitiam, credat in te, qui justificas impium et solam justificatus per fidem pacem habebit ad Deum.—Passio tua ultimum refugium, singulare remedium. Deficiente sapientia, justitia non sufficienti, sanctitatis succumbentibus meritas, illa succurrit. Unde vera justitia nisi in Christi misericordia.—Soli justi qui de eius misericordia veniam peccatorum consecuti sunt. 23. Non peccare Dei justitia est, hominis justitia Dei indulgentia. 61. Meum meritum miseratio domini. 68. Sufficit ad meritum scire, quod non sufficiant merita.

[2] In nativ. Mar. 7: Opus est enim mediatore ad mediatorem ipsum, nec alter nobis utilior quam Maria.—Quid ad Mariam accedere trepidat humana fragilitas?

the devil, then the relationship of right is the opposite of that self-surrender and renunciation of the world which lives only for God and His service. In the secular life (vita secularis) this is not possible. Bernard is not able to appreciate properly the moral relation involved in the fulfilment of man's calling in the world. In his view, the monks are upon the way which leads to the heavenly Jerusalem. This is the shortest and easiest way, because it is lightened of the heavy burdens of the world. To live in this way is to follow after the Apostles. The apostolical life (the current phrase especially of the later Middle Ages) does indeed indicate the task of all Christians; but Bernard considers that it is exhibited only in the monks. He never tires of pressing for the corresponding disposition; and humility is especially to him the first virtue and the basis of all others, along with obedience. Now the sphere for the exercise of this virtue is chiefly monasticism and the rule of its order. It finds its fulfilment in the well-known exercises of prayer, fasting, chastity, and poverty. Here too, he presses for what is inward, but yet in the form of external practices. Bernard was great and experienced in prayer, and his directions for prayer thus contain much that is good and beautiful. The fasting which goes along with prayer is to him pre-eminently a fasting of the inner man, abstinence from sin. Celibacy, however commendable it is,—and it is apostolical life, and is compared to the life of the angels,—ought not to be regarded by us merely as an external work, nor should we boast of it. Nor has poverty any worth if it is only external privation about which we sigh, but only if it is voluntary according to Christ's example. But notwithstanding all this internalization of the external order of life, it is still the way of our own works to which Bernard points as the means by which we may attain to the goal of perfection. It is our own doing, however much it is internalized; and the ideal is not the fulfilment of man's vocation in the world in which God has placed us, while resting in faith on the grace of God, but complete renunciation of the world, which, however, he was not able himself to carry out, as the reality of things and the tasks of life asserted their rights over him.

This character of the renunciation of the world likewise

involves the double way[1] which Bernard designates as the way to the goal of perfection, namely, Love and Contemplation, which he represents as standing in close connection and reciprocity with each other. In both of these, in consideratio and its highest goal (the excessus contemplationis) as well as in the affectus of love, the soul elevates itself above the sphere of sense to the immediate nearness of God.

Bernard treats of *love* chiefly in his *De diligendo Deo*, and his Sermons on the Song of Solomon are the Song of Songs of love. God is in Himself the ground and cause of loving Him, and of loving Him without measure.[2] For God is Himself love, and He is so towards all men; and thus He deserves to be loved by all.[3] Bernard's view is undoubtedly distinguished from the mysticism of the Ancient Church as influenced by Neo-Platonism, in that God is considered by him not merely as the highest good in the sense of being, but as He who becomes revealed in creation and redemption, and who is active in love, and in whom man accordingly finds his goal. Bernard would have this understood under the reward which is assigned to love. God ought not indeed to be loved intuitu præmii, but yet He is not loved sine præmio.[4] Now love has its *stages* upon which it advances to the goal of perfection. There are four of these stages.[5] The first stage is carnal love, in virtue of which the natural man loves himself and cannot help loving himself. On the second stage, man rises to the love of God; but this love is not selfless but selfish, as man is brought by the sufferings and other experiences which God sends him, to feel that he is and can do nothing without God, yet that he is and can do everything in God. This stage is thus still selfishness, only with the difference that the first stage is blind selfishness, while this second stage is the beginning of self-reflection. The repetition of this experience

[1] Ep. 18. 2: Duo animæ brachia, intellectus et amor, *or* cognitio et dilectio veritatis.

[2] De dilig. Deo, i. 1: Vultis ergo a me audire, quare et quomodo diligendus sit Deus? Et ego: Causa diligendi Deum Deus est; modus sine modo diligere. —With these words Bernard begins his treatise.

[3] *L.c.* 2. 6: Meretur ergo amari propter se ipsum Deus et ab infideli qui etsi nesciat Christum, scit tamen se ipsum.—Clamat nempe intus ei innata et non ignorata rationi justitia, quia ex toto se illum diligere debeat, cui se totum debere non ignorat.

[4] *L.c.* 7. 17.

[5] Cf. *l.c.* c. 8 ff. and c. 15.

now leads to his tasting the lovableness of God and thus beginning to love God for the sake of God Himself, because He is so friendly; and then he also loves all that is of God, and consequently his neighbour. This is the third stage; but neither upon this stage is love yet quite pure and selfless. It is so only on the fourth stage, when the spirit, "intoxicated by the divine love, wholly forgets itself, becomes nothing in itself, and strives wholly up to God, attaches itself to Him, and becomes one spirit with Him." Then the Christians rejoice no longer about their want being removed, or about the happiness which is become theirs, but only because God's will is perfect in them.[1] To be thus affected is to be deified.[2] Blessed and holy is he to whom it has been vouchsafed to have such an experience in this mortal life, although but rarely, or even only once and for a moment. For to lose thyself in a certain sense as being nothing, and to be almost annihilated in thyself: this is heavenly life, and no mere human state.[3] Here again are echoed the old seductive notes of the one only reality in contrast to which the creature is nothing. Fellowship with God here ceases to be a personal relationship of personality to personality, and therefore to be a proper moral relationship; and it is conceived in a naturalistic way. Bernard elsewhere avoids these abysses of natural mysticism; yet they have not entirely lost the magic of their attraction for him, although asserting themselves more strongly in the later German mysticism. The reason lies in the deepest want of his system; for although he knows the biblical justification, it is not the basis of his moral reflection, but the moral relationship to God is to him an act of self-elevation to God.

[1] Cf. Plitt, *l.c.* p. 231 f. Ep. xi. 8. Migne, Bern. opp. i. p. 113 f.

[2] De dilig. Deo, 10. 28: Sic affici deificari est. "This expression, which is frequently used by the later German Mystics, occurs in Bernard only in this passsge. But in Ep. 107. 5 he speaks of divina illa et deifica visio of the future." Plitt, *l.c.* 230, note 10.

[3] *L.c.* 10. 27: Felix qui meruit ad quartum usque pertingere, quatenus nec se ipsum diligat homo nisi propter Deum.—Beatum dixerim et sanctum cui tale aliquid in hoc mortali vita raro interdum aut vel semel et hoc ipsum raptim atque unius vix momenti spatio experiri donatum est. Te enim quodammodo perdere, tanquam qui non sis, et omnino non sentire te ipsum et a te ipso exinaniri ac pæne annullari, cœlestis est conversationis non humanæ affectionis. This at once recalls Plotinus and the communication of Porphyry regarding his experiences in ecstasy. Cf. my Antike Ethik, p. 181 f.

The work of the individual himself is thus the deciding element also in Bernard's view.

He comes to the same result on the other way of *consideration*. Bernard treats of it in his *De consideratione ad Papam Eugenium*. Man must begin with himself with self-knowledge. As this is the beginning, so it is likewise the goal, which is to know everything else in relation to oneself: tu primus tibi, tu ultimus.[1] To know oneself is wholesome knowledge; for all progress in knowledge is connected in the closest way with progress and sanctification. The proper object of our knowledge is the supramundane God; for we are created for it. Loving and knowing condition each other. But God is our proper home. This cognitive consideration has also its stages like love. From the consideration of the sensible and temporal we advance to a consideration which estimates and judges, by rising on the ladder of the works of the creation to the knowledge of the Creator. The highest stage is intuitive consideration, intuitus animi, or contemplation. Consideration here gathers itself into itself, and so far as it is supported from above it withdraws itself from human things in order to rise to the beholding of God.[2] Man may here experience this in individual ecstasies (excessus) as the Apostle Paul formerly did, and in such a way that the soul does not so much elevate itself, but rather is transported to the heavenly world.[3] The two ways of love and consideration meet at this point. Here again the want of the proper moral view reveals itself. For those experiences of which Paul speaks of are not meant by him as stages in his life of sanctification, but as special operations of God on the life of his soul in which he experienced God as a power, in contrast to which he was on his side purely passive. Such passive experiences are here made momenta of the moral process; that is to say, the moral is conceived in a natural way, and is consequently misunderstood.

The whole intercourse with God in loving and knowing is

[1] De consid. ii. 3.

[2] De consid. v. 2. 4: Speculativa est consideratio se in se colligens, et quantum divinitus adjuvatur, rebus humanis eximens ad contemplandum Deum.

[3] *L.c.* 2. 3: Ad hoc ultimum genus illos pertinere reor excessus Pauli. Excessus non ascensus; nam raptum potius fuisse quam ascendisse ipse se perhibet (2 Cor. xii. 1–4).

referred by Bernard to Christ; and it is therefore conceived as conditioned even in its present existence by the historical revelation of salvation. This mystical love-intercourse of the soul with her bridegroom Christ, is celebrated by Bernard in his reflections on the Song of Solomon after the example of many predecessors,[1] but with an influence that extended wider, and was destined to last longer. But in his exposition what is limited by historical conditions becomes an objective thing which has its own laws regulating the inner processes and moods of the soul. It was natural that this inwardness would find satisfaction only when it left the whole world behind itself, in order to be wholly merged in God in love; although Bernard also reminds us that in the rest and repose of contemplation we ought not to forget the flowers with which the bed of the bride ought to be decked, *i.e.* the flowers of good works and the exercises of virtue.[2] This amounts to saying that Bernard does not deny the right of the vita activa, but it is nevertheless only a subordinate companion of the mistress, the vita contemplativa. This is the Mary who has chosen the good part before the former, who is the Martha. Here again we have the old negation of the world, as we have already found it. Bernard indeed contributed to make this negation of the world the presupposition and basis of the government of the world by the Church of Rome; but the condition is as little entitled as its consequence to be regarded as correct.

§ 56. *Ethics in the progress of Mysticism.*[3]

The Mystics of St. Victor.

While Hugo of St. Victor exercised an influence on Bernard, Richard and Walter of St. Victor, following him, attached themselves to Bernard. Although adopting the method of the scholastic distinctions, they cultivated the

[1] See above on Gregory of Nyssa.

[2] In Cant. 46. 5.

[3] Liebner, Hugo v. St. Victor, Lpz. 1832. Preger, Gesch. der deutschen Mystik, i. 227 ff., 241 ff. Zöckler, P. R.-E.[2] vi. 356 ff. B. Engelhardt, Rich. v. S. B. u. Joh. Ruysbroek, Erl. 1838. E. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] xii. 765 ff.

tendency to the inner intuition of God as the highest good, and in this immediate relationship they found the highest knowledge and blessedness; but from this position they found no way that led to the tasks of man in the world.

1. *Hugo of St. Victor* († 1141), besides his earlier predominantly mystical writings (*De arca morali; De arca mystica; De vanitate mundi*, and his *De substantia amoris*), embodied his scholastico-mystical theology chiefly in his principal work, *De sacramentis Christianæ fidei*, a section of which he expanded in his beautiful treatise, *De laude caritatis*. In Hugo the mystic often proceeds side by side with the scholastic without their being mediated with each other. The 12th and 13th Parts of his work, *De sacramentis*, treat of the virtues and vices, and contain his ethics. In his view love forms the centre of ethics. Self-love must be included in the love of God; for the latter is not selfless, as no love is without desire for the object loved. "Non amaris si non desiderares." He treats specially of this subject in the tractate *De laude caritatis*, an enthusiastic laudation of love. "If this world is beautiful, how great do you think must the beauty be where the Creator of the world is? So love that thou mayest live; love wisely that thou mayest live blessedly; love God so that thou mayest live in the fellowship of God; and thus shalt thou live through love. But the more thou lovest, thou desirest so much the sooner to come to the goal, and thou hurriest to grasp it. Love, therefore, bids thee run; love makes thee grasp. And conversely, the more thou lovest, the more eagerly dost thou embrace the object loved; love therefore procures the enjoyment. See then how love is thine all. Love is thy life, thy running, thy arriving, thy abiding, thy blessedness. Wherefore love God; live in God; run, seize, possess, and enjoy." We have not here the questionable metaphysics of love which we have elsewhere met with; this is only description of the inner state of the soul. But on that very account the moral activity threatens to disappear in the mood of enjoyment. Love is not rightly founded on faith. Faith comes only into consideration as the beginning of the "renewal," so that the stages of love or hope are accessory to it. In other words, faith does not found the

relationship to God as the presupposition of the activity of conduct; but the former is grounded by the latter, which therefore seeks to come to its self-assurance by the greatest possible elevation of itself, whether it be by the inner sentiment of love, or by contemplative absorption in God, or elevation to God. For Hugo, like Bernard, also teaches the other way of contemplation, especially in his earlier predominantly mystical writings. The soul raises itself on the stages of cogitatio and meditatio to contemplatio. In the ark of Noah, which is the Church, the soul rides over the billows of the world and advances to God in order to rest blessedly in Him. Hugo's description of the contemplative process of becoming one with God, the tasting of the Deity, and the merging of the individual Ego in God, recalls the views of the Areopagite, on whom Hugo wrote a commentary; and it shows his influence, although without the pantheistic basis of the older writings. The ascetic negation of the world, although in different degrees of strength, always accompanies this one-sided affirmation of God.

2. *Richard of St. Victor* († 1173) gives this mysticism more of the scholastic form of treatment by his distinction of its several stages. Many of his writings of a moral and mystical nature have been preserved. Among these we may mention the following: *De statu interioris hominis* (treating of vices and sins, and of contempt of the means against them, namely, the divine instructions, threatenings, and promises, with a section on the freedom of the will, *i.e.* its weakness since the fall); *De eruditione interioris hominis; De exterminatione mali et promotione boni* (on the improvement of man, in which meditation and contemplation have their place assigned to them). Passing over several small tractates, we may further mention his *De gratia contemplationis* (s. De arca mystica, s. Benjamin Major), in five Books; his *De preparatione animi ad contemplationem* (s. De duodecim patriarchis, s. Benjamin Minor), an introduction to the former work; *De gradibus caritatis;* and *De amoris insuperabilitate atque insatiabilitate.* Richard was the first to construct on a psychological basis a detailed investigation of contemplation accompanied with rich distinctions. Like Hugo, he distinguishes it from the preceding stages of cogitatio and

meditatio. The former creeps; the latter walks; but contemplation flies aloft and poises itself even in the uppermost regions. For it does not belong to imagination like the first stage, nor to reason like the second, but to intelligence in which the spirit unfolds itself to the immeasurable.[1] Richard subtly distinguishes the various kinds and stages of contemplation, the highest of which is the contemplation of things which are above reason, and which appear to be against it. On this stage the human soul exults and jubilates, because by the irradiation of the divine light it knows something against which all human reason rises up, such as the mystery of the Trinity.[2] Now this contemplation is of a threefold nature, enlargement (dilatatio), elevation (sublevatio), and finally the ecstasy of the spirit (alienatio). This rapture arises either on the height of devotion (devotio) when the spirit is wholly seized by the fire of heavenly longing and the soul melts like wax; or on the stage of high wonderment, when the soul, illuminated by the divine light, is carried away with admiration of the highest beauty and is raised above itself; or in high bliss (exaltatio),[3] when the spirit, intoxicated with the fulness of lovableness, wholly forgets itself, its past, present, and future, and passes wholly out of itself in an excess of pleasure and is enraptured. They are psychological states which are here described, in which an immediate relationship to God that is not mediated by the history of salvation or by conformity to its order has to be experienced; and therefore states in which such an ecstatic soul is not able to find the way from God to the world and to the task assigned by God in it. This mysticism forms, in fact, the antithesis to the ecclesiastical mechanism and to the external universal sovereignty of the Church; but its opposition to these is also one-sided, and it was therefore not able to overcome this confusion, but only served as a basis for it, and thus lent it power.

3. While Hugo and Richard maintained mysticism always in a certain relationship to scholasticism, *Walther of St. Victor*[4]

[1] De gratia contempl. i. 3: Contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia, in sapientiæ spectacula cum admiratione suspensa vel perspicat et liber animi motus, in res perspiciendas usque quaque diffusus, Stäudlin, iv. 437.

[2] *L.c.* c. 6. Stäudlin, *l.c.* 440.

[3] De gratia contempl. v. 2, 5, 14, 16. Stäudlin, iv. 443 f.

[4] Planck, Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1844, 4.

(† 1180) marks the most thoroughgoing opposition to it. The scholastic dialectic is in his view only of a formal nature, and gives no help to material knowledge, but in attempting to do this leads into manifold errors. He sought to show this in the most violent indictments against Abelard and Peter of Lombardy in his work *Contra quattuor labyrinthos Galliæ*.

§ 57. *The Ethics of Scholasticism in the Beginning of its height.*

The culminating period of Scholasticism and its Ethics begins with Peter of Lombardy, who first successfully combines the dogmatico-ethical material in his Sentences in a schematic form and into a whole, with the view of founding it upon authority and at the same time justifying it in a methodical dialectic. To him is attached the further development of Scholasticism and its more systematic treatment of ethics in the Summas which were now elaborated, and in which Ethics, as well as Dogmatics, concludes an alliance between Aristotle and the received Christian views, especially as they were presented in Augustine and Gregory the Great.

1. From the time of Peter of Lombardy[1] (*Petrus Lombardus*, † 1164), Scholasticism combines Ethics with Dogmatics. Petrus Lombardus treats the matter of ethics in various places in the four Books of his Sentences. In Book II. he discusses the following subjects: De libertate, De virtute, De peccato, De voluntate et eius fine, De vitiis capitalibus, De peccatis in spiritum sanctum; and in Book III.: De virtutibus theologicis, De virtutibus cardinalibus, De septem donis spiritus sancti, De connexione virtutum, De decem mandatis, De legis et evangelii distantia. The ethical conceptions are rather logically analysed than developed in principle. To him, as to Augustine, God is the ground and goal of all things and of the moral life, and His fellowship is therefore the objective Good for the subjective good will. Virtue is, according to Aristotle, a condition of the soul

[1] Stäudlin, iv. 308 f. Wuttke, i. 129 ff. Gass, i. 314 ff. Fr. Nitzsch, P. R.-E.[2] viii. 743 ff.

available for right living, which God produces in us, but which likewise requires the proper movement of the mind itself (motus mentis). Hence the presupposition of all moral goodness is at the same time the freedom of the will, which according to the customary division is Liberty 1. from necessity, 2. from sin as power, and 3. from misery. The first holds of man absolutely, including the sinful man; the second holds of the redeemed; and the third holds of the perfected man. The first includes choice in itself; but by sin the "poterat peccare et non peccare" passed over into the "potest peccare et non potest non peccare;" the second, through the assistance of grace, is liberty from the supremacy of sin, but not from weakness; and hence the redeemed man does not in fact commit deadly sins, but venial sins. The third is liberty even from weakness, as the non posse peccare. Virtue is the right condition of the human will as directed to the good. Love to God is the fundamental virtue and the mother of all the virtues. The three fundamental virtues are faith, hope, and love: 1. Fides, *i.e.* virtus qua creduntur quæ non cernuntur; credere, deo, deum, in deum; the last being the true faith which leads to good works; 2. Spes, *i.e.* virtus qua spiritualia et æterna bona sperantur, *i.e.* cum fiducia expectantur; 3. Caritas, *i.e.* dilectio qua diligitur deus propter se et proximus propter deum vel in deo. Beside these, but brought little into relation with them, there are the 4 Cardinal Virtues: justitia, fortitudo (in suffering), prudentia, temperantia. Then follow the 7 Gifts of the Holy Spirit (according to Isa. xi. 2, 3, Vulg.), which may likewise be called virtues, namely, Wisdom, Understanding, Counsel, Strength, Knowledge, Piety, Fear of God. They go together and form a whole. Further, along with these there is the distinction of the higher and lower virtues, the consilia and præcepta. The commandments are treated according to the two tables of the Decalogue as the rules for the realization of love to God and love to our neighbour. In contrast to the virtues stand the 7 principal Vices, at the head of which is Superbia. Thus the attempt is here made to combine into a whole the several parts which had hitherto been the objects of ethical treatment. The Sentences of the Lombard thus became the basis of the

subsequent Scholasticism and its treatment of Ethics; and Aristotle becomes then more closely combined with the material handed down by Augustine and Gregory, just as he was brought into relation with the Christian theology of France through the Arabian and Jewish philosophy of Spain.

2. *Alexander of Hales*,[1] the Franciscan († 1245), stands in special connection with Hugo of St. Victor as well as with Peter of Lombardy. In the third part of his *Summa theologiæ* he treats, 1. of the Law of human conduct, the lex æterna, *i.e.* the divine will, viewing it not only as a lex indita, s. naturalis, but also as a lex addita, s. scripta, in the form of the Mosaic moral ceremonial and civil law and of the gospel law; the latter being considered in its relation to the natural and Mosaic law, as well as in its distinction into præcepta (opera necessitatis) and consilia (opera supererogationis). He then treats, 2. of Grace and the Virtues as the co-operating powers which fulfil the law; and 3. of the Beatitudes or the fruits and gifts of the virtues. Thus the treatment advances somewhat after the scheme of the Doctrine of the law or of duties, the Doctrine of virtue, and the Doctrine of happiness. The fourth part, which treats of the Sacraments as means of Salvation, concludes with penitence and its forms of satisfactio, in oratio, jejunium, eleemosyne. He seeks in the interest of the mendicant monks to justify alms and evangelical poverty, as well as to prove the meritoriousness of begging and the superfluousness of labouring for the means of nourishment. As to the rest, he is moderate in his mode of moral judgment on practical questions, turning away from the primary severity of his order; but in his form, as an adherent of the scholastic method, he is at the same time strong in dialectical divisions.

3. *Bonaventura*[2] († 1274), a scholar of Alexander of Hales and a member of his order, following Richard of St. Victor, composed numerous writings of a mystical and scholastic nature and in a developed schematic form. In his *Soliloquium*, influenced by Hugo, he says: The soul ought by a look into itself to recognise its distortion by sin; by a look outwards, it should recognise the vanity of the world; by a

[1] Ständlin, iv. 332 ff. Erdmann, Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos. i., Berl. 1866, p. 323 ff. Rettberg. P. R.-E.[2] i. 262 ff.

[2] Erdmann, *l.c.* p. 329 ff. Preger, i. 251 ff. Gass, P. R.-E.[2] ii. 525 ff.

look below itself, it should recognise the punishment of unblessedness; and by a look above itself, it should recognise the glory of blessedness in order to direct its desire away from itself and the world entirely to God. In his *Diætæ salutis* he shows how the soul in nine circuits or day-journeys (diætæ) rises from the vices to repentance, from repentance to the commandments, thence to the counsels (poverty, celibacy, humility), to the virtues, to the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. xi. 2), to the seven Beatitudes (Matt. v. 3 ff.), to the twelve Fruits of the Holy Spirit (Gal. v. 22), thence to the judgment, and thence up to heaven. His *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* sets forth how knowledge rises from the creature to God in order to rest in God (quies, sopor pacis), in the Sabbath of the sixfold labour-journey of life. Mention may be also made of his *De septem itineribus æternitatis* (in which he follows Richard of St. Victor); *De septem gradibus contemplationis; De institutione vitæ æternæ; De contemptu seculi; De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus; Pheretræ*, a preparatory collection for the following two convenient summaries: *Breviloquium* (a short exposition of the order of salvation combining the ecclesiastical doctrine and Aristotle) and *Centiloquium* (the doctrine of evil, its guilt and punishment, and the doctrine of the good with its condition, which is grace, and its goal, which is salvation, expounded in 100 sections). The goal of love is also here immersion in God, excessus mentalis et mysticus, exultatio, the enjoyment of heavenly joy: and the goal of knowledge is intuition of the pure being of the Deity. As in the case of the Mystics of St. Victor, this mysticism continued with all its inwardness on the line of the usual ethic of the double morality and the higher stage of the consilia evangelica. For that inwardness is elevation of the life of the soul itself, and therefore founds the fellowship with God upon the individual's own conduct or state of mind; and this of necessity gives the distinctions of the ordinary and the extraordinary in conduct.

4. *Albertus Magnus*,[1] the Dominican († 1280), embraced all the knowledge of his time. In the second part of his *Summa*

[1] Sigwart, Alb. M. Regsb. 1857. Wuttke, i. 473, Anm. 52. Gass, i. 223, and the Histories of Philosophy by Ritter, Erdmann, etc. Preger, Gesch. der deutschen Mystik, i. 263 ff.

theologiæ he has treated the moral conceptions and put together the materials of a doctrine of the virtues and vices which Thomas Aquinas carried out in detail. Besides, he wrote a Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachian Ethics, which was edited by Thomas. He treats of the virtues in his work entitled *Paradisus animæ, s. Libellus de virtutibus*, the virtutes adjunctæ (infusæ) being distinguished from the cardinales (acquisitæ). Here, as well as in his treatise *De adhærendo Deo*, the ethic of asceticism and of contemplation is developed. The true love of God consists in union with God without thoughts of reward, and only from the impulse to perfection and blessedness beyond the limits of nature. For while the cardinal virtues regulate the natural life, perfection consists in the supernatural life. Thus we have here again what is characteristic of the Mediæval and Roman reflection generally, —these two spheres and stages connected with each other without internal unity, namely, nature and an accessory supernature, the antique and a completing Christianity. The same also holds of the prince of Scholasticism, whom we have now to consider.

§ 58. *The Ethics of Scholasticism at its height in Thomas Aquinas.*[1]

Thomas Aquinas marks the culmination of Scholasticism both in its theology generally and in its ethics. As his combination of Aristotle and Augustine embraces and concludes the previous preparatory efforts in his system, he has become a standard for the theology, and especially for the ethics of the Roman Church, down to the present time.

1. *Thomas Aquinas* died in 1274 in his fiftieth year. Of his works the following belong to ethics: *The Commentary on Aristotle* by his *Magister* Albert the Great, whose "lecturam studiose collegit et redegit," and which forms a moral philosophy;

[1] Stäudlin, iv. 337–389. Werner, Der heil. Thomas v. Aqu., Regsb. 1858, ii. 469–619. Rietter, Die Moral des Th. Aqu., Münch. 1858. Stöckl, Gesch. der Philos. des M.-A., Mainz 1865, ii. 655 ff. Neander, Gesch. d. Ethik, p. 290. Landerer-Wagenmann, P. R.-E.[2] xv. 570 ff. Wuttke, i. 131 ff. Gass, i. 328 ff. Ziegler, i. 282–301. Eucken, Die Philos. des Th. v. Aqu. u. die Cultur der Neuzeit, Halle 1866.

the ethical matter in his *Scriptum in primum, secundum*, etc., sententiarum magistri Petri Lomb., at the relevant places; among his Quæstiones disputatæ there are several on ethical subjects: *De malo, De anima, De veritate;* and the ethical matter in his *Summa contra gentiles*, a collection of the principal truths of Christianity. In this latter work, starting from God, he shows that likeness to God and imitation of the goodness of God is the moral task; the knowledge of God is the highest goal; and the way to it is the law of God. Several of his *Opuscula, e.g. De regimine principum ad regem Cypri*, also deal with moral matters. And above all, his *Summa* belongs to this department.[1]

2. According to the prefixed arrangement, the first part of the Summa treats De Deo; the second part treats of Man, De motu rationalis creaturæ in Deum; and the third part treats of Christ, qui secundum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum. The Prima secundæ contains his discussion of general ethics: De virtute in genere, treating of the final end of man; of the nature of human actions and states, and of their internal principles, *i.e.* of human liberty as the preliminary condition of morality, of the moral powers, and the states of the will; and then of the external principles of Law and Grace. The Secunda secundæ contains his special ethics, and treats De virtutibus in specie, *i.e.* of the theological and cardinal virtues, the virtues of particular classes and callings, and of the gifts of grace, commandments, and moral oppositions corresponding to individual virtues. The work thus far is therefore essentially an ethic or doctrine of virtue; and the whole rests more than is the case with the other scholastics on Aristotle, with whom Augustine mainly is combined.

3. Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas starts from the ultimate *end:* ultimus finis humanæ vitæ ponitur esse beatitudo;[2] for beatitudo habet rationem ultimi finis. Man, how-

[1] On its method of arrangement see i. qu. 2: Quia principalis intentio huius sacræ doctrinæ est Dei cognitionem tradere et non solum secundum quod in se est sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum et specialiter rationalis creaturæ—ad huius doctrinæ expositionem intendentes primo tractabimus de Deo, secundo de motu rationalis creaturæ in Deum, tertio de Christo, qui secundum quod homo via est nobis tendendi in Deum.

[2] With reference to Aristotle's Nicom. Ethics (εὐδαιμονία), and to Boëthius, cf. Summa, i. 1, Qu. 3, A. 2.

ever, finds this happiness in God, and particularly in the visio Dei, and therefore in assimilatio ad Deum more through the intellect than through the will.[1] For as God is the ultimate origin of all being, He is also its ultimate end, and consequently also the ultimate end of man. For God is the absolute being (sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita suum esse est suum velle); and He is likewise the absolute good according to the substantial rather than the purely ethical conception of the idea of the good,[2] and the highest good: res omnes in Deum sicut in ultimum finem tendunt, ut ipsius bonitatem consequantur;[3] and this holds also of man.

4. Through what activity does man gain this highest good? The characteristic distinction of man is his liberty. Thomas Aquinas enters on investigations regarding free-will and unfreedom wholly after the example of Aristotle. It is the conception of formal freedom in which the principle of action in man lies, combined with knowledge as the regulative element, so that Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle and the Greek Church (and in distinction from Duns Scotus), asserts the primacy of knowledge in opposition to the will. This knowledge, however, has its goal in God as the object of fruitio, in so far as God is the ultimate end in distinction from all else which is only an object of usus, because only a means,—according to the common and always returning distinction between frui and uti, which had been current since Augustine. Along with the knowledge, and the will as determined by it, the *πάθη*, passiones, come into consideration, and they ought to be governed by knowledge. The passions are regarded by him as indifferent in themselves—in opposition to the view of the Stoics. They receive by their relation to knowledge their moral quality. They are love and hate, desire and aversion, hope and despair, fear and boldness, anger, joy, and sorrow. Of these, hope and fear, joy and sorrow are the most essential, and they are treated by Thomas very specially along with the others.

By the dominion of the will over the passions, as deter-

[1] Summa, *l.c.* art. 4, 5.

[2] According to the views of Plato and Augustine.

[3] Cf. Aristotle's view: The Deity is the *ἀκίνητον πάντα κινοῦν*.

mined by knowledge, habit (habitus) is formed, *i.e.* the abiding quality, which is not merely potentiality or possibility, but capability and dexterity. Habit is partly *acquired* through a series of self-repeating actions,[1] and partly *infused* through the immediate activity of God. This distinction determines the classes of the virtues. *Virtue* is the habitus of the soul by which it becomes capable of the corresponding good acting: bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur. But with Augustine he distinguishes infused virtue: quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, from acquired virtue, which is non sine nobis.

5. There are *three Classes of Virtues:* the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues, and the theological virtues, each succeeding class standing higher than the preceding. The distinction between the moral and the intellectual virtues rests upon the Aristotelian distinction between the ethical and the dianoëtic virtues, of which the former are acquired by practice, and the latter on the way of knowledge, the latter standing higher than the former. This is only in its own way another form of the much discussed question whether the active or the contemplative life stands higher.

The intellectual character of the Greek moral philosophy put knowledge above action; and it sees the ideal in the philosopher, and therefore the higher virtues in the intellectual or dianoëtic class. This view, as we have seen, was communicated to the Greek Church; and contemplative monasticism then appeared as the higher stage of life. The Western mind was of itself more disposed to action. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit, says Cicero. But through the influence of the Greek way of thinking, the high estimation of knowledge had also soon come to take precedence of this view. The ultimate goal and the highest blessedness is the beholding of God, the visio beatifica,—a goal which falls purely within the other world. The *moral virtues* again, which pertain to the faculty of desire, and are gained by exercise and habit,

[1] So Aristotle says that Virtue is realized by exercise and habit, against which view Luther polemises as sharply as against Pelagianism, on the ground that it is not the person that is determined by the work, but the work that is determined by the person; and for that reason he called Thomas Aquinas a vessel of wrath.

are the four well-known cardinal virtues: 1. *prudence*, which, as distinguished from the subsequent wisdom, is not the mistress, but the handmaid of morality, and does not furnish the end, but the means for the end of practical reason; 2. next *justice*, which gives the order of reason in the activity that is directed outwards; 3. then *moderation*, which has reference to the passions, and is partly restraining; and, 4. *fortitude*, which is partly inciting, and the highest stage of which is martyrdom. Under these four virtues the several Christian modes of action are arranged. Thus, for instance, the activity of religion and of worship on the one side, and that of neighbourly love upon the other, are arranged under justice. The intellectual virtues are primarily the three following: intellectus, scientia, sapientia, to which are then adjoined art (ars) and prudence (prudentia), being the five ways of Aristotle which lead to truth, namely, *νοῦς*, *ἐπιστήμη*, *σοφία*, *τέχνη*, *φρόνησις*.

6. The highest virtues are the three *theological virtues*, which tend to the supernatural goal, and are therefore of a transcendent nature, being the properly divine infused virtues of *Faith*, *Hope*, and *Love*. — Faith is a virtue so far as the supernatural (incomprehensible to the natural man) is an object of cognition. Hope is a virtue as a thing of the will, so far as the supernatural goal appears to be attainable, and is striven after. Love is a virtue so far as the will unites itself with the object, and thereby the individual assumes in a certain measure the nature of the desired object and makes himself like to God. Love is thus the first and highest virtue in dignity, but the last to arise in time; it presupposes the others, and it also includes the moral virtues in itself. This reminds us of Augustine, but is yet different from his view. For, according to Augustine, love is the principle of all the virtues, and these are only its unfoldings (virtus est ordo amoris), so that the four philosophical virtues are thereby raised to Christian virtues, whereas Thomas Aquinas regards them as the preliminary stages of the Christian virtues. Augustine strove to effect a transformation of the ancient way of thinking through the spirit of Christianity; in Thomas Aquinas, Christianity is joined on externally to the ancient way of thinking, and as it were only adds the higher

stages of the supernatural to it as the pre-Christian and natural stage.

7. The common character of the virtues, according to Thomas Aquinas, who follows Aristotle, is formally to be the mean between extremes: in medio virtus. In the third class of the virtues there is only the natural measure in the possibility of divine communication. Now these virtues form an advancing approximation to the highest goal, an ascending pyramid whose point is love, so that the preceding stages may be without this last and highest stage. The *Gifts of the Spirit* aid the effectuation of the virtues. These gifts, according to Isa. xi., are seven in number: intellect, counsel, wisdom, science, piety, strength, and fear. They are abiding states, which are not kept clearly separated from the virtues. The *Beatitudes* mark the *blessing* of the virtues (Matt. v.). They are eight in number; but Thomas does not succeed in giving this traditional material an internal relationship and a necessary position in the whole; and, in fact, they are only briefly treated.

8. Evil forms the opposite of the good; *sin* is the opposite of virtuous action; and vice is the opposite of moral stedfastness. According to the pleasure felt in them, sins are either *carnal* or *spiritual;* and according to their guilt and punishableness they are venial or mortal sins. *Venialia peccata* are constituted by turning away to the finite without any conscious and willed turning away from God; they are *præter*, not *contra* ordinem caritatis, and are visited with finite punishments here and in purgatory. *Mortalia peccata* are constituted by conscious and willed turning away from God, *contra* ordinem caritatis, *e.g.* such sins against the love of God as blasphemy and perjury, and such against the love of our neighbour as murder and adultery; and they are punished with eternal punishments. The gravity of the guilt is measured by the importance of the object or end, by the motives of the act, and by the opposition to virtue. The greater the virtue, so much the greater also is the sin which is directly opposed to it. The greater or less intensity of the will, as well as the circumstances and the greatness of the injury effected by sin, exercise an influence upon its gravity according to the juristic mode of consideration of the Roman

ethics. Among the other different kinds of sin, the principal sins (peccata capitalia) are specially made prominent. There are seven of them, or eight if cenodoxia (vainglory) is included.

9. The norm of the moral life is the Law: the natural and human law (lex naturalis), which is the moral law written on the heart, and the divine law; both that of the *Old Testament*, which sets forth an earthly goal and righteousness of works and has the motive of fear, and that of the *New Testament*, which has a heavenly goal, which demands holiness of disposition, and whose motive is love (lex caritatis according to the old ecclesiastical usage).

Higher than the fulfilment of the Law stand the *Consilia* which form a speciality of the New Testament law of liberty (lex libertatis) in distinction from the Old Testament law of slavery. These Consilia aim at delivering man as far as possible from the enjoyment of the earthly, which is not prohibited in itself; and they thus further his coming to the heavenly. They especially include Poverty, Celibacy, and Obedience (obedientiæ servitus), which forms a more advisable way, because it leads more surely to the goal; and to these three counsels all the others as well as all the kinds of ascetic practice are to be reduced. For the earthly and the heavenly life properly exclude each other. Now man is placed between the two; he is put into the earthly life, and yet destined for the heavenly life. The more he turns himself to the one, the more does he turn himself away from the other.[1] Usually no more is desired from man than that he also strive after the eternal life. This is the way of the commandments, and it is prescribed to all. In it grace is compatible with nature, and the heavenly life with the earthly life. By this way one may become blessed. But it is safer if one strives not merely *also* but *only* after the eternal life, when consequently grace overcomes nature and the heavenly life swallows up the earthly life. This cannot be commanded, but can only be advised.

[1] Summa, ii. 1, qu. 108, a. 4: Est autem homo constitutus inter res mundi et spiritualia bona, in quibus æterna beatitudo consistit, ita quod quando plus inhæret uni eorum, tanto plus recedet ab altero et e converso.—Expeditius perveniet (ad beatitudinem) totaliter bona mundi abdicando et ideo de hoc dantur consilia evangelii.

This is therefore the ethics of the Consilia evangelica. The higher perfection of the moral law of Jesus Christ is therefore fundamentally limited to this. Now as these Consilia evangelica are not for all,—for otherwise the whole earthly life would cease,—consequently Christianity in its perfection is only for a small circle of elect persons: a view which completely reproduces the position of the ancient aristocratism, whereas the moral ideal ought to be a universal obligation, and the highest goal should be set before all. It is the positive conception of Christianity according to the doctrine of works which corrupts its ethics in principle.[1]

The view of Ethics just indicated is expounded by Thomas Aquinas in detail in his treatise *De perfectione vitæ spiritualis.*[2] The perfection of the evangelical counsels which come as auxiliary to love to God is renunciation of temporal things, and particularly at first renunciation of earthly goods, according to Matt. xix. 21.[3] There next follows renunciation of the bodily passions and marriage, according to Luke xiv. 26 and 1 Cor. vii. 32, in which passages the apostolical expressions "flesh," "law of the flesh," and such like, are always referred to the sensuous nature of man. The moral opposition of Scripture between spirit and flesh is, therefore, transposed into a physical opposition, after the example of the expiring moral philosophy of antiquity. And, in the third place, there is the renunciation of our own will according to Gal. iii. 20, Col. iii. 3, and similar passages. These three ways of perfection, however, are represented as pertaining to the status religionis, *i.e.* monasticism and its threefold vow. Along with these counsels which relate to the love of God there are the others which bear upon the love of our neighbour. To them belongs the love of enemies,[4]—a counsel which passes above the perfectio communis and is not a commandment of the Lord; for, according to Augustine, it pertains to the perfect Son of God, and not to the multitude. This ethic thus puts itself into variance with the commandment of the

[1] Cf. Luthardt's Ethik Luthers, p. 76 ff.

[2] Opp. Venet. t. xix. p. 392 ff.

[3] Utilius est ad vitam æternam consequendam divitias abdicare quam eas possidere, *l.c.* c. 7.

[4] *L.c.* c. 14.

Lord in Matt. vi. 44.[1] To this state of perfection in the monk the said treatise joins the perfection of the episcopal and papal class, which need not be here further dealt with. It suffices to see how that here a greater or less moral worth is attributed to an external position in life, and that this is a manifest falling back from the Christian stage on which the moral is apprehended as personal, upon the pre-Christian and lower stages, which confound it with the sphere of external things.

The dualism and asceticism of this whole way of thinking have been already discussed. It erects a wall between the world and Christianity, and thereby makes the fulfilment of the universal calling of Christianity impossible. This limit was not set aside until the Reformation, which overcame it by its apprehension of what is Christian as no longer conditioned by external things, but as personal. The dualism and asceticism in question are shown, for instance, in the treatment of *temperantia*. For with it is co-ordinated the explanation of *fasting;* and fasting is justified by its final relation to concupiscentia, contemplatio, and satisfactio. *Virginity* is put higher than marriage, and martyrdom and monachism higher than virginity.

10. In his doctrine of *justice*, Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides justice into *distributiva* and *commutativa*. The whole of the then current conceptions of right and wrong, trade and conduct, politics and national economy, are received into his doctrine. The rightness of the punishment of death, of necessary defence, and of necessary theft, is established, in the same way as is still done in the morality of the present Romish Church. The moral justification of trade is explained, and it is limited to the procurement of the bonum commune in contrast to the purpose of the individual's own advantage. In accordance with the canon law, the taking of interest is declared to be usury, and is therefore pronounced to be

[1] Altogether there are reckoned twelve Counsels. In addition to the first three referred to and the love of our enemies, there are, superfluous alms, abstinence from taking an oath (*i.e.* "without need"), avoiding offences, beginning and completing all work well to the honour of God, agreement of action with doctrine so as not to be a hypocrite, avoiding unnecessary cares, brotherly admonition. It is evident that these are purely Christian duties, and not mere optional Counsels.

wrong. It immediately follows that the possibility of trading and of the business life is thereby virtually negatived, and the whole of the life in the "world" is compelled to take its standpoint outside of Christian morality. The presupposition which lies at the basis of the explanations in question is the old "natural right" of the Stoics as to the community of earthly goods, a view which had passed into the ecclesiastical thinking of the Middle Ages: only it is modified thus far, that God is regarded as primarily the possessor of all earthly goods.[1] Accordingly, everything is common according to natural right; but without annulling this right, human reason, in accordance with positive law and on various grounds, has added the right of distinctive private property.[2] Yet community forms the basis of the whole, and the duty of communication is a consequence of it. This fundamental community asserts itself in the so-called necessary theft. For, in a case of necessity, the community of natural right comes into view;[3] or, in other words, a legal right of appropriation is made out of the moral duty of communicativeness, which, however, is very two-sided, and certainly corresponds to the Romish confounding of morality and right. The same error also rules the discussion of the question of taking interest.[4] The moral obligation to come to the help of the needy or to another with one's own in an unselfish way, here becomes a legal precept or commandment which forbids the business life to appropriate its own product in the special sphere of money. This view arose from a misunderstanding of several expressions in Scripture, and was grounded upon an erroneous view of Aristotle.

11. In the discussion of the morality of the several classes, Thomas Aquinas attaches himself to the mode of thinking which had developed itself under the influences of the ancient philosophy in the Church, and with express reference to Aristotle. The *contemplative* life with its ecstasies, because it is immediately directed to God, is put above the active life as that which is directed to our neighbour. Mary

[1] Summa, ii. 2, qu. 66, a. 1.

[2] *L.c.* a. 2: Secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessionum, sed magis secundum humanum condictum quod pertinet ad jus positivum, etc.

[3] *L.c.* a. 7: In necessitate sunt omnia communia, etc. [4] *L.c.* qu. 78.

is put before Martha as more meritorious.[1] The Status perfectionis is designated as that of the religions persons or monks and of the bishops, the latter point being a concession to the hierarchy. The Consilia evangelica are exhibited in the three monastic vows, and among the monks, corresponding to the primacy of knowledge; and to them the prerogative of the contemplative life is assigned. Thomas does not treat of the other classes, but to him they constitute only the non-clerical world.

12. He treats of the *State* both in a commentary on the first three books of Aristotle's politics,[2] and in his Summa, as well as in the special treatise *De regimine principum* in four Books,[3] the first two books of which at least are ascribed to him.[4] His doctrine is the characteristic form of the Roman Catholic view, and it is still interesting for our time. As the members of the body form a unity only through subjection under one head organ, as the faculties of the soul form a unity only through subordination under reason, and as the parts of the world form a unity only through subordination under God, so the unity of the State (for which man shows himself to be destined by his helplessness, his social impulse, and his faculty of language) only becomes possible through subordination under a governing head. Hence monarchy is the best constitution, and the end of the State is to be helpful to the citizens in the attaining of their highest goal, which is blessedness. The proper caring for this, however, because it has been assigned to Christ, is also assigned to His representative or vicar. The States and princes are therefore subordinated to him, and have to fulfil their proximate calling in dependence on him, that is to say, they have thus to care for the preservation of peace, etc. But if the prince violates that highest function, the pope has the right to release his subjects from their oath. The sin of heresy deserves the punishment of death. A prince who falls away from the true faith

[1] Summa, ii. 2, qu. 182, a. 2 : Deum diligere secundum se est magis meritorium quam diligere proximum. Vita autem contemplativa directe et immediate pertinet ad dilectionem Dei, vita autem activa directius ordinatur ad dilectionem proximi. Ideo ex suo genere contemplativa vita est majoris meriti quam activa.

[2] The first three Books by Thomas.

[3] T. xix. p. 486 ff.

[4] Baumann, Die Staatslehre des h. Th. v. Aqu. 1873. On what follows, cf. Erdmann, *l.c.* 371 f.

thereby loses his right of dominion over his subjects. As soon as a ruler is excommunicated on account of apostasy, his subjects are thereby at once freed from his dominion and their oath of fidelity.[1] The proposition of Thomas Aquinas, that the people, as the proper possessor of the power of the State, may depose a tyrannical prince, although not kill him, is a reminiscence of antiquity, and it is found, for instance, even in Origen.[2] The doctrine of the Jesuits added to this position a right of revolution.

13. As Thomas justifies the subordination of the State to the Church in the sense of the well-known papal claims, he has also become the representative of the *papal power in the Church* as specially exhibited in the authority of the pope to apply the treasure of supra-meritorious works to individuals in indulgences, on the ground of the mystical unity of the body of Christ. He thereby founded a theory, the practice of which has constantly led to the utmost externalization of the religious and moral life. The speculation and mysticism of this system also became subservient to the mechanism which had mastered the whole ecclesiastical sphere. It is in this that the intellectualism which forms the starting-point of this whole system of ethics finally issues.

14. If we now take a view of the whole system, we shall be compelled to confess that the thoughts which are here presented are not specially new, nor peculiar to its author, but that it is only the products of previous thinking which have been here systematically put together. Thomas Aquinas stands in the closest connection with the scientific tradition. He has only the prerogative of the systematic thinker, although in a predominantly schematic form. But

[1] Summa, ii. 2, qu. 12: Apostatæ a fide sunt excommunicati, sicut et hæretici. Ergo principibus apostantibus a fide non est obediendum.

[2] Baumann, *l.c.* pp. 23 ff., 141. De regim. princ. i. 6: Videtur autem magis contra tyrannorum sævitiam non privata præsumptione aliquorum, sed auctoritate publica procedendum. Primo quidem, si ad jus multitudinis alicuius pertineat sibi providere de rege, non injuste ab eadem rex institutus potest destrui vel refrenari eius potestas, si potestate regia tyrannice abutatur. Nec putanda est talis multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se antea subjecerat, quia hoc ipse meruit, etc. Thomas refers to the expulsion of Tarquin by the Romans and similar facts in support of his position. Yet he adds, when human help is not available men should turn to God for aid.

in this richly organized scheme there are a great number of particular questions discussed and decided; and even the most special details are taken up into the framework of the consideration of principles with a great power of logical thinking. But as regards the whole moral view itself, it is in accordance with the external relationship in which natura and gratia stand to one another in the Romish system, that the Christian element appears only as a higher storey of the building which is reared upon the basis of Aristotle, and that it stands to a considerable degree unrelated to it; and thus the old errors of a one-sided intellectualism and of a double morality, etc., are propagated unchanged. Nor could these errors be overcome, as the deciding knowledge of the righteousness of faith was wanting.

The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas became of canonical authority for the Western Church soon after his death; and but lately it was proclaimed from Rome as the standard of science in the Roman Church, and recommended as the saving of society. Even the popular instruction in morality as it is contained in the Catechisms of the Church of Rome is essentially a popularization of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.

15. *Thomists.* — While *William of Paris*[1] († *c.* 1249), in his treatises *De virtutibus* and *De moribus*, rejected the Aristotelian and Thomist definition of virtue as the mean, because it would be thereby dependent on its opposite, the Dominican, *William Perault*[2] (Peraldus), a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas, attached himself to him as his follower. He expounds his doctrine in his *Summa*, s. tractatus de virtutibus et vitiis. I. De virtute generatim, De virtutibus theologicis, De virtutibus cardinalibus, De donis spiritus sancti, De beatitudinibus. II. De vitio in genere, De septem vitiis capitalibus, De peccato linguæ. This work was much used. It is more practical than dialectical, starting from the theological virtues and descending gradually. In distinction from the superstructure of the infused virtues, the cardinal virtues form the moral substructure, as they are themselves

[1] Cf. Gass, i. 358 ff., who follows Neander.

[2] Stäudlin, iv. 390 f. Extracts from Perault in Schröckh, Kirchengesch. xix. 289 309.

rooted in the powers of the soul. The vices are described individually in vivid detail. — The later *Specubum morale*, belonging to the fourteenth century, is almost wholly excerpted from the works of Thomas Aquinas. It is a sketch of morality illustrated by examples. It groups and describes the relative vices around the seven principal vices, and in order to terrify from sin the future punishments awaiting it are brought to view: recordare novissima tua et non peccabis.—*Antoninus*, Archbishop of Florence († 1459), wrote a much used *Summa theologica* in quattuor partes distributa. It is very like the Secunda of Thomas Aquinas, only more popular in its exposition. Its four parts treat— (1) of the principles of moral theology or of the human soul, and its faculties and laws; (2) of the vices, *i.e.* the seven principal vices, with, as the eighth, cenodoxia; (3) of the different classes and conditions of men and the obligations arising therefrom, together with much juristic and casuistic matter by which the view is turned from the exclusively deciding significance of the disposition to the external action; (4) of the virtues and gifts. The whole work presents a carefully elaborated morality of the different classes of men founded upon practice, active works, merit, obedience, and indulgence; and it forms a contribution to an empirical and practical treatment of the subject.[1]

§ 59. *Ethics in the Beginning of the Dissolution of Scholasticism.*

Duns Scotus and others.

With Duns Scotus begins the dissolution of the alliance between theology and philosophy upon which the formal system of Thomas Aquinas rests. With this new beginning there also falls away the rational necessity of the ecclesiastical doctrine as founded in the essence of God and man, the demonstration of which Thomas Aquinas had taken as his task; and in place of that rational necessity there comes into ethics the idea of liberty in the sense of indeter-

[1] Gass, i. 381.

minism, and in opposition thereto the idea of the authority of the Church. Duns Scotus puts the primacy of the will in the place of the primacy of knowledge; and the conception of blessedness is consequently determined otherwise by him than by Thomas Aquinas, it being regarded not so much as a blessed vision of God, but rather as the disappearing of the will in the union of love with God as it rises to ecstasy. This view was especially cultivated in the Franciscan order.

1. The theology of *Duns Scotus*[1] († 1308) is not ruled by the idea of the highest being, or of internal necessity, but by the idea of the will, or of liberty taken in the sense of acting at pleasure. Philosophy, in fact, is of a theoretical nature, whereas theology is practical, so that the two fall asunder. What is true for each of them is consequently also distinct, and thus the contrast between the *philosophi* and the *catholici* is often found in Duns Scotus. Now, if the will is likewise the highest principle in God, faith has to recognise this will of God specially in His revelation. The Church, however, is the possessor of revelation. Consequently the ecclesiastical authority is the ultimate foundation, and hence the basis of ethics is recognition of the order of the Church. But as the will is highest in God, it is also so in man: voluntas est superior intellectu. The two, indeed, are combined in the soul *unitivé;* but Scotus combats the view of Thomas Aquinas, who, holding that the intellect is superior in consequence of the development of moral philosophy from Socrates, also taught that the will must follow the thinking and choose what reason represents to it as good. The will can determine itself quite apart from and even against the precept of reason; nay, the thinking often follows the will instead of conversely. Duns Scotus thus represents willing as entirely undetermined; the will is liberum arbitrium, and what it does is contingens et evitabile, while the intellect obeys necessity. He is a most decided indeterminist; for, according to him, the intellect only procures the material,

[1] Stöckl, Gesch. der Philos. des M.-A., 2 Bd., Mainz 1865. K. Werner, Die Scholastik des späteren M.-A., 1 Bd. Ders., D. Scot., Wien 1881. Erdmann, i. 413–426. A. Dorner, P. R.-E.[2] iii. 735–754. Th. Ziegler, ii. 322 ff.

whereas the will makes the decision. In knowledge itself the will appears from the outset, and the longer the more in co-operation with the object,—a view which is opposed to the Thomist doctrine of the passive behaviour of man.—The act of consent, of fides acquisita, is a pure act of will in relation to knowledge, as the unbaptized can also exercise it in reference to the doctrine of the Church, whereas the fides infusa, through which we participate in grace, is undoubtedly pure passivity.[1] Here is manifested the old dualism between nature and grace, the latter of which is added externally to the former without inner mediation in the sphere of the will. Now this accentuation of undetermined liberty led on the one side to Pelagian paths, as it recognises no inner necessity and self-grounding of what is moral, but only what rests upon authority, and particularly upon the authority of the Church. It leads thereby to arbitrariness in this sphere and to isolation of what is moral, and even to laxities, as in the question of the duty of restoring what is stolen and such like, which remind us of the later Jesuitical ethics. On the other side, God is the highest good, being not so much as in Thomas Aquinas the object of knowledge but rather of the will, and therefore of the surrender and alienation of the will in love. From this point of view the Ideal appears as that ecstatic mysticism which was especially cultivated in the order of St. Francis, and which seeks blessedness in the complete union of love with God. This furnishes a proof that this mysticism is also compatible with a Pelagianizing way of thinking.

2. *John of Salisbury*[2] (Sarisberiensis), who died in 1180 as Bishop of Chartres, was Abelard's best scholar, and he excelled his contemporaries in classical culture.[3] In opposition to the common scholasticism, he sought to exhibit Christian Ethics scientifically, and not merely in its individual but in its social character, in virtue of which it finds

[1] Cf. Erdmann, *l.c.* p. 423 f.

[2] Herm. Reuter, Joh. v. Salisb. Zur Gesch. der christl. Wissensch. im 12 Jahrh., Berlin 1842. H. Ritter, Gesch. der Philos. vii. 605 ff. Schaarschmidt, Joh. Saresb. nach Leben u. Stud., Schriften u. Philos., Lpz. 1862. Wagenmann, P. R.-E.[2] vii. 59 ff. Gass, a. a. O. p. 310 ff. Th. Ziegler, a. a. O. 302 ff.

[3] But only Roman culture, the Greek being then unknown.

its proper realization in the Church and in the Christian State. He expounds his views in his *Policratus*,[1] "a sort of philosophico-theological doctrine of the State constructed out of ancient and Christian elements, a moral mirror for courtiers and noblemen, whose duties and virtues are described along with their errors and extravaganzas, with a rich knowledge of life as well as of history and classical literature, and in an elegant and ingenious style."[2]

The monk *Vincent of Beauvais*[3] († 1270), in his *Speculum doctrinale*, similarly starts from the ancient ethics and combines with them Christian thoughts. His aim in his collection of Sentences is to give a comprehensive picture of actual life and of the right guidance of life, by reference to the several virtues, and thereby to incite the will to what is good.

Along with him may also be mentioned *Raymund of Sabunde*, a Spaniard, who lived considerably later (*c.* 1436), and who, in his *Liber creaturarum*, sought to connect natural and supernatural knowledge into unity. To the love of God corresponds the grateful love of man in return. In this consists religion and morality. Everything in nature strives after the higher stage; and so likewise does man through love. Man is the recapitulation of the preceding stages of being; and at the same time, by his freedom of will, he is the image of God, and is thus bound by duty to God. Love to God makes him godlike; for amor convertit amantem in rem amatam. Evil is selfishness and self-will; the devil will have nothing but himself. Against this indwelling sin the Christian has continually to combat. Through his becoming united with God in love, he also brings the whole universe which had fallen into disharmony to a harmonious unity. This love, however, is not a quietistic love, but it is

[1] The ancient principle is stated thus in Policrat. iii. 15: Tyrannum occidere, non modo licitum est, sed æquum et justum.

[2] Wagenmann, *l.c.* p. 62. "Undoubtedly his chief work has not been yet exhaustively expounded by any one. It contains his 'Etho-politics,' his theocratico-hierarchical Science of Society in a wonderful mixture of ancient and biblical Old Testament elements, with his views on the relation between Church and State, on the position of the sovereign power, on the right of tyrannicide and revolution, and on the relation of the different classes of society to the moral organism of the State," etc.

[3] Gass in Ztschr. f. KG. i. 365 ff., and in his Gesch. d. Ethik, i. 319 f.

active in the love of our neighbour and in the unfolding and transfiguration of the natural powers.[1] Here we have a series of excellent thoughts which might have had a future, if the development of Spain and of the Roman Church had taken another course.

§ 60. *Ethics in the Age of Nominalism.*[2]

The issue of Scholasticism in Nominalism continued the movement begun by Duns Scotus.

1. *Nominalism* dissolved the untrue combination of theology and philosophy which the earlier scholasticism had cultivated, and by which it had made a religious metaphysic out of the doctrine of the Church. On the other hand, it sought to set theology more on its own feet, but certainly only in the sense of maintaining the authority of the Church. It thereby freed theology from a mass of unnecessary scholastic ballast, in the form of distinctions and such like, and this had a wholesome and preparatory significance. On another side, again, nominalism combined with its denial of universals and the necessity of knowledge, an accentuation of the will in the sense of arbitrariness which tended to shatter the inner basis of morals.

2. We already see this in *William of Occam*[3] († 1347), the doctor invincibilis and venerabilis inceptor. In rejecting universalia, and with them the philosophical proof of reason for the doctrine of the Church as it had been advocated by the previous realistic scholasticism, he brought the two elements of scholasticism—philosophy and the doctrine of the Church—into opposition to each other, and he wished to have each of them referred to itself. This would have been in itself a principle rich in significance for the future if it had been correspondingly carried out. But as he put it, it led in the religious sphere only to a strengthening of the authority of the Church, although not of the papal authority.

[1] Cf. Schaarschmidt in Herzog's P. R.-E.[2] xii. 547 ff., where the literature is given.

[2] Stöckl, Phil. d. M. 2 Bd., Mainz 1865. K. Werner, Die nachskotistische Scholastik, Wien 1884.

[3] Erdmann, ii. 428 ff. Wagenmann, P. R.-E.[2] x. 683–695.

In like manner the subject of morality was recognised by the nominalistic thinking of Peter d'Ailly and others as resting only on the ground of a positive institution of the will without any inner necessity of the thing itself. The good is good, and sin is sin, on the ground of a divine arrangement which might just as well have established the opposite. This is the consequence of the Scotist principle of the will, in the sense of a groundless preference or pleasure. But this amounts to defining the moral as something contingent and denying its inner necessity, whereby the proper essence of the moral is denied and annulled. — The same severance and reciprocal independence which Occam claimed for philosophy and the doctrine of the Church, was transferred by him also to the relation between State and Church. And here too he dissolved the scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas in regard to the dependence of the secular on the spiritual power and their asserted unity, by limiting the spiritual power to its proper sphere, and demanding for the secular power on the other hand independence within its special limits. It was with this doctrine that he stood up for Louis of Bavaria in his conflict with John XXII., and he was supported in his contentions by Marsilius of Padua († *c.* 1342) and John of Jandun († 1338).[1] The principles which were here maintained with regard to the independence of the secular power remind us, in the strongest way, of the later propositions and doctrines of Luther, and they bore in themselves the germ of a reform of the mediæval ideal of the moral life. If such a reformation was not then reached, it was not merely because of the unfavourableness of the times, or the prematureness of the positions set up, but because they were not grasped sufficiently in principle, nor developed out of the religious root of the justification of faith. If the old moral view continued to survive, it was arbitrary to except a single sphere of life from it. Occam remained the Franciscan monk, and the rigid Franciscan party which took the side of Louis sought salvation only in a sharpening of the monastic ideal. *Peter d'Ailly*[2] and Gerson, who were both celebrated nomin-

[1] See the extracts from their Defensor pacis in Gieseler, ii. 3, p. 35 ff., and Friedberg, Die mittelalterl. Ansichten u. s. w. i. ii. 1874.

[2] Tschackert, Peter v. Ailli, Gotha 1877, and in P. R.-E.[2] i. 226 ff.

alists, with all their agreement with Occam, and with all their preference for a more practical and religious than scholastic treatment of questions, were yet bound by scholastic limitations. D'Ailly connected himself chiefly with the mystics of St. Victor, and Gerson extols along with Hugo of St. Victor, especially Bonaventura. Peter d'Ailly's *Speculum considerationis* and *Compendium contemplationis* move entirely on these paths. In the traditional way he contrasts the contemplative and active life under the types of Rachel and Leah; and in allegorical connection with the family of Jacob, he represents the stages of contemplation as a spiritualis genealogia. *Gerson*[1] too, notwithstanding the direction of his disposition to the practical which led him to take his attitude against the vana curiositas in negotio fidei, and to seek to limit the current distinctions as well as to cultivate a methodical mysticism, did not recognise the fundamental error of the system. Nominalism thus also proved itself incapable of giving soundness to Christian Ethics. Moreover, the treatment of ethics, in consequence of the disappearing of the speculative or systematic power of the earlier time, now lost itself largely in casuistry.

3. Towards the close of the Middle Ages *Casuistics* became, more frequently than before, the form in which writers preferred to treat ethical questions. This, indeed, became so much the case that the writings relating to the subject gradually took the form of alphabetically arranged moral Lexicons, which could be consulted in every individual case; and this could only increase the externalism and the deadening of the moral judgment. Or, they chose the form of a collection of moral rules like Gerson's *Regulæ Morales*, in which, with all the rich knowledge of the world and of man expressed in them, the writers showed how insecure the previous foundations had become, and how wavering the moral judgment was, since, in place of fixed principles, there had come in the estimation of particular circumstances, which could not but prepare the way for the principle of probabilism. Questionable and pertinent sentences are here combined with each other.[2] This was a consequence of nominalism. In

[1] Schwab, J. Gerson, Wurzburg 1858. C. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] v. 132 ff.

[2] Gass, i. 401: Utile et inutile, noxium et innoxium dicuntur in moralibus

the matter of the Franciscan, Jean Petit, and the question of tyrannicide, Gerson, both in Paris and at the Council of Kostnitz, took a decided position against the immoral propositions of Petit, and advocated their unconditional rejection on the part of the Council. He also otherwise shows a sober and moderate habit of mind. In his mystical writings (Considerationes de theologia mystica speculativa, De theologia mystica practica, Tractatus de elucidatione scholastica mysticæ theologiæ) he has indeed cultivated mysticism essentially in the customary and specially Franciscan way. The raptus, or amor ecstaticus, is a feeling and tasting of God, with suspension of the lower functions; yet he warns his readers against the excesses of a Ruysbroek, because they endangered pantheistically the distinction between the Creator and the creature. Contemplativeness includes love; and the transfiguration of the God-loving soul includes the unreserved subjection of the human will under the divine will. He likewise warns against an all too rigid asceticism, and against the neglect of duty under the pretext of living only for contemplation, as well as against the images of the phantasy. But with all this he did not hit upon the proper root of the aberration referred to. An entirely different reform of the foundations of the system was necessary.

§ 61. *The German Mysticism.*[1]

Mysticism found its completest, but also its most questionable development in the sphere of the German mind, and in accordance with its subjective inwardness in the Dominican Order. It was developed, partly in a speculative and partly in a practical bearing; but the more speculative it was, so much the more was it influenced by Neo-Platonism and

non absolute, sed per respectum ad nos cum circumstantiis finis, loci et temporis, officii et ceterorum. Nihil est adeo consilium in lege evangelica, quin in casu posset esse obligatorium. Consilium salubre est, frequenter agere contra scrupulos leves et trepidos.

[1] Preger, Gesch. der deutschen Mystik im M.-A., Lpz. i. ii. 1874, 1881. Böhringer, xvii.-xix. Pfeiffer, Deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrh. Besides Ch. Schmidt, Etudes sur le mysticisme allemand au 14me siècle, in the Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences morales, Par. 1847.

Dionysius Areopagita, although not in a directly pantheistic sense. In its practical form it was also continually beset with the danger of regarding the sinful selfhood as interchangeable with the individual limitedness and finiteness. But both in its speculative and practical forms it was characterized by a great energy of the religious subjectivity as contrasted with outward works, and with a warm accentuation and cultivation of the inner relationship to Christ. Nevertheless, in its essentially negative attitude towards the world it was incapable of rightly appreciating the moral task of man in the world.

1. *Master Eckhart*[1] († 1327) is the chief speculative representative of the German Mysticism. He develops his views in accordance with his connection as a Dominican with Thomas Aquinas and his principle of knowledge. God is alone the true reality; the creature is properly nothing; it is only in so far as God is its ground in it that it is. In the measure then that the soul goes out from the creature and leaves it, God effuses Himself into it. The nearest task of the Christian life, is really how to become like the example of Christ as He has shown it to us in His mode of living on earth. This is "the way of the humanity of Christ." He who cannot get to anything higher, let him keep to this way. But the way

[1] Werke herausg. v. Pfeiffer, Lpz. 1847. C. Schmidt, Stud. u. Krit. 1839, 3. Martensen, Hamb. 1842. Jos. Bach, M. E. der Vater der deutschen Spekul., Wien 1864. Lasson, M. E. der Mystiker, Berl. 1868. And especially Preger, Gesch. der deutschen Mystik im M.-A., Lpz. i. 1874, p. 309 ff. Denifle, Meister Eckhart's lat. Schriften u. die Grundanschauung seiner Lehre, im Archiv für Literatur- u. Kunstgesch. des M.-A., 2 Bd., Berl. 1886, pp. 417-652. (See the notice of Loofs in the Theolog. Liter. Zeitung 1887, Nr. 10.) Denifle's positions are: 1. The Latin writings of Eckhart are more important than those in German; 2. the doctrine of Eckhart is essentially the scholastic doctrine, resting on Thomas Aquinas, and only from defective acuteness and clearness of his thoughts carried into his unmistakeably pantheistic errors. These views have been advocated by Denifle against Preger. "The prince of the scholastics is more of a mystic than Dietrich of Freiburg." Scholasticism and mysticism are not opposites. "The German mystics deserve great respect, not as deep, clear thinkers, but as mediators between the scholastic circle of ideas and the intelligence of the German-speaking public" (Den. p. 527). This question still awaits further elucidation and decision, and it may well be the case that Denifle has mistaken the characteristic positions of Eckhart.

of the Deity is a higher way; it is "to walk in the knowledge of the holy Trinity." For this the soul must die to all that is not God, and throw itself into the divine nature. The best and highest virtue is "nothing else than pure separatedness wholly from all creatures." For "he who wishes to be this or that, wishes to be something; but separatedness would be nothing." This is the essence of all humility. The soul which has thus become free from all the creature and from selfness, is then filled by God, so that God effuses Himself into such an entirely pure soul; and thus man is united with God. "Yet a pure soul must also let this be, and must let God alone work without hindrances; and thus he works perfectly His likeness in it, and works it into Himself. Thus the soul comes to understand Him and makes love with Him. This is the essence of perfection." Eckhart returns again and again to the treatment of these themes in his sermons. "When I preach," he says on one occasion, "I am wont to speak of separatedness, and that man should become emptied of himself and of all things; secondly, that one should be formed again into the simple good, which is God; and thirdly, that one should think of the high nobility which God has planted in the soul, in that man comes by it into a wondrous relation; fourthly, of the pureness of the divine nature, and of the clearness in the divine being, which is unspeakable." "God brings forth in the soul His birth and His Word; and the soul receives and gives it further to the powers in a manifold way."[1] With this Eckhart stands in opposition to the prevailing doctrine of works and external religiousness. For it is not individual works which make man holy; "but being holy makes holy works." "Therefore one must never cease till one attains to virtue in its essence and its ground;" so that the virtues of the soul are then natural, and are exercised without a "wherefore," *i.e.* without thought of reward. But if merit does not belong to good works generally, neither does it pertain to extraordinary morals and works. In general, one ought not to seek after what is peculiar. "God has not bound salvation to a peculiar way."

Christ, the incarnate God, and the relationship to Him, have only the significance of a stage of transition. The

[1] Linsenmeyer, Gesch. der Predigt in Deutschland, München 1886, pp. 396, 399.

proper height of perfection consists in the immediate and unmediated union with the Deity in the divine ground of the soul.[1] But the historical character of Christianity, and the abiding tie of our relationship to God in the historical Christ, is thus misapprehended and exchanged for a purely subjective state, which is realized in the divine ground of the soul of man. Although the forgiveness of sin is taught, it is nevertheless not the essential basis of the new life, but only the completion of one's own attitude of life; and therefore it is always a doctrine of one's own work, although not of works. But this position does not pass beyond the predominating ascetic tendency, with its negative attitude to the world, to an appreciation of the positive moral task of the Christian life in the world. This also holds true of the subsequent Mysticism down to the "German Theology" (*Theologia Germanica*) and to Staupitz.

2. *Tauler*[2] († 1361), Eckhart's disciple, represents the thoughts of this Mysticism in his Sermons with a more practical tendency, and as a preacher who exerted a powerful influence. Recognising the external Church and its orders, and holding them in high estimation, he nevertheless sees in the "Friends of God" the pillars of the Church; and he thus puts less stress upon speculations regarding the intra-trinitarian life of God than on the right godliness of the inner life of man. Being rendered incapable for all good by sin, we must let ourselves be drawn by grace, and seize the word of the forgiveness of sin, in order thus to come to "peace and rest of conscience;" for "all worthiness comes never from human words and merits, but from the sole grace and merit of our Lord Jesus Christ." From such penitent faith the love of gratitude is then born. But how far grace further com-

[1] His touching poem: "A Soul lay at the feet of God" (Preger, ii. 62 ff.), also passes into that mystical union which endangers the distinction between the Creator and the creature, and represents the relation between them as more natural than personal and moral:—

"So naturalized art Thou in me,
That naught remains 'twixt me and Thee."

[2] E. Schmidt, Joh. Tauler v. Strassb., Hamb. 1841. Bähring, J. T. und die Gottesfreunde, Hamb. 1853. Preger, Ztschr. f. histor. Theol. 1869, 1. Denifle, T.'s Bekehrung, Münster 1870. Preger, P. R.-E.[2] xv. 251, where the literature is given.

municates itself, is conditioned by the greater or less purity of the subject into which God is to effuse Himself; "just in the same way as when the air is clear and pure, the sun must pour itself forth and cannot withhold itself." The Sermons are specially occupied with the question as to how we are to become free and bare of all things in order that God may be able to give Himself to us in the highest degree. We must first put ourselves externally under the law of the self-denying example of Christ; then we must become internally loosed from all selfness; in order, lastly, to renounce all images and forms of our thoughts, and even our pleasure in the divine consolations, and thus to sink and be merged entirely in God, so as to be over-formed with Him, and to become "a man in God's form."

What has just been said may be illustrated by a few passages from his sermons. "If man is really to become one with God, then all his powers, even those of the inner man, must die and be silent; the will must itself be discharged, even of the good of all will, and become will-less; and so the understanding or the reason must be divested of its cognition of the truth, and the memory and all the powers of their proper subjects or objects. It is a hard death when all lights are quenched, and when wonderfully many lights of the pure soul are shining in their power; yet it must die even to these lights and pleasurably felt gifts, because they are not God alone" (*Second Easter Sermon*). "It is only then that man reaches the divine abyss." "The spirit loses itself so deeply in that abyss in a groundless way, that it knows nothing of itself, neither its mode, nor work, nor operations, nor taste, nor life. For it is all a mere pure and simple good, and an unutterable abyss, an essential good" (*Third Sermon at Pentecost*). "When one truly melts away in the divine ground in a true knowledge of his unequal being, and has previously well exercised himself in this, and has truly and purely cleared and purified himself in spirit and nature according to his capacity, then there is a loving immersion. When nature does its part and cannot go farther, and thus comes to its highest, then there comes the divine abyss and lets its divine spark strike into the pure spirit; and by the same power of the supernatural help of God, the transfigured

spirit of man is drawn and carried out of itself into a peculiar inexpressible pure feeling of God" (*First Sermon on Trinity Sunday*).[1]

Hence the monastic mode of life, as well as all externality in the condition of life, appears to him indifferent. Accordingly the requirement of a personal relationship of experience to God, is here asserted in a significant manner. But the progress of his thoughts does not correspond to the right beginning of the forgiveness of sin through the laying hold of the merit of Christ by faith, and the grateful love produced by this experience. These thoughts rather lose themselves on the lines of the Neo-Platonic mysticism with its demand that the creature shall disappear in the infinite divine essence.[2] Thus there comes to light the substratum of this mysticism in its affinity with pantheism, which identifies the creaturely and finite with what ought not to be, and puts perfection in the inner subjective state of the general feeling of God; although Tauler, as a practical preacher, gives warning against inactive quietism, and he combats the error that we may pretermit the works of love towards our neighbour for the sake of inward devotion.

3. The *Following of the Poor Life of Christ*, or "The Book of Spiritual Poverty,"[3] is in affinity with Tauler, and it was formerly ascribed to him. Here, however, external poverty is required along with internal poverty. "Poverty is likeness to God." For God is a being separated from all creatures. A poor man cleaves to nothing which is below him, but only to that which is elevated above all things. Poverty is freedom from the images and distinctiveness of the creatures and of earthly burdensomeness. As God is free capacity and free working, and yet at the same time blessed rest, so likewise poverty is a pure working, and yet at the same time divine rest.

[1] Cf. Linsenmeyer, *l.c.* p. 420.

[2] So Tauler, as well as Eckhart, repeatedly refers to the heathen masters who, "from the inward principle which they lived and always waited on," recognised the mystery of the Deity, and even of the Trinity, only, as was natural, not the Incarnation. Thus Tauler mentions Plato and Proclus, and refers to Augustine. Cf. Linsenmeyer, *l.c.* p. 427.

[3] Edited by Denifle, Das Buch v. geistlicher Armuth, Münch. 1877. Cf. Preger, *l.c.* p. 260.

These thoughts obtained a great diffusion in Southern and Central Germany, and were expressed at times in touching religious fervour, and with a strong accentuation of the grace of God in the sufferings of Christ.[1] But a reform of the actual life could not be effected by such views because of the acosmistic character which is peculiar to this mysticism, and which therefore makes it take too much of a merely negative attitude to the reality of life,—notwithstanding its representatives taking part in the struggles between the Pope and the Emperor, on the side of Louis of Bavaria. Its negative position is only overcome when the relation to God is apprehended not merely as an inner state, but as the personal relationship of forgiveness, and when from this standpoint a positive relationship to the world of creation and of the earthly calling is also attained.

4. *Heinrich Suso*[2] (1295 – 1366) was one of the most enthusiastic disciples of the "holy master" Eckhart. Up to his fortieth year, he imposed upon himself extraordinary self-tortures. It was only then that they were "forbidden" him by Eckhart.[3] The place of these external exercises was thereafter taken by internal exercises of renunciation. He had practised such mortification even to the verge of dying in order to fill his empty heart with the highest good. To him "Eternal Wisdom" appeared as the sum of all perfection; according to the writings of Solomon, it was the fairest, loveliest darling, and he identified it at one time with Christ and again with the holy Virgin, to whom he consecrated the treasures of his "loving heart from his youth up." The name and fulness of this Eternal Wisdom was summed up for him in the name of Jesus, the eternal Love who is the outstreaming fountain of pure Deity. With an iron stylus he wrote the name of Jesus on his breast, and called himself the "amandus" or "lover" of his heavenly beloved one. In 1335, after his return from the School of Master Eckhart, he

[1] *E.g.* in Margarethe Ebner. Cf. Preger, Gesch. d. deutschen Mystik, ii. 287.

[2] Preger, Die Briefe Susos, 1867; Ztschr. für deutsches Alterthum, viii. 406; Gesch. der deutschen Mystik, ii. pp. 309–418. C. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] xv. 76 ff.

[3] For eight years he had carried on his bare back a cross pierced with nails in order to make the suffering of Christ more sensible. He was wont to offer 100 prostrate and 100 kneeling *veniæ* (*i.e.* supplications for forgiveness).

finished in the monastery at Constance his book "Of the Eternal Wisdom." Its theme is the passion of Christ, and in it he wished to show, in the form of a dialogue between that Wisdom and her servant, how the pious man is to come to perfection through the following of the suffering of Christ. For such a mode of life he gathered in the decayed Christian city associations of "Friends of God" and a brotherhood of the Eternal Wisdom, and exercised by letters and otherwise a far-reaching pastoral activity in these circles, especially among noble and pious women. In his speculation he followed the thoughts of Eckhart. His chief concern is the cultivation of the inner divine life. The way to God leads through Christ by repetition of His sufferings. The degrees of this mystical life are purification, which is the expulsion of all creaturely desires; illumination, which fills the soul with divine forms; and perfection, "which consists in high intuition, in fervent love, and sweet enjoying of the highest good." "He who would attain to the higher perfection, must rise above high things. He must rise above nine things, of which we shall here mention only the four lowest and least. He must first rise above the senses and the sensible nature, and surpass all sensible things; the next is, thou must rise above thy bodily and natural powers; thirdly, above all desire; and, fourthly, above all images and imagination."[1] The man who abandons himself to God "is unformed of the creature, is formed with Christ, and superformed into the Deity." The inscriptions in his chapel closed with the words of Cassian: "All perfection ends where the soul is received with all its powers into the only One, which is God."[2] We easily see, however, how the old error likewise breaks through here, the error which holds the sensible nature to be what is wrong and the impediment of the life in God, just as in Neo-Platonism. Accordingly, instead of the forgiveness of sin, it makes purification the basis of the godlike life, just as the Neo-Platonists identified spiritualization with moralization and saw the goal in union with pure being. Thus Suso, like the other Mystics, refers primarily to the heathen masters; in the second stage to Augustine, Dionysius, Bonaventura, and Thomas Aquinas;

[1] Sermon on John xvi. 28. Cf. Linsenmeyer, p. 434.
[2] Preger, *l.c.* p. 353.

and, on the third stage, to the highest knowledge of Eckhart, although he does not name him.[1] A similar position is taken by the other preachers and representatives of this Mystical School. "I have found rest in nothing but in Nothing."[2] Thus does one of these mystics make the soul speak. This nothing, however, is the pure Deity; for "the place out of which I was born is the Deity, it is my fatherland." It is always the immediate relationship of the soul to the Deity itself which is in question, and not the historically revealed God, nor the historically mediated relationship. All this is only the ladder, which is superfluous when the soul has attained to the Deity itself.

5. *Ruysbroek*[3] († 1381) was the Father of the Mysticism of the Netherlands. He teaches a threefold coming of Christ to us, corresponding to the three orders of being and the circles of life (the divine, the spiritual, and the natural), and the thereby conditioned threefold gradation of the mystical ascent to God. In His first coming He draws the outwardgoing desire of the soul inwards; this is the stage of purification, the struggle of the soul against the inordinate love to the creatures. His second coming is the rich outflow of strengthening gifts into the higher powers of our soul; and here especially we have the inward living participation in the self-divesting sufferings of Christ. In the third coming of Christ, the divided soul is transported out of its earthly consciousness and gazes with transfigured look and unrelated inner face into the bodily life of God with its fulness of gifts and graces, in which ocean the soul sinks—dying to itself in order to come forth always anew again out of God. On the first stage, the essential moral action consists in imitation of Christ and of holiness; upon the second stage, it consists in the exercise of the three theological virtues; and upon the third stage, it consists in mystical intuition. Here we stand again at the same goal which connects this whole way of thinking and mood of mind with Neo-Platonism, and ultimately with the

[1] Preger, *l.c.* p. 412.

[2] Lektor von Sterngassen, Strassburg. Linsenmeyer, p. 441.

[3] B. Engelhardt, Rich. v. St. Viktor u. Ruysbroek, Erl. 1838; bes. R.'s Ansichten über das kontempl. Leben, pp. 224–244. C. Schmidt, Etudes sur le mysticisme allemand, etc., u. P. R.-E.[2] xiii. 143 ff. Osterloo, J. Ruysb., Amsterd. 1874.

intellectual movement of the ancient philosophy from the time of Socrates.[1]

Gerson[2] declared himself opposed to the transcendental excesses of Ruysbroek, because they seemed to annul or endanger the essential distinction between God and the creature. The transfiguration of the God-loving soul included the unreserved subordination of the human will under the divine will, as even the prayer on the highest stage still is: *Thy* will be done in earth as it is in heaven. But within this limitation, Gerson also knows the height of that contemplatio which unites itself with the Deity in the soaring of love. According to his view, the vita contemplativa is the status hominum extra mundum.

6. *Thomas a Kempis*[3] († 1471) has most successfully brought the thoughts of mysticism into the service of edification in his *De imitatione Christi.* This work, which has been translated into all the European languages and been published about 2000 times, is full of religious devoutness, and is therefore still highly prized in evangelical circles. But the ideal of this production is also fundamentally monasticism, and a mysticism which misapprehends the significance of the work of the earthly calling. The same is essentially the position of the *Brethren of the Common Life,*[4] in whom the practical mystical movement was reduced to a Biblical simplicity, and gave itself an actual form in the life of an outward society. Their object was to seek, in opposition to the secularization of life even in the Church, the salvation of their soul and of the people in the following of Jesus Christ, in the form of an associated communal life with a community of goods maintained for their mutual advancement in the spiritual life.[5] The founder of this movement was *Gerhard Groot* († 1384). He received impulses from Ruysbroek and transformed them into practical activity by founding a monastic

[1] See Luthardt's Antike Ethik, p. 181 f. [2] See § 60, *supra*, at end.

[3] Hirsche, Prolegg. zu einer neuen Ausgabe der Imit. Christi, Berl. 2 Bde. 1873-74; Id. P. R.-E.[2] ii. 678 ff.

[4] Hirsche, P. R.-E.[2] ii. 678-760. Möbius, Beiträge zur Charakteristik der Brüder des gemeins. Lebens. Inaug. Dissert. Lpz. 1887.

[5] "Castam, concordem et communem vitam deinceps observabo." "Woe to him," says Florentius, "who when living in fellowship asks what is his, or calls anything his."

society without a binding vow, as a means of flight from the temptations of the world. He celebrated in lofty words the blessing of poverty, and cultivated spiritual exercises, but at the same time required labour.[1] An earnest preacher of repentance, with profound knowledge of the soul, he is yet always bound in the Romish manner in his evangelical knowledge and tendency. Labour only proceeds side by side with contemplation; nor is the full moral appreciation of the earthly calling attained even here. The moral way of thinking still remains the monkish one. And thus even the Brethren with all their exercise of humble love, especially in the case of Florentius, the organizer of the association, still continued to cultivate mysticism in the form of ecstasy. Like Ruysbroek, they distinguished the three stages of: 1. The active life (vita activa), which slays the fleshly lust; 2. The devout life (vita devota); and 3. The contemplative life (vita contemplativa), or the sinking into God. Gerhard and Florentius had led a life of worldly enjoyment until they gave themselves up to *devotio*, and, in contempt of the world and of themselves, to the imitation of the humble life of Christ (desiderium animæ ad Deum). By the gratia devotionis man is transported from the world (raptus in spiritu, tractus in cœlum), and beholds visions. This is particularly seen in the case of *Mande*, who had whole series of heavenly visions,[2] although others sought to subordinate the mystical element to the ethical element, as is shown by the work of Thomas a Kempis, whose work was the finest blossom of this movement, and still more by the wholesome influence which the Brethren exercised on their surroundings.

7. *The German Theology* (*Theologia Germanica*)[3] proceeded

[1] Cf. Rossmann, Betrachtungen über das Zeitalter der Reformation, Jena 1858, p. 261 ff. They engaged in copying manuscripts, binding and (later) printing of books.

[2] Hirsche, *l.c.* p. 723.

[3] Pfeiffer, Theologia deutsch: Die leret gar manchen lieblichen underscheit gotlicher warheit und seit gar hohe und gar schone ding von einem volkomen leben, 3 Aufl., Gütersl. 1875. [Theologia Germanica, which setteth forth many fair lineaments of Divine Truth, and saith very lofty and lovely things touching a Perfect Life. Translated by Susanna Winkworth. With a Preface by the Rev. Chas. Kingsley, and a Letter by the Chevalier Bunsen. 2nd ed.] Lisco, Die Heilslehre der Theologie deutsch., Stuttg. 1857. Hamberger, P. R.-E.[2] xv. 415 ff.

from the circle of the "Friends of God." It was edited by Luther in 1516, and extolled by him; but in the course of his development he separated himself internally more from it. This little work treats profoundly of the opposition of Adam and Christ, *i.e.* of the old and new man, and of the union with God, the highest good. But, as is generally characteristic of mysticism, the historical side of salvation is also here transposed into the subjective; and it stands in connection therewith that this one-sided subjectivity does not find the right relationship to the world, but has an acosmistic character. The perfection of man according to this treatise also consists only in this way of complete withdrawal from the world and from oneself, and in the complete entrance into God conditioned thereby, or deification. This is the old mystical ideal of perfection into which non-Christian phases of mind are worked.

8. *Staupitz*[1] follows the same lines, although more Augustinian in his thoughts and attitude. His mysticism exercised an influence on wide circles of men of an inward habit of mind, on the threshold of the Reformation. In his tractate, "Of the Following of the Voluntary Dying of Christ," and still more beautifully in his little book, entitled, "Of the Love of God," he expounds his thoughts in this connection. The mediæval character of his doctrine of justifying grace is recognisable; and it is explicable why he was forced to repudiate Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone. To Staupitz the goal of man's longing is also the mystical union with Christ; yet not in the naturalistic sense of being merged in God, but in the ethical sense as a devotion of love to God who is to be loved above all things, and it is effected by God who works all things through sufferings in the following of Christ, for He is perfection and full of it. From Him proceeds the essential love, the Holy Spirit, and it becomes indwelling in man, and brings forth in man all that is good, and all virtues and good works. Although God is thus the efficient one, yet the goal is that merging in God in which man ultimately threatens to disappear in God; so that we

[1] Mallet, P. R.-E.[2] xiv. 648 ff. A. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. i. 124-128. Dieckhoff. Die Theologie des Joh. v. Staupitz, in d. Ztschr. f. kirchl. Wissensch. 1887, 4 u. 5.

therefore find ourselves also in Staupitz on the previous path of mystical subjectivity. Yet this responded to a widespread state of mind, as we see, for instance, from the great following which he had in different places, such as Nürnberg.

§ 62. *The Thought of the Following of the Life of Jesus.*

The always-returning motto of the moral ideal, especially in the second half of the Middle Ages, is formed by the thought of the Following and Imitating of the Life, and especially of the Poor Life of Jesus, in connection with the increasing significance which the accentuation of the humanity of Jesus gained in the West, especially on German soil.

1. In the *Greek* Church and theology, the interest that stands in the foreground is the Deity of Christ, and the deification of man as what we principally owe to Him. It was a world that had fallen under the power of death in which Christ had appeared with His proclamation in order to communicate to it supramundane life. It was therefore natural that this side of Christianity should be emphasized with a certain exclusiveness. Thus the Greek theology occupied the theological standpoint, proceeding from above downwards. And the speculative endowment and habit of the Greek mind responded to this theological tendency.

2. The more Christianity became at home in the world, the side of the affinity of Christ with humanity could not but gain in importance; and the anthropological standpoint accordingly asserted itself. It is well known that this standpoint is characteristic of the *Western* Church and its theology. The main questions here turned not merely around the life in the other world, but upon renewal in this life; and this was especially the case in the sphere of the German peoples. Here it was not a dying world, but a humanity entering into history, with which Christianity had to deal. But this humanity required education and renewal. With this requirement the *example* of the man Jesus Christ comes into the foreground. Gregory the Great already emphasizes the

exemplariness of the life of Jesus, and he accentuates it more emphatically than His atonement. He sets forth the example of Christ as valid for the different conditions of life, especially in reference to humility, patience, and gratitude. Isidore likewise speaks of the exemplum humilitatis.[1] The German and Anglo-Saxon poems which aimed at bringing home the Gospel to the newly converted peoples, did not indeed give prominence to the lowliness of Jesus, for that would have been a characteristic too alien to the natural self-consciousness of these peoples; but they bring forward His philanthropy and similar qualities. In short, it is always the man Jesus who is emphasized, but as equipped with divine power. By His instruction and example He is for us the leader through life; and by His death He has bound us permanently to Himself; and therefore we ought to fulfil His commandments in gratitude and obedience by following Him. This is also the thought of the Heliand and Otfried. And this thought of the following of Jesus receives always the longer the more increasing significance, and even becomes in the later Middle Ages the scheme of the whole Christian life. Bonaventura in his *Meditationes vitæ Christi* repeats again and again the invitation to look upon the Lord in order by such contemplation to attain to the imitation of His virtues of humility, poverty, and wisdom; for where shall we elsewhere find example and teaching for all the virtues in such a manner as in the life of the Lord?[2] For, says Ludolf of Saxony in his *Vita Christi*,[3] it is for this that Christ was sent from heaven, that He might go before us on the way of the virtues. Thus it may be said that the thought of the Following, or rather of the Imitation of Christ, forms the centre of the mediæval state of mind down to the close of the Middle Ages. Thus Thomas a Kempis at the very beginning of his *De imitatione Christi I.*, says: Summum

[1] Sentent. ii. 11.

[2] Prooem.: Ubi enim virtutis excelsæ paupertatis, eximiæ humilitatis, profundæ sapientiæ orationis, mansuetudinis, obedientiæ, patientiæ ceterarumque virtutum exempla et doctrinam sic invenies sicut in vita domini?

[3] Proleg.: Ut præiret nos in via virtutum. Cf. Nippold, Das Leben Christi in M.-A. Vortrag, Bern 1884, p. 65 ff. Seeberg, Die german. Auffassung des Christenth. in dem früheren M.-A. Ztschr. für kirchl. Wissensch. u. kirchl. Leben, 1888, 2, 3.

igitur studium nostrum sit in vita Christi meditari; and oportet ut totam vitam suam illi (sc. Christo) studeat conformare. Here, however, it is above all the self-estrangement and the sufferings of Christ which form the centre of consideration. In this sense Bernard in his well-known Passion Hymns has immersed himself contemplatively in the sufferings of Christ. He does not do this without at the same time beholding in the sufferings of Christ also the reconciliation of God; and this distinguishes him, and also the prevailing reflection of those who came after him, from Abelard, who sees in the sufferings of Christ only the means of awakening love in return at the cost of the objective reconciliation of God. But these two sides are not yet rightly mediated and united with each other. The contemplation of the passion of Christ does not serve, above all, to draw from it the joyful confidence of the forgiveness of sin, but rather to let this view work upon one's own sympathy in the devotio-compassionis. Hence along with the sufferings of Christ the sufferings of Mary are presented without hesitation for similar compassion, as by Anselm and Suso (*supra*, § 53, 61). This intuitive contemplation of the sufferings of Christ and Mary comes down through the whole course of this mysticism. It forms an essential element of it, although only as a stage of transition to the goal of perfection, which consists in submersion into the Deity Himself. And down to the present day this is the predominating way in which the passion is regarded in the Roman Church. It serves to awaken compassion, which is a purely pathic and humanly natural thing, as it was in the case of the women of Jerusalem; only that under certain circumstances it goes much farther, and can exercise an influence of such strength upon the phantasy and feeling that it even draws the bodily organism within the range of its sympathy. The most active and celebrated representative of this Following of the Poor Life of Christ was Francis of Assisi, who, from this standpoint, sought to reform Christian society generally.

§ 63. *The Franciscan Reform.*[1]

In the sense of the Following of the Poor Life of Christ, Francis of Assisi made his attempt to reform Christian society; and he sought to heal it by intensifying the monastic ideal, and making it the power determining the universal life of Christendom.

1. *Francis of Assisi* († 1226) had the change in his life, which was to be of such far-reaching consequences, called forth by a sermon which he heard in 1207 in the Portiuncula Church. Its subject was Matt. ix. 10: "Get you no gold, nor silver, nor brass in your girdles: no wallet for your journey, neither two coats, nor shoes, nor staff." He now thought that for the first time he understood the Christianity of Christ. If the life of the Christian is generally to be a following of the life of Christ, then in the foreground of this life of Christ had already been long placed the self-denial and poverty of Christ. Francis wished, first of all, to be in earnest with the Following of this Poor Life in his own person. Its image was to be exhibited in himself; and it was thus that the admiring reverence which was afterwards paid to him understood him. The *Liber conformitatum* set forth forty resemblances between Christ and Francis; and in these he not only came up to the Saviour, but even excelled Him.

2. While he thus exhibited in his own person the Following of the Poor Life of Christ with unreserved renunciation of all personal possession and value of his own,[2] and emphatically asserted the precepts of Christ laid down in the Sermon on the Mount as valid for common life, he sought thereby to heal and to save Christian society in general. This he did, not with new

[1] Gieseler, Kirchengesch. ii. 2, 3 Aufl. p. 327 ff. K. Hase, Fr. v. Assisi, ein Heiligenbild, Lpz. 1856. Zöckler, P. R.-E.[2] iv. 652 ff. Herm. Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im M.-A., ii. 184 ff.

[2] *E.g.* in the Rule instituted by Honorius III. 1223, c. 6, fratres nihil sibi approprient, nec domum, nec locum, nec aliquam rem. Sed tanquam peregrini et advenæ in hoc seculo, in paupertate et humilitate domino famulantes, vadant pro eleemosyna confidentes. — Hæc est illa celsitudo altissimæ paupertatis, etc. Gieseler, p. 329.

means and thoughts, but only by intensifying those that had been hitherto in use. The thought of poverty was indeed asserted generally in the monastic foundations, but Francis in a hitherto unknown manner formed a rule for the whole guidance of life, and not merely for the life behind the walls of the cloister, but within the world. The institution of the *Tertiarians*[1] was designed to introduce this monasticism into general life, and thus to make the whole world into a sort of large monastery. The principle of the greatest possible abstinence from the usual worldly mode of life, was to be practised by the Tertiarians within the civil relationships as the legal rule of their conduct in life. They were to be simple in their clothing, and without any ornament; they were not to visit plays, nor to take part in dances; and they were to fast much, and observe prescribed religious exercises. It was the ideal of the monastic asceticism and negation of the world in accordance with which life was thus to be formed. It is manifest that this could only be carried through with essential qualifications. If carried out logically, it annulled itself. For if poverty is to be the universal ideal, who then is to be a possessor? And if mendicancy is the ideal mode of life, it presupposes givers, and therefore possessors. Moreover, if property is wrong in itself, how can it become right by giving? It is evident that nothing more could be reached than an approximation to the state of the ownerless children of God. This state thus proved itself to be impracticable. Mere individual representatives of asceticism and renunciation did not prove their position, but only put the impossibility of a universal realization of their ideal more clearly into light.

3. This conflict between postulate and possibility led only to an intensified assertion of the postulate. In the circle of the spiritual followers of it, it partly turned the thoughts of their phantasy to a future in which that conflict would find its solution, as in the Apocalyptic hopes of Joachim of Floris.[2]

[1] 1221. Tertius ordo de pœnitentia (Tertiarii or fratres conversi). Bonav., vita Franc. c. 4: Sicut in cœlum tendentibus pœnitentiæ viam omnibus constat esse communem sic et hic status clericos et laicos, virgines et conjugatos in utroque sexu admittens, etc. Gieseler, p. 331.

[2] Cf. H. Reuter, *l.c.* p. 189 ff.

But the movement had also this consequence, that it carried these religious thoughts into the wide masses of the people, and here produced an independent interest in the questions of the public religious life, which was afterwards to receive in many ways important expression.

§ 64. *The prevailing moral view and attitude.*

The fundamental mode of view which ruled the moral thinking and acting in the most varied spheres of life during the Middle Ages, was, and continued to be, that of the monastic Ideal, which drew with it corresponding consequences for conduct in the secular life.

1. *The monastic Ideal.*[1]—The prevailing mood and tone of the Middle Ages was, and continued to be, monastic; and the monk was the ideal of the Christian. This notion exercised great power over the minds of men, and it made itself effective on the most varied sides. The cloister life had received its rules in the West through Benedict, and with them the foundations of the important culture which the monastic life soon attained in such a high degree. Besides the laity and clergy, the monks became an essential class in Christian society; and the congregations sought to secure the reform of the monasteries,[2] and exercised therefrom a far-reaching influence even upon the ecclesiastical and Christian life. This influence fell at that time mostly into the hands of the newly-founded mendicant orders; and thereby a corresponding mystico-ascetic mood, founded upon the renunciation of the world and joy in suffering, became widely diffused. There arose a sort of enthusiasm for the asceticism of mortification. It assumed the most manifold and artificial forms, and in them there was often displayed a wonderful energy of will. The severest self-tortures were combined with the severest privations. The intention was to go safely in this manner

[1] Cf. Gass, i. 283 ff.

[2] The congregation of the Cluniacens was brought to high authority through Odo († 942), and after him especially through Odilo († 1048) and Peter the Venerable († 1156). That of the Cistercians, 1098, obtained its influence chiefly through Bernard, who was, from 1115, Abbot of Clairvaux.

on the narrow way, as well as to become conformable to the passion of Christ in love. Through their own negative and positive doings men wished to gain perfection, and thus to secure for themselves the fellowship of God, instead of possessing it in the forgiveness of sin, and attaining from that standpoint the right moral activity. Thus men practised the exercises of an ascetic heroism such as had taken a similar form on heathen soil.

2. The attitude of mind towards *the World of Creation*, necessarily combined with this view, was a negative and internal one; and it became intensified from a justified attitude and judgment into a misappreciation of the work of God, which had as its consequence a mistaken view of the earthly calling. The Biblical opposition of the earthly and heavenly is transferred from the world of the inward disposition into the world of external existence, and identified with the world of creation on the one side as the world of finiteness, and with the Church on the other side as the world of the heavenly and eternal, so that the world of finiteness receives its justification only through the latter, *i.e.* through the undertaking of service for the Church. It is well known to what an exorbitant degree the claims of the papacy were thereby carried.[1] Again, the contemplative life, which has its reality in monasticism, stood high above the active life in the world. The monks were the *religiosi;* they were viewed as the special bearers of religion or of the life in God, and the inhabitants of the paradise where the rest in God is enjoyed. Apart from this, the world appears as a vale of tears, and it is so called by Bernard (vallis lacrymarum), and as a world of vanity,[2] in which all happiness and joy at the beginning of anything ends sadly. Art afterwards took up this theme, and exhibited it in touching

[1] Cf. *e.g.* Gieseler, ii. 3, p. 101 ff., who quotes from the Summa of Augustinus Triumphus: Sententia Papæ et sententia Dei una sententia est.—Papa universalis ecclesiæ sponsus dicetur.—Utrum Papæ debeatur honor, qui debetur Christo secundum quod Deus? Videtur, etc. Not to say anything of the other glorifications of the Pope, or the consequences which were drawn from the well-known comparison of the Church and the State to the sun and the moon.

[2] Hugo of St. Victor, De vanitate mundi, l. iii.: Curris sed deorsum, crescis sed ad interitum, etc.

pictures;[1] while Innocent III., in his treatise *De contemptu mundi*, written in 1196, gave a powerful expression to the view as a whole in a detailed description of human misery from birth to death. He did not reach the bright picture which he had intended to draw in contrast to this gloomy one. This mood of mind could not but see the moral ideal in monasticism. Here alone did salvation and the way to heaven seem secured. To be converted meant to become a monk, and in this sense to leave the world. Moreover, in the case of those with whom the inwardness of feeling had become predominant, mysticism was combined with monasticism. The great power which this mysticism gained at that time over the souls of men in narrower circles is shown by Preger in his History of the German Mysticism. He gives numerous names, especially those connected with the nunneries belonging to the Dominican order, and to the sphere of Suso's influence.

3. *The Idea of Perfection*, as it was formed according to the monastic ideal, and was then represented in the cultivation of science by the mendicant orders, did not fail to encounter keen contradiction, and yet this contradiction was compelled to yield to the power of the dominant view. *William of St. Amour*[2] († *c.* 1272) at Paris opposed the authority of the monks, and especially the mendicant orders, in his treatise *De periculis novissimorum temporum*, written in 1256. With great severity he quotes the words of Christ regarding the Pharisees, and applies them to the monks, blaming the mendicant life of sturdy people: "Some say that it belongs to perfection to abandon everything for Christ and to go a-begging; but I say that perfection consists in leaving everything and following Christ by doing His good works, that is, by labouring and not by begging. If any one would be perfect, let him after he has abandoned all live on the work of his hands; or let him enter into a monastery which may provide for him.—If the Church has permitted, or rather tolerated, begging in some of the *regulares*, it does not follow that it is to be allowed for all time, contrary to the authority of Paul. The permission which the Church has erroneously

[1] Such as the triumph of Death in the Campo Santo at Pisa.

[2] Pfender in P. R.-E.[2] xvii. 137 f. Gieseler, ii. 2, p. 342 ff.

vouchsafed, ought to be recalled in accordance with known truth." Here there stir the germs of correct knowledge; but the knowledge is fragmentary and self-contradictory, and thus this protest could not but remain without effect even if it had not been externally suppressed. The monk continued to be the ideal. The monastic vow was put on a level with baptism;[1] the indulgence given at monkish sanctuaries (such as that of the Portiuncula) was regarded as particularly powerful;[2] and the scapulary of the Carmelities delivered from purgatory.[3] Nor did the immorality of the priests and monks, which gave rise to the gravest complaints, wholly undeceive the people. The state of the *religiosi* was, notwithstanding, the status perfectionis. Poverty was regarded as a holy state, and the art of Giotto glorified it in his frescoes at Assisi. Riches were considered questionable; acquisition was to be repudiated;[4] and mendicancy was viewed as a thing well-pleasing to God, and as more holy than labour. This could not but bring the moral judgment regarding the earthly life and the fulfilment of the earthly calling into complete confusion. That calling appeared as unjustified in itself, and as requiring to get its justification through special ecclesiastical works and performances. The consequence of this was that men could not remain with a calm conscience in the state of the natural life and apply themselves to their earthly calling; and the resulting disturbance of the conscience could only be allayed by ecclesiastical performances, such as foundations, alms, and such like.

4. The exercise of *Christian Charity* was therefore perverted by these views. Rich as the Middle Ages were in charitable works, yet it was not the charity itself, or the need which it was to supply, which was considered, but charity was regarded

[1] Jerome in his Ep. 22 ad Paulam says of entrance into the monastic state: Secundo quodammodo propositi se baptismo lavare. Thom. Aqu., Summa, ii. 2, qu. 189, a. 3: Unde legitur in vitis patrum, quod eandem gratiam consequuntur religionem intrantes quam consequuntur baptizati. Gieseler, *l.c.* p. 349.

[2] Cf. Gieseler, p. 346.

[3] Gieseler, p. 349: In hoc moriens non patietur incendium.

[4] Guilelm. Lugd., Summa de virtut. 6, P. de beatitud. Paupertas est carentia divitiarum, contemptus divitiarum—propinqua Deo—laeta, quieta, munda, mater et nutrix et custos religionis. Riches was the opposite of all that.

only as a means conducive to the special end of the merit which it was desired to acquire. Men gave to the beggar not in order to help, but in order to do a good meritorious work, and thus to pave for themselves the way to heaven;[1] and, accordingly, the latter Summists discuss alms no longer under the article of "love," but under "penitence" and "satisfaction."[2] Thus Innocent says: "Alms purify, alms deliver, alms redeem, alms protect, alms reach the goal, alms make perfect, alms make blessed, alms justify, alms awaken new life, alms save." Men gave "in provision for their future salvation," "because they wished to sow on earth what they hoped to reap eternally in heaven," "in order to provide according to their powers for the future life in the hope that alms would greatly benefit believers at the resurrection on the last day."[3] "The merit, however, lies not in the fact that the poor are helped, that their need is alleviated, and the evil of poverty overcome, but it consists essentially in the renunciation of the earthly goods that have been given away." "Poorness is a morally higher state than richness, and whoever gives away any of his earthly goods as alms, he comes thereby a step nearer the perfect state of living without property."[4] Begging, however, was not regarded as a shame; it had become a sort of calling. "It is not he who gives an alms that does a service to the poor; but, conversely, he performs a service to the rich who asks him for a gift."[5] And the effect of alms increases with their amount. The more alms, the more intercessors. Thus it is ultimately the work itself which is estimated apart from the person. This is the ultimate consequence of the old divergence from the path of the Pauline knowledge.

[1] In this sense Innocent III., in his *De eleemosyna*, derives this word in an extraordinary way from Eli = Deus, and Moys, quod est aqua, quod Deus per eleemosynam maculas peccatorum eliminat et sordes abluit vitiorum. The purpose of alms according to him is ut fiat propter beatitudinem; and alms are, in fact, better than fasting and prayer. Cf. Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 138.

[2] Gass, *l.c.* 414.

[3] Uhlhorn, *l.c.*

[4] Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 141.

[5] Uhlhorn, *l.c.*

§ 65. *The Secular Morality.*[1]

The ascetic ideal of life could not but come into collision with the actual reality of life and its claims, and thereby call forth a reaction of the moral thinking in the secular sense.

1. *The collision between the ascetic ideal and the reality of its representatives.*—If the Church was the Kingdom of God Himself upon earth, and was thus the standard of all morality, nevertheless the representation of the Church itself often showed itself in very questionable opposition to morality. The history of the papacy, the moral state of the Court at Avignon, and the great schism, could not remain without an impression. The more the papal absolutism grew, its dispensations from oaths and such like could not but confuse the moral judgment, and lead to the loosening of it from the external authority of the Church. The moral reality of the "religiosi" only too often conflicted with the ideal which theory set up. The ever recurring decrees of the Synods against unchastities and vices in the monasteries, and not less so in the nunneries, give evidence of this. In the corrupted state of the Church many saw the preliminary signs of Antichrist. *Gerhoh*[2] († 1169), Provost of Reichersberg, believed that "the fourth night-watch" had already come. What he relates about the conduct of the secular clergy in his descriptions of morals,[3] exceeds all conception. If he does not turn himself against monasticism, which is his ideal, certain accusing voices were yet raised against it at the close of the twelfth century. And what was passing before men's eyes was reflected in the sermons of earnest preachers. Tauler's sermons give us glimpses into the unedifying condition of the monastic life and the melancholy state of the Church.[4]

[1] Herm. Reuter, *l.c.* ii., in various places. Diestel, "Der wälsche Gast," u. die Moral des 13 Jahrh., Allg. Monatschr. f. Wissensch. u. Liter. von Droysen. Halle u. Braunschw. Jahrg. 1854, pp. 687–714.

[2] A. Vogel, P. R.-E.[2] v. 101 f. Sturmhöfel, G. v. Reich. über die Sittenzustände der zeitgenöss. Geistlichkeit, Inaug. Dissert., Lpz. 1888.

[3] In his Comm. on Ps. lxiv., and his De investigatione Antichristi.

[4] So also Linsenmeyer, *l.c.* p. 429.

To him the "Friends of God" are the pillars of the world and of the Church; "and if these men were not in Christendom, the world would not stand an hour."

2. *The issue of the Crusades*, in which the ascetic enthusiasm of the Middle Ages found such a powerful expression, exercised a strong reaction in the direction indicated. In the sphere of Mahommedanism there had been disclosed a world of manifold virtues. This called forth all sorts of critical reflections. Is the world of morality not to be thought of as independent of religion and Church, and as subsisting by itself? Manifold influences of the Arabian philosophy also worked in the way of loosening the mind from the authority of the ecclesiastical dogmatism. At the same time the remembrance and cultivation of the ancient moral philosophy had never died out. Seneca and Boëthius continued to be recognised as of great importance.

3. *The popular Literature*, as it was now developing itself, supported this liberation of the moral sphere from the ecclesiastical tutelage. The Troubadours in the south of France took the side of the Albigenses against the Church; and they stood for the free secular life against the alliance of ignorance with ambition, and of vice with power.[1] A more pious spirit indeed prevailed in the *German poetry* of a *Walter von der Vogelweide* and in *Freidank's Bescheidenheit*. But against the corrupt churchism and the immorality of the priests, they also raised their voices; and in their proverbial wisdom they represented a morality that had really a religious foundation, but was yet secularly free and joyous. Thus Freidank sings:—

> No one ever goes to hell
> Through the food he uses well;
> And who his wife is right possessing,
> He doth not therefore lose God's blessing.

Again he sings of the Net with which St. Peter caught the fishes, thus:—

> He scorns the net who watches;
> The Roman net now catches
> Land and castles, silver, gold,
> St. Peter knew not such of old.

[1] Reuter, *l.c.* ii. 59.

St. Peter was of right good breeding,
So God gave him His sheep for feeding;
But never bade him shear the sheep,
Though now this shearing all must keep.—
Yet oft at Rome is false intent
Of which the Pope is innocent.

The last two lines he adds in a good-natured way, just as Luther did in his first communication to Leo X. We have here on the whole a Christian morality working itself out, which is quite different from the monkish ideal.

In the *Parcival* we find the same position. Gurneman teaches Parcival shame as the beginning of discipline (shamelessness leads to hell), with mercy, gentleness, humility, and, above all, the right measure, and loving women without wavering or false guile. Everywhere the moral factor steps out of the sphere of ecclesiastical works, and the vita contemplativa falls into the background behind the joyous fulfilment of the worldly calling in marriage, etc. In like manner we find in the "Italian Guest of Thomasin of Circlaria" that the monk is not the ideal but the knight, the honest, pious, free man; and that the place does not at all make the virtue. Here too, undoubtedly, morality rests upon the religious basis; for the fear of God is represented as the basis of all virtue. The Christian secular morality is in this respect distinguished from the ancient morality, and likewise by its wider vision for the whole circle of the moral tasks of the civil life.

4. There had thus gradually become disclosed a wide sphere of *real life*, which could no longer be embraced under the ecclesiastical rules; and along with this, there had also become developed a feeling of the justification of the corresponding tasks of life with which those moral views no longer agreed. For when logically carried out, such views could not but make the fulfilment of the tasks of the earthly calling impossible, and yet these tasks were necessary to human life. An inner collision of feelings and an unsettlement of conscience could not but arise in consequence; and these could not be overcome by the customary ecclesiastical means. It was not merely that the national and political consciousness had come in the conflict with the Church to assert itself in Louis of Bavaria and Philip le Bel of France, in such strength that the claim it made of an independent justification was not

compatible with the claim of an unconditioned ecclesiastical supremacy over the sphere of political life, but the fact was that the latter sphere was continually withdrawing itself more from the authority of the former. In like manner the civil and social life was beginning to burst the bonds in which the ecclesiastical rules had attempted to confine it. The age of the Crusades was past, and nothing more remained of the earlier religious enthusiasm, although the effects of that great movement made themselves felt. The circle of view had been widened; the conception of the world had received a multitude of new views into it; and actual connections with the East had been formed. The commerce of the Upper Italian cities rested upon these connections, and it exercised a reacting influence upon the city life of Germany. According to the law of the Church, no intercourse or contract with unbelievers was permissible, and yet this commerce was dependent upon such. Commerce had been generally regarded as a questionable thing; but now men were compelled to put themselves into a right relation to the great commercial activity.[1] The previous order of society was founded upon natural economic foundations; but with commerce the necessary exchange of money obtained an entirely new significance. By means of it the possibility of acquisition and of the accumulation of capital took shape in a way that was hitherto unknown; and the whole form of the order of society was compelled to modify itself in consequence. Labour necessarily came to be quite otherwise appreciated, and the judgment regarding the moral justification of acquisition had to become altered. Then was the ecclesiastical prohibition of the taking of interest compatible with the more developed business life?[2] There thus arose an internal collision of judgments and feelings, which had manifold disturbances of conscience as their consequence. We find thus that the minds of men at the close of the Middle Ages were haunted in a peculiar degree by disturbances of conscience. It was indeed believed that ecclesiastical performances and payments

[1] On this and what follows, see H. Reuter, *l.c.* 54 ff., and Uhlhorn, *l.c.* p. 325.

[2] On the ground mainly of Luke vi. 35, established as a divine dogma by Clement V. and the Synod of Vienne in 1311.

could purchase the right to those secular pursuits; and attempts were made to settle the internal scruples by increased performances of this kind. But these were at the best always uncertain means; for the question was sure to arise, when has enough been done? And, again, how far is such a mode of life generally justified in contrast to the highest authority of the Church? In this way it was not possible to get rid of doubt. And yet the necessity of these forms of activity became urgent; and therefore also the moral justification of these kinds of calling involuntarily pressed itself on men's minds. Thus the moral thinking broke asunder into the recognition of a secular morality, whose justification from the ecclesiastical point of view yet seemed doubtful, and a higher religious or ecclesiastical morality which was regarded as preferable, and yet could not be universally carried out. The moral consciousness had thus lost its unity. But it could not continue in such a state of dividedness; and the fact announced the coming of a new time. Various attempts to reform the moral thinking and guidance of life endeavoured to bring the required moral help; but they were all in vain, because they did not begin at the point at which the aberration had originally started.

§ 66. *Oppositional tendencies and efforts at reform.*

The increase of the power of the papacy and of the external supremacy of the Church, was accompanied in the latter half of the Middle Ages by a series of antagonistic currents and movements which advanced in oppositional parallel lines. These either denied the right of the Church itself and put themselves on the basis of the Spirit, partly in a dualistic and partly in a pantheistic sense, leading ultimately to the gnostic justification of immorality; or, in connection with the Church, they sought in a more energetic return to its sources in Holy Scripture for a reform of the ecclesiastical and moral life. But as they did not deal with the ultimate ground of the ecclesiastical aberration, they substituted for the ecclesiastical legality of the Church only a legal assertion of Holy Scrip-

ture; and thus they were not able to bring about a real rectification and reform.

1. The work of Gregory VII. was meant as *an attempt to reform the Church on the basis of the ecclesiastical authority.* He sought to cure the moral injuries of the ecclesiastical life by making the Church independent of the political power, or rather making it supreme over that power. To raise the papacy to absolute supremacy within the Church, to raise the Church to supremacy over the State, and to raise the Church as concentrated in the papacy to supremacy over the world: these were the three stages of the thought of Gregory which Innocent III. tried to bring to realization, and which Boniface VIII. sought to establish in the sharpest form. But the reality ran counter to the idea; and thus the resulting collision only served to undeceive the thoughts of the Christian peoples with reference to that ideal, and to prepare the soil for oppositional currents. The *ascetic thought* of the Following of Christ, especially in the form of poverty, as it was embodied above all in Francis of Assisi, intended at first to put itself only into the service of the supremacy of the Church. But in appealing to the decision of the people themselves, it awakened in them independent religious thoughts and reflections, which might just as well take up an attitude of opposition to the external Church as work in its service. We thus see the second half of the Middle Ages filled with religious movements which partly took external form in associations, or furnished a basis and material for movements and associations that had an earlier origin.

2. *Dualistic tendencies.*—Several heretical communities had already represented a dualistic *asceticism.* The *Paulicians*[1] in the East present an instance. Starting from the gnosis of Marcion, they modified the consequences of its fundamental dualistic views by means of Pauline elements, and they admitted marriage and the use of flesh, but otherwise they stood in sheer opposition to the Church and to its legal character. The remains of this party passed over into other dualistic tendencies and societies, and probably they were absorbed in the Bogomils who spread from Bulgaria into the

[1] C. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] xi. 343 ff., where the literature is indicated.

West, and who formed a gnostic dualistic sect which rejected the ceremonies of the Church, laid stress on prayer, and required a rigid asceticism with abstinence from marriage and the use of flesh. They formed a constituent part of the *Cathari*[1] (surnamed "Heretics"), who spread from the Slavs in the regions of the Danube over the south of Europe and into the north of Italy and the south of France; and they stood in decided hostility to the ruling Church. On a dualistic basis, they required (at least for the *perfecti*) the greatest possible abstinence from everything that is material, and above all from sexual union, the partaking of flesh, and all kinds of possession. From an erroneous interpretation of the words of Scripture, they also rejected all taking of oaths and killing in war; and they even regarded the "jus gladii" of the magistrate as a deadly sin. This rigorism again led in the case of others, such as the so-called Luciferians, into the opposite extreme of an antinomian libertinism. In spite of the most cruel persecutions, especially in the Albigensian wars, these parties continued to maintain themselves till the fourteenth century.

3. *Antinomian tendencies on a pantheistic basis.* — The pantheistic elements in Scotus Erigena were developed in *Amalrich of Bena*[2] († *c.* 1205), in opposition to the dualism of the Church, which opposes the spiritual and secular to each other in an external manner; and it was carried out by him into a decided pantheism with the motto, "God is all." The ethical consequence of this system was a renewal of the Antinomianism of the Gnostics. "The thesis of Amalrich, that no sin is imputed to those who stand in love, receives its interpretation in the principle of the Amalricans, that to those who live in the spirit fornication and other defilement do not become sin, because that spirit [as which God has revealed Himself in the Amalricans] is God, and it remains unaffected by the flesh and cannot sin."[3] This tendency found its continuation in the *Brothers and*

[1] Steude, Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch. v. (1881) 1. C. Schmidt, P. R.-E. vii. 616 ff.

[2] Krönlein, Amalr. v. B. und David v. Dinant., Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1847, 271 ff. Hahn, Gesch. der Ketzer im M.-A. iii. 176 ff. Preger, Gesch. d. deutsch. Myst. i. 167 ff., 173 ff. Herm. Reuter, Gesch. d. relig. Aufkl. im M.-A. ii. 218 ff.

[3] Preger, P. R.-E.[2] i. 325. Reuter, *l.c.* p. 230.

Sisters of the Free Spirit,[1] who were widely spread in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. As God is all, one needs only to be conscious of unity with Him in order to be in the state of perfection and freedom in which there is no longer any sin. In contrast to this freedom, everything of the nature of a positive rule must be abrogated. Where the Spirit of God is, there is liberty. The popular distinction between good and evil appears to the more advanced as an illusory limitation. This libertine antinomianism was a rejoinder to the nomism of the mediæval Church, and it continued to maintain itself down to the time of the Reformation.

Ortlieb of Strasburg in the beginning of the thirteenth century[2] drew similar consequences from the pantheistic premises of Amalrich. He found a considerable number of adherents called Ortliebians, who, on the ground of the internal revelation of the Spirit of God, rejected the Church with its literalism and legalism. From this there resulted an indifference towards all outward manifestation and practice of morality, as well as the rejection of marriage. The Ortliebians were resolved into the Brethren of the Free Spirit. The *Beghards* and *Beguins* were another class who, in the form of a cloistral but free union, organized themselves into a living association of labour, service, and pious meditation. They recall the Tertiarians of the Franciscan order. They were specially spread in the Netherlands. In their quiet piety they were a source of considerable blessing; but they did not escape the distrust of the ecclesiastical authorities, and they were certainly not unfrequently a refuge for heretical elements.

4. These dualistic and pantheistic sects and tendencies opposed a gnostic Christianity of knowledge to the practical Christianity of the Church, and they thus came even to reject the Church itself. On the other hand, the *Waldenses*[3]

[1] Hahn, Gesch. der Ketzer u. s. w. ii. 420 ff. Jundt, Histoire du panthéisme populaire au moyen âge et au seizième siècle, Paris 1875. H. Reuter, a. a. O. p. 242 ff. Rossmann, Betrachtungen über das Zeitalter der Reformation, Jena 1858, p. 66 ff. C. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] ii. 677 f.

[2] Preger, i. 191 ff. C. Schmidt, P. R.-E.[2] xi. 119 f.

[3] Preger: Waldesians because from Waldes; on this see Herzog in P. R.-E. 1 Aufl. xvii. 502–547, where the literature up to that date is given; and 2 Aufl.

mark—at least at the beginning—an attempt to reform the Christian life of the people within the Church and its ecclesiastical views. Their ruling thought was the ideal of the apostolical life as they understood it from Matt. x. and Luke xviii. Their idea was to reproduce it in the manner of the time as ascetic renunciation of the world, and to liberate the soul, through voluntary poverty and non-possession, from the chains that bind men to the world and from selfishness, by an imitation of the wandering life of the apostles and of Jesus Christ.[1] It was therefore at bottom the monastic ideal of perfection in the ruling Church which hovered before the minds of the Waldenses, only that they proclaimed it as itinerating apostolic preachers in the form of a popular preaching of repentance. It was not till afterwards that they came thereby into opposition to the Church, and that they combined into a special hierarchical organization. In going back for their proclamation of the Gospel to the Scriptures as the only rule of the faith and life of the Church, in opposition to the deciding authority of the ecclesiastical tradition, their whole way of thinking led to their viewing the Scriptures as a legal prescription of the external conduct of life. The New Testament was to them the "law of Christ;" and they expounded it as the inviolable standard of life, only without the ceremonies of the Old Testament and the papal Decrees. Thus they rejected on the one side the ecclesiastical doctrine of the atoning significance of ecclesiastical works, fastings, alms, and prayers, and recognised these only as purifying means of discipline,[2] denied the meritoriousness of works generally; and rejected the fast-days and festivals of the Church, observing only Sunday.[3] On the other hand, they believed that the

xvi. 610–638, by Comba. In addition to Herzog, Dieckhoff, Preger (Beitr. zur Gesch. der Waldesier. Münch. Akad. der Wissensch. 1875), see especially K. Müller, Die Wald. u. ihre einzelnen Gruppen bis z. Anfang des 14 Jahrh., Gotha 1887. Partly against Müller, see Preger, Ueber das Verhält. der Taboriten zu den Waldesiern des 14 Jahrh. Abh. der Münch. Akad. der Wissen. 1887 (11), p. 41.

[1] But with the difference between the French Waldenses, whose itinerating preachers had to be unmarried, and the Italian and German-Austrian Waldenses, whose itinerating preachers might be married.

[2] —— quod quandocunque Deus dimittit culpam, dimittet et pœnam, in Preger, Ueber das Verhält. u. s. w. 1887, p. 94.

[3] Preger, *l.c.* p. 95.

taking of an oath and killing were absolutely forbidden by Scripture, so that even the right over life was taken from the magistrate. And along with this they saw the highest perfection in poverty and celibacy, and in a supposed return to the apostolical ideal. No less than the Roman Church, to which they became opposed, did they lack the knowledge of the righteousness of faith, and consequently the right understanding of Scripture, so that they did not know how to separate purely the spiritual and the secular. But they were always led gradually on from the letter of the Scripture; and they ultimately put themselves under the influence of the Reformation.

5. This legal way of thinking also ruled the other so-called *Precursors of the Reformation*.[1] The principle repeatedly enounced from of old and established by Francis of Assisi, that the Sermon on the Mount is the Gospel of Jesus Christ and should rule the public life, was maintained also by these heralds of the Reformation. This holds also of the always more correct movement which proceeded from *Wiclif* and which passed to Bohemia. In his doctrine of virtue, Wiclif follows the customary division into the four cardinal virtues and the three theological virtues. Yet he does it in such a way that, after earlier examples, he saw in humility the root and in love the soul of all Christian virtue; and in his exposition of its theological stages up to its highest form of wholly selfless love to God for the sake of Himself, he attached himself especially to Bernard of Clairvaux. Wiclif considers that love to our neighbour results from this love to God, and he accentuates in regard to the former the right order which it observes, and the duties of the calling which is assigned to every one by God; and thereby he indicates a fruitful reformatory point of view in estimating the moral task.[2] In connection with this view, he also repudiates the doctrine that the evangelical counsels are not obligatory on every Christian.[3] According to the

[1] G. Lechler, Joh. v. Wicl. u. die Vorgesch. der Reformation, 2 Bde., Lpz. 1873, especially i. 528 ff. [John Wiclif and his English Precursors, transl. by Lorimer, 2 vols. 1878.]

[2] Liber mandatorum (decalogus), c. 23: Faciat ergo quodlibet membrum ecclesiæ, quod incumbit officio sui status, etc., Lechler, i. 531.

[3] Omne consilium Christi obligat quemcunque. De civili dominio, ii. 13. Lechler, i. 533.

habit of the time, he reckons these counsels as twelve, including among them the obligation not to take an oath. It appears from this that his recognition of the divine right of the natural condition of life, was still quite obscured in the mediæval way by a legal attitude towards the word of Scripture. Thus, too, he saw the ideal of the State in a commonwealth in which the place of private property is taken by the communism of love which rules the whole.[1] In Wiclif, as in all the mediæval attempts at reform, the Gospel is made into a law. It was reserved for Luther, on the basis of his fundamental knowledge of the righteousness of faith, to recognise the right distinction between them, and to establish it in opposition to the fanatical attempts at reform in his time, which sought to translate that error into practice.

6. *Hus*, in dependence on Wiclif, also regarded the Holy Scripture as the "law of Christ," and in this sense the "evangelica lex" was to him the authoritative standard for the regulation of the Christian life.[2] The radical Hussites, going beyond Hus himself, like the Waldenses, rejected the ecclesiastical works of penance as having no atoning efficacy, and they repudiated the fast-days and festivals of the Church,[3] while at the same time they maintained the word of Scripture itself to be the external law for the civil life. In consequence of this, they rejected oaths and capital punishment,[4] and the Taborites drew the conclusion from this fundamental view, that the divine law should take the place of the heathen (Roman and German) law, and should be the standard for administration and justice.[5] And thus, too, the later "Bohemian Brethren," who called themselves "Brethren of the Law of Christ," from their falsely legal principle of Scripture, declared war and the power of the sword to be absolutely forbidden by the law of Christ for the faithful Christian; and they even declared the undertaking of political offices to be unallowed, and the swearing of an oath to be a sin.[6] They thus mixed up the spiritual and secular with each other; and they held fast to

[1] Tunc necessitaretur respublica redire ad politiam evangelicam, habens omnia in communi. De civ. Dom. ii. 16. Lechler, i. 600.

[2] Lechler, ii. 236. [3] Preger, *l.c.* [4] Lechler, ii. 292.

[5] Lechler, ii. 471. [6] Lechler, ii. 509.

the celibacy of the priests.[1]. Doubtless a relaxation of this severity gradually arose; and mediating views, such as those of Procop of Neuhaus, asserted themselves, which allowed riches and political offices, and thus made an approach to the world possible.

7. *John of Goch* concurred in Wiclif's later polemic against monasticism. This is especially seen in his *Dialogus de quattuor erroribus*,[2] in which he represented the Gospel as "law," but, at the same time, as a law of the liberty of love and of the heart. He directed his polemic against the unevangelical legalism which had early been admitted into the Church, and especially against the necessity or meritoriousness of vows. A vow may be a help to the weak, but there is nothing good in it in itself. The monks wrongly call their order a "state of perfection," as in fact they are the imperfect. Internal holiness is the highest perfection; it is higher than any perfection of "made religions." The clear distinction between justification and sanctification was not reached by him; and it is even lacking in *John Wessel*,[3] the most evangelical of all the precursors of the Reformation. For in his view what justifies is at bottom love, *i.e.* infused righteousness. Thus he also shares with scholasticism its basis of the "fides caritate formatur," although to the exclusion of all merit. From this root all the ethical errors of the Roman Church might again grow forth at any time. It was Luther's knowledge that first went to the bottom of the error; and by his renovation of the Biblical knowledge of the righteousness of faith, he securely established Christian morality in its relationship to God, as well as to the secular life of the world. That knowledge alone was able to protect the Church from the danger of a new form of heathenism which threatened it from the circles of Humanism.

[1] Lechler, ii. 513. On the "Bohemian Brethren," cf. v. Zezschwitz, P. R.-E.[2] ii. 648 ff.

[2] See Lechler, ii. 516 ff. Ullmann, Reformat. vor d. Reform. i. 17 ff. [Reformers before the Reformation, T. & T. Clark.]

[3] Lechler, ii. 529. Ullmann, ii. 239 ff. H. Schmidt in P. R.-E.[2] xvii. 791 ff.

§ 67. *Humanism.*[1]

The secular way of thinking, characteristic of antiquity, found its most influential expression in opposition to the ecclesiastico-ascetic thinking in Humanism, which threatened the Church with a new heathenism of culture—a danger which was only averted by the Reformation in its own sphere.

The knowledge of the Roman antiquity had never wholly died out in the West. In the fourteenth century, Dante and Petrarca referred to it with renewed emphasis, while Boccaccio also drew attention to the Greeks. The advancing decline and ultimate overthrow of the Greek Empire, with the fall of Constantinople, brought many learned Greeks to Italy; and they reanimated the study of Greek, and kindled and diffused a new zeal for classical Greece. This striving to return to the sources of spiritual culture could not but enter into opposition with scholasticism and its dependence on secondary sources. The appreciation of Christianity itself, in its original form, could promote or hinder it according to the attitude of mind towards it and the strength of the inner impulse of truth. The effect of Humanism in Germany was to promote Christianity, but the opposite was predominantly its attitude in Italy. The enthusiasm with which the comparatively new discovered spiritual world of antiquity was greeted in wide circles in Italy, and its study cultivated, caused that world to appear in an ideal light in contrast to the superstition and ceremonialism of the Church; and to live in it appeared as the highest form of spiritual life. The philosophical as well as the moral thinking of the ancient world was thus renewed. Petrarca († 1374) paid homage to the thought of the Stoics, and Marcilius Ficinus († 1499), a follower of Plato, and the Platonic Academy, founded in

[1] Voigt, Die Wiederbelebung des klassischen Alterthums, 2 Bde., 2 Aufl., Berl. 1882–83. Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien, Basel 1860, Bd. 1. Gieseler, ii. 4, § 154. K. v. Raumer, Gesch. der Pädag. i., 2 Aufl. 1846, pp. 37–65. Pasqual-Villari, Savonarola, übers. v. Verduschek. i. 1868; on Lorenzo Medici, p. 23 ff. Gregorovius, Lukretia Borgia, i. 1870; on the moral state of the period of the Renaissance, p. 89 f. Gass, Gesch. der christl. Ethik, ii. 1, p. 1 ff.

Florence by Gemistus Pletho in 1440, put Plato and Neo-Platonism straightway in the place of Christ and Christianity. Laurentius Valla, again, proclaimed his allegiance to the philosophy of Epicurus. The consequence of all this was the renewal of the ancient moral way of thinking, which declared the natural in itself to be moral. This gave rise to a paganism such as Erasmus saw reviving in Rome, and a heathenism which ruled in wide circles, and even asserted itself in literature and in the moral conduct of life. Even pæderasty was revived with the ancient heathenism, and along with it came the glorification of the most immoral liberty.[1] At the same time, an external attitude was taken up in connection with the ceremonies of the Church; nor could the mechanism of the Roman Church become inwardly master of this heathenism. It was only able to unchurch it externally; or it set up a mysticism in opposition to it which itself had heathen roots, and whose mentally deadening asceticism was in many respects itself nothing more than a glow of sensual feeling. It belongs to the merits of the Reformation, that it averted this danger of a paganizing of Christendom by its return to the original powers of the moral life, and that it opened up to it the fountain of another moral spirit. This merit also belongs to the Ethics of the Reformation, whereas the Roman Church continued to move upon the old paths, and sought on that way to obtain the mastery of the world in the service of the Church.

[1] See, for instance, Gregorovius, *l.c.* "After the first breach with the Middle Ages and their ascetic Church had been completed in the Renaissance, an unlimited emancipation of the passions came in. All that had been regarded as sacred, was laughed at. The Italian Freethinkers produced a literature which, for naked Cynicism, had nowhere its like. From the *Hermaphrodite* of Beccadelli down to Berin and Pietro Aretino, there stretches out a literary marsh at the sight of which the earnest Dante would have shuddered as at the Stygian pool. Even in the less lascivious novels and the less obscene comedies, the dominant motive is always adultery and ridicule of marriage. The hetæra became the Muse of the æsthetic literature of the Renaissance. She was put boldly side by side with the saints of the Church. The saints of Heaven and the nymphs of Venus were placed beside each other as celebrated women.—Selfishness and heartless preying upon men and the relations of life, were nowhere so much in vogue as in the fatherland of Macchiavelli."—"Luther could never have arisen among the Italians."—For further testimonies of this kind, see Luthardt's *Apologetic Lectures on the Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, in App. to Lect. i., 7th ed., T. & T. Clark.


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